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Globalization, privatization and scientific advancements pose new 
challenges and opportunities for the development of Indian 
agriculture. The emerging paradigm shifts focus to creation and 
application of new knowledge for agricultural development and 
global competitiveness. To facilitate this shift and realize greater 
economic efficiency, a new set of responsive institutions should 
emerge.
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agriculture. The roles of the state, markets and collective actions are 
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trade and agro-processing.   
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Agriculture will continue to play an important role in the economic
development and poverty alleviation in India even in the era of economic
liberalization and globalization. Generation of gainful employment and income
for the rural poor, strengthening of household food and nutritional security and
sustainable use of natural resources shall continue to be the main objectives of
agricultural development in the country. However, there would be a paradigm
shift in the development strategy. Market forces will now greatly guide agricultural
production, and private sector would be a useful ally of public sector in the
development process. Knowledge will be the key catalyst of growth, besides
the traditional sources of growth like land and other resources. These developments
will require significant changes in a majority of the existing institutions to keep
them relevant in the present context. In some cases, obsolete institutions may
have to be replaced with the new ones. This institutional change will be guided
by expected impact in terms of increasing economic efficiency, strengthening
incentives like protection of intellectual property, providing level-playing field to
development agents, encouraging participation of stakeholders, enhancing
accountability, etc.
The institutions for management of land, water and other common resources
should involve their users and other stakeholders for efficient, sustainable and
equitable use of these resources. The institutions dealing with agricultural
marketing and credit should reach and protect the interests of small farmers,
besides increasing economic efficiency. The most significant change will,
however, be witnessed in the institutions dealing with creation, protection,
exchange and application of new knowledge and technologies. This is because
the governance, management and organizations of public research system will
have to change to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. The public system
will also be required to encourage private research through appropriate incentives
and regulatory mechanisms. In particular, protection of intellectual property will
be critical; it will determine the linkages between investment, technology and
trade, which shall further reinforce the need for institutional change. A strong
intellectual property regime will encourage private investment both domestic
and foreign and improve access to internationally competitive technologies and
vmake an agricultural economy vibrant. The government may have to play a
greater role to monitor such developments and respond accordingly.
The government has enacted a number of legislations and amended some
others to facilitate development and use of technologies. The present volume
discusses provisions in and appropriateness of these institutional reforms. It also
covers the institutional changes needed for agricultural marketing, credit and
management of natural resources. These institutions may not directly affect
technology uptake, but facilitate technology adoption, and therefore, are
indispensable for evolving knowledge-intensive agriculture in the country. I hope
this volume would be immensely useful to policy makers, administrators,
researchers and other readers alike.
Mangala Rai
Secretary
Department of Agricultural Research and Education, and
Director-General




Technological advancements favoring better utilization of land and water
resources fueled agricultural growth in India since the mid-1960s. Technologies
were generally embedded in inputs (seed, fertilizer, pesticide, etc.), and therefore,
were simple in the beginning to disseminate and adopt. However, in future,
there will be a paradigm shift—productivity growth would be largely driven by
technological advancements, which would be highly knowledge-based and
information intensive. This shift requires new approaches to development,
management and dissemination of technologies. The need for change is further
heightened by evolving incentive system, ownership of intellectual property,
restricted flow of research material, international treaties and conventions,
globalization, challenges of the World Trade Organization, changing role of the
state, etc. Thus, a new set of institutions should emerge to provide the growth
impetus and synergy to optimally harness technological advances. In fact, benefits
of technological change will be maximum when efficient and responsive
institutions are in place.
In the wake of economic reforms, the institutional change should involve
re-examination of the roles of the state, markets and collective actions in the
management of natural resources and provision of goods and services to farmers.
The challenging question is that the Indian agriculture has reached a stage where
public sector may have to largely focus on the roles of facilitation, guided
regulation and social welfare. Honestly put, the baggage of public organizations
in their current form, functioning and accountability will be a big liability to the
society in future. Thus, there is a need for phasing out, merging, remandating
and may be establishing need-based new organizations. Further, active
involvement of the private sector in national development has become a dire
necessity. Therefore, strengthening public-private interface should engage our
attention. This volume addresses some of these issues in the contributed papers
and synthesis of the available evidence. In particular, efforts are made to analyze
the role of hierarchy, incentives, laws and regulations in promoting relevance
and efficiency of institutions.
There are a number of institutions dealing with various sub-sectors of
agriculture and it is rather difficult to cover all of them in a moderate attempt
viilike this volume. Therefore, scope of this work is confined to the institutions
affecting development, management, dissemination and impact of emerging
knowledge-intensive technologies. Specifically, it covers institutions relating to
agricultural research and extension, marketing and trade (including post-harvest
processing), credit and agrarian reforms. Lessons from the institutions for
sustainable management of natural resources are also drawn for dissemination
of technologies needing collective actions. Besides the contributed papers, an
attempt is also made to provide an exhaustive review of literature on theory and
application of the institutional economics in agricultural development to outline
the direction for institutional change.
Since the contributed papers of this volume were presented and discussed
at a seminar “Institutional Change for Greater Agricultural Technology Impact”
organized at National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy Research
in March 2001, we were benefited from the comments of the discussants and
participants. We are grateful to Dr A Vaidyanathan, Dr S S Johl, Dr S L Mehta,
Dr Kiran Singh, Dr Dayanatha Jha and Dr P L Gautam for providing able
guidance and invaluable insights. We are also grateful to all the chairpersons
(Dr S S Johl, Dr S S Acharya, Dr Mohan Kanda, and Dr Kanchan Chopra) and
discussants (Dr V M Rao, Dr D P Chaudhary, Dr R Maria Saleth, Dr M S
Bhatia, Dr J P Mishra, Dr S Thorat, and Dr S Selvarajan) of various technical
sessions for their significant contributions. Authors of the contributed papers
deserve our special thanks for agreeing to contribute the papers, revising them
on the lines of discussions held during the seminar, and responding to numerous
editorial requests. The reports provided by all the rapporteurs (Dr B C Barah,
Dr K K Datta, Dr P S Birthal, Dr M Sudha and Dr Anjani Kumar) were helpful
in developing the synthesis chapter.
We have also benefited from invaluable guidance and input provided by Dr
D K Marothia and Dr Robert Tripp in planning the seminar. Our colleagues at
NCAP extended all help in organizing the seminar and bringing out this volume.
We are indeed grateful to all of them. Financial support for this work was provided
by the National Agricultural Technology Project of Indian Council of Agricultural
Research and is gratefully acknowledged.
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 have come to an age where giving keynote addresses becomes a bit of ritual
 which one cannot resist. But I am not apologetic for it, because the subject is
very interesting. The subject is institutional environment necessary for making
the results of technological research effective on the ground.
What does agricultural research do? Research contributes in two ways: (a)
It pushes yield barriers up through development of varieties, and (b) it develops
agronomic and resource management practices for the varieties to perform
optimally. Both the technologies pay attention to the ways of economizing the
costs. It is not simply reducing the cost of production but also reducing the cost
of reaching the ground level. Both contribute to increasing profitability and that
is the most important driving force for effective use of research results. Therefore,
one of the major issues is of functioning of research stations. I will talk about
that a little later.
Now, let us look at what happens on the ground. Firstly, there is lack of
transmission of knowledge generated by the research system to the actual users
of research. The second is the actual physical environment in which cultivation
takes place; it is basically soil and water environment, which is highly variable
and complex for various reasons. The performance of technologies crucially
depends on soil moisture management. People speak with such excitement about
the potentials of biotechnology; it may produce varieties in the lab with reduced
research lag, but these varieties will not perform until soil-moisture environment
is managed at optimal level. Due to constraints operating at farmers’ fields,
there exists a wide gap between the demonstration yield and the actual crop
yield realized on farmers’ fields, which thereby affects the costs and returns.
Another important dimension associated with the costs and returns is that
farm sizes are very small, affecting the propagation and use of technology. In
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principle there are no strong economies of scale. Numerous constraints like
improperly managed irrigation systems, sub-optimal fertilizer use, etc. operate
in the system. Small farmers have limited access to modern inputs and credit
facilities, and poor bargaining power in the product market. The idea is of having
a credit system, which is highly subsidized through the public system in our case,
or with the help of genuine cooperatives. The message is that the smallest
should not be disadvantaged in availing credit as well as the prices for his products.
Now I shall discuss the important issues one by one.
Soil and Moisture Management
Rainfed lands have low moisture-retention capacity, degraded soil, and high
rates of surface-water flow. It is perhaps the reason why watershed programs
have been given emphasis and are effective for the purpose of institutionalization.
You cannot control the seasonal distribution of moisture that depends purely on
the distribution of rainfall. But, you can increase the control on amount of moisture
available per unit of area and that will have effect on the production of different
varieties. In the case of irrigation, we are bringing in extra water from outside.
It increases both the amount of water available and its seasonal distribution—
this is what our irrigation systems have done. It is not the quantity of moisture
available but how effectively you are able to regulate its availability to the plants
at the right time and in the right quantity. An optimal soil moisture regime
consisting of all these elements is supposed to bring the best results out of any
given technology. The more sophisticated is the technology, the more demanding
it is in terms of better soil and moisture conditions.
Now, about surface irrigation system, most of it is in the public domain
because it is of common pool nature, which, in principle, should be accessible on
equitable basis. But for various reasons, it is not treated as a common pool
resource; it is largely left for the exploitation by the private sector. The
management of irrigation systems is notorious which has succeeded
remarkably in providing more water for a longer duration of time, but has failed
miserably in ensuring the control element. The question then arises why not to
privatize the irrigation systems? As a result of privatization, markets will lead to
optimal allocations of water, as markets are well-defined in time and space.
Each common small network in the market is a part of a large network. Whatever3 Keynote Address
you do in one part of the network, it will affect the larger network. It is not
only the water to be sold, but one should ensure that water reaches the right
users in right quantity and at right time. When you have thousands of users,
there are outright violations of the rules because of locational and other
advantages. Then, the requirement of optimal management of moisture will not
be met. Therefore, irrigation systems will continue to be in the public domain.
This is also demanded by the nature of the resource, water.  It is extremely
important to improve the management of public water system. Since environment
and technology are changing, we need flexibility in ways and means to allow
changes in cropping systems. For this, we need efficient water management
through creation of a system with well-defined rights which are acceptable to
all, and effective mechanisms to control the encroachment. There should
also be sufficient internal flexibility to adopt rules for the management.
These are the challenges of institutional reforms needed in this area. The creation
of users’ associations at the outlet of canal command area is important for
negotiation of rules and participatory management to make the system function
better.
The same set of problems is being focussed in watershed programs. We
talk about the Ralegaon program; it is not that it can be replicated but it has a
very important lesson. The entire community is involved in what is being done,
how it is being done, and who is expected to do what in this scheme for the
collective group. Unless the basic deficiencies are corrected, bringing institutional
reforms is a difficult task. Unless we are able to create mechanisms for incentives
to individuals, it cannot simply work based on the bureaucratic rules.
Credit and Marketing
The vulnerable section here is of small farmers who can’t go to the market
because of their limited asset base. We have to overcome these limitations in
the size of credit and marketing. Cooperatives failed to address this problem;
they have become totally undemocratic, and everything is against the spirit and
philosophy of cooperatives. Now the question is how to get politics out of
cooperatives? They must be able to mobilize their resources. Credit is a very
challenging area for insightful research. There exist some research studies, but
we need to do a great deal of research in this area. We cannot talk in the air4 A Vaidyanathan
about how institutions actively function. It is an area where entire institutional
reforms are needed.
In markets, we have to ensure the bargaining power of small farmers and
see that how do the markets function, especially in sharing of information, rules
for grading, weighing, auctioning, etc. An effective marketing institution should
facilitate more information, fairer trading, better prices and greater transparency
in its functioning. Privatization and market-mediated solutions can work in this
direction. Markets cannot work without public support. Between government
and private sector, various institutions exist like non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), cooperatives, etc. Expanding the scope of participatory, democratic,
and transparent organizations for managing these common activities has a much
wider role in empowering the disadvantaged and realizing the economies of
scale. We also have to identify the areas in which private institutions can function
more efficiently.
Research System
It is very important to see the functioning of agricultural research
institutions—their focus, internal incentive system, etc. We have regional research
stations where we are supposed to conduct the adaptive research. There are
several issues that need to be critically examined for efficient functioning of the
system. This is primarily because there is limited scope for private sector’s
participation in agricultural research, except seed, and bulk of research will
continue to be in the public domain. We should improve functioning of the public
research system. Our first job as a researcher is to unravel the existing deficiencies
in the system; it is really being self-critical in the first step. Then, we have to
look at how actively institutions function. A very few empirical studies have
been done on how similar institutions work differently under different
environments. This may give us an insight into the underlying conditions for
functioning of research institutions and engineering the needed institutional
reforms.Introduction

conomic and technological systems are changing rapidly all over the globe.
However, intensity and impact of these changes are more pronounced in
developing countries. Although trade liberalization and integration of developing
economies with rest of the world have opened new avenues for growth, these
have also exposed the domestic systems to intense competition and a new regime
of incentives and institutions is emerging. There is a greater reliance on market
forces, and competition and incentives are largely going to be influenced by
trends in the world markets. Under this emerging scenario, we need efficient
organizations to link the domestic system with the world market, and a highly
developed information system to monitor developments in the world markets
and provide right signals for efficient organization of economic activities and
allocation of resources. The main objective is that the domestic players in the
developing countries should have easy access to global markets and resources,
including technology, and the domestic institutions should improve the access to
the markets.
On the scientific front, the recent advancements in molecular biology,
information communication technology (ICT), space sciences, etc. have profound
implications on economic development. These scientific developments, on the
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one hand, have enhanced the growth potential significantly and have increased
the chances of harnessing this potential due to better precision in research
methodologies and reduction in research and development (R&D) lag. On the
other hand, with the advancements in ICT and space technology, it has become
easier to have access to improved technologies and their attributes
(characteristics, sources, potential benefits, etc.). What is needed is that
appropriate policies and institutions are in place to promote and harness these
scientific advancements for developing a knowledge-based society.
In India, although the reforms of economic liberalization and structural
adjustments initiated in 1991 were not explicitly directed to agriculture, these
are expected to impact agricultural sector significantly. The impact, however,
will be more visible with the completion of second phase of the reforms, covering
financial sector, public organizations, protection of intellectual property and labor
regulations (Vyas 2001). This, coupled with harnessing technological revolutions,
is expected to transform Indian agriculture significantly. It is now a fact that
further growth in the agriculture could be achieved through increase in
productivity, which is possible only through accelerated development and
dissemination of improved technologies. Since most of the cutting-edge
technologies are knowledge intensive, new institutions and organizations are
needed for their development, management and use. In particular, the participation
of private sector in agricultural R&D and the protection of intellectual property,
including plant varieties, require reorientation of the existing R&D institutions.
The experience of the Green Revolution has also shown that besides technological
advancements, supporting institutions like credit, land reforms, etc., as well as
incentives like prices, are of paramount importance for technology-led growth
in agriculture. Therefore, the development of knowledge-based modern
agriculture would require changes in all these institutions. The past experience
has clearly shown that full potential of some of the technologies, e.g. hybrids,
integrated crop management, watershed development, bio-inputs, etc., could
not be realized due to lack of proper institutions (Pal et al. 1998; and Kolavalli
and Kerr 2002). These were information-intensive technologies, while the existing
institutions were tuned to transfer of input-based technologies like seeds of
open pollinated crops and fertilizers.
The above facts grossly point towards the need and direction of institutional
reforms in Indian agriculture. Though the main emphasis in this volume is on the
institutions relating to agricultural R&D — technology development, management,7 Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture
transfer and use, regulations, etc., other institutions, such as credit, agrarian and
marketing and trade affecting adoption and impact of technologies, are also
discussed. This chapter presents the concept and evolution of institutional
economics and their applications in economic and agricultural development,
followed by a synthesis of the issues by sub-themes in the context of Indian
agriculture.
The Concept and Application
The new institutional economics
The burgeoning literature on institutional economics is being increasingly
applied to understand and accelerate the process of economic development.
Conceptually, institutions are different from organizations; the former refer to
the ‘rules of the game’, while the latter refer to the group of individuals bounded
by some common objectives. The institutions could be formal (e.g. laws) or
informal (social norms, traditions, customs, etc.); these govern behavior of
economic agents or individuals and determine incentives in political, social and
economic relations (North 1990). However, these concepts are often used
interchangeably in the literature and so is in this volume. But, the use of these
terms against each other maintains the distinction between them.
The principles of neo-classical economics, usually applied to explain the
behavior of economic agents, hold that individuals make rational choices and the
market forces satisfying the marginal conditions ensure economic efficiency in
the system. It considers the role of state in the event of market failure. However,
market failures or imperfections due to real world intricacies, and opportunistic
human behavior, do not always result into the Pareto-optimal solutions, envisaged
in the neo-classical economics. This theory also failed to explain uneven
performance of the economies over space and time. As a result, the focus
shifted on the role of political and individual ideologies, institutions and incentives
in explaining the economic performance. The basic premises of ‘rationality’ and
‘competition’ facilitating market equilibrium were questioned. It was argued
that individuals are ‘bounded rational’ (rationality within information available)
and the incentive structure determined by the institutions affect the behavior of
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determining economic performance (for detail discussion, see Williamson 1985).
The developments in the institutional economics draw on a number of
disciplines, notably economics, sociology, anthropology, law and organization
theory, and do not converge to a unified theory to study the institutions and their
determinants. The early work in this area, commonly referred to as the ‘old
institutional economics’, was successful in highlighting the importance of
institutions and their development in specific contexts. The work, however, lacked
theoretical foundation. The path-breaking work of Coase (1937 & 1960), North
(1990) and Williamson (1975 & 1985) laid the foundations of what is popularly
known as the ‘new institutional economics (NIE)’. The NIE maintained that
transaction, rather than market, is an appropriate unit of analysis, as economic
agents try to minimize the transaction cost. The transaction cost was defined as
‘the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems’ by Williamson (1985),
while others defined it as ‘losses due to imperfect information’ and further
divided into ‘search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and
policing and enforcement costs’ (Dahlman 1979). The concept has been
increasingly used to explain how organizations evolve in market economies, or
efficiency of hierarchy and markets. In case the cost of market transaction is
higher than that of internal transaction, firms bring new but related economic
activities under them, which is known as vertical integration. Conversely, a higher
cost of internal transaction or hierarchy leads to greater dependence on market-
based transactions. Further applications of this concept provided an understanding
of the roles of state (hierarchy), private sector (markets) and voluntary agencies
in economic development (Picciotto 1995).
Other important theoretical approaches followed in the NIE are: Political
economy and public choice theory, property rights, path dependence, quantitative
economic history, and principal-agent theory. All of these, though important
contributions, sometimes compete amongst themselves and therefore, are difficult
to put on the trajectory of conceptual developments. Williamson (2000) has tried
to put them into a perspective by describing four levels of analysis in the NIE.
The first level is embeddedness of informal institutions, which are often considered
as given as they change over a very long period of time. Their analysis draws
inputs from social theory. The second level of analysis is broad institutional
environment or ‘setting formal rules of the game’, especially property rights. At
this level, property rights and political theory are more useful. The third level is
‘play of the game or aligning governance structure with transactions’, and is9 Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture
largely guided by the transaction cost economics. At this level, enforcement of
the property rights and contract laws is critical. The governance process should
ensure order to resolve conflict and realize mutual gains (Commons 1934). The
extreme cases where assigning property rights is difficult, or transaction cost of
the enforcement of property rights is high and distribution of the benefits is
highly skewed, the theory of collective actions assumes significance (Olson
1965; and Ostrom 1990).  The fourth and final level of analysis deals with
resource allocation and incentive alignment, drawing on the principles of neo-
classical economics and the agency theory. At this level, setting of the marginal
conditions right, ex ante incentive alignment and efficient risk bearing are
important, rather than ex post governance. This description of the economics of
institutions, thus, clearly indicates that the NIE does not neglect or replace the
neo-classical economics, but it broadens the scope of analysis by bringing
additional useful insights into the process of understanding economic development.
Application in agriculture
The NIE is increasingly being applied to study economic and agricultural
development. The evidences suggest link between quality of institutions and
investment and growth (for review of evidence, see Aron 2000). Some notable
examples of institutional failure or weak institutions are the breakup of former
Soviet Union, economic crisis of east Asia, and low growth of African economies.
Weak financial institutions are responsible for the east Asian crisis, while lack
of incentives demolished the production system in the Soviet Union. The economic
growth in African and other developing countries is poor because structure of
institutions (property rights and other rules) and their enforcement do not provide
incentives and encouragement to productive or wealth maximizing activities of
individuals and organizations (North 1990). The investment level is low and the
firms are small scale, using low capital-intensive technology (often inefficient).
In other words, there are not enough incentives to innovate and invest.
Advancements in the NIE have also been applied to agricultural development
and change. The most notable applications are in the field of agrarian structure,
management of common pool resources, technology systems, including provision
of improved seeds, marketing and trade, and micro-institutions for credit and
poverty alleviation. The focus of analysis has been on describing the existing
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overall objective of indicating appropriate form of institutions (see Chapter 3).
Another significant contribution of these studies has been that they successfully
underscored the intimate interactions between institutions and technology to
influence economic performance. For example, micro-level agrarian institutions,
such as share-cropping, lower the cost of labor supervision in the field and
reduce risk by spreading it among landlord and share-cropper (Bardhan 1989).
At the same time, agrarian institutions like tenancy and labor contract change
because of technological interventions and allow productivity gains of improved
technologies (Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Some analysts maintain the key role of
ideology in making the society receptive to technological change, in particular
and agricultural development, in general. Furthermore, it is found that ‘social
capital’ significantly influences the absorption of technology (David 1997). The
study of technology systems (research and extension) also reveals that a
pluralistic system with active partnerships between various actors emerges only
when appropriate institutional framework (property rights and regulations) is in
place. This coupled with nature of technology, incentives and information flow
greatly affects the provision of the technologies embedded in inputs (e.g. seed)
to farmers (Morris 1998; and Tripp 1997, 2001). It is thus evident that institutions
are as important as technology for economic development, and they evolve
together interactively during the development process. It is this link between
institutions and technology which is getting increasing attention of researchers
in recent years.
In the context of Indian agriculture, the recent studies on institutional change
are mainly influenced by the change in economic policies, which, in turn, is the
result of internal crisis of the balance of payment and external shock of the new
trade regime. In the new policy regime, emphasis shifted to a greater role of
markets in economic development, and a receding role of the state to facilitation
and social welfare. Vaidyanathan (1996) visualized continued dominance of the
state in irrigation, research and extension and infrastructure development, but
he underlined the need for reforms in the public organizations for their financial
viability and efficiency. On the other hand, some other researchers consider
institutional reforms sine qua non for sustainable agricultural development and
poverty alleviation (Gandhi 1998; and Saleth 2000). In particular, sustainable
use of common pool resources and management of surface irrigation have
received much greater attention, and the need for institutional reforms ensuring
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time and again (Jodha 1992; Chopra et al. 1990; Kerr et al. 1997; and Marothia
2002). The issues highlighted in the context of technology systems are: (a)
Reforms in the public sector organizations to ensure accountability; (b) aligning
incentives with performance, and reducing transaction cost by decentralization;
(c) enforcing property rights (such as IPR) and other regulations; and (d) improving
information flow in the seed systems (Pal and Singh 1998; and Tripp and Pal
2001). All these studies have made important contributions in terms of their
objectives and scope of the analysis, but the critical link between institutions and
technology was however not accorded due importance. This volume revisits
some of these works to search for the evidence of these interactions. Our
assumption is that the role of technology in accelerating agricultural development
through steady growth in productivity would be central in the years to come,
paving the way for emergence of knowledge-intensive agriculture. Since most
of the new technologies would be knowledge-intensive, the interplay between
technology and institutions would be much stronger. Another related concern is
that how best small holders can be served with the intensification of technology-
institution links and increase in the capital and knowledge intensity of technologies.
All these aspects need an in-depth analysis.
Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture
Institutions for management of common pool resources
Institutional aspects of management of common pool resources such as
land, water, forest, irrigation tanks, etc. have perhaps received considerable
attention of researchers in India. Here, we use the available evidence to draw
lessons for the development and dissemination of technologies requiring collective
actions, and not establishing link between institutions and technologies. Open
access to the commons is the main problem, which is popularly known as the
‘tragedy or crisis of commons’. Commercialization of the use of resources and
conflicts arising due to the increasing scarcity have further complicated the
management problem (Jodha 1992; and Kerr et al. 1997). Besides these problems,
distorted policies, breakdown of the traditional social institutions and lack of
alternative formal institutions are responsible for degradation of the commons
(Singh 1994; and Marothia 2002). For example, lack of property rights and12 Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya, P K Joshi and Raka Saxena
subsidized electricity supply have led to unabated mining of groundwater. Similarly,
breakdown of village-level social institutions has led to degradation of common
lands, irrigation tanks, village forests, etc.
The main problem with sustainable use of common pool resources is lack
of institutions to resolve conflict, and ensure equitable distribution of benefits
and ordering of contract. Assigning property rights to individuals or groups is
difficult, and privatization, as often advocated, provides incentives for management
but does not ensure equitable distribution of benefits. The experience of
cooperative management of the commons has shown mixed results —
cooperatives are mostly dominated by the government nominees, and lack
resources and people’s participation (Singh and Ballabh 1996). Another option
is the participatory management or governance of the commons with clarity of
rights and responsibilities of stakeholders (Chopra et al. 1990). This concept has
been implemented in the forest management through enactment of the Joint
Forest Management Act, and also being tried for the management of surface
irrigation, both canal and tank in some states. For the success of such institutional
arrangements, it is essential that there are effective links between various agents
such as government, user organizations, voluntary groups, individuals, etc. Further,
the problems encountered with these arrangements are: (a) Larger institutions
sometimes create conflicts with the macro-institutions and political system, and
(b) time, space and resource specificity of institutions make generalization and
replication difficult. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that there must be
adequate incentive for people to ensure their participation in the management of
the commons. Transparency of rules, credibility of enforcement and conflict
resolution mechanism further add to the success of the participatory management.
The management of groundwater and fishery resources is much more
difficult as these are confronted with a number of conflicts in the absence of
suitable property rights. The property rights, in fact, are linked with land rights,
which are highly skewed, and the power relations govern access to these
resources. Moreover, enforcement of pollution laws to check resource
degradation is extremely weak. As a result, these resources are depleting in
terms of both quantity and quality. Harmonization of relations between the state,
people and community would perhaps provide solution to promote sustainable
use of these resources (Chapter 7).
Some important lessons can be learnt from the experience of common pool
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requiring collective actions such as watershed development and integrated pest
management. Economic benefits (higher income or risk reduction) have been
much higher in the case of people’s participation, particularly in low productivity
regions. This has been clearly shown in the case of watershed development
programs (Chapter 5). Therefore, to ensure people’s participation, adequacy of
incentives, demand-driven program development and decentralized decision-
making are essential. In the context of R&D, this implies that research agenda
must be demand-driven and clients should be involved in the on-farm technology
development and evaluation. Technological intervention should benefit all social
classes in the target domain, and necessary information, training and other support
should be extended, at least during the initial phase of the intervention. Farmers’
organizations and voluntary groups could be useful allies of public research and
extension systems in this task.
Institutions for agricultural R&D
Nature of emerging technologies. Before we discuss technology-institution
links, it would be useful to take a look at the nature of emerging technologies in
the field of agriculture during the next twenty years or so and their implications
on R&D strategy. Broadly speaking, emerging technologies could be framed
into four typologies. First and the most discussed are the products of biotechnology,
including genetically modified organisms (GMOs) or transgenic products. The
major research products or technologies in this category are plant varieties with
gene for resistance to biotic (e.g. Bt cotton, Bt corn, herbicide tolerant seed)
and abiotic (salt tolerance varieties) stresses, varieties with gene for better product
quality (e.g. ‘golden rice’), planting material developed by tissue culture technique,
animal health vaccines, etc.2 It is difficult to distinguish these technologies from
the traditional ones in terms of their physical characteristics. But, these are
significantly different in their biological characteristics, application management,
market differentiation for farm produce, biosafety issues, etc. For example, in
2
 Genetically modified varieties for biotic stresses are, in fact, in the field or advance
stage of field testing or experimentation. However, the varieties for better quality or
tolerance to abiotic stresses such as water stress, are yet to make a significant
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the case of GM seeds, farmers need to know attributes of the seed, care in its
use (e.g. planting of ‘refugia’ in the field), sale of GM product in market, etc.
These technologies are knowledge intensive and offer scope for appropriation
of the benefits by the private sector. Second type of technologies are related to
open-pollinated varieties and hybrids developed using conventional breeding
methods. These will continue to be important vehicles for increasing and sustaining
crop productivity on a vast proportion of agricultural lands in the country. The
significant deviation more likely is that hybrid technology would be available for
even more crops, including rice and wheat. Hybrid rice is now a reality in India
also. Besides hybrids, better plant types, e.g. ‘super rice’ also have potential for
yield advantages. These technologies may attract the participation of the private
sector. Third type of technologies relate to improved crop and resource
management methods based on system approach. There is a considerable scope
for realizing potential of technologies such as watershed development, integrated
crop management, precision and protected farming, micro-irrigation, etc. Most
of these technologies require greater skill for their adoption. Fourth category of
technologies includes improved and value-added inputs (such as biofertilizers,
treated seed for tolerance to biotic stresses or nutrient supply), better products
for plant and animal health, post-harvest processing and value addition, etc. The
private sector would find delivery of these technologies attractive, and some of
them can even be imported.
The technologies discussed above have certain distinct features, having
implications for the institutions governing them. Most of these technologies provide
scope for participation of the private sector in their development and dissemination.
This requires that there should not only be adequate incentives for the private
sector to participate, but also protection of farmers against monopolistic behavior
of large companies, and thereby ensuring access of small farmers to these
improved technologies. In other words, institutional issues relating to management
and use of technologies, particularly of the proprietary products become critical.
Further, most of the future technologies will be knowledge intensive, and therefore,
specific efforts should be made to disseminate information about the attributes
of these technologies to farmers. This is particularly important when information
flow in the technology system and commercial input market is inadequate (Tripp
and Pal 2001). The farmers need information about technology attributes and
quality of inputs (seeds, pesticides, fertilizers, etc.) available in the market. Lastly,
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supply of spurious inputs like seeds and pesticides, causing substantial losses to
them.
Institutional imperatives. The Indian agricultural R&D system is slowly moving
towards a pluralistic system drawing strengths from the public, private and
voluntary sectors. This coupled with significant presence of international
agricultural research centers (IARCs) has raised the issues of their appropriate
roles and need to develop synergies through partnerships. These organizational
developments have implications on the institutions governing them and
management of technologies. The most significant is the protection of intellectual
property. The private sector not only wants facilitating regulations, but also
sufficient incentives in the form of protection of intellectual property. To this
effect, the government has liberalized entry of the private companies, including
multinationals, in agricultural R&D, and also passed recently acts like the Plant
Varieties Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act (2001), and the Patents
(Amendment) Act (1999). These Acts primarily aim to provide incentives to the
private sector by bringing the domestic IPR regime at par with the international
regime envisaged under the World Trade Organization (WTO). These
developments are not in isolation with technological developments. As noted
above, the emerging technologies provide considerable scope for appropriation
of research benefits and therefore may attract lot of private investment in
agricultural R&D. Thus, agricultural R&D organizations, institutions governing
them and technologies are simultaneously evolving or undergoing a drastic change
in India. Appropriate policy interventions and enforcement of the institutions
can shape this healthy trend for catering to R&D needs of the country.
In this context, three issues deserve special attention. First is the clarity on
the roles of various actors in the R&D system based on their comparative
advantage, and providing enabling policies and macro-environment to undertake
their respective roles. The public research organizations, particularly ICAR,
have now much larger responsibility of coordinating research and catering to
the needs of other providers of R&D (e.g. basic research support to the private
sector). This function could be best performed on the pattern of the All India
Coordinated Research Project (AICRP) and the Centre-State Coordination
Committee, which help establish direct link with all the stakeholders. This is also
essential to overcome institutional and disciplinary rigidities. On the other hand,
the public research organizations need to undergo a number of reforms.
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enhancing funding and linking it with performance, improving management and
information system, capacity including human capital development in frontier
areas of science, introducing performance-based incentive system, etc. deserve
immediate attention (Mruthyunjaya and Ranjitha 1998; and Pal and Byerlee
2002). The extension system also needs to be reformed on the similar lines; it
should be made demand-driven and accountable to farmers and also should be
strengthened in terms of financial and manpower resources. Some researchers
even suggest that agricultural extension should be farmer-driven and controlled
(for detail discussion, see Part 2 of this volume). All these reforms cannot be
implemented in one go; realization of the need for change (by research managers
and policy makers), developing a road map for reforms, and learning from the
experiences would be desirable. The on-going reforms particularly under the
National Technology Project provide a good starting point.
The second issue relates to the credibility of the regulatory mechanisms—
this includes both appropriateness of the regulations and degree and cost of
their enforcement. A number of laws are enacted to regulate the technology
systems; the most important are the Seed Act (1966), the Plant Varieties
Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act (2001), the Patent (Amendment) Act (1999),
the proposed bill on conservation of biodiversity, rules regulating GMOs, the
Insecticide Act (1968), etc. Some of these have been in existence since long
and some are enacted very recently. It is likely that more than one regulations
govern a technology; for example, new seeds are governed by the seed act,
plant variety protection act, and regulations relating to biodiversity3. And if the
seed is genetically modified, regulations for GMOs also control this. All these
may add to the cost as well as effectiveness of the regulations. High cost of
implementation, delay in release of technology and weak enforcement may defeat
the basic purpose of the regulation and also may cause enormous economic
losses. Therefore, regulations should be simple, transparent and easy to
implement. There is no simple rule to develop such regulations, but these evolve
over a period of time with learning from the past experiences, as well as from
others.
The third point relates to protection of farmers’ interests. This concern is
gaining importance with the increase in participation of private sector in the
3
 The Seed Act is under review to harmonize all the functions (testing and registration
of varieties, quality control, point-of-sale seed inspection, etc.), as well as provisions in
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development and delivery of technology, particularly those embedded in inputs
(e.g. seed). This could be addressed at two levels: (a) Providing information to
farmers about technologies and their attributes. This will help farmers to make
a rational choice and also protect them from the unscrupulous trade activities.
Since information has attributes of ‘public good’, the public sector should take a
lead role in provision of the information. Of course, the private sector could be
a useful ally, and there could be cases of private delivery of public information.
(b) Grass-root-level mechanism to ensure quality of inputs (e.g. point-of-sale
inspection of seed) and legal system to protect consumer-farmers (e.g. Consumer
Forums) should be made more effective and easy to approach (Pal and Tripp
2002). In the absence of such protection mechanisms, greater reliance on the
private sector in the provision of agricultural R&D and technology-related inputs
is bound to exploit the farmers.
Agrarian and credit institutions
The basic objective of this sub-theme was to know how agrarian and credit
institutions, including those linking production with processing, affect impact of
technologies. The main issues covered are ceiling on land holdings, consolidation
of holdings, tenancy, and contract farming. The issues relating to agricultural
financing touched upon are: performance of rural credit institutions and institutions
for micro-credit. In the wake of economic liberalization, agrarian reforms have
been denied their due importance, in spite of their significant impact on agricultural
development in the past. Consolidation of holdings and tenancy reforms in West
Bengal (‘Operation barga’) and Karnataka (Land Reform Act 1974 and
Amendment 1979) have contributed significantly to agricultural development.4
The tenancy reforms not only changed the rural power structure, but also provided
powerful incentives to raise land productivity. The reforms also improved tenants’
access to new technology, modern inputs and institutional credit (Haque 2001).
Thus, tenancy reforms have accelerated adoption of new technologies, but it is
not clear whether further legalization of tenancy, particularly in the high
productivity regions, would benefit small and marginal farmers. The same holds
true for abolition of ceiling on land holdings. In the high productivity regions like
4
 In West Bengal, land ownership rights were given to the tenants, whereas Karnataka
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Punjab, the ‘reverse tenancy’ is common. This coupled with abolition of land
ceiling will promote concentration of land with large farmers. Further, with the
lack of non-farm employment opportunities, the misery of small farmers and
landless laborers would worsen (Chapter 14). Therefore, it is suggested that
region-specific land reforms would help accelerate the rate of technology adoption
and thereby agricultural development in the country.
Contract and corporate farmings are important institutional arrangements
to realize economies of scale, accelerate speed of technology adoption and
ensure supply of raw material to agro-industry. However, corporate farming is
not preferred because of high asset and location specificity, desisting firms to
make huge investments in land, and adverse equity implications. Contract farming,
on the other hand, does not have asset specificity and can promote rapid adoption
of technologies and increase productivity and farm income (Haque 2001).
However, it is observed that the transaction cost in dealing with a large number
of small farmers is high and therefore, the processing units try to reduce the
transaction cost by working with well-resource endowed, large farmers. Thus,
institutional arrangements to integrate small farmers with market economy are
yet to emerge. This was addressed in the seed production to some extent, where
seed companies work through the organizers who link farmers (by mobilizing
them) with seed companies (Pal et al. 2000).5 The experience of Japan and
China may be useful in linking small farmers with domestic as well as international
markets.
Abolition of priority lending to agriculture and liberalization of commercial
financial institutions have raised doubts on the availability of institutional credit
to agriculture. On the recommendation of the expert committees, several reforms
were introduced in the public sector banks (PSBs)—the main banking
organizations in the country. These include allowing the PSBs to raise capital up
to 49 per cent from the public, increased autonomy and office automation, half-
yearly review of performance, etc. These reforms have made some impact, but
real issue of reducing the non-performing assets by simplifying legal procedure
for recovery of over dues is yet to be addressed (GoI 1998; and Reddy 1999).
Any effort to privatize the PSBs in the absence of effective regulatory mechanism
5
 Small farmers are linked with market in milk and sugar cooperatives. But this is because
of homogeneity of the product (milk and sugar) and not because of institutional
arrangement. The same degree of homogeneity may not be possible in other agricultural
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would not only restrict credit flow to agriculture but also would be vulnerable to
financial crisis (Mathur 2002). Therefore, efforts should be targeted to improve
efficiency and competitiveness of financial institutions. In the context of
agriculture and rural development, micro-finance, high-tech agriculture, and
information technology are expected to make impact on the institutional credit
(delivery mechanism and extent of lending), and institutional change must respond
to these developments. Efficiency and effectiveness of rural financial institutions
through quantitative and qualitative parameters, and their ability to make impact
on sustainable rural development should form the basis for performance
assessment. Also, focus must shift from the supply side to the demand-side
management of credit (Chapter 15).
One of the major limitations of formal credit institutions was the high
transaction cost. The credit institutions find it costly to reach a large number of
people spread over a region. On the other hand, the cost of following cumbersome
lending procedures of the commercial institutions was also high for the borrower.
This serious constraint was addressed by the micro-finance approach, which
was patronized by the apex rural banking institution, i.e. the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development. Linking of self-help groups (SHGs) with
commercial financial institutions through NGOs has reduced the transaction
cost of both the lending institutions and borrowers. At the same time, SHGs
encouraged people’s participation and demand-driven approach. This institutional
innovation has made significant impact in terms of improving income level and
standard of living of beneficiaries, and empowered the rural poor, particularly
the women. In fact, suffering from poverty is the main binding force to form and
stay with SHG. This helped NGOs to mobilize the rural poor and facilitate delivery
of about three-fourths of the total micro-credit in the country. However, the
success is confined to the southern region of the country, where infrastructure
development is comparatively better (Chapter 16). Further work is required to
draw lessons for replicating this institutional innovation in other parts of the
country for meeting credit needs for agricultural purposes.
Agricultural marketing and trade
Traditionally, India followed an administered price policy to protect both
producers and consumers, and to enforce this policy, the government made a
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resulted into creation of a number of institutions (the Commission for Agricultural
Costs and Prices (CACP), commodity boards, agricultural marketing boards,
Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority, etc.),
para-statal organizations (the Food Corporation of India (FCI), seed corporations,
state trading corporations, marketing cooperatives, etc.). Besides, a number of
regulations were enacted to control agricultural marketing, particularly for
foodgrains. These include the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (1954), the
Essential Commodity Act (1955), the Future Contracts (Regulation) Act (1952),
the regulated market acts (of different states), the Prevention of Blackmarketing
and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act (1980), restrictions
on interstate movements of foodgrains, regulations on input markets, particularly
seed and pesticide (see section on R&D), quantitative restrictions on imports
and exports, etc (for details see Acharya 1997; and Gulati and Sharma 1991).
These regulations were successful in managing the food security during the
periods of shortage (Pal et al. 1993; and Tyagi 1990). But, these are said to have
eroded incentives for the participation of private sector (World Bank 1999).
Now in the wake of the economic liberalization under the WTO, and complacency
on the food security front, a number of regulations like interstate movement of
foodgrains, quantitative restriction on exports, and canalization of exports have
been removed. Also, there is pressure to reduce the scale of direct interventions
in foodgrain markets, and to reduce subsidy on inputs, so as to bring the incentives
at par with the international level. The question now is whether agricultural
market institutions would be efficient in providing right information and incentives
to producers, and especially allow small producers to participate in trade-led
growth opportunities.
Given the rapidly expanding volume of marketed surplus in Indian
agriculture, it would be unrealistic to assume that the para-statal agencies can
handle majority of the produce. Therefore, the private sector should be
encouraged to take increasing responsibility of grain marketing, and the public
sector agencies should take a facilitating and welfare (food security) role. This
may even involve transfer or sharing of facilities created by the public sector, or
private execution of the public functions (e.g. storage and transportation).
Professional bodies like CACP may assume additional role to guide on the
privatization of agricultural marketing and trade, and strategy to meet challenges
of international competitiveness. Secondly, there is a need for improving efficiency
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corporations, seed corporations, etc., by making them decentralized and
accountable. Inefficient organizations should either be closed or privatized.
However, direct interventions like procurement or some other form of protection
should be extended to the farmers in the new growth areas with high risk.
Regulated markets and cooperative marketing have by and large failed to
meet the expectations (Chapter 18). Only cooperative marketing with value-
addition activities has been successful in those cases where management is
purely professional, such as AMUL (Chapter 20). Agricultural foodgrain markets
in India are considered to be efficient and integrated, but much can be done to
improve their functioning. Deliberate attempts are required to improve marketing
efficiency of perishable commodities (like fruits and vegetables) and livestock
markets. This requires reconsideration of market regulations and phasing out of
outdated controls (Acharya and Chaudhri 2001). The guiding principle is that
domestic market reforms are pre-requisite for integrating with the world markets.
Also, it is quite likely that trade liberalization may destabilize domestic markets,
as international prices are highly unstable in comparison to the domestic prices
(Pal et al. 1993). Therefore, in order to avoid this and protect the poor, due care
is required in monitoring the international prices and trade.
Agro-processing with value addition is another area which needs immediate
attention. In this sector, there would be a shift from small-scale, employment-
intensive industry to large-scale, capital-intensive industry for improving efficiency
and product quality. Several models of organization of agro-processing linking
production with processing are in operation in the country; these include
government, cooperative, corporate with contract farming, etc. It is found that
farmers’ participation is low in the government and cooperative models. The
cooperative models are in fact government-administered organizations. The
success of the model depends on the availability of capital for investment, strength
of backward and forward linkages, professional management and availability of
processing technology (Chapter 20). Contract farming is successful only when
there are adequate incentives for both industry and farmers, which are also
influenced by technological support for yield enhancement and better product
quality. Contract covering a very long period, as in the case of horticultural
products, is bound to fail unless supported with strong legal framework. This is
mainly because of loss of contact between the farmers and industry and new
opportunities emerging for either party, which were not anticipated earlier
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framework for contract farming. In addition, efforts are required to study
organizational models of agro-processing industry, their contracting arrangements
and behavior of individuals (farmers). Appropriate technological support, both
at the production and processing level, could further help develop this sector.
Lastly, efforts are needed to cater to the needs of small farmers for their
integration into this high growth sector.
Conclusions
The foregoing discussion brings out that if technological change of varied
nature have to accelerate the pace of agricultural development in India, new
efficient institutions would be required. Since the development approach,
incentives and nature of technologies are changing rapidly, institutional change
is bound to occur in all sectors of Indian agriculture, which will be further hastened
by the new trade regime. It is likely that the formal institutions to facilitate
functioning of markets, enforce contractual arrangements, and protect property
rights and other incentives would be more stronger and dominant in future.
However, traditional institutions involving people’s participation, particularly small
holders, to manage natural resources and to provide livelihood security to the
rural poor should also be strengthened. Resource scarcity would also induce
institutional change, which should be encouraged by providing appropriate policy
environment. The state would continue to play a facilitating and welfare role,
but with much greater efficiency, transparency and accountability. With regard
to technology, intensification of R&D efforts, efficiency of public R&D
organizations, management of intellectual property, incentives, and dissemination
of information about technology would be critical. Given the public good nature
of knowledge and even some technologies, preponderance of small holders,
dominance of marginal production environments, and centrality of equity and
environmental concerns, there would always be need for government interventions
in agricultural R&D, both in terms of investment and provision of R&D services.
The discussion has provided some insights into the direction of institutional
change for knowledge-intensive agriculture. However, there are still some gray
areas requiring our attention. For instance, much could be achieved by improving
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those areas (e.g. R&D, surface irrigation) where the public sector would continue
to play a dominant role. Information on improving their efficiency and
accountability through decentralization and other measures will be extremely
useful. Another related aspect is the forging linkages (horizontal and vertical)
among various institutions, particularly between macro and micro institutions,
formal and informal institutions, and public and private organizations. The issue
is how effective linkages among the institutions can be forged and sustained
over time. A better understanding of this issue would help reduce transaction
cost in economic systems and generate synergies through effective utilization of
resources. More importantly, this will help understand policy and other interventions
required to protect and empower small holders and poor consumers during the
process of globalization. Finally, concerns are raised about enforcement of laws,
regulations and conflict resolution mechanisms in India. How this weakness
could be addressed? The problem could be with the formulation of laws (provisions
contained therein) or with the design of the implementation agency. Important
regulations governing the agricultural sector could be studied for making them
effective. We must also look at the possibility and conditions for private
enforcement (outside court of law) of contracts and resolution of conflicts.
Besides this overview part containing the synthesis and literature survey,
the book is organized into four parts. Part 2 deals with the lessons to be learnt
from the institutions for management of natural resources. Part 3 discusses the
institutions for agricultural research and extension. Agrarian and credit institutions
are covered in Part 4. Finally, Part 5 presents the institutions of agricultural
marketing and trade.
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n the recent years, there has been a rise in interest in the study of the institutions
in economics. This is because of the inadequacy of the neoclassical theory in
dealing with a set of issues like uneven performance of economies in space and
time, persistence of inefficient institutions, role of ideology in choice determination
of individuals, and rationale and effect of the rule observing behavior, etc (North
1997). These inadequacies were attributed to both conceptual and methodological
frameworks used in the neoclassical theory. Further, the neoclassical economics
does not deal with the incentives and behavior of political actors, or the influence
of political process on target for growth, stability, pollution abatement regulation
in agriculture or the division of public investment among sectors and enterprizes
(Eggertsson 1997). The neoclassical economics completely ignores “power”
dimension in policy-making (Schmid 1978). The framework is also being criticized
for its isolated nature in that it does not encompass the reality and efficacy of
transaction costs (Williamson 1990). This is due to greater focus on a few key
variables like price, quantity, etc. Further, the framework offered no scope to
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integrate politics into economics to capture the real time phenomenon of economic
outcome as influenced by political institutions. Institutions are taken for granted
for observing the social rules, conventions and other elements of the structural
framework of social interaction in the mainstream economics. They are often
pushed so much into the background that many of their central propositions are
sometimes stated with false notion of institutional neutrality (Bardhan 1989).
These inadequacies led economists to look for an alternative framework for
analyzing economic phenomena with explicitly studying interaction of institutions
with these phenomena.
A study of literature indicates that markets are not ideal mechanisms for
coordinating transactions among actors when either the quality of product is
uncertain, increasing returns to scale prevail, and future contingencies are
uncertain, or there is multitude of repetitive transactions within a truly
decentralized monetary economy. Evidences also indicate that the markets do
not always lead to the best economic performance in the industries with complex
and rapidly changing technologies (Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). On the other
hand, as disillusionment with the capacity of the state to control the “commanding
heights” of development economies sets in, the role of private and voluntary
sectors increases (Picciotto 1995). Thus, accumulating literature, both against,
and for on various coordinating agencies like markets, state and voluntary agencies
in economic growth of nations led to increasing interest in institutions and reasons
behind varied performance of these institutions under different contexts. If there
is a clear evidence that weak political and economic institutions significantly
hamper economic growth, policy makers might take measures that may
strengthen institutions in particular ways or encourage more appropriate political
structures (Arnon 1996).
Types of Institutionalism
Institutional economics in the minimal sense is economics with institutions
in the role of either explaining entities or explained entities or both. Consequently,
different versions of institutionalism result from different specifications of how
institutions are conceptualized and explained, which aspects of institutions are
explained, how institutions are invoked in explaining something else, and what
this something else consists of, etc. (Maki 1993).29 Institutional Economics- A Review
Old institutional economics vs neoclassical economics
The old institutionalists believe that institutions are more “as settled habits
of thought common to the generality of man” and less instrumental (Veblen
1919). This concept rejects much of the neoclassical tradition with its emphasis
on rational maximizing atomistic agents (Stein 1994) and thus, this version of
institutionalism of Veblen and others emerged largely out of critique of orthodox
assumptions (Hodgson 1989). In the neoclassical economics, institutions are
treated as exogenous fixed entities and no attempt is made to explain their
evolution. In old institutional economics, the role of institutions and their evolution
over time under particular circumstances is the central part (Grabowski 1988).
The old institutionalist approaches are classified into three categories (Gruchy
1990):
● Miscellaneous or topical approach which draws attention to economic
problems that are ignored by orthodox economics but lacks theoretical
cohesiveness.
● Thematic approach which focuses on various well-established basic themes
but still lacks an overall framework of interpretation into which the basic
themes can be fitted in a general unity, and
● The paradigmatic approach which seeks an overall analytical framework
of analysis.
Gruchy (1982) admits that old institutionalists have become engrossed
in the analysis of limited issues rather than in an exposition of the
theoretical foundations of their economics. The general view is that the old
institutional economics lacks a theoretical framework (North 1997; and
Maki 1993).
New institutional economics vs neoclassical economics
Although the new institutionalists are concerned with issues not often
considered central to the mainstream of economics, they still begin with an
appreciation of the neoclassical theory as a powerful tool for predicting many,
but not all, economic outcomes in the real world. The new institutional economics
does not fundamentally challenge the percepts of the neoclassical economics,
but criticizes it for failing to explain the nature of institutions and the role they
play in supporting the existence and operation of markets (Stein 1994). The new30 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
institutional economics has grown not through re-emergence of traditional
institutionalism, but mainly through developments in the heart of modern orthodox
theory itself (Hodgson 1989). The new institutional economists have begun to
broaden the scope of economic inquiry without overturning established
methodologies.
North did not discard the neoclassical theory, but modified it. He retained
the fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition, and the analytical
tools of micro-economic theory. He modified the rationality assumption and
added the dimension of time (Fogel 1997). The new institutional economics
draws upon mainline micro-theory, economic history, economics of property
rights, comparative systems, labor economics and industrial organization, and all
these are complementary to each other, rather than a substitute for conventional
analysis (Williamson 1975).
Old institutional economics vs new institutional economics
The role of institutions and their evolution over time under particular
circumstances is a central part of traditional institutional economics (Grabowski
1988) and hence is context-specific. The old institutional economics is non-
theoretical, while the new institutionalism is theoretical, i.e. neoclassically non-
adhoc. Representatives of the new institutional economics are committed
methodological individualists, while the members of the old institutional economics
subscribe to holism, often of a functionalist kind (Maki 1993). In the new
institutional economics, there is a greater willingness to explore the boundaries
of existing models and to focus on relaxing different sets of assumptions. Hence,
it attempts to move towards “realism” and “realistic” philosophy without violating
the paradigm of having “a unified theoretical framework”, independent of
particulars of space and time. It can be used as a tool for designing institutions
(Toye 1993).
Institutional Economics
Subject matter of institutional economics
Broadly, the subject matter of institutional economics falls under two heads, viz.
genesis or the persistence of existing institutions, institutional change and impact31 Institutional Economics- A Review
Item Mainstream economics Institutional
economics
Approach Materialistic Idealistic
Unit of observation Commodities and prices Transaction
Objective of individual Self-interest Self and others
Relation to other
social sciences Narrowly economic Considers all
Concept of value Value in exchange Value in use
Concept of economics Akin to physical sciences A cultural approach
Social deportment Belief in free will Behaviorist
Postulate Equilibrium Disequilibrium
Focus Particularism Holism
Scientific method Allegedly positive Mostly normative
Data Mostly quantitative Mostly qualitative
System Closed Open
Econometrics Well-adapted Ill-adapted
View of economics Essentially static Essentially dynamic
Role Usually offer choice Often prescribe
Attitude towards
collective action Against it Considered unavoidable
Patron scientists Smith, Marshall Veblen, Commons
Source:  Paalberg (1993)
Table 1.Basic differences between mainstream economics and
institutional economics
of institutions (i.e. accounting for different outcomes as behavioral consequences
of different institutional regimes). The new institutionalists generally focus on
the following four areas of research: (i) Transaction costs and property rights,
(ii) political economy and public choice, (iii) quantitative economic history, and32 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
(iv) cognition, ideology and the role of path dependence. The new institutionalism
cuts across many disciplines such as political science, law, business, anthropology,
sociology and economic history. It professes that institutions provide mechanisms
to enable individuals to escape the tension between individual and social rationality
created by the perverse incentives that lead to the failure of markets. It builds
on and modifies the neoclassical economics in order to resolve the problems of
market failures through allocative mechanisms, such as property arrangements,
private contracts, community arrangements and collective provision (Roy 1995).
There are four broad kinds of institutions, viz. contracts, property rights,
conventions and authority (Mathews 1986). The last three constitute “prevailing
institutions”. Contracts respond to market conditions either assisted by prevailing
institutions where these are supportive, or hindered where they are incomplete
and/or hostile to the transaction concerned (Hubbard 1997). This leads to two
central propositions of the new institutional economics: (i) The nature of business
contract is determined by the uncertainties and assurances arising out of the
transactions involved and from the prevailing institutions, and (ii) prevailing
institutions are altered by social action responding to changes in relative prices.
In other words, the institutional economics emerges from the theories of firm
(transaction cost), market (imperfect information), politics (institutions used to
favor interest groups) and history (institutional change) (Hubbard 1997).
Divergent literature on institutions in economics highlights three conceptual issues,
viz. social choice, economics of institutions, and information problem (Eggertsson
1997).
Levels of analysis in institutional economics
According to Williamson (2000), there are four levels in the analysis of institutions,
which are distinguished based on the origin of institutions, rapidity (frequency)
of change in institutions, causal force behind change, and how institutions are
treated (exogenous or endogenous) in economics. These levels and inter-linkages
are depicted in Figure 1 wherein downward arrows indicate constraints posed
by higher level on lower level institutions, and upward arrows indicate feedback
from lower level to upper level institutions, thereby clearly bringing about the
fact of embedded nature of institutions. Some salient features of this embedded
system are:33 Institutional Economics- A Review
Figure 1.  Economics of institutions










































L.2: Economics of property rights/positive political theory
L.3: Transaction cost economics
L.4: Neoclassical economics/agency theory
Note: Downward arrows indicate feedback from upper level to lower level, and
upward  arrows indicate feedback from lower level to upper level.
Source:  Williamson (2000)34 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
Level 1. Mostly institutions are treated as “given” and expected to change
very slowly and many of the institutions are of spontaneous origin.
Level 2. The structures observed here are partly the products of evolutionary
processes but design opportunities are also posed.
Level 3. Any issue that arises or can be reformulated as a contracting
issue can be examined to advantage in transaction cost economizing terms.
Moving beyond the agency theory tradition of ex-ante incentive alignment,
transaction cost economics turns its attention additionally and predominantly to
the ex-post stage of control.
Towards Institutional Economics
Definitions of institutions
● Schultz  (1968): Institutions are behavioral rules. These rules pertain to
social, political and economic behavior.
● Powelson (1972): Institution is a set of relationships between individuals,
that are designed to resolve conflicts.
● Bromley (1974): Institutions comprise the working rules wherein conflicting
social demands are reconciled.
● Runge (1981): Institutions increase the value of a stream of benefits
associated with economic activity by coordinating behavior and reducing
uncertainty in the realm of human interaction.
● North (1993): Institutions consist of a set of constraints on behavior in the
form of the rules and regulations, a set of procedures to detect deviations
from the rules and regulations and finally, a set of moral, ethical behavioral
norms which define the contours that constrain the way in which the rules
and regulations are specified and enforced.
● Hayami and Ruttan (1985): Institutions channel the behavior of people with
respect to each other and their belongings, possessions and property,
providing assurance by setting the “rules of the game”.
● Eggertsson (1997): Institutions are the enforceable rules that affect the
expected payoff of actors. Institutions directly or indirectly assign to
actors the control over scarce resources. Institutional change, therefore,
involves a new structure of control in the economic and political domains.35 Institutional Economics- A Review
Theories of institutions
According to Maki (1993), theorizing institutions is dependent on rejecting
the extreme form of the rationality assumption which involves the idea of perfect
knowledge on the part of economic actors. A typology of institutional theories
based on different concepts of “rationality” and unit of analysis is given by
Knudsen (1993).
Table 2. Typology of neo-institutionalist contributions
Perspective/unit of Contractual focus Technological focus
analysis, type of ‘transaction’ ‘decision maker’
explanation and
concept of rationality
Equilibrium models Principal-agency Neoclassical theory/
and maximization theory game theory
rationality
Functionalist Property rights theory; Information economics;
explanation and Williamson transaction Institutional game theory
bounded rationality cost theory
Models of economic North’s transaction Austrian institutionalism;




In formal equilibrium analysis, “individual” is modelled as a perfect rational
agent who is able to find the optimal strategy under each situation without any
learning process.  In these models, at the single decision maker’s level,
“maximization rationality “is the hardcore and at the system level “equilibrium”
concept forms the hardcore. As a result, the program commits itself to an analysis
of only those systems that display rather stable and well-coordinated behavior,36 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
while dismissing systems with no or several equilibria as anomalous and
uninteresting cases. ‘How a state of equilibrium was emerged in the first place
from the causal interaction between agents’ is, however, not explainable by
orthodox programs. By postulating an adjustment mechanism, without a foundation
in individual behavior, the orthodox program has been restricted to make rather
extreme and unsophisticated assumptions (Knudsen 1993). The principal agency
model seeks to address the issue of how a so-called ‘incentive compatible
contract’ can be drawn up, i.e. a contract in which it is in the agent’s own
interests to act in accordance with the interests of the principal.
(ii) Functionalist theories
In this, institutionalists focus from the start on the systems in which there
are either no or several equilibria, or on systems with different kinds of
coordination failures, such as market failures, organizational failures, etc .The
rationale behind this strategy is that it is for providing solutions to these kinds of
problems that institutions, including norms, conventions, standards, etc., have
evolved to either supplement the market or replace it. In functional explanation,
the functions served by the phenomenon we wish to explain which are meant to
explain its existence. However criticisms have been raised against this reversed
order of cause and effect.
According to Elster (1983), a social researcher must specify the causal
mechanism through which an institution is reproduced and not merely indicate
it. More specifically,  Elster recommends both a natural selection mechanism
and a reinforcement mechanism as two possible examples of feedback loops
which can justify the use of functionalist explanations. While this selection
mechanism takes place at the population or industry level, the reinforcement
mechanism takes place at the level of single decision maker. It appears reasonable
to think the use of functionalist’s explanation of institutions together with the
concept of satisfying or bounded rationality (Knudsen  1993).
(a) Property rights theory. Property rights develop to internalize externalities
when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.
Increased internalization results from the changes in economic values, changes
which stem from the development of new technology, opening of new markets,
changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned (Demsetz 1967). Although
the thesis of the property rights school has been that market failures mostly lead37 Institutional Economics- A Review
to a redefinition of property rights. Arrow (1963) went a step further. He
maintained that in certain circumstances market failures would also produce
institutions as a substitute for and not merely as a support for the market
institution. It is under situations marked by ‘structural uncertainty’ and where it
becomes impossible to formulate contingent contracts that the market is replaced
with internal organization as a more suitable allocation mechanism. The choice
of property rights affect the distribution of transaction costs on different groups
(Schmid 1978).
(b) Williamson’s transaction cost theory. Transaction costs include the costs
of the land, labor, capital and entrepreneurial skills required to transfer property
rights from one person to another (North and Wallis 1994). The costs of
determining, capturing and retaining the attributes of an asset constitute
transaction cost (Barzel 1989). The central idea behind this program is that
there are different ways of organizing transactions and these differ in cost.
Transactions are assigned to and organized within governance structures in a
discriminating way. The key behavioral assumptions of Williamson’s program
are: bounded rationality and opportunism. The protective belt constituting
dimensions of a transaction are, degree of uncertainty, the frequency with which
transaction reoccurs and the degree to which asset–specific investments are
involved in the transaction. Williamson’s main focus is on economic organizations
and their contracting relations. According to him, the main purpose of contract
is to reduce transaction cost (Poulton et al. 1998). However, the transaction
cost school, i.e. implication that firm’s governance structure must improve
efficiency, is being criticized because firms not only have incentives to reduce
transaction costs (which is efficiency enhancing), but they also have incentives
to cartelize markets (efficiency-reducing) (Schneiberg and Hollingsworth 1988;
and Eden and Hamson 1997).
(iii) Neo-institutionalist theories (explanatory models focusing on social
change)
Traditional equilibrium analysis and programs with a functionalist mode of
explanation share a common characteristic, i.e. they give priority to the study of
stable states at the expense of the processes which are meant to produce these
conditions. The researchers who focus on social processes are not satisfied
with theories, which do not explicitly account for the conceivable origins of a38 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
state of equilibrium or a relatively enduring social pattern. Those who focus on
processes and explanations of social change, therefore, require that the dynamic
analysis be integrated into the actual model on a non-ad hoc basis. This
necessitates the broadening of the behavioral foundations of economic theory,
i.e. replacement of concepts of both unbounded and bounded rationality with
procedural rationality (Knudsen 1993). Based on this perception, theories of
path dependence and evolutionary economics are formulated.
(a) North’s transaction cost theory. According to this theory, the costliness
of information is the key to the cost of transaction. If transaction costs are too
high, trade will not take place and economies will stagnate. The challenge of
economic development, therefore, is to reduce the transaction costs of increasingly
complex forms of trade. This is achieved through development of institutions
that support trade, provide available information, protect property rights and
develop  effective mechanisms for enforcing agreement.
The above theory besides being used for analyzing economic contracts, is
used for explaining behavior of state with regard to its control over its subjects
(Nye 1997) and inefficiency of political institutions (North 1981). Nye (1997)
concludes that when the choice of production methods (of citizens) increases
the potential rent to be extracted, the capacity of the ruler to extract rent is
reduced, and the ruler will choose to weigh the trade-offs between control and
income in a manner to maximize the expected gains. The higher the transaction
cost of monitoring alternate mechanisms of production, the more is the revenue
extraction and control tied to specific activities on the part of subjects, and
smaller is the potential gains from the peoples use of “optimal” production
technology, the more likely is the ruler going to force the people to work and
produce in a fashion that is not the first best for them and that does not maximize
their surplus, although it allows for easy control. According to North, the
inefficiency of existing political institutions develop primarily from three problems,
imperfect information, transaction costs of various sorts, and the consequence
of additional actors, such as the roles of the state agents in enforcement or non-
enforcement of property rights. Thus, he argues that institutions are devised,
first and foremost, to serve the needs of those who devise them and that they
may or may not facilitate exchange, whereas the main purpose of contracts is to
reduce transaction costs (Poulton et al. 1998).
(b) Path dependency theory. This theory insists that it is of decisive importance
to explicitly model the process from which an institution emerges. The theory39 Institutional Economics- A Review
states that some unimportant events can arise early in such a process and start
a ‘snowball effect’, leading the system towards a particular institutional solution
from which it is no longer possible to escape (Knudsen 1993).  In other words,
the theory says that ‘history’ matters in the emergence of an institution. Path-
dependency is a cumulative process where random events in the opening phase
of the process determine the outcome in the long-term. It is therefore with good
reason that these processes are termed ‘ historical’ (David 1988). It is also felt
that this theory can be useful in explaining (a) the existence of inefficient
institutions, and (b) the phenomenon like a social system becomes ‘locked into’
a technical standard.
(c) Evolutionary theories. Recently, it has been argued that the new
institutionalism is an effort to promote a methodological shift in economic research
from physics and mechanics to biology and law. Development of evolutionary
theories is a step in this direction. The evolutionary research program has to
analyze long-term process of change using the analogy of biological genetics.
Nelson and Winter (1982) developed an evolutionary theory of ‘firm’ taking
‘firm’ as a collection of routines which need to be continuously reproduced. In
this way, it differs from neoclassical theory wherein a firm is seen as a production
function. It is conceptualized in this theory that routines or ‘acquired features’
can be inherited and transmitted through imitation, social learning, etc. Just like,
‘mutations’ in biology, ‘innovations’ explain changes in behavioral pattern and
technical routines. In biology, the concept of ‘natural selection’ exists, and on
the same analogy, ‘natural selection’ mechanism is conceptualized in economics,
but the rapidity with which the selection becomes effective differs.  Winter
(1964, 1975) has argued that the economic environments change too quickly to
eliminate all inefficient firms or firms with inadequate routines. In this way, this
theory also explains the simultaneous existence of both efficient and inefficient
institutions.
In the context of explaining successful collective action, contrary to zero
contribution, thesis of Hardin and the problems anticipated by collective action
theory of Olson, Ostrom (2000) explains the need for considering existence of
multiple types of players in a society. In addition to the rational egoists, a society
also consists of “norm-users, conditional cooperators and willing punishers.”
Ostrom takes the help of evolutionary theories in modeling the emergence and
survival of multiple players in a population. According to this, individuals
inherit strategies and those carrying more successful strategies for an40 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
environment, reproduce at a higher rate. He also outlines an indirect
evolutionary approach wherein players receive objective payoffs, but make
decisions on the transformation of these material rewards into intrinsic
preferences.
Institutions: Functions, Changes and Performance
Functions
1. Institutions are conflict resolution mechanisms
2. Institutions are mechanisms to address externality
3. Institutions are a response to missing markets
4. Institutions are a response to overcome demosclerosis (political inertia to
change outdated programs due to prevalence of a number of interest groups)
5. Institutions are transaction cost minimizing mechanisms
6. Institutions are a response to uncertainty
Institutional change
According to Eggertsson (1997), institutional change involves a new structure
of control in the economic and political domains. The process of growth alters
the demand for institutions (for their economic functions). This, in turn, brings
about disequilibrium between demand and supply of (economic functions
performed by) institutions, and hence, institutional change occurs (Schultz 1968).
According to Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), there are four levels of society
at which there may be variation in the dominant forms of economic coordination,
viz. the regional level within a country, the level of nation-state, the level of
transnational regions, and the global level. The choice of coordination mechanisms
(institutions) at these levels is constrained by the social context within which
they are embedded. Depending on the nature of that embeddedness, there is
variation in the collective forms of governance. According to Evenson and Putnam
(1987), intellectual property rights in the USA changed relatively rapidly in
response to shifts in economic and technical factors within the national system,
but this is not true for the international system. Legislators respond to the changing
demand for the institutional changes by balancing the perceived societal benefit41 Institutional Economics- A Review
and expected individual benefit to successful investors (Fan 1987), but at the
same time, to design laws to balance individual national benefit versus global
benefit is a very difficult task. Each type of institution (coordination mechanism)
has various positive features, or else it would be strongly opposed by various
economic actors.  Nevertheless, each mechanism does have particular failures.
It is the contest between those who support and those who oppose these
coordinating mechanisms that tends to lead to transformations in coordinating
mechanisms over time (Campbell et al.1991).
Theory of induced institutional innovation. Changes in market prices and
technological opportunities introduce disequilibrium in the existing institutional
arrangements by creating new profitable opportunities for the institutional
innovations (Hayami and Ruttan 1985; Shaffer 1969; and Gary 1978). Changes
in market conditions and technologies bring about changes in relative resource
scarcities, which, in turn, induce changes in social systems and institutions
(Hayami and Kikuchi 1982). According to North and Thomas (1970), the potential
benefits that have historically induced institutional innovations have resulted from
economies of scale and reduction in transaction costs. This theory views
institutional change as a response or joint-product with technology. Pereira (1974)
and Gary (1978) infer that causal relationship between technological and
institutional change can work in both the directions, and the major institutional
changes in agriculture are dictated by socio-political factors and not merely by
economic ones.
However, criticism has been raised against this theory. Field (1984) asserts
that it is impossible to make all institutions endogenous within a model of individual
choice based upon individual maximization. It was argued that when interpersonal
relationships assume the characteristics of game of assurance, the theory of
induced innovation can be used to explain institutional change. In situations of
prisoners’ dilemma, the induced innovation theory can not be used (Grabowski
1988).
The theory of induced institutional innovation from a public choice perspective
states that specific demands for institutional change arise from a set of constraints
which limit the accomplishment of a shared objective. The constraints may
include factor endowment, technology and population growth, as well as the
existing barriers (Runge and Witzke 1987). The supply of institutions is a response
to the demand based on institutional alternatives that redirect and reorganize
these activities in response to constraints and opportunities. This process is42 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
endogenous when it arises within the reference group rather than being imposed
from outside.
Institutional changes are response to address income distribution. The
demand for institutional change is increased if the income stream of a social
group gets decreased absolutely or relatively. The theory is emphasizing
that when new opportunities of resource use arise and the resultant outcome
presents opportunity for alternative distributional pattern of income among
stakeholders, institutional change/innovations occur. The demand for institutions
is derived from the demand for assured income streams and the efficient
coordination of economic activity. The demand for institutional innovation is
derived not only from the demand for more efficient allocation of resources but
from the perceived fairness and social acceptability with which current institutions
can be expected to channel these allocations now and in the future (Runge
1984).
Response to conflict between national and local objectives. Conflict
between national objectives and administration of property rights at the local
level sets the stage for redefinition of division of power. The market for rights
and property are influenced greatly by public policies that have multiple objectives
as well as by demand and supply for the resource itself (Castle 1978).
Response to changes in ideology. Institutional change is a response to changes
in ideology. Dominant ideologies change over time as intellectual entrepreneurs
espouse and face contrasting views of the world and are ultimately able to
convince about the merits of their stand (North 1981). Ideological shifts (ex
democracy, socialism, etc) redirect government action, which is primarily the
outcome of interdependence between civil and economic rights. Changes in
private property rights flow from the social changes in concept of justice and
changes in value (Tideman 1988; Macpherson 1978; Bromley 1991; and
Powelson 1972). Ideological consensus is the characteristic of more developed
countries, so conversely, ideological conflict is attributable to less developed
countries. Economic and political ideologies are the basis for institutional ideology,
and the consensus on all the three ideologies is essential to institutional
effectiveness (Powelson 1972). In the long run, an institution need not conform
exactly to existing values. Its changing functions and structure over time may
whittle them away.
Institutional innovations are response to overcome budget constraints.
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(Otto and Edleman 1990). In a similar paradigm, the emergence of open access
is viewed as a consequence of decision not to invest in management of certain
resources (Swanson 1996).  North (1990) argues that institutional arrangements
tend to be self-perpetuating until trends of change in relative prices  (so increased
costs of maintaining existing institutions) are such that pressure for reallocation
of resources become irresistible.
Institutional innovations seek to reduce transaction costs. Institutional
innovations in this paradigm are viewed as an attempt to search for institutional
alternatives having lower transaction cost just as technological innovations aid
in reducing production costs (Kydd et al. 1997; and Matyas 1998).
Demand  for one institution is actually a displaced demand for another
institutional change. Feder et al. (1991) on land rights in Thailand observed
that the demand for and value of secure property rights is an important measure
of a displaced demand for credit by producers who can gain access to capital
markets when they have collateral land rights. Zimmerman and Carter (1999)
by using dynamic simulation analysis of the option value of marketable land
rights, reported that collapse of traditional institutions for risk management is a
vital part of the demand for marketable rights.
Macro theory of institution building. Economic growth requires increasing
social differentiation (Powelson 1972). Division of labor is limited by size of the
market and mistrust. In this backdrop, institutions serve as an entity in which
contestants acquire confidence. Once mutual confidence is achieved, the original
institution may be modified or abandoned if a more efficient form emerges. In
the context of economic growth, new conflicts arise due to changes in values.
Thus, new institutions emerge which will be in conformity with the new values.
Syncretic approach. Working in the context of capitalistic economies, Boyer
and Hollingsworth (1997) proposed a syncretic approach combining three major
interpretations with their strengths and weaknesses. The weaknesses of
rationality-based institutional change are sunk costs invested in existing institutions,
which provide them with a high degree of legitimacy. Even when actors may
have good sense of what a superior institutional arrangement may be at any one
moment in time, it may be blocked by the habit and inertia of social interaction
(Boyer and Orlean1992; and David 1988). In both, the first and second models,
the missing component is ‘power’ and it is the core of institution building in the
third model.44 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
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Institutional performance
Hollingworth and Boyer (1997) used the term “social system of production”
referring to the way that institutions or structures of a country or a region are
integrated into a social configuration. They also inferred that different coordinating
mechanisms (institutions) were associated with different social systems of
production, and that different coordinating mechanisms and different social
systems of production resulted in different types of economic performance.
Hence, they emphasized the importance of embeddedness of institutions in
determining its impact on economic performance. Ensminger (1997) and North
and Thomas (1973) also made similar observations, i.e. the fit between formal
and informal institutions is the key for success of formal institutions. When
formal systems are imposed upon a society with which they are out of accord,
self-enforcement may erode and externally engineered incentives may fail to
yield the predicted results. These observations also imply that no institutional
configuration can simply be borrowed and implemented in any given social setting
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997). The same implications were drawn by Powelson
(1972) in terms of “transplanted institution”.
Traditionally, institutions have been conceived as media through which tasks
are accomplished, and therefore, institutional efficiency was the performance
variable. But in the context of institutions being viewed as recurrent conflict
resolving mechanisms, the performance variable is institutional effectiveness.
This consists of capacity to identify conflicts, establish and enforce rules of
universal applicability and acceptability of institutions to all persons using them.
National consensus on economic and political ideology is a sine qua non for
institutional effectiveness (Powelson 1972). These observations on the whole
imply that institutional selection for good performance must be “context based ”
and “objective specific.”
Determinants of feasibility of institutional change/design
According to Libcap (1990), the likelihood of institutional change is related
directly to the magnitude of expected gains, and inversely to the number of
competing interests, heterogeneity of the groups involved in negotiation, degree
of asymmetric information across groups, and initial and the projected inequality
in the distribution of wealth. Feeny (1987) has stated that incentive compatibility,
enforceability and informational efficiency are important determinants of the46 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
feasibility in institutional design. Institutional innovations which satisfy certain
demands at lower marginal cost are generally preferred, because they provide
some assurance that the benefits of change will be distributed fairly.  The
institutional changes that will occur at some future date, can never be exactly
foreseen. However, some conjectures can be made by analyzing alternative
proposals in the light of the source of demand. These conjectures on future
outcome are not value free because both the demand for and supply of new
institutions are driven by normative criteria (Runge and Witzke 1987).
When social capital endowment is very high, a society can largely dispense
with collective regulation and rely on the emergence of a decentralized equilibrium
of cooperative behavior. In order to avoid significant reshuffling of individual
status, institutional inertia may occur which may result in resource degradation
(Baland and Platteau 1998).
Institutions in Rural and Agricultural Development
Economic institutions are conceptualized as social systems providing decision
rules for the use of resources and the distribution of income from such use.
However, social, legal, political and economic institutions together determine the
actual resource use and distribution of income. Environmental issues, agricultural
development and commodity programs range across the various social disciplines
and so are institutional inherently (Paalberg 1993). Hence, agricultural
development is dependent on institutions in several ways. Emergence of new
institutions in agricultural production is attributable to the firms’ interest to assure
timely delivery and compliance with quality and safety standards for agro-exports
together with policy, market and factor distribution context (Escobal et al. 2000).
In this section, an attempt is made to review application of institutional theories
in selected areas of agricultural development, viz. marketing and trade, technology
development and adoption, sustainable resource use, poverty alleviation and
growth in rural areas.
Institutions in marketing and trade
As noted in the introduction section, when uncertainty and scale economy
prevail together with asset specificity in production, processing and handling,47 Institutional Economics- A Review
market is not the ideal coordinating mechanism. The qualities of agricultural
commodities, viz. (i) perishability, (ii) quality standards required for raw material
or commodity, (iii) seasonal variability of raw material supply, (iv) technical
sophistication and equipment specialization in post-harvest activities, and (v)
level of fixed costs and scope for economies of scale in post-harvest activities,
suggest the relevance of non-market institutions in handling them. Jaffee and
Morton (1995) have applied the transaction cost analysis to marketing of certain
high-value crops in sub-Saharan Africa. They have hypothesized that the range
of feasible institutional arrangements for commodities which pose inherent
problems for quality control and vertical coordination and which are associated
with economies of scale in production and/or processing, will be limited to
vertically integrated systems or contract–based systems. For commodities with
less demanding techno-economic characteristics and lower investment
requirements, decentralized, small-scale trading and processing operations could
well be the institutional norms. This concept has been used in a number of
studies on agricultural marketing, e.g. on potato in Egypt (Loader 1996), cashew
in southern Tanzania (Poulton 1998), cotton in northern Ghana (Poulton 1998a)
and cotton and wheat in Sindh province of Pakistan (Stockbridge et al. 1998).
Gow et al. (2000) using a case study on an agri-business in a transition economy,
have shown that in the absence or ineffectiveness of public institutions in contract
enforcement, use of “internal” private mechanism can have a significant positive
effect on output and efficiency of both the partners in the transaction.
Technology and institutions
Transaction costs change relative prices of technology and thus influence
technology adoption. North’s (1968) recognition of the fact that the same stimulus
did not always have the same effect led him to focus on the role of economic
institutions in shaping the capacity of economies to exploit the opportunities. His
emphasis on extreme sensitivity of the cost of transactions to institutional
arrangements, greater role of transaction sector in inducing technological change,
and role of ideology in creating a society receptive to technological change
needs greater attention in the context of technology development and spread in
agriculture. Institutions are devised to prevent transactions from being too costly
and thus, to allow the productivity gains of large scale and improved technology
to be realized (Bardhan 1989).48 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
The quality of institutions can affect technological progress. David (1997)
has discussed how take up of technology is constrained by “social capital”.
Analyzing technology adoption in industries where network externalities are
significant, Katz and Shapiro have (1986) observed that the pattern of adoption
depends on whether technologies are sponsored or not. As sponsored technology
has a strategic advantage and may be adopted even if it is inferior. The path
dependency theory advanced by Arthur (1989) and elaborated in the historical
context by North (1981) and David (1985), is concerned with the problems of
technological lock in which inferior products become established by virtue of
historical serendipidity.
According to Mokyr (2001), it is possible for an economy to be “struck” at
low level of income because the institutions are inappropriate for technological
progress. Existing institutions are filtering the emergence and diffusion of new
technologies. In the long run, some radical technological innovations seem to
call for epochal changes in institutions, but the success of those changes may
not always be guaranteed (Freeman (1986). Some specific characteristics
associated with a particular technology might be the causal force leading to
evolution of specific institutions. Markets as mechanisms of coordination do
not lead to the best economic performance in industries whose products
have technologies that are very complex and change very rapidly (Hollingsworth
and Boyer 1997). All these observations on interaction between technology
and institutions emphasize that the relations between technology and
institutions are bidirectional and not unidirectional, and this interaction
needs due attention in technology development and spread policies.
Evidences confirming this conclusion are available in agricultural sector also.
Helmberger (1966) found that cooperatives were in jeopardy given the trends
in technological change and the structure of agriculture. Conforming this
observation in the context of industrialized agriculture, Fulton (1995) has
stated that agricultural production has become less unpredictable (quality-wise)
because of technological change (development of varieties). The result is a
predicted decline in both family-oriented agricultural production and cooperatives.
Based on this observation he has suggested that certain co-operatives are more
likely to be formed than others, example being cooperatives in fruits and
vegetables, where the input provided by members is subject to unpredictable
variability.49 Institutional Economics- A Review
Sustainable resource use
In recent years, budget constraints brought into light the limits on the ability
of the state to address the negative externalities. Hence, more emphasis is
being laid now on collective management of resources. But in history, evidences
are there for both success and failure of collective actions. This is due to the
fact that communities themselves are dynamic, inducing dynamism in institutions
through which they gain access and control over resources. Changed institutional
settings offer changed choice sets to members of community and thus determine
ultimately the resource utilization pattern. Further, most of the natural resources
are subjected to ecological dynamism also. These realities call for attention to
institutions in sustainable management of resources by addressing (i) asymmetry
in perceptions (of different stakeholders), (ii) transaction costs issue (by means
of property rights), (iii) shaping and stabilizing expectations (i.e. reduction in
uncertainty) to influence investment in (conservation and improvement of
resources) long-term growth, (iv) poverty and low income issues, (v) interregional
and intergenerational externalities, (vi) imperfections in other markets, and finally,
(vii) catching up with dynamism in ecology and demography. Evolving institutions
of watershed management, participatory irrigation management, and joint forest
management, etc. are some examples of application of the theories of institutional
economics in sustainable resource management. Further interventions in other
related institutions like introduction of crop insurance (Junjie 1999) and suggestion
for regulating market power (Gopinath and Junjie 1999) are documented in the
literature to reduce use of chemicals in agriculture.
Poverty alleviation and growth
The debate on the effects of inequality on economic growth has sharpened
in recent years. One of the mechanisms through which inequality affects the
growth is that the productive opportunities might vary along the wealth distribution
with capital market imperfections (Ferreira 1999). The two prominent capital
markets with imperfections encountered in this mechanism are credit and
insurance markets. Barro (1999) reports that the negative effect of inequality
on growth is significant for poorer countries, but vanishes above a certain per
capita income threshold. These observations highlight the need for overcoming
these market imperfections not only from equity point of view but also for higher50 P A Lakshmi Prasanna
growth and poverty alleviation. The imperfections in these markets are due to
high transaction cost of lending and monitoring in the context of incomplete
information and moral hazards. To overcome these imperfections, institutional
innovations like micro-finance under group lending is being suggested, as it implies
lower transaction cost to lender and better targeting of clientele (Puhazhendhi
2000; Khandker et al. 1995; and Zeller 1998). However, applicability of this
concept in agricultural financing (in the context of high risk and seasonality
associated with the sector) is being debated and tested. Some evidences of the
successful operation are found in properly designed financing programs.
Effective formal property rights are needed for rapid economic development.
But as cautioned by North, efficient policies that are perceived to be inequitable
can stall or reverse effective reforms due to political considerations. This
underlines the need for institutional reforms which are efficiency oriented, socially
equitable and political sustainable (Brockmeier 1998). For example, interventions
in the form of creation of institutions, like management of common property
resources, can check even distress population migration (Chopra and Gulati
1998).
How to choose from institutional alternatives? The nature of goods and
services and development objectives help choose from institutional alternatives.
In the context of social services, Blank (2000) has provided some guidelines in
choosing institutional alternatives (Table 3). For example, under the situation of
Table 3. Models of public-private interaction by types of market failures
Institutional Externalities Distributional Agency Unobservable
alternatives concerns problems output quality
Public sector owns Yes Yes Yes Yes
and manages
Private sector owns and Yes Yes Yes Yes
manages with regulation
Private sector owns Yes Yes Yes Yes
and manages with
regulation and vouchers
Public sector owns and Yes Yes Yes Yes
private sector manages
Source: Blank (2000)51 Institutional Economics- A Review
externalities, distributional concerns and unobservable output quality, public sector
agencies have dominant role. On the other hand, in the absence of agency
problems and unobservable output quality, externalities of the private sector can
be managed with regulations. In between these two extremes, there is a lot of
space for public-private interactions.
Conclusions
The important conclusions that emerge from the foregoing discussion are:
1. Institutions though broadly categorized as formal and informal based on the
enforcement mechanism, are really multi-dimensional and embedded.
2. An appropriate institution is context-specific and sensitive to the aimed
objectives (i.e. its expected functions).
3. Markets are not the sole institutions to be relied upon under all situations.
4. Complementarity, compatibility or perfect fit between the prevailing and
new institutions is an important parameter to be considered in institutional
reforms/design.
5. Multi-dimentional nature of goods and services is to be considered while
looking for proper institutional design.
6. Technology and institutions are linked by two-way relations, contrary to the
traditional belief of institutions as fixed entities.
7. Sustainability in agriculture is determined by the dynamics of evolution of
ecology and institutions.
8. Interplay of economic and socio-political institutions determines the economic
performance.
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
ommon pool resources (CPRs) of land, water, forest, fisheries, wildlife and
agriculture constitute an important component of community assets in India,
and they significantly contribute to livelihood of people, despite their rapid depletion
and decline in the physical productivity (Singh 1994; and Arnold and Stewart
1991). All natural resources, including CPRs, are amendable to management
under various property regions, viz. state, private and collective community, etc.
Even a particular resource may be held under more than one property regimes,
or can be managed under distributed/shared management system (Townsend
and Polley 1995; Cox 1985; and Marothia 2002).  There is nothing inherent in a
resource itself to determine the nature and type of the property right, but it is
determined by social and institutional arrangements evolved and enforced by
the community to protect the resource (Bromley 1992; Jodha 2002; and Marothia
1993 & 2002).
Institutional arrangements play an important role in the management of
natural resources, in general and CPRs in particular, under any property right
regime. In the context of CPRs, institutions are defined as “collective action in
control, liberation and expansion of individual action” (Commons 1931). Thus,
institutions express the value system of a society and enforce it in the form of
working rules.  In other words, institutions are ‘working rules’ to order relationship
among individuals within a society, and structure incentives in human exchange,
whether social, economic or political (North 1990; Weimer 1995; Williamson
1994; and Dasgupta and Maler 1994).  The property rights or institutions are
part of the `cultural capital’ by which resource user communities convert the
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`natural capital’ (resources and ecological services) into `human-made capital’
or inputs of production. The cultural capital comprising social and institutional
capital (Coleman 1988; and Ostrom 1992) indicates how people in any society
view the use of natural resources and associated values and ethics, including
customs, norms, religion and culturally transmitted  knowledge (Folke and Berkes
1995).  The principles of working rules are critical to form social relationships,
choice of alternative policies, and governance in managing natural resources in
general, and CPRs in particular.
A number of scholars from different disciplines have documented the extent,
size, usages and contributions of CPRs to the livelihood system of the rural poor.
They have also identified the factors responsible for the degradation and depletion
of CPRs, and analyzed efficiency of alternative approaches for the governance
of CPRs. However, only recently, the focus shifted towards understanding the
role of institutions in the management of CPRs under property right regimes or
some combinations thereof (e.g. distributed governance) under different agro-
ecological and socio-cultural environments. Mainly, the Oakerson (1992) model
and its derivative forms are applied for analyzing CPRs in various parts of the
world. These studies, by and large, indicate that physical, technological, social
and institutional attributes affect the outcome directly or through shaping the
collective actions, which, in turn, can ensure efficient, equitable and sustainable
use of CPRs  (Bromley 1992; Ostrom 1992; Tang 1992; and Marothia 1993).
This article reviews the problems of CPRs management from an institutional
perspective. Specifically, the article describes the connections between institutions
and collective outcomes in the context of degraded lands, water resources,
land-use and irrigation systems, fisheries, biodiversity and community knowledge.
The consequences of changing institutions on sustainable use of CPRs are also
discussed.
Erosion of Institutions and Decline of Common Pool
Resources
During the last two decades, scholars from various fields have documented
the factors leading to the decline of CPRs in India in terms of area, physical
degradation and ineffective management systems. The important factors
responsible for the decline are demographic changes, encroachments, fragmented63 Institutions for Common Pool Resources
land holdings, land holdings in the vicinity of forests, tiny farm size, acquisition of
common lands by developmental agencies, increased pressure of outsiders on
common lands, and disintegration of social and institutional arrangements evolved
and enforced by rural communities to protect and manage CPRs. Economic
development with greater reliance on market forces and commercial interests,
commoditization of CPRs and unfavorable public policies have also resulted into
the decline of CPRs (for case studies, see Marothia 2002).
A number of studies conducted in different parts of the country clearly
indicate that erosion or collapse of the ‘social capital’ leads to decline of CPRs.
Once the ‘social capital’ depletes, CPRs become an open access resources and
the process of their depletion begins (Jodha 2002). Local social groups and their
customs have played an important role in designing informal institutional
arrangements for managing CPRs collectively. Over time, however, these
informal binders seem to loose their effectiveness, and as a result, voluntary
participation in resource  management is declining.  Also, due to the introduction
of elected village councils (panchayats) and derecognization of traditional social
arrangements and customs (social capital), the community lost collective stake
and control over the CPRs, and the culture of group action got replaced by
individualistic tendencies. All these led to disintegration of village community
and depletion of social capital (Gupta 1987; Jodha 2002; and Negi 2002).  Further,
most of the development programs undertaken by the government to restore
and conserve CPRs largely focused on financial and technical support without
recognition of local perceptions and traditional knowledge systems (Jodha 2002).
Understanding of the traditional institutional arrangements may serve as an
important step towards rehabilitation of CPRs as well as rebuilding of social
capital.
Changing Structure of the Institutions and Their
Consequences
Common lands
Apart from performing several useful ecological functions, common property
land resources (CPLRs) provide livelihood support to the rural poor. Rapid and
significant reduction in the extent of CPLRs, largely due to breaking down of64 D K Marothia
institutional arrangements, has brought down the ratio of uncultivated to cultivated
land. The problems and prospects of restoring the environmental health of the
degraded lands have been examined by several researchers.  The results have
indicated that under the traditional institutional arrangements, use of CPLR was
regulated through the measures like grazing tax, livestock lives payable during
ceremonies, and penalties for unauthorized use.  The tragedy of commons could
be avoided in the contemporary societies also through organization of social
groups and effective enforcement of social norms.
The efforts being made to regenerate the degraded CPLRs in the country
suggest that entire planning mechanism of the forest department may have to
be altered by putting the resources under community’s control, reducing the role
of forest department to provide technical and scientific support, and enforcement
of the formal institutions. The productivity of CPLRs has improved in several
parts of the country through innovative experiments undertaken by the non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), Tree Growers Cooperative Societies
(TGCS) and other organizations (Singh 1994).  However, with the improvement
in the productivity of CPLRs, the members of the development group themselves
press for privatization of CPLRs for value-addition activities. It is desirable for
sustainable management of CPLRs that the privatization or design of the new
institutional arrangements should be built around ethical codes of the traditional
institutions.  For example, regulated access to the fodder and fuel biomass under
the joint management of CPLR in the Aravallies has significantly improved the
distribution of benefits, which, in turn, has led to better standard of living. The
joint management of CPLRs has successfully created participatory management
institutions, facilitating equitable distribution of permanent assets and more
activities for women to enhance their socio-economic status. Furthermore, the
joint management has also increased enrollments in schools, promoted growth
of biodiversity and ensured sustainability of CPLR projects after withdrawal of
external support (Marothia 2002).
However, similar results in the joint management of revenue lands and
forests could not be achieved due to bio-physical, socio-economic and
technological constraints, and failures due to non-functioning of markets, weak
institutions and inadequate policy support. In order to mitigate fuel wood, fodder
and small timber scarcity and to achieve visible success in implementation of
the joint forest/land management, several reforms for enhancing the capacity of
the forest department are required.  These reforms should respond to local65 Institutions for Common Pool Resources
institutions, restructure rights and privileges over forest, streamline policies and
laws pertaining to non-timber forest products (NTFPs) and design appropriate
agro-forestry models (Saxena 2002).
The TGCS experience of reintroducing a decentralized system of
management of village common lands indicates that people have potential to
resolve land related disputes at the local level, and appreciate the value of
regenerating and utilizing the common lands in a sustainable manner. However,
politically motivated privatization of common lands and village level politics affect
this process adversely (Singh and Ballabh 1996).  Formulation and effective
implementation of a judicious land-use policy, periodic survey for land-capability
classification, simple procedures for land lease to grassroot institutions and
interdepartmental coordination are important for afforestation of wastelands.
Water resources
This section reviews the role of community institutions in harvesting and
use of rainwater, participatory water management in canal and tank command
areas, and technological, policy and institutional options to overcome the
management problems.  Strategies for the replication of the community-based
water management models are also discussed.
Rainwater harvesting and community institutions. Rainwater harvesting
can meet people’s basic water needs as well as improve food and livelihood
security.  Two comprehensive studies reported in Marothia (2002) indicate that
community participation is essential for the transformation process from a state
of ecological poverty to a state of sustainable economic growth.  In all the three
successful cases of Sukhomajiri, Ralegaon Siddhi and Tarun Bharat Sangh,
village-level organizations played a crucial role in developing institutional
arrangements and enforcing them for equitable distribution and sustainable use
of water resources. A multi-layered institutional structure was created in the
villages for decision-making and implementing the applied program with
participatory democracy rather than representative democracy (Agrawal and
Narain 2002). In another study of Shankerpura village in Gujarat state,
interventions by Sadguru Water and Development Foundation (SWDF) in
designing institutions to evolve rules and norms for sharing resources and reducing
conflicts, organizing people, building capacity, and bearing the transaction costs
associated with uncertainty of technology, and negotiation with government helped66 D K Marothia
out restoring livelihood system of the people (Ballabh and Thomas 2002). In
both the studies, it was suggested that to understand poverty-environment
interface in the management of CPRs, it was imperative to design integrated
village ecosystem with high order of democracy in decision making, create
appropriate community-based property rights, provide financial grants to village
institutions, and induce village institutions to raise fund by organizing their CPRs.
Canal irrigation and institutions.  Many success stories of irrigators
cooperative societies and water user associations  (WUAs) working in the
command area of river basins have been documented during the last three
decades. Shared resource management has been the key to success of irrigation
cooperatives/WUAs.  For example, the state Department of Irrigation facilitated
the formation of cooperatives and still maintaining the main water courses in the
command areas of the rivers of Tapi, Vkaikakrapur, Mala, Thindal and Partiganj
distributories of Tamil Nadu and Bihar, and Mahandi carved areas.  However,
designing and enforcing the internal institutional arrangements by the members
of the societies for equitable and efficient water distribution, recovery of irrigation
fee and maintenance and repairs are pre-requisites for successful management
of canal irrigation system beyond outlets (Mahapatra and Rajput 2002; and
Marothia 2002).  In some cases, WUAs also promoted group farming to enhance
the productivity of tiny farm holdings.
Irrigation tank. For several centuries, tanks have been central to irrigated
agriculture in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and
Chhatisgarh. Tanks are, however, disappearing fast because of decades of
siltation, poor organization and management, decline of compulsory labor
contribution (Kudimaramat) for the maintenance work, inadequate operation
and maintenance budget from government, meager revenue from tank-based
activities (social forestry, fisheries, duck and goat rearing, grazing leases), poor
collection of irrigation fee and growth of wells in tank command area. Most of
the tanks in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere have degraded into open access due to
weak institutional arrangements, property rights and breakdown of local authority
system (Vaidyanathan 1997; and Palanisami and Ramasamy 1997). The
government and international donors have devised programs to rehabilitate large
tanks.  The experience shows that three strategic elements are essential for
rehabilitation of irrigation tanks. Firstly, creation of a WUA at the tank level
with strong common property interests in the conservation of irrigation tank
with clarity of management rights, responsibilities and rewards. Secondly, creation67 Institutions for Common Pool Resources
of new sources of resource generation for sustained investment in maintenance
and repair of the tank complex through giving the rights to WUA over plantations
in water-spread area and tank bunds. And third, creation of upper tier organization
as co-ordinating structure which can lobby with government agencies for
resources and favorable policies.  In order to produce significant impact, the
tank rehabilitation program will need to search for ways to enhance relevance
of farmers organizations or WUAs and to discover an appropriate nay, creative-
response to the rise of well-irrigation which has emerged as the prime cause of
decline of tanks in much of south India (Shah 1993).  Similar strategies may be
designed to rehabilitate tanks in other parts of the country, and special attention
should be paid to numerous small tanks.
Technical and institutional arrangements for groundwater. Groundwater
accounts for over half of the total irrigated area in India.  The expansion of
groundwater irrigation was largely due to improved drilling and lifting technologies,
lower per unit cost of water pumping, massive rural electricity program, liberal
credit for exploring groundwater and subsidized supply of electricity.  The
productivity of irrigation in conjunction with chemical fertilizers and high-yielding
varieties (HYVs) is much higher for groundwater as compared to canal, mainly
due to less wastage of water and flexibility to adjust the timeliness and quantity
of water distribution to crops.  Until recently, the government policies of supporting
and promoting private groundwater development were widely acclaimed time
and again.  However, there is now a growing concern that the existing policies,
if continued, may lead to over-exploitation of groundwater, particularly in the
arid, semi-arid and hardrock regions of peninsular India. Further, under the private
property regime, water markets have emerged in many parts of the country
(Shah 1993).  The individual farmers are more concerned with their private
gains and costs, while completely ignoring the social cost of over-exploitation of
ground water resource (Joshi and Tyagi 1991; Dhawan 1995; and Vaidyanathan
1996). Efficient, equitable and sustainable use of groundwater can be achieved
through providing appropriate technological support for regulation of spacing of
tubewells, identification of aquifers, size of pumps, and control on the overall
rate of exploitation. This should be accompanied by the institutional arrangements
like rights over water, land tenure, users’ relationship, financial incentives, etc.
Ownership of groundwater is tied with the ownership of land, and the landowners
have right to extract groundwater beyond any limit until it is available. This
traditional dominance of private property regime needs serious rethinking for68 D K Marothia
judicious use of groundwater.  Property rights for groundwater are complicated
because of nature and size of aquifers and capability of more than one user to
tap the same aquifer.  Groundwater is thus neither a true open access resource
because the ability to extract groundwater is limited by well ownership, nor
common property resource because it lacks an identifiable group of users having
co-equal use rights (Ciriacy-Wantrup and  Bishop 1975).  Research and
administrative efforts are required to study various aspects of property regime
for groundwater and their adaptability in different agro-climatic regions. The
ecological, economic and equity gains of the property right systems could be
much higher than the investment needed for institutionalizing the system (Saleth
1994).  Legislative measures are also equally important to manage groundwater
and minimize environmental and equity problems in the long run. But, these
could be more effective if enforced with the support of appropriate local
organizations (Moench 1994). In order to develop new technical and institutional
arrangements, financial incentives currently provided for power, diesel and credit
need to be critically analyzed (Shah 1993; Dhawan 1995; Vaidyanathan 1996).
For example, groundwater can be efficiently managed through drip and sprinkler
irrigation technologies under common property regime. These technologies are
being adopted on a large scale by private landowners.  It is important to expand
the manufacturing capacities for sprinkler and drip irrigation systems to meet
their growing demand, as well as to keep the prices under check, so that the
financial incentives could also be availed by small farmers.
Fishery resources
Inland water fishery is managed under different property and management
regimes having direct bearing on socio-economic conditions of fishermen. The
property rights over river water rest with the state, despite the fact that it flows
through more than one states and is managed by different departments.  This
causes multiple conflicts in exploitation and management of riverine fisheries in
terms of resource investment in fish stock and fishing rights. Privatization of
riverine fisheries has created social and economic inequalities in many states,
and therefore, some kind of a central authority should be constituted for
development of fisheries in major rivers of the country flowing through two or
more states. Also, the Fish Farmers Development Agency (FFDA) needs
structural changes in its approach with respect to preferential allotment of pond69 Institutions for Common Pool Resources
water, and provide credit and technical support to fish cooperatives and fisher
groups (see also Marothia 1997).  Similarly, new institutional arrangements are
required to regulate the efforts and limit the fish harvesting to maximum
sustainable level in the estuarine fisheries, which are presently under an open
access regime.  The same holds true for the fisheries in floodplain wetlands,
which are under either cooperative or private management regime.  These
arrangements should be strengthened through re-examination of the lease policy
and revitalization of the cooperatives.
The need for innovative institutional arrangements is felt for shrimp farming,
which has spatial and temporal environmental externalities, as well as adverse
socio-economic impact within coastal ecosystem. Pumping of brackish water
and indiscriminate use of sub-terranean fresh water for hatcheries of shrimp
farms cause salinity, making fresh water unfit for irrigation and human
consumption. Coastal mangrove forests are also depleting fast due to shrimp
farming (Saleth 1997).  To internalize the externalities in shrimp farming and
promote efficient use of coastal resources, policy for coastal CPRs, market
interventions and institutional structures are called for.
Biodiversity
Sacred groves. The institution of sacred groves (SGs) to conserve biodiversity
dates back to pre-agrarian hunting stage.  The SGs are widely distributed in
various parts of India and provide a variety of cultural, social, economic,
ecological, health, psychological, religious and political functions to individuals,
clan and communities. The SGs encompass a variety of systems ranging from
truly private to community owned and managed groves. Unlike many CPRs,
SGs do not necessarily provide tangible economic benefits to the community but
instead provide a common socio-religious space which the community uses to
establish cohesiveness, identity, solidarity and well-being of inhabitants, including
crop and animals (Malhotra 2002). However, many groves are threatened
because of the weakening of traditional beliefs and cultural and biological
integration. We need to understand the process of and the factors responsible
for the shift in the traditional values and beliefs. To understand the changes that
are taking place in the institution of SGs, we need to develop approaches and
models which should help us in analyzing the nature of threats, both internal and
external, that are likely to destabilize the institutions of SGs rather than economic
models.70 D K Marothia
Table 1. Examples of institutional innovations for sustainable
management of common pool resources in India




(a) Grazing, Several innovative institutional  initiatives have been
panchayat, undertaken by NGOs, cooperatives and user groups
revenue, waste to institutionalize degraded CPLRs. Among the most
or porromboke successful ones are: The Gambhira Cooperative
land Farming Society (Gujarat), AKRSP (Gujarat),
National Tree Growers Cooperative Federation
(working successfully in several states), Ubeshwar
Vikas Mandal (UVM) in Rajasthan, Chakriya Vikas
Pranali (CVP) in Bihar, Indian Farm Forestry
Development Cooperative (in several arid and semi-
arid regions), village councils of Andhra Pradesh,
committees of Mukhias (Rajasthan), Fodder Farms
(Gujarat), Gram Vikas Mandals (Gujarat),
Participatory Watershed Development Program,
Collective action in salt-affected and waterlogged
soils.
(b) Protected and Joint Forest Management (in most of the Indian
reserved degraded States), forest protection  committees (West Bengal),
forest land Van Panchayat  model of UP hills (now in Uttranchal),
Village development committees (Himachal Pradesh),
hill resource management societies (Haryana), tribal
hamlet committees/Gram Vikas (Orissa), Village
Woodlots, Social Security Plantation and Forest
Farming for Rural Poor Programs of State
Department of Forest (working in several states of
India).71 Institutions for Common Pool Resources
Sl. Common pool Institutions for collective actions and governance
No. resources
2. Integrated Experiences of Sukhomajri, Ralegaon Siddhi, Tarun
management of Bharat Sangh, NM Sadguru Water and Development
land and water Foundation, PRADAN, Rajiv Gandhi Watershed
resources Development Mission and other NGOs working in
tribal regions (Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Orissa and
West Bengal) have been successfully replicated with
some adjustments suited to local agro-climatic
conditions.
3. Canal / lift Participatory Irrigation Management (Madhya
irrigation for Pradesh and Chhattisgarh), Irrigation Cooperatives
surface irrigation (Mohini Water Cooperative Society, Gujarat Shri
Datta Cooperative Water Management Society, and
Amrutvahini Life Irrigation Cooperative Society
Maharashtra), Water Users Associations (Andhra
Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Bihar, Maharashtra),
NM Sadguru Water and Development Foundation (life
irrigation network in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan), on-farm water management research pilot
project of ICAR/water and land management
institutes. Traditional Kuhls irrigation management
system still functioning as effective institution for
collective action in some parts of  Himachal Pradesh.
4. Irrigation tanks PRADAN and other NGOs have been working for
tank rehabilitation through collective action in Tamil
Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Rajasthan, Orissa, West Bengal and Chhattisgarh.
5. Groundwater Pani Panchayats (Gram Gaurav  Pratishthan,
Maharashtra), Tube well Cooperatives and  irrigation
companies of   Kheda and Mahsana of Gujarat.
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6. Multi-purpose A few community institutions have mobilized local
village ponds participation for de-silting and sustainable
(domestic use of management. These village ponds are in a large
water for village number in the states of Chhattisgarh, Orissa,
population Jharkhand, and West Bengal. However intensive
livestock, fresh efforts are required for collective institutional
water aquaculture) innovations. Local NGOs can play important role in
institutionalizing these water bodies in coordination
with Panchayat (for example Tagore Society for
Rural Development).
7. Non-timber forest NTFPs: Madhya Pradesh Minor Forest Products
products Cooperative Society Model.
8. Inland and marine The Pong Dam Reservoir  Cooperative Management
fisheries Society in Himachal Pradesh, Captain Bhery
Fishermen’s Cooperative Society in West Bengal, The
Marine Fishermen’s Cooperative Societies in Kerala,
Marine Fisheries Cooperative Societies Karnataka,
and The Marine Fishermen’s Cooperative Societies
of West Bengal. Traditional institution of fisherfolk
groups  is still functioning under collective governance
in marine and inland fisheries in coastal and non coastal
areas of the country.
9. Coastal CPRs A few examples of people’s movement/collective
protest and legislative interventions are available for
arresting the degradation of coastal CPRs (i.e.
Ministry of Environment and Forest, The Supreme
Court of India Intervention to internalized  the negative
externalities  due to  shrimp farming  on coastal CPRs).
In terms of  institutional initiative,  this is a gray area.
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Medicinal plants. Conservation of medicinal plants has not been accorded
due attention by researchers and policy makers while addressing the land-based
CPRs. In the context of the new economic policy and the regime of World
Trade Organization (WTO), conservation and sustainable use of medicinal flora
will be directed and enforced by the interplay of property and patent regimes
(Ved 1997). Analysis of the magnitude and dimension of the trade and trade-
related benefits and costs is difficult, unless frantic efforts are made to unearth
10. Traditional Shared management/ participatory conservation of
ecological protected areas (experiences of Keoladeo National
common Park, Bharatpur; Dalma Sanctuary, Bihar; Kailadevi
knowledge and Wildlife Sanctuary, Rajasthan;  Rajaji National Park,
biodiversity Uttranchal). Very effective community-based
conservation institutions for management of sacred groves are
functioning in  Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Karnataka,
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkand,
Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh,
Orissa, Uttranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Meghalaya, Sikkim
and other north eastern state. For medicinal and
aromatic plants, village- level institutions for traditional
medicinal system, and Ayurvedic institutions still
effectively working in tribal areas. Traditional/
indigenous knowledge of tribal and local communities
are being incorporated currently in the National
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan at state level.
The traditional knowledge is being synthesized with
scientific knowledge to recover biological and
intellectual commons in several states through  NGOs
working in tribal dominated areas.
Note: The table is primarily based on the case studies  reported in Marothia (2002),
Singh (1994), Singh and Ballabh (1996), and Arnold and Stewart (1991).
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them. The approach for conservation and sustainable use of medicinal plants
should be location-based and context-specific. It must consider the synergistic
relations among economic, institutional and technological factors which determine
the conservation and propagation strategies of medicinal plants in forest and
non-forest CPRs and on cultivated lands.
Protected areas. The protected areas are affected by the continued existence
of conventional rights of local people, such as livestock grazing, harvesting of
timber, collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs), etc. Tourists also use
the protected areas for recreation and education, while scientists use them for
research.  Each of these uses creates a set of stakeholders with limited rights
over the protected areas.  Kothari (2002) suggests that only a partnership among
conservationists, communities and social activists, and the empowerment of
ecosystem-dependent communities can withstand destruction of wildlife and
habitats. Changes are, therefore, needed in the conservation policy, law and
administration to allow for a much more participatory system, which is respectful
of both the needs of wildlife and the rights of humans.  Such changes will have
to integrate relevant community knowledge and practices, customary laws and
local institutional structures, government agencies, etc. However, such a
conservation strategy requires empowerment of local people, trust between
authority and local people, and political will to overcome socio-economic and
cultural constraints. There are several examples of people and resource
communities addressing such hurdles and creating opportunities for shared
resource management. For example, the Sikkim Biodiversity and Ecotourism
Project has shown that collaboration between public and private sectors, as well
as local communities in a participatory design can conserve biodiversity assets
of global significance.
Intellectual Property Rights and CPRs
With the provision of patents and intellectual property rights (IPRs) into the
domain of biodiversity under the WTO, a potential threat has been posed to the
biological and intellectual heritage of our diverse communities by appropriating
and privatizing their knowledge. Shiva (2002) argues that a pluralistic IPR regime
with strong legal framework should be evolved which makes it possible to
recognize and respect indigenous knowledge system and protects the livelihoods75 Institutions for Common Pool Resources
based on it through the prevention of biopiracy. Entitlements, equity, sustainability
and justice are built into usufruct rights since ownership is based on concepts of
return on labor. Whereas IPRs on plant genetic resources or products derived
from them convert the survival resource held in common by the poor into the
monopoly of the rich and powerful.  Often this appropriation is done under the
projects for ‘bioprospecting’, which, in fact, leads to the enclosure of the biological
and intellectual commons.  In the context of IPRs, it is necessary to evolve
community intellectual property rights (CIRs) related to biodiversity to balance
and set limits for IPRs and on the monopolies of transnational companies (TNCs)
(Gupta 1999; Gadgil and Utkarsh 1999; and Mishra 1999).  Community’s control
over the common resources is the only real mechanism for ensuring sovereign
control over the natural resources.  The legal precedence of biodiversity as
commons has already been established by the provisions of the Panchayat
(extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act.  This implies that any IPR regime that
relates to biodiversity has to have a mechanism of institutionalizing CPRs for
respecting indigenous knowledge of people, protecting biodiversity and preventing
biopiracy.
The importance of community property rights and reconciling the system
of common knowledge of indigenous communities with modern approaches to
the management of natural resources are gaining importance. Development of
the documents such as the People’s Biodiversity Register, that takes advantage
of the crucial methodological advances of the modern fast track science to
confer dignity on and enhance the utility of the slow track indigenous knowledge
could serve as  a useful tool in such an endeavor. Full benefits of such an
integration would, of course, flow only when supported by the systems of open,
public participation in the management of natural resources and a just sharing of
benefits flowing from relevant commercial applications (Gupta 1999; and Gadgil
and Utkarsh 1999).
Conclusions and Policy Implications
This article has discussed the role and effectiveness of institutions in
sustainable management of CPRs.  The discussion has also flagged the prospects
for redesigning or creating new institutions. It is now conclusively established
that the process of CPRs depletion begins with the collapse or erosion of the76 D K Marothia
social capital or informal institutions.  Development program for CPRs largely
failed due to lack of understanding of the social capital, which is critical for the
management system of CPRs. In addition to the existence of appropriate
institutions, which facilitate the effective functioning of the management system,
willingness of the community to reform the existing institutions in the changing
socio-cultural, economic and political environment, and collective enforcement
of new rules by customary authority are also important.
Community mobilizes and NGOs play a catalytic role in designing multi-
layered technical and institutional innovations intended to solve or alleviate
ecological poverty through community participation in the management of CPRs.
The community-based experiences have been adopted by many government
organizations, and institutional mechanism developed by the communities and
NGOs have been successfully replicated. Change in the mindset of politicians,
bureaucrats, resource management agencies and village-level institutions are
the common features of successful replication of the community-based institutional
innovations. The property right regimes, particularly their structures, enforcement
and linkages with social and ecological systems, have a central role in the
management of CPRs.  Without well-defined property rights system and its
effective enforcement, the management systems of CPRs have failed in the
past. Further, it is also important that no single type of property rights regime
can ensure the rehabilitation and sustainable management of CPRs. Relative
merits of a range of institutions in conjunction with alternative property rights
regimes and CPR under consideration guide the management system. General
consensus is, however, in favor of joint or decentralized  system of CPRs
management, which requires clear understanding of the distribution of the rights
and responsibilities among  and within the states, resource industry, private owners
and local communities.
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atershed program is reckoned as the engine of agricultural development
in the fragile and marginal rainfed areas. Since the Seventh Five Year
Plan, the Government of India has been according high priority to the rainfed
areas, after realizing that the impact of  green revolution in the irrigated areas
was gradually fading away. The serious drought of 1987 further justified
investment needs in the rainfed areas. As high as 65 per cent of the total
agricultural land in the country is rainfed. Watershed program was viewed as
the only program which could face the emerging and complex challenges of
rainfed areas — high poverty, huge unemployment and acute degradation of
natural resources. Until 1987, several pilot projects on watershed were
implemented in different agro-ecoregions of the country. Over different plan
periods, the nature and scope of watershed program was modified and these
were tuned to encourage more of peoples’ participation.
In the past, several useful studies have been conducted to assess the impact
of watershed programs, and examine the extent of peoples’ participation (for
seminal reviews, refer Chopra et al. 1990; Marothia 1997; Deshpande and
Thimmaiah 1999; Hanumantha Rao 2000; and Ratna Reddy 2000). The available
watershed evaluation studies have provided useful insight on the performance
of numerous watersheds but have not attempted to assess the patterns of multiple
benefits from watershed programs across regions, sizes and types, and extent
of peoples’ participation.
This paper attempts to analyze the earlier studies, and provides some logical
conclusions on the performance of watershed programs and peoples’ participation
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at aggregate level. It also identifies conditions for larger participation of the
stakeholders in the watershed activities. More specifically, the objectives of this
study are: (i) To document the benefits of watershed program in different regions
of the country, (ii) to assess the role of peoples’ participation in the success of




The study is based on the meta-analysis. It is the analysis of analyses. The
meta-analysis is relatively a new methodology. The purpose is to collate research
findings from previous studies, and distil them for broad conclusions. Meta-
analysis can be helpful to policymakers, who may be confronted by a number of
conflicting findings (Alston et al. 2000). The meta-analysis has earlier been
applied to assess the returns on investments in education (Lockheed et al. 1980;
and Phillips 1994), and to understand the implications of certain medical treatments
on offspring (Mann 1996). Recently, it was diligently applied to measure the
returns on research investments at the global level (Alston et al. 2000). In the
present study, an attempt has been made to amass the available micro-level
studies, which evaluated the watershed programs and assessed peoples’
participation. These micro-level studies have been critically reviewed and
analyzed for upscaling the conclusions to stipulate the macro-level picture of the
watershed benefits and peoples’ participation.
Watershed programs were launched with three principal objectives of
improving efficiency, equity and sustainability in the rainfed areas. To document
these benefits, a few proxy indicators were chosen and analyzed. The benefit-
cost ratio and the internal rate of return (IRR) were used as proxy for efficiency
gains from watershed programs. Additional employment generation in agriculture
as a consequence of watershed activities was assessed for equity benefits.
Four important indicators were identified to demonstrate the sustainability benefits.
These were: (i) Increased water storage capacity, which augmented the irrigated
area, (ii) increased cropping intensity, (iii) reduced run-off, which enhanced
groundwater recharge, and (iv) subsided soil loss.83 Impact of Watershed Program and Peoples’ Participation
Watershed programs have a unique characteristic of collective action of all
the beneficiaries and the stakeholders. Therefore, peoples’ participation becomes
very critical to determine the performance of any watershed program. In the
present study, peoples’ participation has been documented as high, medium and
low with respect to various activities at different stages of the watershed
programs. Intensity of peoples’ participation was related with the multiple benefits
derived from the watershed programs. This exercise also drew lessons for
institutionalization of collective action.
Data
Numerous studies have been conducted to evaluate the performance of
watershed programs, covering the entire country. These, therefore, represent a
wide range of environment according to their agro-ecological location, size and
type of watershed, source of funding, rainfall, regional prosperity/backwardness,
etc. Under the present study, an exhaustive bibliography was prepared of the
studies which evaluated watershed programs, and thus could scan 311 case
studies. Complete bibliography is available with the authors and may be obtained,
if desired. These studies were published as either research articles or research
reports. There are, however, many more studies, which could not be traced.
The meta-analysis calls for a large number of studies; more the studies, higher
the reliability of results.
Results and Discussion
Benefits of watershed programs
Watershed programs have been specifically launched in the rainfed areas
with the sole objective of improving the livelihood of the poor rural households,
who encounter disproportionate uncertainties in agriculture. Their income levels
are meagre and their plight is further compounded by acute degradation of soil
and water. The Government of India has aggressively intensified watershed
program in fragile and high-risk ecosystems, where the farm incomes have
markedly descended due to excessive soil erosion and moisture stress. It was
viewed that the watershed programs would bring ‘second generation green84 P K Joshi, Laxmi  Tewari, A K Jha, and R L  Shiyani
revolution’ in the rainfed areas by providing appropriate technological and financial
support.
The watershed programs were located across different agro-ecoregions.
These were planned, developed and implemented by various agencies. The
available literature repletes that the past investments in watershed programs
have yielded the desired results of raising income levels, generating employment
opportunities and conserving soil and water resources. A summary of the multiple
benefits reported in the numerous studies is illustrated in Table 1. It can be seen
that the mean benefit-cost ratio of watershed program was quite modest at
2.14. This revealed that investment in the watershed programs under fragile
and uncertain rainfed environments yielded more than double. There were about
15 per cent watersheds having benefit-cost ratio more than 3 (Figure 1). Only
less than 3 per cent of the watersheds were reported to have benefit-cost ratio
less than 1. The mean internal rate of return on watershed investment was
about 22 per cent, with a maximum of 94 per cent. This rate is quite comparable
with any of the successful government programs. It was interesting to note that
there were 35 per cent watersheds, which yielded more than 30 per cent internal
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performed very poor; the internal rate of return being less than 10 per cent.
These evidences suggested that the watershed programs performed reasonably
well in the fragile and uncertain environments. The investment was logically
justified, as it significantly raised the income levels of the beneficiaries in the
target domains.
Another important purpose of the watershed programs was to generate
employment opportunities and through that alleviate rural poverty and reduce
disparities among rural households. The mean additional annual employment
generation in the watershed areas on various activities and operations was about
181 man-days per hectare. It was as high as 900 man-days per ha in the
watersheds with multiple activities. Generating employment opportunities for
the rural poor means raising their purchasing power, and in turn, alleviating rural
poverty. Based on these observations, the watershed investment may be
characterized as a poverty alleviation program in the fragile areas.
Rainfed areas are confronted with acute problem of land degradation through
soil erosion, and high risk in agriculture. Technological interventions through soil
and water conservation can largely overcome these eventualities. The watershed
programs are mainly aimed to conserve soil and water to raise farm productivity.87 Impact of Watershed Program and Peoples’ Participation
The available evidences revealed that both these objectives were accomplished
in the watershed areas. Soil loss of about 0.82 tonnes per ha per year was saved
due to interventions in the watershed framework. Conserving soil means raising
farm productivity and transferring good soils to the next generation. On water
conservation, it was noted that on an average about 38 ha m additional water
storage capacity was created as a result of watershed program. Augmenting
water storage capacity contributed to (i) reducing the rate of runoff, and (ii)
increasing the groundwater recharge. These have direct impact on expanding
the irrigated area and increasing the cropping intensity. On an average, the
former has increased by about 34 per cent, while the latter, by 64 per cent. Such
an impressive increase in the cropping intensity was not realized in many surface
irrigated areas in the country. These benefits confirm that the watershed programs
performed as a viable strategy to overcome several externalities arising due to
soil and water degradation.
The above evidences suggested that the watershed programs have
successfully fulfilled the three principal objectives, viz. (i) raising income level,
(ii) generating employment, and (iii) conserving soil and water resources. These
benefits will have far reaching implications on the rural masses in the rainfed
environment. The results of meta-analysis further showed that the benefits vary
depending upon the location, size, type, rainfall, implementing agency, and peoples’
participation, among others.
Peoples’ participation and benefits from watersheds
Peoples’ participation in planning, developing and executing the watershed
activities is indispensable. It calls for community participation and collective
action. It is necessary because individual choices have collective consequences
in the watershed framework. Action of one group of farmers at one location
affects adversely (or favorably) the other group of farmers at different location.
Often the different groups and locations have conflicting objectives with respect
to their investment priorities and enterprize choices. These needs are to be
converted into opportunities. The action of all the farmers in the watershed
should converge in such a way that the positive externalities are maximized, and
the negative ones are minimized. To achieve this, the community or stakeholders
have to develop their own rules, which resolve their conflicting objectives. It is
believed that a better organized and an effective peoples’ participation would88 P K Joshi, Laxmi  Tewari, A K Jha, and R L  Shiyani
yield higher benefits. A summary of the results on peoples’ participation and
benefits from watersheds are given in Table 2. The available evidences have
confirmed that there existed a positive relationship between peoples’ participation
and benefits from watershed programs. The benefit-cost ratio was much more
(2.4) in watersheds where peoples’ participation was high in comparison to
those watersheds which had low participation (1.24).  The other impact indicators
were also far ahead in watersheds having a greater peoples’ participation.
It was interesting to find that the benefits from watershed programs were
conspicuously more in the low-income regions than in the high-income regions
(Table 3). The benefit-cost ratio was 2.46 in low-income regions and 1.98 in
high-income regions. The corresponding figures for annual employment generation
were 175 and 132 man-days per ha. The low-income regions call for such
investments to enhance income levels of the rural poor. This suggests that
watershed program should receive a higher priority by the government in the
low-income regions. Such investments will not only raise income and employment
opportunities in the low-income regions but also contribute to conserving soil
and water. In a recent study, Fan and Hazell (1997) have demonstrated that the
returns on investment in inputs as well as research at the margin were higher
for the dryland areas than for the irrigated areas. Farmers in these regions could
not invest due to low income and limited opportunities. Government intervention
through watershed programs would benefit the rural poor in the low-income
regions. Ironically, the participation of beneficiaries in planning and execution of
the watershed was observed to be less in the low-income regions than in the
higher income regions. This implied that poor rural households were less involved
in planning and decision-making processes in the watersheds. However, these
rural poor have been offering their services in various activities launched in the
watershed. In fact, for the small farmers and the landless laborers in the
watershed, there is often little prospect for development from the watershed
works beyond the employment gain during the project period (Farrington et al.
1999). Perhaps a greater involvement of the beneficiaries would yield higher
dividends from the investments in watershed-related activities.
These evidences revealed that peoples’ participation was the key
determinant in the success of the watershed development programs.  Peoples’
participation is not only critical during the implementation phase of watersheds
but also beyond the actual investment phase. In the absence of active involvement
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Conditions for Peoples’ Participation
Traditionally, the watershed programs in the country have been supply-
driven. The Central and State governments have been allocating resources for
watershed development. Subsequently, the officials used to identify locations
for these programs and prioritize various activities for implementation. Such an
approach did not match the needs of stakeholders in the watershed. In the
absence of peoples’ participation, the potential benefits of the watershed programs
could not be realized. Recognizing this, the concept of the Participatory Integrated
Development of Watershed (PIDOW) was initiated in the 1980s. This qualified
partial success. Overtime, the peoples’ institutions, like Zila Parishads, self-
help groups, and watershed implementing committees were gradually involved
in the project management system. With allocation of more funds for watershed
development, several non-governmental organizations came forward to
aggressively participate in implementing this program, and demonstrated the
importance of peoples’ involvement in the success of the watersheds. Most of
these arrangements were informal and varied across watersheds and
implementing agencies. To make it formal, the 1994-watershed guidelines
specifically included peoples’ involvement as one of the conditions in the
watershed development. More important was the observation how peoples’
participation come forward voluntarily. And in reality, it is only the voluntary
participation (not forced one) that would sustain the watershed program. It is,
therefore, important to identify the conditions under which the watershed
beneficiaries would involve themselves in its implementation, both during the
project tenure and later in maintaining it when the project is formally over.
Demand-driven watershed approach
Demand-driven watershed activities will attract peoples’ participation more.
Once the watershed is identified, the needs of the stakeholders must be assessed
jointly by the implementing agency and the stakeholders. Since there are diverse
groups of beneficiaries in the watershed, their needs should not be overlooked.
There are often reports that only influential and large farmers were involved,
neglecting small and marginal farmers. Besides, there have been evidences that
most of the watershed programs were not sensitive to the needs of women and
landless laborers. Most often, these groups were silently left out of watershed92 P K Joshi, Laxmi  Tewari, A K Jha, and R L  Shiyani
related decision-making processes. Attempts to integrate small and marginal
farmers, women and landless laborers into the process require conscious efforts
right from the beginning. It is, therefore, necessary that the need assessment of
the stakeholders should be a precondition in designing and developing the
watershed activities.
Self-help groups
The second stage of peoples’ participation comes when various interventions
are made. At this stage, a regular monitoring is required. The success of a
watershed depends on how effectively the stakeholders monitor the progress.
There are reports from some of the successful watersheds that informal groups
were constituted there to regularly monitor the watersheds’ activities. These
groups were of different forms. In some watersheds, for example, the formal
users’ associations were formed. These associations have been found to be
economically viable, and contributed significantly in managing the common pool
resources in the watershed areas. A new concept of ‘Mitra Kisan’ or ‘Gopal’
has shown mixed results across different watersheds in different states
(Deshpande and Thimmaiah 1999). Similarly, in a few watersheds, the
participating farmers formed the ‘thrift groups’.
Success of the watershed program will rely on not only the institutions, but
also the effectiveness of credit and input delivery systems, output markets, and
technology transfer mechanisms. A strong linkage of watershed program with
various institutions would yield the desired outputs. Effective linkages between
self-help groups or users’ associations and various institutions would outlast the
watershed program.
Decentralize the decision-making process
Decentralization of decision-making processes can also contribute to the
success of the watershed program. This, however, is possible only if there is
flexibility in the process. Often it is noted that the rigid norms do not allow
decentralization of decision-making. To some extent, involvement of elected
representatives of the people (MLAs and MPs) in the development process
may ease the process. There are reports that in Madhya Pradesh, a conscious
effort is being made since 1995 to involve the elected representatives of people.93 Impact of Watershed Program and Peoples’ Participation
Greater involvement of local MLAs, MPs and representatives of the Panchayati
Raj institutions may assume significant role in project planning and execution,
since they are the ones, who would like to take political mileage from the success
of developmental programs, like watershed.  In this process, they become party
to the watershed and can be voted-out in the event of tardy progress.
Target poor regions
The poorer regions should receive higher priority in getting watershed
programs. In these regions also, the relatively backward villages should be given
higher attention in the watershed program. Overall, the prioritization of
stakeholders in poor regions was not sought effectively. It should be ensured
that the stakeholders must be involved during planning and execution of the
watershed. The observation from a few watersheds in low-income regions was
that the households generously participated in the program to increase the farm
productivity and income levels. The landless  laborers have incentives in the
form of more jobs in the rural areas, and the women folk, for fetching water and
fuelwood from the watershed area. There are reports that a well-knitted
participatory approach even checked the migration of rural youth.
Commensurate benefits and costs
As stated earlier, the actions of individuals have collective consequences.
There are many conflicting objectives among the stakeholders. In a watershed
framework, the benefits do not commensurate with the cost incurred and the
labor put in the watershed activities. Sharing of benefits in accordance with the
cost will go a long way in sustaining the watershed program. For example, in the
watershed framework, the farmers located at the upper reaches have to invest
more but gains of this action are more to farmers at middle or lower reaches
(Joshi et al. 1996).
Training of stakeholders
Training of beneficiaries is another key element for the success of the
watershed program. The stakeholders must be aware about the importance of
various activities in the watershed, as well as their benefits in terms of economic,94 P K Joshi, Laxmi  Tewari, A K Jha, and R L  Shiyani
social and environmental impacts. Many actions by the stakeholders in the
watershed are being accepted out of ignorance; these adversely affect the income
and environment of other stakeholders and locations. Educating all the
stakeholders would minimize such actions and maximize benefits from the
watershed. Both, the Hanumantha Rao Committee and Sri Eshwaran Committee
have strongly recommended the need for training of all stakeholders in the
watershed. These recommendations must be adhered for making the program
more participatory and successful.
Summary and Conclusions
The paper has documented the benefits from the watershed programs by
collating information from micro-level studies and providing a macro dimension.
The benefits have been assessed in terms of efficiency, employment and
sustainability. It has been noted that the watershed programs have been raising
income, generating employment and conserving soil and water resources. The
analysis has further shown that the benefits of the program have been more in
the poor income regions than in higher income regions. It has been suggested
that the watershed program could be a vehicle of development to alleviate poverty
by raising farm productivity and generating employment opportunities in marginal
and fragile environments.
The benefits of watershed programs have been more where peoples’
participation was higher. It has been found that peoples’ participation is important
not only during the phase of implementation of watershed development activities
but also beyond the actual investment phase. In the absence of users’
involvement, the watershed programs are likely are likely to fail.  The important
conditions of peoples’ participation have been related to (i) demand-driven
watershed programs rather than the supply-driven, (ii) involvement of all
stakeholders (including women and landless laborers) in program implementation
and monitoring, (iii) decentralization of decision-making processes, (iv) involvement
of elected representatives and Panchayati Raj Institutions, (v) commensuration
of benefits of all stakeholders with cost, and (vi) establishing effective linkages
between watershed with other institutions, like credit institutions, input delivery
system, and technology transfer mechanism.95 Impact of Watershed Program and Peoples’ Participation
Watershed program has been reported as one of the most important
strategies to bring socio-economic change in the rainfed system. In some of the
regions, it has silently revolutionized the agriculture and allied sector through
various technological interventions, particularly soil and water conservation, and
crop diversification. It is reported that for watershed program, location-specific
technologies are available. There is an overwhelming policy and political support.
It is postulated that the only problem is lack of appropriate institutional
arrangement. This has been a major obstacle in attaining the potential benefits
of watershed programs. It has been argued that earnest efforts to enthuse
stakeholders for their voluntary participation would sustain watershed
development and bring prosperity in the rainfed areas.
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he technological changes in the mid-1960s brought forth the importance of
irrigation along with seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and improved cultivation
practices. During the last two decades, the role of subsidies and expenditure on
irrigation has become an important issue in the academic debate and led to the
thinking of transfer of irrigation management to the users. The transfer of irrigation
management has to be seen as a means to reduce pressure on the State finances
and address environmental sustainability. The issue of management of irrigation
has become prominent from two important point of views. The first view is that
the irrigation sector continues to consume a large amount of budgetary resources
and has remained far from self-supporting. The net returns to investments have
not been commensurate with the efforts made. In addition, the pricing of resource
has also remained sub-optimal for quite some time, and this has led to compounding
inefficiencies in the sector. Secondly, irrigation being the largest user of water,
its influence on environment and resource degradation has created a deep
concern. It has been reported that large amount of land is degraded mainly due
to inefficient use of water, and this has inflicted cost on both the sides, namely
on the slowing down investment in the sector and in the resource use pattern.
Inefficiency in resource use is caused by exogenous and endogenous factors.
The former refers to the organizational structure of irrigation department, whereas
the latter includes farm-level inefficiencies. All these factors have led to a strong
view of transferring irrigation management to the user groups. With this
background, the concept of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) became
stronger and even policy decisions are being taken to expedite the process of
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
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transfer. In this paper, we attempt to analyze the institutional aspects of irrigation
management as reflected from the literature and through a few case studies.
Our attempt here is to analyze the role of institutions under different settings
and property regimes. The focus is on the sustainability of the institutions.
Technology and Growth
In the theory of production economics, technological change shifts production
function upwards. The inducement for growth thus comes through the change
that takes place in production and its composition. But, the path that induces
growth through technology has an important aspect of institutional facilitation,
which is overlooked often. The presence of institutions actually facilitates the
conduit. In any economy, the process of transformation through technology has
a strong interface with the existing as well as emerging institutional structures.
Similar is the case of changes that have occurred through the technological
revolution of the mid-1960s. In a common parlance, the Green Revolution in
India is attributed to the miracle seeds, use of fertilizers and pesticides, availability
of irrigation and cultivation practices. It should, however, be noted that along
with the technological change that has prevailed in the process of agricultural
growth, a significant share was contributed by the institutional change that has
taken place. Thus, technological change is often induced either by practice or
through an external force, whereas institutions are formed (if not already existing)




Any development process comprises three levels. The first stage begins at
the preparation for the process of development that essentially requires inducing
growth in the first place. Availability of investment and resources for achieving
such growth is an important component at this stage. The second step is to
ensure the quality of growth and its structural placement. In other words, the99 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
two stages together involve identifying the weak and the strong spots of the
economy and ensure that the resources are used in proper direction. The third
stage is a crucial one, which translates growth into development through existing
or newly evolved institutions. This transfer remains only as a component of the
growth process but the role of institutions is quite crucial. Thus, the failure of
translation of growth into development rests on the institutions.  This has been
brought forth historically in different case studies by North and Thomas (1970)
and North (1990). Institutions in the general understanding are the rules governing
any social and economic process. These can be formal institutions initiated and
directed by the state, or informal institutions established by the stakeholders or
emerged through cultural dynamics. In the context of irrigation, institutions include
the laws, administrative arrangements for operation and maintenance of irrigation
systems, institutions associated with the use of land, labor and capital in irrigation
systems, and interface of the stakeholders in terms of informal institutions. It is,
therefore, clear that the institutions governing irrigation sector have three different
actors, viz. the state and state governed laws, the interdepartmental linkages in
irrigation administration (Revenue and Irrigation Departments), and private
property regimes in terms of land ownership and tenancy contracts. In this
entire framework, the institutions intervene exactly like technological parameters
in shifting the production function upward, but unlike technological change,
institutions do not alter the physical quality of resources. Informal institutions
generally interface with resource allocation and government laws, and the
stakeholders. Such an interface essentially creates a kind of reaction, depending
on the property regime, people involved, and the state control. Institutional theory
helps in answering many of these issues where an interface occurs between the
state initiated structures and the user groups. Focusing on costs and benefits,
incentives and penalties to individual actors, institutional analysis demonstrates
the economic rationality of co-operation and possibility of co-operative equilibrium
outcomes from the competitive games (Ostrom 1990; and Sengupta 1991). The
institutional economics provides answers to some important questions like “What
are the conditions wherein individuals realize the necessity of collectiveness and
under what conditions they will co-operate?” For example, it helps to explain
the conditions under which farmers are willing to act collectively for the
management of irrigation. The institutional economics, therefore, offers the
possibility to generalize the theory of co-operative actions which developmental
agencies require in generating predictable outcomes from planned inputs.100 R S Deshpande and G Mini
Historical evidence of institutional interventions
It has been an experience since the beginning of this century that institutions
have played an important role in enhancing growth, attaining better distribution,
and increasing economic welfare.  In the early part of twentieth century, the
formation of institutions essentially with the state initiatives was not as common
as it became after the independence. Cooperatives, labor institutions and legal
framework were made stronger during those days. However, during the pre-
independence days, the informal institutions were quite strong.  These included
social institutions like caste, family, village religious groups, sect groups and
other such institutional bodies. Traditional village institutions also played a
significant role. Among the village institutions, land ownership rights, village
functionaries and their economic rights, social hierarchies depending on
economical hierarchy, etc. were the prominent ones.  Similarly, the traditional
institutions governing natural resources were also quite significant. In the post-
independence period, initially the community development institutions at village
level were established, and the development process was centred around the
community development network. This was followed by a strong initiative towards
obtaining an egalitarian land distribution through a series of reforms in the land
market.  Thus, land reforms came up as a recognized institutional intervention.
The evidence shows that we achieved mixed results on land reforms across the
states.  Whatever may be the measure of success, it is quite clear that the land
reforms could eliminate the intermediaries, protect the tenants and change the
agrarian structure to a large extent.  Close on the heels of land reforms were
the reforms in the rural credit system as well as the price policy. All these led to
a sea change in the rural institutional structure. The traditional village institutions
managing natural resources including water were quite prominent. For instance,
irrigation was managed through Phad system in the west, whereas it was
managed by Khudimarammat in the south. These traditional institutions emerged
in the socio-cultural milieu.
Irrigation: Participation and Institutionalization
As mentioned earlier, irrigation sector has the inefficiency syndrome for
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expected returns from the investment made in the sector.  This is mainly due to
high operation and maintenance costs of the system.  The second important
reason for the inefficiency is indiscriminate use of water due to the absence of
proper information and guidance.  Such information should be provided to water
users by either the state governments or the public institutions established for
this purpose. The functioning of irrigation sector is controlled by three institutional
regimes. First is the administrative mechanism of the state. The second institutional
regime pertains to the village-level institutions that are of formal nature. The
third institutional regime refers to the water users associations (WUAs); these
can be of either formal type established with the state support or informal in
nature, initiated and established by the users themselves. Literature suggests
that the lack of horizontal integration between different levels makes it difficult
to ensure efficiency of the irrigation system.  In such a case, a few important
aspects of the formation of institutions are quite crucial to improve their
effectiveness.  We discuss below a few of these.
Collective action and irrigation management
The importance of institutional arrangements in water planning and
management has been increasingly recognized. But what makes individuals come
together for collective action? Collective action is used to describe the process
and consequences of individual decisions to voluntary co-ordinated behavior. In
reality, individuals associate themselves for a collective action under uncertainties
with an objective to search for the solutions. The individual not only gets an
identity but also security in the process of collective action. Since individuals
face a number of problems insolvable on their own, they tend to come together
to find solutions and this becomes an immediate necessity rather than a choice.
There are various schools of thoughts to explain collective actions. The
first (and the most recent) draws on the institutional economic analysis of local
forms of collective action to derive generalized principles for collective action.
This analysis uses formal models derived from the theory of repeated games to
challenge the dominant thesis on the unfeasibility of collective actions among
rational self-interested individuals. The second school emphasizes the force of
tradition, social rights, value systems and moral codes in generating and preserving
co-operative management of resources to ensure, among other things, the
minimum food security for community members. Collective dependence on local
resources is often institutionalized in religion, folklore, and tradition.102 R S Deshpande and G Mini
These two schools of collective action arise from two strongly established
traditions in social sciences. Even then, the contrasting schools of ‘rational choice’
and ‘moral economy’ construct rather similar images of collective action. In
‘rational choice’ associated with Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith, a person is
first of all a rational self-interested individual (Homo economicus), While in
‘moral economy’ associated with Durkhem, a person is firstly a social being
(Homo socialogicus) guided by social norms and then only an individual. The
collective behavior is modeled in the moral economic framework; there it is
argued that under the pressure of risk aversion farmers develop collective social
insurance mechanism.  It has been argued in the literature that Scot’s assumption
of a risk aversion, or ‘safety first’ are not necessarily the only reasons of
collective action, and Fenny (1983) has argued incorporation of market as an
important factor for collective action.  Therefore, in any analysis of collective
action, the immediate issue is the study of conditions under which collective
action emerges, becomes effective, and is sustained over time.
Unmediated effects
The conceptual framework to develop collective action keeping in view
water resources has been developed and depicted in Figure 1. WUAs are formed
through the synthesis of physical, technical, social and economic parameters.
Policy and agency inducing such formations support these parameters, but all
these act at different levels. Initially, the technical and physical parameters decide
the formation. This is supported and reinforced by the other four components.
In addition, the formation of an institution is decided mainly by the homogeneity
of the community involved.  It is a direct function of the interests and matching
of these interests among the members of the institution.  The formation of WUAs
has also a strong link with the performance of the irrigation system and the
condition of the resource, which, in turn, decide the sustainability of WUAs.
In any system of irrigation management, the concerned groups can be
categorized into three important hierarchical groups: (i) Public administration or
the organizing agencies like the Command Area Development Authority (CADA)
or Irrigation Department, (ii) Local level organizational structure like Zilla
Parishad, and (iii) Farmer groups and individual farmers, their interests,
aspirations and limitations.  The transfer of irrigation management from
government to the WUAs implies, to a large extent, the failure of the interface103 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
Figure 1. Factors affecting the role of Water Users Associations in
















































































at these three levels.  Researchers believe that the irrigators have an untapped
wisdom and local knowledge, which can help in taking a quicker and more
effective decision.  More than that this will also manage the supply situation
more effectively. In order to understand the possibility of shifting from a publicly
managed irrigation to a participatory management of irrigation, mapping of the
community and farming systems, reaction of the community concerned and the
net gains of collective action are essential requisites.  Gordon (1987) while
elaborating the social aspects of irrigation development brought forth these issues.
Irrigation management through the community participation requires fuller
understanding of the social engineering in that region. Jamie Morrison and Ian
Carruthers have established that imposition of organizational structure may be
occurring in the enthusiasm to transfer irrigation management to the stakeholders.
This, they argue, should not be occurring without any regard to the existing
institutional setting, and that failing to take note of such institutions may bring the
performance of PIM below the expectation. The management models can not
be imposed from the top or outside. Such reforms must come from the bottom104 R S Deshpande and G Mini
and with a full understanding of the existing community structure.  If there is an
imposition of sets of rules and organizational structure formed by the irrigation
researchers generalizing on the understanding of a few communities, it will face
difficulty in enforcement mechanism.
Formation of WUAs
The process of formation of WUAs emerges through different theoretical
constructs. As discussed earlier, the moral economy framework and the collective
action framework are predominant factors.  Social engineering, scarcity of
resources, inability of the state to ensure fair distribution and increasing
inefficiencies in resources use contribute towards organizing an user association.
In the context of an irrigation system, the WUA originates from either an external
initiative (i.e. state or NGO initiated), or from the indigenous efforts of the
water users. The difference in the two approaches is that the former will be
more legalistic and formal, whereas the latter will be informal and fragile. The
process goes through three stages: (1) Felt need (by state, NGO or by
stakeholders), (2) external conditions, (3) internal structure, and (4) the formal
process.
The pressure of inefficiencies due to the earlier management practices,
improper distribution of water, poor maintenance of the system, economic non-
viability and inefficient use together provoke the initial process. External factors
decide the structure and functioning of WUAs, which include (a) physical and
technical aspects of the irrigation systems, (b) social and economic contexts in
which they operate, and (c) government and policy forces which regulate the
WUAs and the irrigation system. All these factors together set in the precondition
for the emergence of a WUA.  But these can not be independent of the internal
structure of the proposed association. The internal structure includes contours
of the proposed structure, legal and enforcement framework and the process of
conflict resolution. Thus, the process of emergence is dictated by these
components.
Generalization versus local specificity
In India, the WUAs originated either through initiatives from a few NGOs
functioning in these regions or by the interested individuals. A large number of105 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
Box 1. Factors affecting structure and functioning of Water Users
Associations
External conditions Internal structures
● Physical and technical factors ● Origin
● Water scarcity ● Membership definition
● Technology and infrastructure ● Size
● Social and economic factors ● Leadership roles and specialization
● Market penetration ● Socioeconomic heterogeneity
● Farmer incentives ● Rule enforcement
● Financial viability ● Water distribution
● Local social organization ● Conflict resolution
● Policy and government factors
● Policy environment
● Legal framework
● Agency structure and incentives
them, in search of a tight legal framework, got registered as registered societies
under the Societies Registration Act or the State Co-operatives Act. This ensured
a continuum of the state control in a different form. In fact, the very establishment
of such users’ association faces difficulties when the state functionaries refuse
to share their responsibilities with others (Lele and Patil 1994). Experience from
Andhra Pradesh is, however, different, where the State Government through its
functionaries initiated steps to form WUAs (Raju 2000). It is an accepted fact
that with the initiative from the state, the WUAs will be more stable but one
cannot opine about their efficiency and effectiveness. Theoretically, as Vedeld
(2000) puts it, ‘village polity and its nature in terms of political homogeneity or
heterogeneity decides the sustenance of the group.’  It is possible to form a
group induced under the state efforts even under politically heterogeneous
situations, but its sustenance is doubtful.  As an alternative, if the collusion and
collective action germinates out of the pre-formation constraints and without
any external force, it remains more stable. Jean-Jacques and Jean-Charles (1997)
argued that let the collusion take place and only at that moment collective action
on the part of the actors is feasible. This requires the agents to have two sets of
information, namely, the information about the mutual and collective requirements,
and the contours of mismanagement in the earlier regime. All this leads to the106 R S Deshpande and G Mini
fact that organizations are readily feasible, largely effective and stable over
time if these are formed with complete information about local-level problems.
Property regime
Any collective action is associated with the typologies of property regimes
under which it originates. In a private property predominant resource, the
collective action does not originate unless the pre-conditions are very strong.
The conflict resolving mechanism established by either the state or the state-
sponsored agencies does not function satisfactorily in a private property regime.
The sustenance of collective action is also jeopardized in a private property
regime unless the external conditions are not sufficiently strong in binding. In
the private property regime, the required conditions for initiating collective action
will require the failure of the state and/or the market in the process of conflict
resolution. More than that the message should go very clearly to the actors
(participants) that the state/state agencies have failed in resource management.
Any collective action stemming out of private property regime, therefore, should
have a better conflict resolving mechanism and a clearly defined framework.
Formation of an users’ association in the domain of common property
resource or open access resource is not as difficult as that under a private
property regime. However, if the ownership status is of mixed nature then the
stability of the user group gets affected.  In a purely ‘non-private ownership’
situation, the feasibility of users’ association is dictated mainly by the inability of
the state in ensuring the welfare of the user groups and conflicting/provoking
interventions of the state. The social engineering of the formation of an users’
association becomes much easier in the common property regime mainly due to
five reasons: (1) There are no conflicts of ownership, (2) State is not the solely
dictating partner, (3) Formation of the users’ association relaxes the state control,
(4) Local level flexibility is feasible in organizing the institutions, and (5) The use
rates can be clearly defined (see Deshpande and Nikumbh 1993).
The Evidence from Field
On the background of the framework developed above, we have taken up
a few case studies to emphasize the precondition for the emergence, process of107 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
formation and characteristics for sustenance of WUAs. We have attempted
case studies from three different domains, namely, the associations in canal-
irrigated region, tank-irrigated region and groundwater-irrigated region. The
rationale behind viewing the collective action from these three dimensions is to
bring forth variations due to different property regimes.  In surface irrigation,
the State has a stronger control on formation as well as sustenance of a user
institution. To some extent, tank command areas have private as well as public
control on the emerging institutions. We come across a tank command area
managed by the minor irrigation department or by village communities. Private
individuals rarely own a tank and the management of the tank with private
ownership is quite sporadic. In contrast to these two situations, the groups sharing
groundwater have a complete private ownership on the system.  Thus, we here
have for discussion these case studies.
Surface irrigation: institutionalization in a state regime
WUA: Gundur case. WUA functioning in the village Gundur of Koppal district
was chosen for the study since it is one of the few associations functioning
actively in the command area, that provided a useful laboratory for the study of
collective action. Farmers’ comprehension of the principles of water management
suggested that poor management leads to excess of water availability in some
areas and deficiencies elsewhere.  This strengthened a collective action in
Gundur. The benefits of an organized and justified sharing of water played an
important role in determining the strength of the association. It was the water
scarcity in the presence of poor management that forced the farmers to maintain
sub-distributory and field channels collectively by undertaking weeding and
desilting once in a year before the on-set of irrigation season. Since they did not
receive grants from any source, the association itself generated financial and
technical assistance. Collective action thus relates to the benefits they receive
from the maintenance, and the stress on resource distribution.  Along with the
irrigation infrastructure, the facilities for transport and communication also
facilitated the activities by making it easier for members to meet, travel along
the system and monitor the compliance.  All the members of the association
grow only paddy, since they feel that it is the only assured crop, and with good
roads and connections the farmers have better access to markets. Hence, the
market penetration has increased the economic returns to agriculture, and thereby,108 R S Deshpande and G Mini
the incentives for farmers to participate in WUA.  Other social institutions, such
as the village Panchayat and the milk cooperatives are functioning quite
successfully in the village. This has increased people’s experience in forming
and participating in the voluntary associations. Thus, we expect this to be a
stronger WUA, where there are many other local social organizations playing a
supportive role.
More than any other single factor, the long-run sustainability of the association
depends upon sufficient incentives to farmers to participate. This includes more
efficient and reliable water delivery, control over water management, augmented
farm productivity and farm income, empowerment of farmers, etc. The viability
of the association is partly due to the process of farmers making investment in
maintenance and cleaning of nalas. They have no hesitation in paying water
charges to association as well as to the revenue department. Some of the farmers
were even of the opinion that water rates could be hiked to promote better
management of water.  This association is stronger in spite of the fact that the
group is heterogeneous in terms of social  background and assets. Both the local
and migrated farmers are members of this association. The usually held view is
that the farmers who are economically and politically strong are the ones who
play a dominant role as far as the water use is concerned.  But this view does
not hold true in the case of this association. This is because the incentives to
sustain the cooperation are much stronger than the causes that lead to its
breakdown.
Leadership for the association came from the tested hands in the community
in whom people had reposed trust and confidence. The office bearers of the
association have proved their worth by past performance like getting the
association registered, contributing money during shortage, conflict resolution,
etc., and they share the same egalitarian structure and interest with other
irrigators.   Farmers are of the opinion that there should be government support
and involvement in providing legal framework, technical and organizational training,
monitoring and regulating externalities, marketing facilities, credit, financial support
for major rehabilitation work, etc.
As the members of the association live in a single village, the disputes are
generally settled in the context of shared dependency and loyalty. Although
there are sporadic instances of violation of cropping pattern, water-related disputes
are very rare.  Financial transactions and records are open for verification.  A
few farmers verify the records and the verification is recorded with their signatures109 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
or thumb impressions. Therefore, transparency and accountability together have
strengthened the collective action. Effectiveness of the association in encouraging
members to contribute to group effort revealed that given a conducive
environment, timely and reliable water supply and political leadership, groups
will emerge and survive where a critical mass of individuals have practical
knowledge of the potential gains from the collective action.
There are a few interesting points that emerge out of this case study. The
association was formed by the stakeholders under the stress conditions caused
by mis-management of water distribution system. The scarcity of the resource,
good understanding of the technology, availability of infrastructure and market
links helped the formation of the group. Its viability and strength was derived out
of the incentives in terms of a justified water distribution system as well as a
good leadership. Despite the fact that the group is heterogeneous, it has developed
a sustainable mechanism for conflict resolution and enforcement of rules.
The case discussed here had the benefit of users’ initiative even though it
worked in close association with the irrigation bureaucracy.  Here, the
administration was an involuntary partner and had little influence on functioning
of the group. But, we have deliberated below about the groups, which were
initiated at the intervention of the irrigation department.
WUA formed by the Command area development authority (CADA).  In
order to ensure proper supply of water in the tail-end area of the project in
Raichur and Bellary districts, 16 WUAs were formed with the initiatives of
CADA. A central sector scheme was formulated (to form WUAs) and
implemented to meet the establishment cost and other contingent expenses during
the initial stage of the society. Financial assistance in the form of managerial
subsidy for a period of three years was also budgeted. Study undertaken to find
the functioning of the WUAs revealed that all the associations have become
defunct. A number of factors are responsible for the failure of these WUAs.
Water did not reach the tail-end of the project due to indiscriminate use of water
in the head region of the distributory system, and the sub-distributory systems
had become inoperative. As a result, neither the agency nor WUAs were able
to prevent crop failure. As water became scarce, even perfectly coordinated
actions and investments could not solve water shortages, and thus, these cases
provided insignificant motivation for the collective action. Also, the sub-
distributory system became inoperative, due to non-availability of technology
and infrastructure, which further reduced the incentives for the WUA activities.110 R S Deshpande and G Mini
This reflected on the sustenance and financial viability of the WUAs. Neither
CADA officials nor their nominees to the association spent time with the irrigators.
No emphasis was given to help the farmers to identify their problems, bring out
alternative solutions and assist the irrigators in identifying appropriate strategies.
This failed the formation and sustenance of the group. If the WUAs have to
function, immediate repair and rehabilitation of the canal system should be
undertaken by the irrigation department.  And the rehabilitated canal system
should be handed over to the associations, which would generate income by
charging for water use, and this would be an incentive to maintain the system
efficiently.
Finally, since the irrigation agencies are traditional engineering organizations,
the professional reward is always identified with the design or efficient
implementation of physical projects and not in the routine operation and
maintenance (O&M) or dealing with farmers’ demand. This ultimately resulted
in the failure of collective action. In the absence of pressure from the user
groups, this was neither attempted nor feasible.
Financial assistance by way of managerial subsidy for a period of three
years given by CADA provided incentives for sixteen WUAs to be registered.
However, after three years of checkered functioning, the efforts declined both
in quantity as well as intensity.  While non-receipt of salary dampened the
enthusiasm among the employees of the association, the difficulties in procuring
water made the members of the association lose faith in the group functions.
The Tungabhadra project also presented a similar picture and WUAs created in
a top-down administrative fashion generally lived a short life.
Tank irrigation: interface of public and private regimes1
Traditionally, tanks were one of the important sources of irrigation and were
usually managed under village-level institutional arrangements.  Tanks also served
as a major source to recharge groundwater. But tank irrigation has been declining
at a very rapid rate. Among the main reasons for neglect of this source of
irrigation are the property ownership patterns, absence of sufficient funds for
O&M, abolition of village institutions and transfer of tank administration to the
1
We are grateful to Dr M. J. Bhende for discussing the case with us.111 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
Table 1. WUAs formed with state initiative and failed to sustain
Name of WUA Taluka Year of Area of Extent Number
regist- operation of land of
ration (ha) farmers
(A) Bellary District
1. Jowka Hospet 1991 D2,5R,7R 825 200
2. Mannur Sugur Sirguppa 1991 Sugur dist. 1018 100
3. Amarpur Bellary 1991 D-15-L 1325 200
4. Bandral Sirguppa 1992 D-2,1R,2Dp 503 100
5. Karur Sirguppa 1992 D5,5R,6R, 1000 100
8R,7L,9L,10L
6. Kolur Bellary 1992 13/9 of 243 100
RBHLC
7. Andral Bellary 1992 D-15-L 1440 200
8. Chaganur Bellary 1992 D-34 488 100
9. Balkundi Sirguppa 1998 Not available 480 100
Total 7322 1200
(B) Raichur District*
1. Dhadesugur Sindhanur 1990 D-36/5B 799 100
2. Somalapur Sindhanur 1992 D-32-19 1000 100
3. Diddigi Sindhanur 1992 D-54,10L 800 100
4. Manvi Manvi 1992 D-85/6 1000 100
5. Gadar Raichur 1992 D-104-A 501 100
6. Sindhanur Sindhanur 1993 D-54 550 100
7. Belliganur Sindhanur 1996 D-54,10L 875 100
Total 5525 700
Total of (A)+(B) 12847 1900
Source: CADA, Munirabad
(*Note: from November 1997, Raichur district has been divided into two districts: Koppal
district and Raichur district.  Raichur district is undivided here).112 R S Deshpande and G Mini
minor irrigation department (Thippaiah 1997). The selected case studies relate
to Mullaskere-Arenahalli tank, which comes in Periyapatna taluka of Mysore
district of Karnataka.  The catchment is 17 sq. km and water spread is 7.2 ha.
The tank has a command area of 18 ha and canal length of 1 km. The problem
includes siltation at a very fast rate, breaches in making them defunct, canal and
improper functioning of sluices. Vegetation (weeds) have infested even the tank
bed, reducing its water holding capacity. There was an attempt to form a group
to repair the sluice, bund and canal on the initiative of an influential farmer
having land under the command area. They could repair some of the breaches
and enhance the water flow. But, the attempt was short-lived and the problem
surfaced again. Now, as the maintenance of the tank has been handed over to
the Zilla Parishad, the villagers (irrigators in the command area) have made a
representation to the Parishad asking for rehabilitation of the tank.  However,
a more serious factor responsible for neglect of the tank is installation of bore-
wells by some of the farmers in the command area. These farmers are least
bothered about the repair of the tank as they get sufficient water for irrigation
through bore-wells.  Thus, in a typical mixed property regime between the state
and private ownership, the incentive to start a user group is quite negligible in
tank-irrigated region. The maintenance of tanks rests with either the minor
irrigation department or the Zilla Parishad. Also, there are not enough funds
earmarked for the maintenance purpose. An alternative and more efficient source
of irrigation (bore-wells) is available which comes under private ownership,
thereby having little incentives for collective action.
Groundwater irrigation: managing in a private regime
The initiative for groundwater development and use has always rested with
individual farmers exploiting and using the resource at their own will. This has
led to the abuse of the resource in a spatially and temporally differentiated
manner, resulting in inequity, inefficiency and interference. The direct participation
of the government in groundwater development has been limited to state tubewell
programs. The government institutions dealing with groundwater like the Central
Ground Water Board, State Ground Water Departments, the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), etc. have been playing the
role of observing institutions rather than monitoring bodies. Therefore, we have
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of different intensities. As regards the ownership, groundwater presents a typical
case of ownership. The key feature that distinguishes groundwater markets
from other forms of irrigation is that water pumped is the property of the pumper.
But a water seller neither owns nor produces the water he sells, in effect what
the water sellers do is to lease or sell the service of their irrigation equipment
and enjoy ownership rights over the community groundwater resource (Shah
1993).
It is the ownership of a groundwater extracting mechanism (WEM) that
decides the access as well as the ownership, and therefore inequity in the access
has been one of the typical problems. As a natural resource, groundwater should
be shared by all users. Equal rights over groundwater resources are not being
enforced effectively for all members of the community; hence the owners of
WEM are able to usurp others’ share without having to compensate the
community. This causes the problem of well interference in the absence of
equal access, and results into a variety of contractual relationships. For example,
in many parts of Gujarat, it is for a well owner to lay underground pipelines
through neighbours fields at his own cost, and dissuade them from establishing
their own WEMs by informal long-term contracts for the supply of water at
mutually agreed prices (Shah 1998).
Large water sellers are known as water companies–7 to 150 partners jointly
owning and operating a WEM; they invest primarily for selling water to other
farmers. This is being attempted in some parts of the country.  In Narsanda
village of Kheda district (Gujarat), a co-operative tubewell has been in successful
operation since 1952.  The association controlling it has been selling water to
members and non-members at different rates (but lower than the market prices),
has distributed bonus to members, and has been competing with the neighboring
private sellers. However, another such co-operative tubewell started in Bamroli
by the leaders of the Narsanda co-operative themselves, failed.  Similarly, in
Mehansa and Ankalav (Gujarat), water companies have proliferated and are
doing well–more professional in managing business, keep regular accounts, issue
printed receipts, distribute profits at the year end, etc.  In Navli and neighbouring
Karamsand village of Kheda district in Gujarat, the sellers made efforts to unionize
in the late 1960s and a pump owners association was registered which still
exists, but later on, the well owners started pursuing their individual interests
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Groundwater- Pani Panchayat as an institution of collective action
‘Pani Panchayat’ was started on the background of the severe drought of
1972/73 in the state of Maharashtra. A forum of industrial technologists was
organized under the leadership of Shri Vilasrao Salunke in the Western
Maharashtra to suggest ways and means to deal with the drought situation.  The
group went around the drought-affected region and felt that only collective action
can help to mitigate the effects of drought.  Similarly, they also wanted that
drought preparedness could be organized in a similar manner. The choice was
quite difficult.  Maharashtra being a hard rock aquifer region, groundwater was
not plenty in supply so that each farmer could dig irrigation well. Water impounded
in the percolation tanks was to be utilized and the natural feasibility was to get a
group organized to share groundwater.
As a first step in the process, a trust under the name Gram Gaurav
Pratishthan (GGP) was registered in the year 1974, and it leased-in a 16-ha
plot of land on a long-term basis at Naigaon in Saswad taluka for the work.  It
had set the following objectives for the drought preparedness and sharing of the
resource (GGP 1983):
(1) To provide initially relief to the farmers of Purandhar taluka (Pune district)
by improving their economic conditions and mitigating the cause of droughts
recurrence.
(2) To create facilities to raise social and economic conditions of the people in
this taluka.
(3) To conduct research studies in socio-economic conditions, so that the urban
interests could be linked with the process of creating integrated rural
development.
(4) To do all such lawful things as are conducive or incidental to the attainment
of all the above aims and objectives.
The experience of the Naigaon farm from 1974 to 1979 and a continuous
thinking about the GGP’s objectives gave rise to certain principles in water
sharing.  Shri Salunke started a co-operative lift irrigation scheme with the initiative
of the farmers. The initial scheme was started at Naigaon itself.  The following
seven basic guidelines were formulated to run the scheme (GGP 1983; and
Kolhe et al. 1986):
(1) GGP would help in formulating lift irrigation scheme for the cohesive groups.
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(2) Sharing of water would be on the basis of the number of members in a
family and not in proportion to the land owned by them.  Every household
would get water rights to the maximum of 2.5 acres with an allocation of
0.5 acre per capita.  The land in excess shall remain under rainfed conditions.
This particular clause incorporated the principle of equity in water sharing.
(3) A beneficiary shall not have exclusive rights to irrigation.  These will not be
attached to the land.  If the land is sold, water rights shall revert back to the
Trust.
(4) Initially, all the members would contribute 20 per cent of the capital cost in
cash, and the balance 80 per cent will be provided by GGP in the form of
interest-free loan (wherever, subsidy was not available), or 50 per cent
would be met from the government subsidy and remaining 30 per cent
would be given by GGP as interest free loan.
(5) A landless laborer would also share water on a similar basis. He could
enter into a contract with the cultivator and use his water rights on that
land.
(6) High water consuming crops like sugarcane, banana and paddy will not be
included in the cropping pattern of the beneficiaries.
(7) The project should be entirely administered by beneficiaries with the help
of ‘Panch Committee’ from among them.
With these principles and the administration by the beneficiaries, the first
scheme started functioning in 1979.  The functional steps in the Pani Panchayat
scheme were simple and easy to operate.  Once the beneficiaries decided to
form a lift irrigation society, they had to prepare the guidelines for operating the
society. These included the record of rights, cropping pattern, issuing of no dues
certificate from bank/village accountant and a consent letter.  An account was
to be opened in the bank jointly with a representative of GGP and Gat Pramukh
(group incharge). A Panch Committee was formed which was to acquire the
necessary land for pump house, pipelines, etc.  A sevak (worker) was appointed
by GGP to operationalize water distribution according to the fixed time table
prepared by the Panch Committee. The Panch Committee was to resolve the
difficulties, problems and tensions amongst the beneficiaries. It was also expected
to ensure the recovery of Pani Patti (water charges fixed on crop/acreage
basis) and the contribution towards the loan advanced by GGP.
The basic philosophy of Pani Panchayat is to share water on certain
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in three different ways.  Firstly, every one in the group shares the concern
about the principles laid down. Therefore, it is rarely that one comes across
the violations of the regulations. Secondly, the scheme is operated on
horizontal rather than vertical administrative principles.  This binds the
partners into a theme of mutual development. Thirdly, GGP’s help is always
available on a large number of technical and other matters. This fosters the
tie between the nodal agency and the scheme (see Deshpande and Reddy
1990).
The Pani Panchayat movement had faced a rough weather some
time back and the momentum came down. Three factors were primarily
responsible for this situation. The first hurdle came in the form of a parallel
lift irrigation scheme promoted through government programs. This scheme
also had the advantage of subsidy. It was, therefore, quite natural for the
rich elements of the society to take advantage of the state-run scheme,
rather than forming a group on the basis of the Pani Panchayat principles.
These principles would not serve the interests of those who are influential in the
society and consequently, in the Government mechanism. Secondly, the scheme
involves curbing of private profits and use rights of a group and promoting of the
same in another group, the weaker sections. Any such social engineering
approach would confront difficulties because of the neglect of the interests of
the ‘haves’.  Pani Panchayat was not an exception to this.  There are certain
examples where outside elements had taken interest in blocking the spread of
the scheme. Lastly, a resource-based scheme can not remain away from its
politicization.
The success of Pani Panchayat was in the form of the spread of the
scheme and its effective implementation over the years. Theoretically, the success
of Pani Panchayat can be attributed to the process of social engineering
through which it was established.  As a first step, there was severe stress on
the resources and the stakeholders came together under the agreement to share
it.  The second important aspect was the structure of the institution, wherein,
three segments worked in close collaboration with each other. The Panch
committee monitors the conflict resolution and ensures participation. The ground
rules guarantee the benefits, rule out the possibility of outliers and ensure
sustainability of the institution. The process is thus a well-set process and likely
to sustain.117 Institutions for Management of Irrigation
Sustenance and Economic Viability
Preconditions and intra-institutional structure
The emergence of an institution passes through two important domains,
namely, the pre-conditions of the emergence and the intra-institutional factors
that are conducive to its establishment.  The pre-conditions necessarily require
the earnestly felt needs by the stakeholders.  Such needs arise out of either the
stress conditions imposed by the earlier system of management or the material
changes that occur in the process.  In the literature, the homogeneity of the
group is stressed as one of the important prerequisites in forming an institution.
However, there is a strong relationship between the felt needs and the extent of
homogeneity in the group.  These are selected inversely as, even under an
extreme stress, the most heterogeneous group will come together in order to
form an institution.  It is, however, a different matter to discuss the sustenance
of such a group over time.  Another important issue that comes for discussion
here is the condition that defines an acceptable stress level by the group in
terms of resource sharing.  The extent of departure from such acceptable stress
level generates the favorable conditions for existence of an institution.
The intra-institutional requirements for sustenance and economic viability
of an institution include quite a few factors.  Among these the important ones
are the definition of membership and the role of members, mechanisms set in
order to resolve conflicts and enforce the basic institutional trade.  The qualities
of leadership as well as the financial stake also count as important intra-institutional
pre-conditions.  The size of the institution matters significantly as the larger
institutions have lesser control and multifarious leadership has to balance the
conflicting interests.
Extra institutional and regime-specific conditions
Sustainability of any institution in a medium-term perspective hinges upon
the threat perception from within and outside the institutional domain. The extra-
institutional factors include economic and social factors of the region. Market,
financial institutions and other local organizations have a significant impact on
the sustainability of a resource-using institution. The policy environment and the
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on the sustainability.  Specifically, the extra-institutional conditions are location
related and have a clear interface with the society. Technology, infrastructure
and interaction of the state with the institutions decide the pattern and the process
of the emergence of an institution.
Economic and financial stability
Stability of an institution and its sustenance depend upon the financial control
that the institution exercises on its members.  This linkage is more important
from the point of view of achieving the long-term sustainability. If the financial
matters are transparent and beneficiaries have adequate information about them,
stability of the institution is more assured.  Similarly, negative externalities that
emerge out of the functioning of the institution may jeopardize not only the
financial stability but also the economic viability of the system.  In this process,
relationship between the partners, namely, the state, members of the institution,
market and other local organizations has to be carefully observed.
Optimizing the gains
Sustainability of an institution relates directly to the process of optimizing its
effective components.  As mentioned above, the stakeholders in the formation
and sustenance of the institution include the state department of irrigation,
beneficiaries of irrigation, individuals who are not members of the institution but
depend on the same resource and other social and financial institutions in the
region.  The optimization of gains will require a clear understanding of gains
from the formation and sustenance of the institution and how these gains are to
be shared by the stakeholders. Sustainability automatically ensures optimum
gains to its partners.  We hypothesize here an existence of an ‘inverted U’ type
of relationship between water scarcity and returns to organization (Figure 2).
Here, we have defined the returns not simply in monetary terms but
also in terms of aggregate welfare gains. When water supply is plentiful, there
is a little reason for farmers to organize. As water becomes scarce, even collective
actions cannot address water shortages, and thus, the benefits from organizing
are extremely low. Therefore, benefits of the organization are high during the
situation of moderate water scarcity. The relation between the external condition

































incorporating this relationship, it is possible to get more insights into the effects
of the external conditions (physical and technical, social and economical, policy
and governance) on people’s behavior regarding water use. Such an
understanding is significant for a better maneuvering of the influence of social
forces on the actions of water users within a community, and therefore, it is
indispensable for searching institutional solutions to the problems of resource
management.
Conclusion
The paper is an attempt to understand collective actions and formation of
institutions in three different property regimes for irrigation water. An institution
is basically a mechanism to help enhance the allocative and production efficiency.
Thereby  its presence and impact are recognized in terms of a shift in production
surface, almost of a similar type as that of technological change or infrastructure.
Figure 2. Relationship between water scarcity and returns to an
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The irrigation institution has been chosen as a platform for the analysis, since
water has been a focal point of many conflicts at the micro and macro levels.
The functions of water institution will involve a host of requirements such as
efficiency in resource use, allocative efficiency, environmental interface,
sustainability and resolution of conflicts. But all these functions alter according
to property rights regimes and local-level conditions. The three case studies
bring forth the minimal role of the state-initiated institutions, strong interface
between an institution and property rights regime, and factors leading to
sustainability of the water users’ institution.
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 mammoth fresh water crisis awaits future generations of India. The emerging
water crisis is not the result of natural factors but has been caused by
improper management of water resources, pollution of both surface water and
groundwater and the shortcomings in the designing and implementation of
institutions which address these problems. The intermittent natural factors such
as droughts, etc. compound and exacerbate human failures.  In this overview
paper, an attempt has been made to assess the present and future requirements
of water by various user sectors such as household, industrial and agricultural.
Water crises in this paper have been defined at three levels. First, water scarcity,
which means gap between supply and demand under the prevailing legal,
institutional and price arrangements. Second is the water shortage, which denotes
the absolute concept indicating low levels of water supply relative to the minimum
levels necessary for basic needs. Finally, water stress which signifies acute
water shortages for prolonged periods, hampering economic growth and
development. It is important that these distinctions are recognized for evolving
appropriate policy response to mitigate water crises.
The paper has three sections which follow the Introduction. The first deals
with the existing and potential needs of water at the aggregate level and identifies
areas of water scarcity at the regional level. Even in those areas where water is
abundant, good quality water is not available for domestic purposes due to
improper management, leading to soil erosion and drying up of traditional water
streams and fountains. Another dimension of water crisis has been related to
the problem of water quality. The competition for water leads to over-exploitation
of groundwater, which, in turn, affects the quality of groundwater and makes it
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unfit for domestic purposes. Excessive withdrawal of groundwater from coastal
aquifers has led to hydrostatic imbalances between fresh and salt water, resulting
in intrusion of saline water along the coastline. The water quality is also
deteriorating due to discharge of untreated industrial and municipal effluents in
the rivers and streams, affecting not only surface water resources but also
threatening the life support systems.
The second section of the paper deals with competition and conflicts over
water and political economy of water allocation among various sectors and
users. In the face of scarcity, how limited water is allocated is an important
question. It has been argued that limited water gets allocated by one of the three
methods: (i) Administrative allocation, (ii) user-managed allocation, and (iii)
market allocation. These views are simplistic and a complex set of factors
determines water allocation. In the absence of explicit and wide spread recognition
of the rights and priorities for different claimant groups, the domestic needs of
rural population have suffered more than those of other claimants. Water gets
allocated as a default option and water management institutions and organizations
are unable to resolve the problems. As a result, conflicts over water have been
increasing over time. The last section deals with strategies that may avert
impending tragedy, and reforms needed in water management.
The paper highlights inadequacies of the existing institutional provisions in
tackling water crises in India. The paper suggests that radical reforms are required
to tackle water crises in India. The public agencies need to learn from some of
the innovative experiments and breakthroughs made by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) in this area.
Pressure on Fresh Water
The rapid increase in the use of water in India during the last three decades
has set the stage for competition for capturing water resources by various water
use sectors and users.  As a result, water resources have been almost fully
exhausted in many areas. Steep decline in groundwater levels and deteriorating
water quality are some of the manifestations of these competitions and captures.
Over appropriation of water has been a major source of conflict among users
within and across sectors in many areas, which is evident at both the micro and
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areas to meet the domestic and drinking needs in urban areas has sharpened the
conflicts between rural and urban areas.  The alarming rise in the amount of
waste generated by industries and municipalities had an adverse impact on fresh
water bodies in the form of water pollution and contamination, leading to several
public interest litigations. The crisis in meeting the drinking water needs of rural
population is becoming unmanageable.  At the same time, the public surface
irrigation systems continue to operate at very low efficiency, and salinity and
water logging are quite common in canal command areas.
Growth in water demand
The water demand defined as the quantity of water required for consumptive
as well as non-consumptive uses.  It is influenced by factors such as population,
urbanization, demand for food and non-food agricultural commodities, industrial
production, energy requirements, quality of life and preservation of environment
and flora and fauna.  Of these, domestic, agriculture and industrial sectors are
the major consumptive water users.  The competition for water among these
three sectors is intensifying over the last 2-3 decades. The domestic use of
water does not increase only in proportion to the population growth but also
depends on whether the population growth takes place in a rural or an urban
area.  The per capita demand for water also rises with the increase in income
level, primarily because of increase in the demand for modern sanitation and
healthcare facilities.
With the growth in population, the demand for food crops increases, which,
in turn, leads to an increased demand for irrigation water. The extraction of
groundwater for intensive commercial agriculture has made qualitative and
quantitative changes in the value of groundwater resources. From being a source
of protective irrigation, life-saving irrigation during monsoon failure and winter
period, groundwater use has now become the most critical input in commercial
agriculture (Shah 1993). With the commercialization of agriculture, water has
become a tradable commodity. Water markets have developed in many parts of
the country, even in areas where agriculture productivity is very low such as
north Bihar (Shah and Ballabh 1997). The massive private investment in
groundwater irrigation coupled with the public investment in surface irrigation
systems has helped India to achieve self-sufficiency in cereal production. Today,
India produces and consumes about 170 million metric tons of cereals each year126 Vishwa Ballabh
(Bhalla et al. 1999).  The question, however, has been raised about the nation’s
capacity to double its production to over 340 million tons by the year 2020 due to
water scarcity (Rosegrant et al. 1999).
India has been persuing a policy of rapid industrialization through state
participation since independence. This process got steam in 1991 with the initiation
of structural adjustment and economic liberalization to attract domestic and foreign
investments. Several Indian states are also pursuing policies to encourage
development of industrial estates. All these efforts have contributed to a
significant increase in the industrial growth rate since the 1980s. Large
concentration of industries, however, increases the demand for water significantly.
Further, many of these industries discharge their effluents into surface and
groundwater bodies, without any accountability or concern (Sundar 1987; and
UNICEF 1997). The neglect of industrial water requirement in water development
planning is a matter of concern, particularly when many industries are reserving
water for future use and thereby establishing their rights over other potential
users.
India’s population is over 1 billion, and it is estimated that it will be somewhere
between 1.2 –1.3 billion in 2025 (Visaria and Visaria 1998; and GOI 1999).  The
most important point these projections bring out is that the urban population is
expected to grow from the present 25 per cent to 45 per cent by the year 2025.
This would have a major impact on water management strategies (Ballabh et al.
1999). The per capita water availability is secularly declining due to increase in
population.  In 1951, the per capita availability of fresh water was 3450 m3 per
year, which dropped to nearly 1250 m3 in 1999, and is further expected to decrease
to 760 m3 in the year 2050 (GOI 1999).  The situation is already critical in six out
of the twenty major river basins with per capita fresh water availability going
below 1000 m3  (World Bank 1996).  With such a sharp declining trend in per
capita availability of water, meeting the needs of food and fiber for such a
gigantic population is a real challenge. The projections made by the Ministry of
Water Resources suggest that the water requirement will be in the range of
942-1221 BCM by the year 2025 (GOI 1999), as against the total withdrawal of
518 BCM in 1990.  There are, however, strong reasons to believe that existing
withdrawal and future requirements have been grossly underestimated. For
example, the domestic water requirement has been estimated based on the
norms prescribed by the Ministry, which are a way below the actual quantity of
water use (Ballabh and Singh 1997; and Prabhaker et al. 1997). Similarly, The127 Water Crisis and Institutional Challenges
estimate of water used for irrigation purposes suffers on two counts: (i) The
estimate is based on utilization of water, while recycling of surface and
groundwater through percolation, etc. has not been taken into account; and (ii)
in many canal command areas, groundwater is an important source of irrigation
due to unreliability of canal water (Ballabh and Singh 1997; and Shah 1993).
Often groundwater withdrawal in canal command areas is ignored in estimating
the actual utilization of water.
These national-level statistics mask huge inter-basin and inter-regional
disparities.  The utilizable water resources per capita per year vary between
3020 m3 in the Narmada basin to about 180 m3 or less in Sabarmati basin and
basins of inland drainage.  Out of the twenty major basins, four basins had more
than 1700 m3 per capita per year utilizable water resources, while nine basins
have had between 1000-1700 m3, five basins 500-1000 m3 and two basins less
than 500 m3 in the year 1991 (GOI 1999).  Similar variations exist between
different seasons (within a basin), which aggravates the problems of water
scarcity.
On an average, the annual rainfall in India is about 4000 cubic kilometre.
This is not evenly distributed across different parts of the country, as well as
different months of the year.  Based on the criterion developed by Falkenmark
et al. (1989), TERI (1998) developed water availability map of Indian river
basins, which shows that except the north-west (India), central (Mahanadi),
north-east (Brahmaputra sub-basin), and western coastal belt, almost every
other part faces some kind of water constraint and stress (Figure 1). The water
availability above 1700 m3 in a basin, however, does not mean that it is available
for use.  Many areas such as south Bihar, Dangs in Gujarat, north-eastern
states, and the states like Jammu and Kashmir receive plentiful rainy water, but
also experience acute water shortages during the dry season due to institutional
and technical failures. Some of these areas had well-developed traditional water
harvesting systems, but these systems lie in tatters now (Agrawal and Narain
1997).  Loss of traditional water harvesting system causes water scarcity even
for drinking purposes in these areas.
The gap between supply and demand for water is growing in almost every
part of the country.  Purely from the point of view of competitive demand and
supply equilibrium, the requirement and actual withdrawal exceed the supply of
water resources, and this leads to a competition for capturing the water. The
manifestation of these competitions are visible from the attempt to capture water128 Vishwa Ballabh
from deep aquifers, diversion of irrigation water for drinking purpose and
reservation of water for industrial and urban townships and municipalities  (Ballabh
and Singh 1997; and Moench 1995).
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Water pollution
Although industrial and domestic uses of water constitute only a small
percentage of the total water use, their impact on water availability is quite
significant.  The major sources of water pollution are domestic wastewater,
industrial wastewater and effluents, and agricultural run off.  Water pollution
from domestic and human waste causes many severe water-borne diseases.
Water quality of the Indian rivers is monitored at 480 stations under different
programs such as Monitoring of Indian National Aquatic Resources
(MINARAS), Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS) and Ganga
Action Plan (GAP). A number of physical, chemical, biological and bacteriological
parameters are measured (TERI 1998).  The questions have been raised about
the adequacy of the samples and parameters for monitoring water quality.  For
example, there are seven locations in the Sabarmati basin where sample for
water quality or stream flow are being monitored, and the total number of samples
collected from stream flow in a year is over 5000. But, groundwater quality is
monitored only through two wells at each station which may not be termed as a
representative for the location (Ballabh and Shunmughum 1999).
It is estimated that the sewerage generation from urban centers in India
grew from about 5 billion liters a day in 1947 to around 30 billion liters a day in
1997.  The total sewerage treatment capacity is estimated to be only 3 billion
liters, which is approximately 10 per cent of the present wastewater generation
(TERI 1998). Due to inadequate sewage disposal facilities, refuse invariably
gets mixed up with freshwater bodies leading to water borne diseases such as
malaria, cholera and even epidemics.  Eighty per cent of the children in villages
suffer from parasitic helminithic diseases caused through mixing of night soil in
open water sources (Laxmi et al. 1997).
Wastewater generation from industries has grown from about 70 million
liters a day in 1947 to about 3000 million liters a day in 1997 (TERI 1998). Of the
total pollution generated by the industrial sub-sector, 40-45 per cent is contributed
by industrial chemicals, about 38 per cent by food-processing industries and the
remaining part is contributed by the paper pulp and other industries (World Bank
1996). Most of the 22 industrial zones identified as problem areas are located in
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh.  Similarly,
of the 24 grossly polluted river stretches, 15 lie in these states (CPCB 1995).
Further, industrial units that cause pollution are both big and small. While big130 Vishwa Ballabh
units might have statutory requirements to set up different treatment plants, it
has been difficult to enforce pollution control norms on small polluting units and
industrial estates.  Small scale units though have been operating since
Independence, they grew rapidly in number after the 1970s.  In 1971, the total
number of registered small scale units was 0.24 million, which grew to 1.7
million in 1993 (CMIE 1995).  Due to technical and institutional lacunae, pollution
has been an intractable problem.  The last few years have also seen a rising
number of environmental jurisprudence.  Citizens’ groups have been able to
mobilize judicial actions against the erring industries that led to court orders for
closer of industries that flouted pollution control norms.
Agriculture has dual impact on water quality.  Firstly, the excessive use of
fertilizers and pesticides and their leaching into the water aquifers directly
affects the water quality.  Secondly, over extraction of groundwater causes
deterioration of the water quality. The share of groundwater in irrigation has
been increasing and that of surface water is decreasing.  Of the 3841
administrative blocks in India, 620 (16 per cent) exploit groundwater to capacity
or even overexploit it, and the development has been most extensive in Punjab,
Haryana, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu (WRI 1994).  Punjab which has been a pioneer
in adoption of the green revolution technologies and contributed significantly to
food self-sufficiency, has been experiencing declining water table for quite
sometime (Chopra 1997).
Excessive withdrawal of groundwater without commensurate recharge, as
well as leaching of pollutants into the aquifers cause deterioration of the
groundwater quality.  A survey of groundwater quality in 22 industrialized zones
has indicated that in none of the areas groundwater was fit for drinking purposes
(TERI 1998).  Over-extraction of groundwater from deep aquifers in north
Gujarat has resulted in increasing levels of fluorides and TDS in groundwater.
Excessive withdrawal of groundwater from the coastal aquifers in Saurashtra
and Kutch has resulted in saline intrusion into freshwater aquifers, rendering
water in many thousands of wells saline (Bhatia 1992; and Sangvai 1994).
Groundwater quality has major negative implications on its availability for various
uses.  Widespread deterioration of groundwater quality causes sharp reduction
in the availability of fresh groundwater that can be used for various needs (Kumar
and Ballabh 1999).131 Water Crisis and Institutional Challenges
Competition and Conflicts Over Water
The growing demand for water poses a serious challenge to evolve more
effective water policies to sustain growth in irrigated agriculture, promote efficient
allocation of water across competing sectors and users and prevent degradation
of the resource without any conflict.  The current water management falls far
short of the above expectations.  Several case studies demonstrate that present
patterns of water use in many areas are unsustainable, and that the water is
becoming scarcer day by day and a stage is being set for all round competition
for capturing the fast depleting water sources.  The following few case studies
demonstrate the nature and type of the conflicts.
Conflict between upstream and downstream users and inter-state water
disputes
The rapid increase in the use of water in agriculture, industries and urban
townships is causing scarcity of water down streams.  In the absence of well-
defined property rights in river/stream flow, surface water sources are de facto
open access resources and therefore are being over-exploited. The riparian
doctrine also does not promote socially optimum use of water  (Ballabh and
Singh 1997).  When a river basin cuts across state boundaries, the upstream
state over-appropriates water resources, leading to inter-state disputes.  There
are several examples of inter-state disputes over water, most notable among
them being the Cauvery water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.
The Cauvery river basin is densely populated and irrigated agriculture dates
back to over 2000 years.  The Cauvery river system is almost fully utilized.  The
conflict over Cauvery was first negotiated between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu
in 1892; more than a hundred years later, it has still not been solved.  The interim
award of the Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal in 1991 created dissatisfaction in
both the states, leading to conflict and riots (Folke 1998).  Growing scarcity of
water and political economy of states often lead to rejection of such tribunal
awards.  It is argued that the tribunal awards (allocations) take a narrow view
of resource management, suggest enforcement of rigid deadlines and technical
designs (see Datye et al. 1997).  It also does not take into account regeneration
of ecosystem and groundwater recharge which often becomes counter
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The over-extraction of water from unconfined groundwater aquifers also
affects the water movement.  For example, in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the flow in Sabarmati declined significantly due to excessive withdrawal by the
Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (Moench 1995). The decline in the river
flow had been compensated by increased releases from upstream reservoir
since 1976 (Patel et al. 1979).  However, it appears that the increased withdrawals
in the recent past for domestic and industrial purposes have adversely affected
the availability of water in the vicinity of Ahmedabad and the down stream
villages (Ballabh and Singh 1997).
Conflicts due to industrial and municipal pollution
As mentioned earlier, the magnitude of industrial pollution has been increasing
in several basins.  Several public interest litigations are pending in the State High
Courts and the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court of India in 1980 invoked
Article 21 of the constitution which guarantees right to life (including water and
environment), and thereby restored people’s natural right to water quality.
Similarly, the Kerala High Court upheld the right of the residents of Lakshadeep
Islands against the excessive groundwater pumping by large farmers (Saleth
1993).  The Gujarat High Court in a landmark judgement declared that the
“polluters have to pay”.  In spite of all these efforts, pollution of water bodies
continues unabated in most of the river basins, which often leads to conflicts
between industrial units and rural people (IGIDR 1999).
The National River Action Plan (NRAP) program has identified the
Ahmedabad stretch of the Sabarmati river as one of the most highly polluted
stretches in India. In terms of industrial development, Ahmedabad is one of the
top ten cities in India with 15 to 20 per cent of its land occupied by industries.
Everyday, 470 million liters of polluted waste is discharged from Ahmedabad
city into the river Sabarmati, which consists of 78 per cent of the total waste
water generated (Pangotra and Shukla 1994).
Since 1987, some of the sewage water is diverted to one of the medium
irrigation systems, Fatehwadi canal, and is used to irrigate agricultural crops.
When sewage water is allowed to pass through the infiltration layer, it is
automatically filtered and nitrogen, potassium and heavy metals present in it are
significantly reduced.  But, the raw sewage water also contains pathogens,
causing cholera and typhoid, and harbors salmonella bacteria, protozoa, eggs of133 Water Crisis and Institutional Challenges
worms and all types of viruses (Gupta 1993).  Untreated or partially-treated
water could be used to provide limited irrigation only to selected crops.
In a study conducted by the Institute for Study and Transformation in seven
downstream villages of the Sabarmati basin, 50 per cent of the respondents
reported crop failures; 73 per cent yield losses; 69 per cent change in quality of
grains; and 93 per cent reported pest infestation in crops due to polluted water.
The impact of polluted water is not only limited to the croplands and livestock,
but also adversely affects human health.  The polluted water which stagnates in
ditches and pounds in the villages, has become a convenient medium for breeding
of mosquitoes rapidly, spreading malaria.  Further, dangerous disease causing
pathogens are carried to the downstream villages also.  Besides, due to high soil
moisture created by the water, a lot of shrubs and trees have come up on the
common lands.  The bushy growth of the shrubs and trees provides a safe hide-
out to thieves and other anti-social elements, leading to increasing number of
thefts and looting (Ballabh and Singh 1997).
There are reports that pollution has created acute shortages of drinking
water in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and many other states.  This often becomes so
acute that people organize processions and picket the Government offices
protesting against the erring industrial units.  For example, in 1997 in Tamil Nadu
about 3000 people organized a procession against a dyeing and bleaching unit.
They held the unit to be solely responsible for groundwater pollution and the
resultant scarcity of drinking and irrigation water in the area (Moench 1999).
Conflicts due to water diversion to cities and industries
Increasing water scarcity has led to diversion of water to cities and municipa-
lities from the reservoirs constructed for irrigation purposes.  As more and more
cities are experiencing water shortages and the impact of fluoride content, the
state governments and local urban bodies are making provisions to bring water
from long distances through pipelines. The most preferred source for bringing
water from a long distance is a dam constructed to provide irrigation water. For
example, between 1976/77 to 1996/97, water allocation from a multipurpose
reservoir to the cities varied from a minimum of 7 per cent to 100 per cent of the
water stored in the reservoir (Ballabh and Singh 1997).  As fresh and competing
claims are being made, farmers in the canal command areas are receiving less
and less water, leading to conflicts among different water use sectors.134 Vishwa Ballabh
Several industrial and commercial establishments in urban areas are meeting
their water needs from groundwater through their own deep tubewells.  As the
local supply recedes due to the growth of townships and industrial units, water is
brought through long distance pipelines by digging deep tubewells in the rural
areas or sometimes water is transported through tankers.  This phenomenon is
growing fast.  As water scarcity becomes severe, the local people start agitating,
and protests and demonstrations become a common feature.  The most notable
example is of Coimbatore and Erode districts in Tamil Nadu where district
administration had to mediate between water sellers (who were selling water to
industrial units and urban centers through tankers) and farmers.  Several
negotiations have taken place since 1997 when conflict arose for the first time
and agreements were signed between water sellers and purchasers (industrial
units) and representatives of farmers before the District Administration officials,
which stood as guarantor.  It was decided that no new deep bore wells could be
sunk in the area. It has been reported that industry owners violated the agreement,
as a result protest and conflict have become common features in the area
(Janakarajan 1999). In many arid and semi-arid areas, farmers believe that
groundwater transportation from rural to urban areas and industrial units is the
major cause for groundwater depletion.
The competition for scarce water also leads to wide scale pilferages. It is
quite common that farmers capture canal water and transport it to non-canal
command areas often at the cost of other farmers in the command area. These
farmers not only irrigate their own land but also sell it to other farmers at
exorbitant prices.  Similarly, the farmers also divert drinking water transported
through long distance pipelines for irrigation purposes. The irrigation and water
supply departments often do not have any control beyond the capture and release
of water to the systems. The allocation of water resources to different sectors
and users is determined more by default than by design (Ballabh et al. 1999; and
Janakarajan 1997).
Intra-sectoral conflicts in water use
Competition for capturing of groundwater for irrigation purposes results in
a decline of water table.  Conflicting interests of well owners and profit-motive
water sellers further add to this problem (see Shah 1993; and Shah and Ballabh
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water is made available to even those who do not have capacity to invest in
deep tubewells.  However, it also has adverse consequences in terms of
sustainability of groundwater.  The discourses on development of water markets
in the Indian context have largely ignored the impact of water markets on
sustainability of the resource base. Further, competitive deepening of tubewells
makes the access to groundwater increasingly skewed in favor of large, resource-
rich farmers, leaving small farmers at a disadvantage in sharing the benefits of
well irrigation (Vaidyanathan 1999; and Shah and Ballabh 1997).  Competitive
deepening of wells for irrigation also adversely affects the quantity and quality
of drinking water in rural areas.  As a result, the number of “no sources” villages
is steadily increasing over time (Agrawal and Narain 1997).
Another ignored dimension of development of water markets in the Indian
context, is that in many areas water markets are not yet fully developed, and
therefore, unequal transaction takes place between sellers and buyers, resulting
into exploitation of the buyers not only through the mechanism of price but also
through non-price mechanisms. In several areas, water buyers have to pay
compensation through crop share and labor which is exploitative (Shah and
Ballabh 1993 & 1997; and Janakarajan 1997).  Although the instances of open
conflict between such buyers and sellers are sporadic and infrequent, purchasers
are resentful of their conditions in many areas.  Often conflict arises in surface
irrigation system due to competing claims made by the river delta farmers and
those covered by the basin irrigation systems. The general rule to resolve such
type of conflicts is that the riparian rights of the farmers in the delta are protected.
However, it has been seen over time that the delta farmers are the losers and
their share in water is declining over time, which is leading to conflicts among
old riparian right holders and new claimants of water resource in surface irrigation
system (Appasamy 1997).  The mechanism to resolve such conflicts through
the court of law is not only costly but takes considerable time.
Intra-sectoral competition is not limited to agriculture only; industries,
particularly the large ones, also take precautionary measures.  In many instances,
they ensure dependable water supply before establishment.  The source may be
either a river stream or a surface irrigation system or a reservoir.  The small-
scale industries, however, have to be dependent on groundwater sources and
water suppliers through public industrial estates, both of these sources are
relatively costlier than the water supplies to large-scale industries. Furthermore,
an increasing number of cities and municipalities facing scarcity of water are136 Vishwa Ballabh
finding it difficult to meet the water requirements.  Unauthorized establishment
of deep bore wells is becoming a common phenomenon.  The share of
groundwater in the total supply of drinking water in many cities is steadily
increasing.  As a result, the water table is steadily decreasing; for example, in
Ahmedabad, the water table in 1940 was about 12-15 meters, which went down
to 60-80 meters in 1984 and further to 90-100 meters in 1997.  As a result, a
number of tubewells have been abandoned (Gupta 1993).
Who Wins and Who Loses
As the competition for fresh water is increasing, water allocations among
different sectors and users is an important issue to understand.  Broadly, there
are three mechanisms for the allocation of water: (i) Public administrative, (ii)
user-based, and (iii) private or market-mediated allocation (Meinzen–Dick and
Mendoza 1996). Administrative allocation of water includes publicly managed
allocation of water among nations, across sectors, or within basins and irrigation
systems, through quantity distributions or administered water pricing schemes.
The user-based allocation systems are controlled by the users with a direct
stake in the use of water, often operating within pre-defined water right.  Market
allocation of tradable water rights attempts to structure economic incentives for
water users, whether irrigation, industrial, or municipal users, to consider the full
opportunity cost of water when making water use decisions. The four categories
of users, viz. rural and urban, domestic, industrialists and farmers, are interest
groups in the sense that they have specific claim on the resource under contention
and lobbies actively promote their interests.  In addition to these four groups,
there are water managers, pollution control boards and social activists who
influence water allocation and management.  Among the last three categories,
water managers have a strong influence.  The irrigation department, water
supply departments and municipalities have strong influences on capture, shortage
and distribution of water resources.
Table 1 summarizes the basic character of the user groups and other related
people, their nature, claims, strengths and ability to influence water management
and allocation.  It is common knowledge that landowners use maximum amount
(about 93 per cent) of the total fresh water.  They are also large in number and
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a large vote bank.  However, landowners are not a homogenous group and can
be differentiated in terms of size of holding and degree of commercialization.
Because of their size and unions, they have a strong influence on local legislatures
and provincial governments.
Industrialists are the smallest group in terms of their number but have
disproportionate influence over the state and central governments.  They protect
their interests by promoting the national causes of economic growth and
employment and use their superior financial powers.  As a result, they have
been often able to secure rights over fresh water even during extremely adverse
conditions and bypass water pollution laws. On the other hand, the urban domestic
users who constitute the second largest group, have an advantage over their
rural counterparts in terms of concentration.  Their main objective is to have
secure and safe drinking water.  They exert pressure through and on
municipalities which, in turn, help them secure fresh water.  When water is
transported from distant rural areas, their interests clash with landowners and
rural domestic users.  Urban domestic water users are not a homogenous group
and there are differences in access to fresh water, based on their economic
strength and location within the city.
The rural domestic water users by far are the largest in number; but they
are dispersed, stratified and the weakest among all the claimants of fresh water
resources. Although less water is required for domestic purposes, often collecting
it needs walking a few miles.  In several areas, agriculture receives sufficient
water for irrigation but no water is available for domestic purposes. In fact, the
high level of extraction of groundwater for irrigation has reduced the water
utilization for household purposes in the arid and semi-arid areas (UNICEF
1997). The stated national water policy which gives primacy to drinking water
has not been enforced.
The remaining three groups are responsible for managing fresh water
resources.  Faced with water scarcity, the preferred approach has been the
identification of new sources, capture, store and transport of water through a
centralized system of administration by the water managers.  In the allocation
of water, power relations play an important role among different sectors, regions
and social groups. There is a complete institutional failure in addressing the
issues of efficiency, equity and sustainability in allocation of water resources
(Ballabh et al. 1999).  In these competing claims and political contestation, the
scarce fresh water is allocated to the influential sectors, such as urban domestic140 Vishwa Ballabh
needs and industrial units.  Urban domestic users, being more articulate and
politically powerful at the state and national levels, along with an organized
urban administration, are better placed to demand and appropriate fresh water
resources for their own needs, while rural domestic users get the last priority.
The industry enjoys supremacy on account of its concentrated economic
power and ability to pay a higher price for water. Also, weak enforcement of
pollution laws allows industries to impose water pollution externalities and
diseconomies on rural people. The poor people in the villages, in far flung areas
and urban slum dwellers are worst affected by these political contestations
(Ballabh et al. 1999; and Vani et al. 1999).
The Central Pollution Control Board together with the state-level Pollution
Control Boards have the responsibility to determine pollution control norms, and
to monitor and enforce them.  By and large, the Pollution Control Boards have
failed to enforce the pollution control laws enacted by the central and state
governments. These institutions are largely concentrating on mega and big cities
and ignoring small towns and cities who also contribute a large percentage of
the urban sewage.  They lack financial resources to invest in waste treatment
facilities.  Though a Common Effluent Treatment Plant is mooted as a solution
to this, its adoption across cities has been very low. The existing institutions
have, by and large, failed to address these issues (Bhatt 1986; and Ballabh and
Shunmugham 1999).
The response of NGOs and social activists has been critical in identifying
alternative technologically feasible and institutionally workable solutions.  The
NGOs are a very few in number and their scale of operations is also small in
relation to the magnitude of the problems.  They advocate local water harvesting
as a sustainable solution to the rural drinking water needs, and participation and
control of farmers in the management of irrigation systems.  The involvement of
farmer organizations in the irrigation management can lead to decentralized
management and local capacity building for greater efficiency in source utilization.
So far, 13 states in India have formulated irrigation management policies that
encourage effective involvement of farmers in the irrigation management.  Under
the Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) program, irrigation management
functions below the outlet level are being transferred to farmers organizations.
However, the implementation of PIM program has been at a very slow place in
many states due to several reasons (Brewer et al. 1999).  Lack of commitment
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for their poor adaptability.  The constructive community responses at the moment
are sporadic, patchy and unlikely to be a big answer to the emerging problems.
Their involvement needs to be enhanced and conditions need to be created for
their meaningful participation.
To sum up the discussion, as the situation of fresh water resources is further
tightened and the gap between supply and requirements widens, the competition
and conflict over water would increase. The political economy of state supports
urban rich domestic users, industrial units and rich landowners.  The losers are
poor farmers, urban poor and people living in remote rural areas who are unable
to meet their basic needs. The increasing pollution and lack of proper sewage
and effluent treatment further accentuate the problem of water scarcity. A
recent World Bank study has estimated that the total cost of environmental
damage in India amounts to US$ 9.7 billion annually.  The damage to water
bodies constitutes substantially to the overall environmental damage (World Bank
1995).  Under these circumstances, will India be able to meet the challenges
and provide safe water for domestic uses, as well as meet the needs for irrigation
water to enhance agricultural production?
Meeting Future Challenges
It is evident from the previous discussions that India will be facing severe
water crisis in the coming decades. It is argued that 50 per cent of India’s new
water demand can be met by improving effectiveness of irrigation.  The remaining
part of the increased demand can be met by small dams and conjunctive use of
aquifers, etc. (Seckler et al. 1998).  It is estimated that proper watershed
development can conserve a minimum of 10 per cent of the current water use in
irrigation from all sources (Vaidyanathan 1999). However, the piecemeal
treatments to address land and other problems in implementation of watershed
programs, rather than an integrated program has not brought the desired results.
Similarly, there were well-developed traditional water-harvesting systems to
meet water requirements for agriculture and domestic water purposes (Agrawal
and Narain 1997). The first Irrigation Commission had highlighted the importance
of minor irrigation and small water-harvesting structures, and their problems.  In
spite of some efforts, the development and maintenance of traditional water
systems succeeded only moderately (Ballabh and Choudhary 1999).142 Vishwa Ballabh
The institutional responses to the current water crisis have been sectoral
and segmented.  These approaches often have a negative impact on other water
users, as well as on water bodies (Ballabh et al. 1999; and Kumar and Ballabh
1999).  Property rights over water are contested under four sets of legal
framework: traditional, common law, legislative and institutional (Moench 1999).
Past one and a half centuries of water management in India is replete with
examples of evolution of relationships between the community and the
environment on the one hand, and between the community and the state on the
other. This relationship ignored complete social structures, which it was supposed
to serve. The users were never involved in the planning of water development
projects and evolving water allocation decisions. The conflicts, as highlighted in
this paper, can be resolved only through integrated management, involving all
stakeholders.  The new water management institutions should not only effectively
manage ground and surface water bodies but should also determine the import
and export of water from and to the basin.  Further, the institution should not
only be involved in the allocation of water, but it should also involve itself in the
preservation and maintenance of the water balance in the hydraulic environment
of the basin. This consideration sometimes runs contradictory to the task of
allocation and conservation of water.  Adoption of these strategies means
reorientation of the relationship between state, people and community, which is
lost due to excessive involvement of the state in the water sector.  The real
challenge of mitigating water crisis in India, therefore, lies in creating such robust
self-governing people’s institutions for water management.
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fficient water appropriation is an ancient tradition in the country. From time
immemorial, numerous methods of water appropriation and varied types of
structures in the ancient India sustained water resources. The rich heritage and
cultural values formed the core to the unique traditional water institutions. Besides
being sustainable, the traditional water systems also endowed with in-built
environmental merits.
Unfortunately, these wonderful systems have been destroyed beyond repair,
and the new approach of irrigation development ignored the traditional water
institutions. The new approach (emphasizing on tube wells, taps, canals and
dams) unfortunately considers centuries old successful water resource
development as irrelevant. The continuation of the neglect of water institution
management (including pond, tanks, tanka, talab, etc.) dragged them to the
brink of death. The emphasis on productive consideration of the imperial masters
began the neglect of the minor irrigation, which were people friendly as well as
perform several environmental and equity functions.  On the contrary, the royal
patronage (serving as regulatory mechanism), people’s participation and collective
action, etc. survived the traditional water system for ages. The meticulously
designed strategy for water resources embedded in the traditional ingenuity
should be properly understood, which is critical to improve several of the modern
but unsustainable method of water appropriation. An understanding of the ancient
methods of Kudumaramat, phad management techniques and the moghal
architectural designs of haveli system, tanka and baoris, etc. provides important
1 
 This paper is drawn from Barah (1996), which provides elaborate discussion on various
systems.
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lessons in the context of sustainability. Combining man and water in an
interwoven way, the traditional systems manifested the excellence of indigenous
knowledge (Chambers 1977; and Chambers et al. 1989). The interface of man
and water resources is necessary to ensure sustainable water resource
development.
But lack of information and ignorance of technicality of the systems has
caused sheer neglect of their maintenance resulting in the demolition of the
traditional water institutions. Hence, there is a need for synergy between
traditional knowledge and modern system for sustainable development of water
resources.
Water Resource Development
The historical empiricism on water resource development is extremely
fascinating and the lesson derived from such knowledge has far reaching
implication to society, whose neglect contributed to the failure of the system and
widening gap between irrigation potential created and utilized. The modern
methods emphasize more on engineering solution and push the users to the
receiving end rather than being the partners to the management. This is a
primary factor leading to the unsustainability. The magnitude and growth of
investment on major irrigation systems during the last four decades are mind
boggling. Total plan outlay on irrigation, in nominal terms, and flood control in
India increased from a level of Rs 6,647 million in 1961 and Rs 169,786 million in
1985-1990 to Rs 389,300 million in 1990-95. But, compared to major irrigation,
Table 1. Growth of irrigation in India
Item 1980-81 1984-85 1998-99
Gross cropped area (m ha) 172.6 176.4 182.7
Irrigation (m ha)
Major and medium  22.7  25.3   27.5
Minor    31.4  35.2   40.9
Total      54.1  60.5   68.4
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the minor irrigation, despite negligible investment, demonstrated impressive
performance.
The past experience shows that the sources of minor irrigation such as
ponds, lakes, tanks (sagar), wells, baories, nadies, small kutcha bunds, tankas,
kund, khadins, guhls, ahars, etc. were suitably located and constructed with
excellent engineering techniques. The scarce rainwater was skillfully conserved
and stored for future use for man and animal (e.g. the famous chain tanks
system in south India). The successful management of water resources was
made possible due to royal patronage and peoples’ participation. On a number
of occasions, kings and chiefs, as a part of self-glorification, used to erect
Jalstambha (liquid pilar of victory) rather than Jayastambha (victory pillar to
celebrate the victory from time to time), symbolizing the unique method of success.
But the tradition unfortunately, becomes the thing of the past. Yet despite the
onslaught, there is ample scope for revival of the traditional systems. Many of
the ancient water bodies even today perform useful functions in many parts of
the country. There were as many as 58,528 tanks (large water structures) in
Andhra Pradesh and 43,474 tanks in Karnataka during 1955-56 (Reddy 1993;
and Rao 1988).
Tanka, Talab, Baories, etc. in Rajasthan desert traditionally performed
marvellous job of collecting and storing runoff water. The phad system in
Maharashtra, Haveli system in Madhya Pradesh, Khadin in Rajasthan and
Ahar-pyne in Bihar are among such excellent water harvesting systems. This
paper presents a brief review of some of these systems.
Declining trends of traditional water-harvesting systems
The so-called “productive consideration” facilitated profit accumulation of
the imperial rulers, but the democratic state also continued to neglect the minor
irrigation sources in favour of big irrigation projects. Imposition of taxes, water
cess, dry and wet assessment and taking away the control of water from the
hand of users are some of the state initiatives shattering the community
organizations (like Kudimaramat) and loosing people’s interest in the maintenance
of their own water system.
Moreover, mining of water and intensive agriculture severely harmed the
catchment areas of old water bodies. The uncared tank bed and large-scale150 B C Barah
encroachment of catchment area by individuals and the state are widespread.
Large residential colonies were built on the bed of tanks and lakes, and the state
machineries encroached the tank bed and auctioned it to the Town Development
Trust. Table 2 gives an illustration of the present status of the old water systems
of Jodhpur City. In brief, the pond lost the fresh rainwater, soil lost the restitution,
the atmosphere lost its purity and the tank lost the pleasantry.
Table 2. Old water structures in Jodhpur city
Old water structure Converted to
(Talab, sagar, etc.)
Phoolalao Vyas Park
Jagat sagar Public Park
Bakhat sagar Nehru Park
Kalyan sagar Raik Bag(Urban)
Masuria talab Masuria colony
Fadusar Kaliberi Mining belt
Abhoy sagar Residential colony
Need for revival of traditional water systems
The expansion of canal and well irrigation in the last two decades contributed
to increase in the irrigated area. But mismanagement of water resources in
these two irrigation sources has caused many environmental problems and land
degradation. The revival of the maintenance system of tank and other water
bodies potentially improves the irrigation potential without harming environment,
besides improving the cost effectiveness. Question is how to go about it? The
indigenous knowledge base for the management of the traditional water harvesting
systems is credited as a necessary requirement in this context. Proper
documentation of these water-harvesting systems and understanding of the
institutional mechanisms of their management are necessary to derive appropriate
lessons for future planning. The information also helps revamp the water policy
for sustainable development.151 Healthy Water Bodies and Weakening Institutions
Traditional Water Systems
Water works in south India
The most part of South India suffered severely from water scarcity in the
past due to lack of efficient network of water system and erratic rainfall (Raju
1941). The water scarcity was felt so much during the Sangam period (believed
to be upto 300 BC) in South India that the kings and people were compelled to
invent mechanisms to hold rainwater. By combining technical skill and energy,
the people of Kongu valley sunk deep wells and brought out water by breaking
hard rocks with their pickaxes, which attracted the royal admirations. The wells
supplemented them to great extent and judicious use of limited water supply of
the people convert the arid tract into arable lands.
The kings of Chola kingdom ingeniously tamed the Kaveri river and supplied
abundant water for cultivation. As a result, the region was named as “Punal
nadu” (a land of water). The Chola Kings, particularly Karikala devoted much
of their efforts to control Kaveri, constructed tanks and bund raising both sides
of Kaveri by embankment and dykes, cutting inundation channels, etc. The
master plan of raising the banks of Kaveri river and cutting in channels to tame
the river was a stupendous task. Should this task be dubbed as “rudimentary” in
recent time?.
As there was no supply of water from the rivers (like the Tungabhadra, the
Pennar, the Krishna and the Godavari), people in the region had to depend on
the storage reservoirs and deep-sunk wells. Kakatiyas of Warangal built large
number of artificial tanks, which were suffixed with such terms as samudra,
ceruvu or teruvu, kere or Kereya. The spatial distribution of various water
structures indicates their concern towards the regional imbalances of water
resource development; an aspect usually ignored by modern planners. In addition,
there were number of streamlets called Vagus, to receive rains. The location of
tanks in the hilly terrain inter-connecting surrounding hillocks by small bunds
indicates the application of technical parameters in planning such work. The use
of undisturbed natural contour (physiographical evidence), economics of cost
saving, user-friendly management practices and environmental consideration,
all combined together sustained the systems. The organization of management
of irrigation system involved the village officials (ayagars) such as Karnam,152 B C Barah
Pedda Kapu, talari, purohit, blacksmith, goldsmith, carpenter, potter, waterman
(Vetti), barber and shoemakers.
The Vijayanagar kings followed the Kakatiya model of rural development.
There were elaborate irrigation works throughout the state covering areas south
of the Tungabhadra and the Krishna. The Porumamilla tank in Cuddapah is the
living symbol of great work of the Vijayanagar period, which continues supplying
water without interruption. The engineering specification, art of selection of
tank location, materials used, and the anticipated benefits from the water works
signify the technical perfection and foresightedness of the early builders.
In the period of Bukka-II, Singaya Bhatta, a hydraulic engineer called Jala
Sutrada, diverted water of the river Henne through a channel called
Pratapa-Bukkaraya Mandala channel to the Siruvera tank at Penugonda. The
rulers, village assemblies and Mahajanas (money lenders) took active interest
in the maintenance of water works and utilized the services of man and materials.
Remission of taxes and endowments by village assemblies, temples and
philanthropists were encouraging factors too.
The construction of tanks was a societal activity involving kings, queens,
members of royal families, ministerial staff (chieftains, officials and nobles)
temples, villages and individuals. In fact, tanks in South India were not only the
socio-economic and cultural activity but also a source of religious belief. The
demand for temple tanks in the area was also a source of development of
rainwater harvesting system. Grand celebration to mark the victory of war also
associated with digging tanks. The irrigation system in the Madras Presidency
was well developed and could be classified into five heads: River-fed canal
system, river-fed system of tanks, rainfed tanks in groups, isolated tanks, and
wells. There were 30 canal projects, 22 reservoirs, 33,086 tanks and 728,092
wells to irrigate annually between 11 to 12 million acres of cropland during the
British period. In addition, there were nearly 35,000 tiny water structures. In
total, there were as many as 337,311 water structures in the presidency. That is
why Sir Thomas Munro clearly mentioned that the development of water resource
was remarkably advanced at the beginning of the British period (Sivakumar
1988).
Golden age of tanks (937- 1336)
This period showed the booming of activities of constructing new villages,
Agrahara, Satra (guesthouse and temples) and tanks. A significant development153 Healthy Water Bodies and Weakening Institutions
in this period was the institutional arrangement for tank system of empowering
the local government. The participation of people was given a high priority. The
village headman (Gaunda) took leadership representing the institution called
Nagara. For groups of villages (Nadur) Nadagaunda was the leader. The
nadurs were formed to facilitate construction of common source of irrigation.
During the reign of Kalyana Chalukya (973-1184 AD), the tank building activities
benefited the districts of Dharwar, Bellary, Chitradurga and Shimoga.
Vikramaditya VI (1080 AD) constructed a number of tanks and repaired
the breach tank of Tambasamudra. Somesvara IV (1184 AD) introduced a gift
tax called Punnaya Sunka to the tank at Gonasamudra in Dharwar, for the
purposes of dredging and repairing in stone and wood sluice. Nokkayya (1062
AD) constructed Santagere, Molakere, Pattana- swamigere and Talavidagere
in the Santara Kingdom (Shimoga district).
The Vijayanagar empire (1336-1565) contributed significantly in building
up of water structures in the pre-British period and gave priority for the upkeeping
of water structures. The capital city of Vijayanagar had plenty of water to
satisfy the needs of everyone; there were 70 canals running through the city.
These structures benefited the common people and enriched the treasury. In
1369 AD, a famous tank called Porumamilla was constructed. The royal reward
for merit and recognition of the expertize were important factors for development
of the resource.
Thus, the fourteenth century showed humming construction activities of
tanks, reservoirs and canals, and in the fifteen century, priority was given to
renovation and maintenance of these tanks where cooperation and contribution
from people were sought. The modern planners can draw lessons from the
success stories and sustainability of old water-harvesting systems. The success
was guaranteed on account of the delegation of specific responsibility to person
concerned2. This limited description of the glory of tank irrigation of Karnataka
tells three points. (a) There was consistent effort for building up water structures
over many centuries to hold the runoff water and harvest for the benefit of
human being. (b) Royal patronage and people’s participation together made the
system a success and sustainable. (c) The development of water resources
2 Krishnaraya (1509-1529 AD) while granting Chandragutti as an amaram (fief) stipulates
that the dredging of the silt from the local tank had to be done regularly every year and
the responsibility for this essential task was rested on the gaunda Senabova, a resident
of the village.154 B C Barah
seems to combine sense of fulfilment of basic needs, love for beauty, devotion
to religion, the God and sentiments.
Traditional Water Systems: Technology, Design and Practices
The construction of tanks reached a commendable height before the
beginning of the British rule. The British rulers attended to renovation and repair
Box 1. Porumamilla Tank
This tank was constructed by connecting four natural hills by three short
earthen dams. The length of the bund was 4,500 feet and the total length
including the hill is 14,000 feet (about 5,000 rekhadanda). At the deepest
portion, the bund is about 12 feet wide at the top and 150 feet wide at the
bottom. Its height is about 33 feet. The side slope provided for the bund is 2
horizontal to 1 vertical. Further it was stated that a tank should follow certain
norms for its success. A good tank must satisfy some minimum requirements
(sadhanas), and be guarded against faults (dosha) in the construction work
(see Annex).
It can be surmized that the construction of bund on a bed of hard impervious
clay and providing of surplus escape arrangements through sluices built at
the end of the bund were well known and full proof system.
The recognition of hard and successful work and encouragement to
scholarly and expert services of the tank systems was also a crucial factor
for the success of the system. Employing unskilled labour for earth work and
skilled labour for masonry and stone works were usual practices. Utilization
of the services of dasa vidya Chakravarthi (master of ten sciences) and
Jalasutra (hydraulic engineer) like Singaya Bhatta, technical recommendation
of expert (siddharasodhadinde) for the water works indicate the seriousness
and respect for the professionals. The site selection and size of tank, position
of water weirs, construction material used, speak of the knowledge of the
civil engineering sciences. The fact that without separate department of public
works, which is common in the present days, and high profile officials for
such works, the system worked well; it simply indicated the managerial
competence and people’s participation.155 Healthy Water Bodies and Weakening Institutions
of these structures selectively. Some of those continue to remain in use for
centuries, demonstrating the proof of the indigenous knowledge of the ancient
builders in terms of design and construction of tanks. For example, technological
specification of the Ananthrajasagar tank at Porumamilla in the Badvel taluk of
Cuddapah district, constructed in the year 1367 AD, is one of the few monumental
living instances of excellence of the Vijayanagar empire.
There is variation of the traditional water-harvesting technology from location
to location. The location specificity, topographical adaptability and community
involvement are reflected in the diversity of the technology. The shape and size
of the water bodies and the method of water appropriation in South India differ
from that in other parts of the country. Among the other variation of systems
prevalent in other parts of the country, the prominent ones include Khadins in
Rajasthan, Haveli system in Madhya pradesh, Guhl in Himachal Pradesh and
Uttar Pradesh, Ahar in Bihar, etc. Depending on the nature of water appropriation,
the systems are further categorized as check dam, diversion system and water-
spreading submergence system.
Khadin system (Rajsthan)
Khadin is an ancient water harvesting mechanism in the desert environment
of Western Rajasthan. It is an integrated land and water use system. It is practiced
in the rocky catchment area and valley plains in proximity. The run-off from the
catchment area is stored in the lower valley enclosed by an earthen bund. Surplus
water if any, passes out through spillway sluice. The water so appropriated
stands on Khadin throughout the monsoon period and percolates down the soil
by the first week of November. This leaves the soil moist to enable to plant
wheat or chickpea. Thus, these crops can be harvested without irrigation. The
soils in Khadin are fertile as runoff water carries fine sediments and help soil
reconditioning. The rocky catchment areas are mainly sandstone or limestone
to generate effective run-off .
Haveli system (Madhya Pradesh)
Farmers in upper part of the Narmada covering Jabalpur, Narsingpur, and
part of Damoh and Sagar in Madhya Pradesh have been practicing an interesting
water-harvesting system called the Haveli system. It comprises of holding156 B C Barah
rainwater in the embanked fields, which are enclosed on four sides and retaining
the water so impounded until the sowing time approaches. The system benefits
more than 0.35 million acres of land by providing supplementary irrigation in the
state of Madhya Pradesh. Rainwater is retained in heavy black cotton soil and
clay in nature (locally called kabar) until the end of the monsoon season and
released (called mongha) before the onset of the rabi season, so that the fields
become ready for the rabi crops. It not only provides the required moisture for
the rabi crop, but also enriches the ground water level through percolation. It
also reduces the water distribution and management problems. The indigenous
natural control of kans weed in the kharif season is another remarkable benefit.
When rainwater is impounded and made to stand in the fields for months, the
weeds rot and die away resulting in free weed control system. The system is
probably one of the unique water-harvesting system developed by the Gond
tribals. However, the system is on the decline because of introduction of soybean
in the kharif season and the construction of Bargi dam in the region (Pangare
1992).
Drinking water supply (Rajasthan)
The city of Jodhpur, under the dynastic rule made elaborate arrangement
for drinking water through different water structures. Between 1459 and till
the end of the 19th century (1897-98), the rulers of Jodhpur constructed a
number of different types of water structures. The design and material of
construction of these structures demonstrate engineering excellence and
thoughtfulness of the rulers. The entire Chonka Daijar plateau in this region
measuring a length of 30 km and breadth of 5 km served 50 functional surface
water bodies like nadies (25), talabs (40), tanks (5), and lakes (5) and indirectly
to 154 groundwater bodies like wells (98), baoris (48) and Jalras (8). These
water structures are as old as 500 years. In the past, the natural bodies are
improved and preserved by the people through innovative ideas and full
participation of the people. The inhabitants demonstrated immense sense of
belongingness and reverence towards the preservation of these bodies.
Unfortunately due to the negligence of management, a large number of these
bodies are subject to pollution, become unpotable and ultimately destroyed forever.
The establishment of public water system set the process of decline, sharply157 Healthy Water Bodies and Weakening Institutions
Table 3. Ancient water structures in Jodhpur city
Catchment Polluted Potable Partially Preserved  lost Damaged
Nadies
(1458-1600 AD) 13 12 3 10 12 16
Talabs
(1458-1885)  19  18 11 17 10 18
Tanka
(1794-1887)  5  0  2   3  0  0
Lakes
(1126-1931)  0  5 3  - 2-
Streams  -  -  -  8  4 (functional)
Wells
(1460-1931)  33 57  Maintained
by PHED
Baories
(1460-1880) 30 18   Lost and
non-potable
Jhalras
(1660-1750)   8  nil
Source: S M Mohnot (personal communication)
around the 1960s. The structures being looked after well are continuing to serve
the people.
Interestingly, the pattern for destruction, whatever be the type of
water body, is identical. First, the catchment areas are damaged through
construction of residential areas, agriculture, mining, road and public
entertainment park. Then the water supply is affected by restricting the run-off
and making the water structure dry. Thereafter, the bed of the water structure
is encroached and converted into a seat of commercial activities. The onus of
the development led destruction, therefore, lies on the architects of modern
development.158 B C Barah
Neo-traditional Water Systems
Pani Panchayat (Maharashtra)
The need for revival of water-harvesting system is not a new idea. A
successful work sets example for further works. In this context, the story of
Pani Panchayat and Phad system in Maharashtra and traditional irrigation
institutions in Tamilnadu are good examples. The Pani Panchayat combines
the modern method with the traditional technology and management tools of
water harvesting. The famine stricken villagers implanted the idea that the
construction of check-dams and percolation tanks to store rainwater is the only
remedy for providing employment and finding permanent solution to recurring
droughts. The block is considered to be a convenient operational unit for
water harvesting. The Naigoan experiment in the Purandar taluk of Pune
district is a typical experiment of despair to success. A unique characteristic of
the design is to distribute water not on the basis of land area but in proportion to
the household size. Thus, it compelled the farmers to adopt the cropping
pattern for the best use of available water, and restricts cultivation of high
water consuming crops like sugarcane. Care was taken that in the
development of such system, the farmers should have financial stake in it.
Therefore, it was made mandatory that the beneficiaries must contribute to
the development cost. For the success of the new water-harvesting
technology not only the community contributed to its better management, but
also the Gram Gaurav Pratisthan, a village-level organization, organized necessary
training for farmers on the rudimentary knowledge of conservation aspect of
the technology. The villagers decide to cooperate, select appropriate location
and take decision to start the scheme. The Gram Gaurav Pratisthan offered
technical guidance in the construction process. The beneficiaries elected a
Pramukh (group leader) to liaison between farmers and officials in all matters,
ensure uninterrupted working of the system and distribution of water-rationing
card to the beneficiaries. All matters relating to the operation and distribution of
water and conflicts are recorded by the elected official and communicated to
the village community at a regular interval (for details, see GGP 1983; and
Chapter 6 in this volume).159 Healthy Water Bodies and Weakening Institutions
Phad (diversion) system (Maharashtra)
The Phad system is a successful farmer-managed water-harvesting system
of the 16th century in Maharashtra, presently operational in the three river
systems, viz. Tapi basin (Panjhra), Mosam and Aram (in Dhule and Nasik
districts). This system also existed in Philippines (known as Zanjaras), Indonesia
(as Subaks), Pakistan (as Guls) and in Northern Thailand (as Mung Fai).
These systems with different sizes and types are highly diverse in nature.
Panjhra river Bandharas system. To understand the system, it is necessary
to know the physical and natural conditions of the location. The river has steep
gradient and runs through rocky bed west to east about 88 km. before it falls on
the Tapi river at Thalner. This topography makes the construction of the
bandharas (weir) suitable. A series of weirs (about 45) were built to divert
water for agricultural use, but presently only 14 of them are functioning (Patil
1996). Perhaps, the Farukki kings (1370 -1600 AD) permitted the farmers to
divert the river water for irrigation purposes. The diversion weirs were raised at
different locations and canals were digged to carry water upto the fields.
The phad is a well-bounded part of a command area with fullest control of
water. It consists of the following inter-related parts:
1) Bandharas or low weirs constructed across the river.
2) Kalva or canals between users fields and bandharas. Each canal has
uniform discharge capacity of approximately 150 - 400 litres/second.
3) Charis or distributaries for feeding water from the kalva to different areas
of the phad.
4) Sarang or field channels for carrying water to individual fields.
5) Sandam or escapes along the canal and charis for diverting excess water
into the drainage.
6) Kayam Bhagayat or command area is usually divided into four blocks or
Phads. Initially, all farmers are said to have land in each of the phads,
which is changing due to land fragmentation.
The management of the phad system is under the chairman of the Bhagayat
committee (irrigators’ committee) consisting of elected members from the
irrigators. Number of the members of the committee varies from committee to
committee. The membership is not permanent, usually for 2 to 4 years, but can
be changed in between depending upon the interest of the members. The160 B C Barah
committee is responsible for supervision, protection, administration and
maintenance of the system, and conflict resolution. They are assisted by employed
official called halawdar (overall incharge of operation within a phad), patkaris
(responsible for patrolling the kalva within the village). They attend to minor
maintenance of the kalva like de-weeding, etc. and report to the halawdar and
bhagayat committee on the condition of the kalva. Jaglia is responsible for
watering and guarding the field, turn water flow from one field to another as per
the schedule under the direction of the hawaldar or the committee. The officials
are paid in cash or kind (e.g. 2 kg foodgrains per bigha of irrigated area). The
main basis of these wages is the minimum wage for agricultural workers.
However, owing to urban-rural wage differentials, affected the participation of
the members. Increase in water rates, reduction in water supply due to the
construction of a dam for water supply to towns, incompatible modernization,
etc. deteriorated the system (Patil 1996).
Conclusion
The analysis has clearly brought out that the traditional systems were
excellent in sustainable use of water resources. The water structures suited the
location specificity, topographical adaptability and satisfied the community
requirements. Not only the state, but also the chieftains, service workers and
women patronized and promoted the water harvesting systems all over the
country. The community participation in the management, methods of fund raising
for development activities, utilization and choice of local construction materials
(integrated approach to man-material), construction technology and architectural
deployment on the structures were highly commendable. Man, material and
methods were so interwoven that the resulted system could stand the test of
time. These systems passed through several stages, which made them unique
and sustainable. Such experimentation include the vast and huge tanks in the
South India, extensive moisture retention technique of Khadins in Rajasthan,
the submergence systems of Ahar in Bihar, Haveli system in Madhya Pradesh,
Guhl diversion system of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and Phad system
in Maharastra. These systems demonstrated excellent technological perfection
and the process of social absorption of the technology; an aspect which is missing
in the modern methods. Even the traditional water-lifting devices also depicted161 Healthy Water Bodies and Weakening Institutions
scientific excellence. The modern methods, unlike the traditional one, are primarily
based on imported technology, and failed to satisfy the local needs, making the
water systems unsustainable. Incorporating the best traits of the traditional
technology, the alternative strategy of modern methods could potentially make
the system more effective and sustainable.
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Irrigation Development’, University of Hyderabad, Hyderabad.Annex.  Requirements for construction of the traditional irrigation tanks
1) A king endowed with righteousness, rich, happy and desirous of acquiring
permanent wealth or fame,
2) A brahmana learned in hydrology (pathas sastra)
3) A ground adorned with hard clay,
4) A river conveying sweet water and three yojanas distant from its source,
5) Hill parts which are in contact with it (bund),
6) Between these portions of the hill a dam (bund) of compact stone wall not
too long but firm,
7) The two extremes (sringa) pointing away from fruit giving land (phala
sthira),
8) An extensive and deep tank bed,
9) A quarry containing straight and long stones,
10) The neighbouring fields (command area) being level and with fruit-growing
trees,
11) A water course (sluice) having strong eddies (brahma) on account of the
position of the mountain (advisthana), and
12) A gang of men skilled in the art of its construction.
The six faults to be guarded against are listed as:
1) Water oozing from the dam,
2) Saline soil,
3) Situation at the boundary of two kingdoms,
4) Elevation (kurma) in the middle of the tank bed,
5) Scanty supply of water and extensive stretch of land (command area), and
6) Scanty land and excess of water.
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uman activities can contribute to environmental degradation and resource
scarcity in three ways. Firstly, human activities can degrade and deplete
natural resources if these are used at a rate faster than the renewal rate.  A
second source of degradation or scarcity is population growth; a set amount of
land and water is shared by increasing number of people, resulting in a steady
decline in its per capita availability.  Thirdly, weak property rights lead to unequal
access to natural resources, leaving the rural poor subject to the scarcity.
These factors are often ignored in exploitation of natural resources. Unfortunately,
the success of resource exploitation is judged in terms of immediate economic
results, without considering either the impact on ecosystem or knowledge of the
users, who are often displaced or marginalized by technically more effective
exploiters moving into the area (Berkes 1985).  This has led to exploitation of
natural resources beyond their sustainable level and added to the miseries of the
rural poor as well.
Although intensive aquaculture practices provide valuable foreign exchange,
one may strongly question the advantage to the country and their indigenous
population in terms of sustained socio-economic benefits (Meltzoff and Lipuma
1986; Goodland and Ledec 1987; Bailey 1988; and Primavera 1991).  The
switching from food to commercial activities erodes social/cultural experience
of sustainable resource use.  The progressive exploitation of the ecosystem to
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expand the economy has today made it necessary to redevelop the ecosystem
in order to maintain the economy (Regier and Baskerville 1986).  Fisheries and
aquaculture are faced with similar problems which need to be tackled from an
integrated societal-environmental system perspective, where interrelations
between sectors and their dependence on the processes and functions of coastal
seas need to be explicitly recognized.
The expansion of aquaculture is not only limited by what is happening in the
market or other sectors of the economy, but also by an increasing demand for
environmentally safe goods and services. But, such environmentally safe
production process can easily be disrupted as the scale of aquaculture grows
relative to its supporting ecosystems (Folke and Kautsky 1989), leading to various
kinds of conflicts—conflicts of interests, values, actions or directions. Thus,
conflicts are inescapable, particularly during the resource-based development
stage, and require amicable resolution mechanism. This paper examines the
nature of conflicts in the development of coastal aquaculture in southern India.
The specific objectives are: (1) To assess the status of aqua-farmers; (2) to
examine the economic impacts of aquaculture farms; and (3) to analyze the
nature of conflicts in the use of common property resources.
Study area
Sirkazhi (Tamil Nadu). Shrimp culture in Sirkazhi taluka and in the entire
district was introduced with full support from the Government as a viable
alternative to paddy cultivation and also to utilize barren and uncultivable,
alkaline lands.  The unexpected protests due to various reasons gave a dead
blow to the growth as well as to the future of the industry.  Despite the
country’s apex court’s rulings, the industry still survives contributing to the
state economy.
Nellore (Andhra Pradesh). Shrimp culture in Nellore district is perhaps the
pioneer in aquaculture development in Andhra Pradesh, and the farming activities
are confined to about 24 villages near the Kandleru creek and no farms are
located near the sea. Shrimp culture has helped the area directly and indirectly
with more business and economic activities.
Status. Most of the aqua-farmers in Sirkazhi (Tamil Nadu) and Nellore (Andhra
Pradesh) have taken up shrimp culture mainly for export purposes.  Good quality
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is a financially lucrative venture.  This has been revealed by the information
collected from aqua-farmers in the regions.  Profit rate ranged from 20 to 50
per cent per annum, which can not be thought of in any other activity.  Unemployed
coastal folks and agriculturists are offered jobs on the aqua-farms and are paid
higher than in any other farming activity.  Thus, increased profits and better
wages contribute to overall economic welfare and better standard of living of
the people in the region.  However, advancement of shrimp farming has polluted
drinking water, and this has forced the society to spend money on drinking
water. As per the NEERI’s estimate, the value of environmental costs is more
than the value of shrimps produced in Tamil Nadu.  For Andhra Pradesh, the
estimated value loss due to the damage caused by aquaculture was about four-
times of the earnings. However, economic benefits to the society from the
development of aquaculture in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have been
enormous.
Socio-economic Status of Aqua-farmers
The socio-economic survey conducted in the coastal Tamil Nadu and Andhra
Pradesh to study the standard of living of people around the ponds has revealed
a significant increase in annual income of the farmers. The reason behind this
increase was the vast employment opportunities generated by aqua-farms.
However, the income level in Tamil Nadu was more than twice of that in Andhra
Pradesh. The standard of living of the people, measured in terms of possession
of consumer goods, also increased significantly.
Infrastructure facilities are the most basic need of the people, which is the
responsibility of the government. These facilities have been lacking in many
places of Andhra Pradesh. Infrastructure facilities like transport and
communication are better developed in Tamil Nadu. Apart from this, Tamil Nadu
was also found to possess more of other infrastructural facilities like educational
institutions, banking and non-banking services and a number of voluntary
organizations. Infrastructural changes are significant in the area of prawn
cultivation both in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.  According to the response
of the interviewed people, there have been significant changes in infrastructure
facilities like new roads, transport and communication facilities, offices, and
markets (Table 1).166 N Rajalakshmi
Employment opportunities
The importance of fisheries as a source of employment is highly significant.
It has been shown that it is more productive and profitable than any other
agricultural activity.  Fisheries provide employment directly to about 0.25 million
people out of a total of 0.55 million fishermen in Tamil Nadu, whose livelihood
depends upon marine and inland water fisheries (Rajalakshmi 1999a). About an
equivalent number of people take up fishing as a part-time job. Nearly 0.2 million
persons earn their livelihood from associated vocations such as fish transportation,
basket making, ice and salt manufacturing, etc.  It is a way of life for the whole
fishermen population.  In Sirkazhi taluka, about 2,800 fishermen and 200
fisherwomen are directly employed on aqua-farms and depend on aquaculture
for their living. The survey also indicated significant increase in employment
opportunities after aquaculture development in the study area (Table 1).
Common Property Resources: Rights and Conflicts
Generally, there is open access to common property resources and nobody
is willing or able to control the use of these resources.  Common property
resources may be divided into local or regional and global commons (Berkes
1985).  Examples of the former include many of the world’s grazing lands,
fisheries, deep ocean mineral deposits and the Antarctic region, and examples
of the latter are the world’s atmosphere or ozone layer and geosynchronous
orbits.  Biogeochemical and biogeophysical cycles are crucial for the maintenance
of a number of global commons and are at risk from or already disrupted by
human activity.  Common property resources can be further divided into three
categories: (1) Open access resources belong to no one, have no restrictions on
their use and are difficult to manage; (2) Community-owned resources mean
that the co-ownership can exclude outsiders; and (3) State-owned resources
might be better managed, although that is not the case always.
The most common property resources in the study area are creeks and
coast lines which are used to set up shrimp farms.  These resources as well as
the sea have been used by the local fishermen for their living from time
immemorial, due to open access to them. These interests have caused conflicts
and clashes, resulting in protests and threats to destroy the shrimp farms in the
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Table 1. Institutions, infrastructure facilities and employment after
development of aquaculture
Institutions Tamil Nadu Andhra Pradesh
(percentage of respondents
indicating improvements)
Education facilities 94 32
Banking and non-banking 76 54
Communication 82 44
Voluntary organizations 54 56
Transport facilities 100 100
Status of employment
Change in employment 30 72
Family employment 18 60
Women employment 18 48
Village employment 14 74
Infrastructure
New roads 46 40
Construction of new houses 48 96
Improvement in transport facilities 4 32
Change in communication facilities 32 22
Offices 66 44
Quarters 2 12
Market facilities 22 82
Types of conflicts
As a result of rapid expansion of aquaculture, a number of shrimp farms
have been set up in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. There are instances of
violation of many rules as there is no proper system for supervizing and monitoring
these farms.  This has resulted in various conflicts in the use of common property
resources.  The shrimp farms fenced their area without giving any notice and
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for years together. The shrimp farms have been set up without considering the
hardships of the local fishermen.  The open access system has given rights to
the fishermen for using the seafront for their livelihood.  Likewise, the owners
of the shrimp farms just purchased the cultivable lands from agriculturists and
converted them into aquaponds.  This is also resulting in conflicts with the users
of land for agricultural activities.  Some of the farms have not shown any concern
when the groundwater became brackish.  Only a few farms have made
arrangements for the supply of sweet potable water to the local people.  Such
conflicts have made the local people to voice and protest severely against the
shrimp farms.
Conflicts between fishermen and aqua-farms. The shrimp farms do not
provide access to the beach for traditional fishermen who reach the sea from
their villages.  As aqua-farms are located on the sea front and entry is restricted,
the fishermen have to take a longer route to sea for their operations.  The
traditional, local fishermen doing fishing for years are subjected to such hardships
because of the newly emerging aqua-farms.
Social conflicts. Social conflicts arise between the local people and aqua-
farmers due to salinization of drinking water, salinization of land, and fear of
floods during the rainy season.  It is reported that salinization of land is spreading
further and even the wells are yielding saline water. The agricultural farms
adjoining the shrimp farms are also affected; aqua-farms are developed right on
the banks of the creeks without leaving any space for draining of floodwater.
Due to physical obstruction caused by the dykes, the natural drain is blocked
and floodwater stagnates on agricultural lands. Therefore, protests are voiced
by the affected people.
Conflicts in the land-use pattern. Indiscriminate conversion of fertile
agricultural lands into aqua-farms has led to many problems.  This practice
aggravates landlessness among the farmers. Absentee landlords sell away their
lands to aqua-enterprizes, who offer attractive prices of land.  Those who
undertake jobs or cultivation under tenancy farming lose their livelihood
occupations, and agricultural production of crops is also affected.  In the earlier
years, vast areas of mangroves were destroyed for agriculture.  Though
mangroves are conserved ecological habitats by the law, they have been destroyed
for constructing aqua-farms in the recent years.  However, this activity has
been curtailed by the enforcement of strict rules and regulations by the
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Conflicts between aquaculture and agriculture. Water and land are finite
resources, and their use for fish production is highly competitive with other
economic uses.  Competition can be expected to increase with population growth,
demand for food, energy and employment.  The growth of aquaculture will
depend on its ability to compete successfully for these resources.
Conflicts between profits and survival. It is the market mechanism and the
invisible hands which underline the choice of new fishing technologies and the
harvesting patterns.  Conflicts at sea today are essentially the conflicts between
the few, spurred by the motive of profits, and the many, whose objective is
survival.  The formers are largely catering to the ever increasing demand for
sea food from the over-fed metropolitan consumers in the developed countries
and the latter to the basic protein needs of rural masses of the region.
When water resources are abundant in relation to their demand, there will
not be any difficulty, but the reality at present is entirely different.  As population
grows, economies develop and megacities expand, freshwater will be in greater
demand.  Unlike a resource such as oil, for which coal, wind or nuclear power
can be an alternative, water has no substitute.  The indiscriminate exploitation
of basic natural resources for development has begun to flicker the warning
signal about the limited potential left over for future.
As a matter of fact, economists typically recommend stringent controls to
protect common property resources from over exploitation. Yet, it cannot be
denied that the recommendations tend to draw attention of those who make
policy in this area.  Managing common property resources, for example, will
carry more weight when we are able to identify more precisely maximum
incentives faced by those who will use, or misuse the resources. Pollution can
even be considered a “negative resource” rather than an externality.  Climate
and the processes regulating it may be considered as fundamental, vital resource
under this paradigm (Rajalakshmi 1999b).
Economic Aspects of the Conflicts
In the case of blocked access to the beach or creek, the fishermen require more
time to gain access to their boats which are kept on the beach.  Before the
development of shrimp farms, the fisherman had a direct path to their fishing
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occupying several hectares of land, direct access between the beach and the
village is clearly blocked.  This has led to several other implications such as a
longer and more difficult transport route of fish catch to the local village market.
This has been a major conflict in the region of Nellore where fishermen have
blocked access to the Kandleru creek.
Salinity of agricultural land is reported to be another problem faced by the
agriculturists.  Some of the village wells have become unusable as a result of
salinity.  In the extreme cases in Andhra Pradesh, where all the village wells
have been contaminated, it has been found that women had to walk for longer
distances to fetch potable water from the nearest water source.  However, it
appears that well water salinity is seasonal and related to the intensity of rainfall.
The demands on women’s time are further strained as a result of problems
with fodder and fuel wood collection. Semi-structured interviews of women
have suggested that in the farming communities, women are required to spend
more time in searching for fuel for homes and fodder for their animals.  This is
perhaps a result of the growing number of shrimp farms, occupying wasteland
once used to graze animals and collect fuel wood.  With the advent of shrimp
farms, large areas under thorny bushes (used as a source of fuel wood) have
been cleared.
The fishermen’s productivity and general wellbeing are reported to be
affected by health-related problems associated with shrimp-farm effluents
discharged from the jetties into the near shore area where they fish.  This has
been reported in certain areas of Nagai district of Tamil Nadu and Nellore
district of Andhra Pradesh, whereas others do not complain any ill effect. In
addition, fishermen complain that their nets get snagged by the effluent discharge
pipes that extend up to 50 m out to the sea.
Employment issues are also said to affect the fishing communities since the
direct purchase of wild seed has declined rapidly over the years. This is perhaps
a direct result of the growth of operational seed hatcheries in the vicinity of the
shrimp farms.  It is important to mention here that the development of shrimp
farming has further paved the way for the growth of shrimp hatcheries, supplying
viable seeds to the shrimp farms. This again provides employment opportunities
for many coastal folks.  The shrimp farmers in the region once relied solely on
the wild seed purchased from fishermen before the growth and development of
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the shrimp farms a steady seed supply at a rate scaled by the quantity purchased
as opposed to per individual seed (Patil and Krishnan 1998).
Conversion of agricultural lands
It is generally considered that productive agricultural land is the most ideal
land for aquaculture.  But large-scale conversion of such land into aqua-farms
leads to hyper-nitrification that, in turn, leads to high production of phytoplankton,
affecting the standing crops. High levels of nutrients can cause blooms of toxic
species, which may result in mass mortality of the cultured species.  Increased
level of dissolved organic matter increases the number of micro-organisms,
especially bacteria.  Growth of filamentous algae and macrophytes may also
occur.  In marine environment, changes in the natural production of phytoplankton
and macro algae have been recognized in the vicinity of farms, where there is
vigorous flushing.  Besides stimulation of primary production, changes may occur
in the prevalence of species, abundance of phytoplankton and growth of
macrophyte.
The nature of fauna of the receiving water is influenced by the dissolved
oxygen concentration, nature of substrate and availability of food in aqua-farm
effluents.  It is a common practice to convert agricultural land and the land
under salt production, into coastal aquaculture units.  Conversion of agricultural
farms and salt-making lands had been rampant in fragile coastal areas of Tamil
Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.
Conclusions and Suggestions
A developing country like India needs more foreign exchange for importing
basic raw materials, advanced technology, etc., and therefore, export of marine
products is also encouraged to earn foreign exchange. Shrimps continue to be
the largest item realizing the maximum foreign exchange among the marine
products. Shrimp culture has been undertaken in many parts of the country,
mainly due to its lucrative export earnings and inability of capture fisheries to
meet the increasing demand of shrimps.  As a result of the new techniques of
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enterprize.  But shrimp culture in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh is facing
serious oppositions and has been denounced on the ground that it pollutes the
environment and degrades the resources.
Public opinion about closure of the existing aqua-farms is primarily based
on the perceived pollution problems. A section of the public opined that these
farms must be closed, as they damage environment significantly and cause
hardship to local people.  Another section feels that aquaculture is a panacea
for all the ills, and therefore, should be encouraged for the economic welfare.
Reduction in jobs on agricultural farms, pollution of groundwater and foul smell
have also been reported as important disadvantages of aquaculture. However, it
is opined that the aqua-farms should be allowed to continue with the measures
to check pollution and other negative impacts.
If landless laborers and fishermen are involved directly in shrimp culture,
they shall be able to enjoy the benefits. Some fishermen in the area have taken
up shrimp farming and derived higher income. However, if the capitalists are
allowed to capitalize the high profit generating opportunities, inequalities in income
and wealth will get accentuated, resulting in clashes between local population
and shrimp industrialists.  In order to resolve these conflicts and develop
sustainable aquaculture, the following suggestions are made:
1. Proper land-lease policy will help the landless laborers in becoming aqua-
farmers. Setting up of aqua-farms based on co-operative principles will be
helpful to small farmers, as well as to the industry.  It will improve socio-
economic conditions of the people in the region.
2. Efforts should be made to ensure that the local people are motivated to
accept the steps taken to protect the environment.  Without the co-operation
of the local people, any solution will not be a lasting one. Also, the
‘precautionary principle’ as well as ‘pollutor pays principle’ should be used
wherever necessary.
3. Various government agencies, research institutes, private sector and coastal
management projects should exchange information regularly.  Also, a specific
system may be evolved to help improve cross-sectoral co-ordination in the
development and management of coastal areas.
4. Effective procedures specific to aquaculture should be established to assess
environmental and social consequences of water extraction, land-use,
discharge of effluents, use of drugs and chemicals and other aquaculture
activities.173 Institutional Aspects of Aquaculture Development
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
his note discusses some of the important issues raised in the six papers that
were presented in the technical session on ‘The Role of Institutions in the
Management of Common Pool Resources (CPRs)’.  Even though the papers
are few in number, in terms of their coverage of issues, depth of analysis, and
level of treatment, they are representatives of the larger body of literature that
is already available on the subject.  All papers underscore the role that institutions
— both formal and informal — play in the management of natural resources, in
general and CPRs, in particular.  They all argue, in fact, that it is the erosion of
the traditional institutions and the state’s inability to fill the institutional vacuum
with new and alternative institutional arrangements that has led to the
mismanagement of CPRs and other natural resources.
While Marothia’s paper reviews and synthesizes both the theoretical issues
and empirical evidences on the role, effectiveness, and replication scope for
institutions in the context of five set of CPRs, the other two papers concentrate
their analyses in the specific context of water resources.  Of the latter two
papers, the one by Deshpande and Mini demonstrates the emergence and
operation of institutions in the context of detailed micro case studies of the Pani
Panchayat system of Maharashtra and a few select Water User Associations
(WUAs) in Karnataka.  The other paper by Ballabh starts its argument for
water institutional reform essentially from macro perspective, though micro-
level issues and cases are also used intermittently.  While Rajalakshmi’s paper
deals with the institutional issues within the case study framework based on a
detailed study of aquaculture farms in Tamil Nadu, Barah’s paper evaluates the
same within the context of a historical review of traditional irrigation and other
water storage systems.  Joshi’s paper is somewhat unique as it evaluates the
implications of institutional aspects (especially, participatory arrangements) for
the performance of watershed programs based on a meta analysis of 311 case
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studies.  With this general characterization of the papers, let us now identify
some of the important issues raised in these papers.
Embedded Nature of Institutions
There are two dimensions to institutional embeddedness: linkages of
institutions with the physical, social, and political economic aspects (i.e. the
institutional interface with the physical, socio-economic-political environment),
and linkages within institutional components (i.e. the structural linkages within
and among institutions).  The first dimension relates to institutional replicability,
whereas the second determines institutional effectiveness.  The papers under
consideration here address/recognize these dimensions in varying degrees.
Institutional environment
All papers recognize, with differing details, the embedded nature of institution
with the socio-cultural environment. Interestingly, however, there is some
ambivalence in understanding the erosion of traditional institutions. These
institutions have disappeared in most cases because the social, cultural, and
economic conditions that supported them have themselves changed with time.
Even in the limited number of informal and local-level institutions with success
(e.g., Pani Panchayat, Ralegaon Siddhi, and Sukhomajiri), their performance is
critically linked to the particular physical and social environment. While this fact
is well known, there are few issues that require attention in future research.
What are the physical, social, economic, and other conditions [including
personal attributes of leader(s)] that underline the successful performance
of these local institutions?  Are there any broadly identifiable typologies
among them?
Intra and inter-institutional linkages
All papers, with the exception of the one by Joshi and Rajalakshmi, draw
our attention to the second but very critical dimension of institutional
embeddedness, i.e., the structural linkages among institutions at different levels.
The linkages that received attention in all the three papers are essentially in177 Discussant’s Note
terms of the need for “polycentric governance” or “distributed governance” to
bring together various stakeholders– mainly the state and the people– within a
common institutional framework.  Deshpande and Mini’s paper considers the
intra- and inter-institutional linkages in the context of micro-level water institutions/
organizations. Marothia’s paper not only deals this aspect in detail but also
underlines yet another aspect of inter- and intra-institutional linkages, i.e.,
“institutional thickening”. He also cites some evidence to show that multiple
institutions (institutional thickness) are more effective than a single or few
institutions. But, under conditions where many institutions are loosely linked or
intensely competing for the same space (e.g., Panchayats, organizations like
WUAs, Watershed Committees, and various other committees), multiple
institutions are no guarantee for institutional effectiveness.  The key issues that
emerge for discussion are: What are the layers or components of the
institutional framework that is essential to operationalize the idea of
“polycentric” or “distributed” governance? How can we engineer and
strengthen the intra-and inter-institutional linkages and achieve institutional
thickening?  Can the joint or shared management arrangements (e.g., Joint
Forest Management) be graduated into polycentric governance
mechanisms? If so, what are the alterations needed and additional
conditions to be ensured?
Scarcity-Induced Institutional Change
Although all papers argue or provide evidence for the fact that it is the
resource scarcity that motivates institutional change both at the micro- and macro-
level, the papers by Deshpande and Mini, Ballabh, Rajalakshmi, and Barah are
more explicit on the issue of scarcity-induced institutional change. Deshpande
and Mini provide evidence for the fact through detailed micro-level case studies
of Pani Panchayat and WUAs, whereas Rajalakshmi shows the same fact
based on an intensive study of aquaculture farm in Tamil Nadu. In contrast,
Ballabh describes the scarcity-induced institutional change from a macro
perspective in terms of the institutional implications of scarcity-induced water
conflicts, Barah’s attempts are from a historical perspective of decline and revival
of traditional water institutions.178 R Maria Saleth
Interestingly, Deshpande and Mini attempt to explain these interrelated issues
using a figure (on page 119) in which return to organization is measured on the
Y-axis and level of water scarcity is measured on the X-axis.  The relationship
shows an inverted ‘U’ curve, implying that the return to organization increases
with scarcity to reach the maximum at a given level of water scarcity but begins
to decline beyond that level. The result is very provocative partly because the
return to organization is related to the physical aspect of scarcity and partly
because the return is considered for a given level (or structure) of organization.
When water scarcity is increasing, the value of the resource should be increasing
providing incentive for the adoption of even organizations with higher transaction
costs. The argument holds still true even as we generalize organization to
institution. The fact that scarcity induces institutional change, though seems to
be tautology on the surface, throws, however, some interesting and theoretically
challenging issues. Does resource scarcity always prompt institutional
change?  Or, more aptly, at what level of scarcity can institutional change
or organizational innovations be reasonably expected?
Technology-Institution Interface
From the perspective of the main theme of this Seminar, the interface
between institution and technology assumes a special significance.  Extending
the argument on the relationship between resource scarcity and return to
organization (or, institution), we find that scarcity-induced higher value of the
resource also prompts technological innovations that conserve the resource from
conventional sources and augment additional resources from non-conventional
sources.  Interestingly, there are important linkages between technology
and institutions, both in terms of technology-induced reduction in
transaction costs as well as in terms of institution-induced economic
incentives for the adoption of technological innovations.  The implication
of this issue is another aspect that deserves our attention.
Deshpande and Mini also observe an important similarity between institutions
and technologies as both of them induce a shift in the production possibility
frontier.  However, they also point out that technology enters on the production
sphere, whereas institutions enter into the allocation sphere of economic activities.
Thus, technology adds resources through productivity change whereas institutions179 Discussant’s Note
augment resources through allocation and use efficiency.  This suggests an
implicit linkage between institutions and technology as it is the motive of efficiency
that prompts technological change and in most cases, the effectiveness of
technology development and application is itself critically influenced by the
prevailing institutional arrangement.   Other than these implicit and tangential
linkages, the papers under consideration deal mainly how institutions enhance
resource-use efficiency rather than how institutional change enhances the impact
of technology in the resource context.
Joshi’s paper highlights yet another dimension of the technology-institution
interface in the context of watershed performance.  Here, there are indirect
evidence that the effectiveness of watershed programs — both as a package of
technologies and as a part of organized institutional interventions — depends on
the effectiveness of institutions that facilitate participation.  Since the paper also
shows participation to be more in resource scarce regions, there is also a
potentially interesting issue of whether scarcity contributes to the effectiveness
of technology via the former’s direct relationship with institutional thickening
and its effectiveness.
The Political Economy Context of Institutional Design
The political economy context of institutional design is an important issue,
especially at the macro level.  For this purpose, it is necessary to develop an
analytical framework to capture the inter-relationship among various
stakeholders as well as their rights and duties, objectives — both conflicting
and synergetic, and organizational potential.  Such a framework can then
serve as a vehicle to structure hierarchically their rights and duties,
synthesize their objectives, and resolve their conflicts.  The paper by Ballabh
presents the rudiments of such a framework in the particular context of water
resource allocation and use (see Table 1).  The paper interprets the analytical
framework presented in the table essentially to identify the winners and losers
among the stakeholders (rural domestic users, urban domestic users, landowners,
industrialists, water managers, pollution control agencies, and social activists/
NGOs).  But, the framework, if refined and developed further, can be used for
a much wider purpose of institutional design within a political economy context.
For, it brings together the intricate linkages both among and between users andproviders of the service, highlights the hierarchical nature of the rights and duties
(i.e., the rights and duties of the users are defined within the rights and duties of
the providers), and indicates the differing power relations and conflicting
objectives.
Nature of Institutional Change
While this point is not directly related to the papers being considered here,
it is important to set an important fact straight as some participants have talked
mistakenly about the “rate of institutional change”.  As argued already, since
institutions are embedded within the socio-politico-economic environment and
structurally linked with other institutional components, institutional change is an
amalgam of concurrent changes in a number of institutional dimensions.  From
this perspective, there is not one ‘rate’ but several interrelated and dependent
‘rates’ of institutional change.  Although it is possible to conceptualize these
rates within the marginalist paradigm of the neo-classical approach, it has doubtful
policy relevance, as there is no tractable framework to trace these rates of
changes.  Furthermore, since institutional change is an intricate process evolving
gradually over a long span of time, often exceeding the time horizon of even
long-term planning and usually characterized by discontinuity.  Thus, the notion
of the “rate of institutional change” should not misguide us from the main idea of
the “process of institutional change”, where the focus will be on the correct
policy aspects of identification, creation, and strengthening of right institutional
components.
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 number of developments that have taken place in the recent past in the
economic and scientific environments call for reforms in agricultural research
and development (R&D) system in India. Liberalization and integration of the
economy with the rest of the world require efficient growth in the agricultural
sector, which primarily has to come through technology-led growth in productivity.
This growth, unlike in the past, should be sustainable, equitable and widespread
in terms of sectors and regions. This is an enormous task to be achieved in an
environment of scarce, if not declining, public support for agricultural R&D.
On scientific front also, there have been significant developments. For
example, advancements in biotechnology have provided new opportunities for
growth in the agriculture. It is poised to make significant contributions in terms
of productivity gains, reduction in productivity losses due to biotic and abiotic
stress, reduction in post-harvest losses, improvement in product quality, animal
health, etc. At the same time, it has posed a number of institutional, ethical and
bio-safety issues to be addressed by the developing countries including India.
Increasing participation of new performers of biotech research, particularly
private sector, scope for globalization of biotech research, and regulations for
transfer and use of biotech products, require careful analysis and response. In
particular, the roles of public and private sectors, a balance between biotech and
natural resource management research, and the management of intellectual
property call for changes in the institutional and policy framework. A partnership
between research performers, participation of the stakeholders and the enabling
regulatory mechanisms are indispensable in making the system more responsive
and efficient.
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The public research system needs to address its ‘second generation’
problems to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, policy, institutional
and management reforms should always be encouraged for improving efficiency
of the research system. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR)
has made a beginning in implementation of the recommendations of the review
committees, and more recently, through implementation of the National
Agricultural Technology Project (NATP). The former mainly deals with
governance and organizational reforms, while the latter focuses on improved
research planning, information system, research partnership, etc. (ICAR 1988
& 1998; and Mruthyunjaya and Ranjitha 1998). Although ICAR is the main
agency responsible for agricultural research in the country, it is important to
consider the national agricultural research system (NARS) in totality for reforms.
This paper examines the policy and institutional imperatives of reforms in the
NARS. The paper first discusses the issues relating to governance, organization
and management of agricultural research in the country. This is followed by an
assessment of adequacy of regulatory framework, affecting incentives and
performance of the system. Lastly, the measures to strengthen linkages between
research and extension systems have been outlined.
Governance
The governance of agricultural research broadly comprises funding,
development and implementation of regulatory framework and appointment of
governing board and chief executive. However, the difference between
governance and management seems to have blurred in the Indian R&D system,
and this has been the main concern of successive reviews of ICAR.
Reorganization of ICAR in 1973 provided some professionalism to the
governance of research, but the system is still firmly under the control of the
government. This section spells out some of the broad governance issues to be
addressed.
Policy environment
Public policies are important instruments for setting incentives and objectives
of any organization and the agricultural research system is no exception to this.183 Agricultural R & D Reforms in India
Unfortunately, there has been no science or research policy in the country. The
draft National Agriculture Policy also does not offer much to reform the technology
system. Nevertheless, there have been some significant policy initiatives in the
past. The most important is the continuous support of the government for
agricultural R&D, and this support has remained intact even during various
political and policy regimes. The public policy should now create an efficient
institutional mechanism which could address the emerging R&D issues.
The first objective of the public policy should be to develop a pluralistic
institutional and funding base for agricultural research. In other words, the policies
should strengthen the NARS where several actors pool their resources and
perform agricultural research in the areas in which they have a comparative
advantage. For this, it is important to put a proper incentive and regulatory
system in place. The government has provided lucrative incentives like tax benefits
and research grants to attract private investment in research. The industrial
policies were liberalized under the process of economy-wide reforms in 1991.
The second issue relates to the providing of an enabling incentive and regulatory
framework for the system. In this context, protection and importation of
intellectual property are extremely important in an era of biotech research. The
issues are that there should be a cost-effective and credible framework for the
regulation and protection of intellectual property. The credibility will be established
when there is an independent body to enforce the regulations, and the instances
of ‘rent-seeking’ are absent. The regulations should be cost-effective, in terms
of their transaction costs as well as delay in the transfer of technology.  In
particular, the case of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has focused
attention on these issues. The third issue needing attention of policy-makers is
the focus of public research institutions. In the context of NARS, the public
institutions should focus on provision of public goods, which do not attract the
private sector. Also, the public research institutions should ensure that R&D
needs of marginal and inaccessible areas are adequately addressed. If necessary,
there could be some incentives for meeting the technology needs of these (often)
neglected regions.
Funding
In India, unlike the developed countries, almost the entire funding of
agricultural research is from the government, and private funding is at the margin.184 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
The government expenditure on agricultural research, in real terms, has shown
a consistent increase (Pal and Singh 1997), but the intensity of expenditure has
remained well below than that in the developed countries (Fig. 1). The immediate
response to this could be that this intensity should be raised to commonly
prescribed norm of one per cent of the agricultural gross domestic product
(AgGDP). The second policy response could be to correct the shares of cost-
factors in the total expenditure. The share of salary has been increasing at the
cost of operating and capital expenses on research, both in ICAR and SAUs,
impairing their efficiency. The incremental expenses therefore should augment
the operational and capital expenses. This has been initiated under NATP, which
should be continued in the Tenth Plan also.
The mode of funding has also changed over time and now the effort is
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significant reform effected in the developed countries is the separation of
funding with execution of research and shifting from block grant to competitive
mode of funding. This change has primarily originated from the exceptional
growth of the private sector, which now contributes to about 50 per cent of the
total research expenditure (Alston et al. 1999). It is not likely that such a situation
will happen in India in near future, and therefore, block grant system of funding
should continue. Moreover, the transaction cost of competitive funding is
comparatively high and productivity is rather low (Huffman and Just 1994).
However, competitive funds like the Agricultural Produce (AP) Cess Fund and
the Competitive Grant Program (NATP) of ICAR should be strengthened to fill
gaps in critical technology, foster inter-institutional linkages (including linkages
between the public and private sector) and instil institutional reforms. These
funds could be made more effective and efficient by defining their objectives,
research priorities, and strengthening the monitoring and evaluation system (Gill
et al. 2000).
The relative contribution of the central and state governments to the research
funding is another issue that needs some discussion. Although agriculture is a
state subject under Constitution of India, the major responsibility of funding and
execution of research is with the centre. About half of the national expenditure
by agricultural research and education is done by the central government, and
most of the expenditure of state governments is on education. In fact, nearly 20-
30 per cent of the expenses of SAUs are met by ICAR through either the direct
grants or research schemes, such as All India Coordinated Research Projects
(AICRPs), AP Cess Fund Schemes and NATP. The intensity of research efforts
is very low in the states, particularly in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan
and Uttar Pradesh (Fig. 2). These states should get high priority in allocation of
resources in the Tenth Five Year Plan. It is also important that major responsibility
of applied and adaptive research and education is shared by the states, and
ICAR focuses more on basic and strategic research, capacity building in frontier
areas of science, gap filling, etc. A consistent emphasis on location-specific
research in the ICAR institutions would weaken basic and strategic research in
the country. Moreover, the relevance of applied research conducted in a
centralized mode may be weak due to less or no involvement of stakeholders.
These factors will prove to be counterproductive in increasing the efficiency of
the system in long run.186 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
Autonomy and accountability
One of the most important tasks to address the ‘second generation’ problems
of the NARS is to make public research system autonomous and accountable.
This point was also echoed by the review panel of ICAR (ICAR 1988). When
liberalization, privatization and deregulation are parts of the economy-wide
reforms, there is no reason why the public research organizations should not be
made fully autonomous for improving their flexibility and efficiency. It is also
important to recognize the fact that research is a highly specialized creative187 Agricultural R & D Reforms in India
process with uncertain outcomes, and it requires different working rules,
incentives system and flexibility in management of resources. Thus, autonomy
should ensure flexibility in the governance as well as management functions
such as research program planning, HRD, finance, administration procedures
and international collaboration (Nickel 1997; and Byerlee and Alex 1998). Several
models have been tried all over the globe; they vary from a complete autonomous
system of the CG Centres to the corporate model of Embarapa in Brazil. In the
Indian context, autonomy on the pattern of the Aeronautical Development
Agency (ADA) in the Defence Research and Development Organization
(DRDO) could be considered. The ADA is supported with a professional body
for technical matters, and enjoys complete functional flexibility in a decentralized
fashion. At the same time, the agency is accountable to the government.
ICAR’s vision document, ICAR Vision 2020, states the need for
debureaucratization of the governance and replacement of civil service rules by
the new business-oriented rules, so as to make the system more autonomous,
efficient and accountable. For this, the Governing Body of ICAR should be
made more independent, the professional and financial rules and personnel policies
should be modified. The system should have complete flexibility in generation
and utilization of resources, establishing linkages including international linkages
and adoption of personnel policies. The governance, however, must articulate
role of R&D in attaining national objectives, ensure accountability in utilization
of public funds, encourage reforms and bring transparency in management. A
similar change is required at the state level. It should be realized that if the
system has to deliver in an environment of competition, it must have the same
flexibility as exists in those organizations with which it has to compete. Moreover,
the cost of micro-management is very high. For example, ICAR and SAUs
spend 17 and 11 per cent of their resources on management, respectively. If we
add to this the time spent by scientists on management-related work, which is
reported to be about 10 per cent, the total cost would be in excess of 20 per
cent, which is high enough by any standard.
Organizational Structure
Public institutions for agricultural research are organized mostly on
commodity/resource and disciplinary setup. This pattern has its own merit of188 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
blending of strategic and applied research with input- or product-based
interventions, which may be valid even today. However, now the challenges
demand for production system-based technological interventions, requiring
increasing interactions between various institutions and disciplines. This section
deals with these issues, in general, and public-private partnership, in particular.
Contemporary developments
Agricultural research in India has been largely in the public domain. At the
centre, there is ICAR to plan, coordinate, promote and execute research in the
country. It has a network of institutions (about 93 institutions) to conduct research–
national and central research institutes for basic and strategic research, and
national research centres, project directorates and AICRPs for applied research.
At the state level, there are SAUs for education and conducting state-specific
research. These SAUs, 31 in number including the central university in the
northeast, have regional research stations established under the National
Agricultural Research Project. The participation of the private sector, particularly
in seed, is now growing rapidly.
Thus, the country has well developed research institutions, and there are
about 22,000 qualified scientists working in the ICAR/SAU system. However,
the level of funding and research infrastructure varies – scientists in ICAR are
better funded and equipped, while their counterparts in SAUs, particularly their
regional stations, are constrained due to inadequate resources. Addressing
resource constraints and improving research planning and linkages in these public
research institutions should be a high priority agenda.
Future perspectives
There are two important issues relating to future orientation of agricultural
research organizations in the country. First is to encourage non-public research
organizations to strengthen the NARS. This requires action on two points: (a)
Appropriate regulatory framework and incentive system to attract private sector,
both for profit as well as non-profit, in funding and execution of research (the
issue discussed later in detail); and (b) separation of funding from execution of
research, so that various actors can pool their resources and perform, based on
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more on strategic research, while private research programs can cater market-
oriented applied research. Private funds can also support public research
programs for strategic research directed to strengthen applied research in the
private sector. On a similar pattern, public funds can support private research
directed to benefit weaker sections of the society or a research program with
societal orientation.
The second issue relates to bringing necessary changes in the public research
organizations for addressing future research needs in multi-institutional, inter-
disciplinary and system perspective. This requires some changes in research
planning to solicit effective participation of stakeholders and supporting institutional
linkages and systems research through competitive funding. These issues are
discussed below.
Research planning. An advantage of commodity/resource and disciplinary-
based organizations is that final output or technology can be easily visualized
and planned, producing a higher degree of research success in the past as witness.
However, in a complex production system such visualization may not be sufficient
unless it is based on a system perspective. As the system complexities are
increasing overtime, there is a need for change in research planning—it should
now shift to matrix mode of research planning where scientists from various
disciplines and institutions are pooled for a mission-oriented project. This
essentially involves planning for addressing production constraints, filling gaps in
critical technological and exploiting opportunities in various agro-ecological
regions. A multidisciplinary team of scientists from the institutions located in an
agro-climatic region is commissioned to address a particular research problem.
The AICRPs and NATP envisage research planning in this mode, but their
share in the total research funding is very small. Therefore, increasing proportion
of the plan funds should be allocated to this mode.
The participation of stakeholders helps in improving not only the relevance
of research, but also facilitates research planning in systems perspective.
Scientists can identify research problems for the required technological
interventions in the system. Individual scientists or team of scientists, however,
may still work for a component of technology, but they together can contribute
to the development of targeted technology. For such a change, exchange of
information between researchers and farmers, and participation of farmers in
identification of production constraints and growth opportunities are essential.
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Competitive funding. Competitive research funding is a powerful mechanism
to bring institutional reforms in the research system. These funds can improve
relevance, cost effectiveness, and accountability of research (Kampen 1997).
Institutions and scientists compete for funds to work on the identified priorities.
Objectives, key concerns (like multidisciplinary and inter-institutional approach
for equity-driven research) and modalities of the funds are well-defined and
disseminated (Gill et al. 2000). Although some of the funds like AP Cess Fund
of ICAR, were established long ago, these are hardly used for bringing institutional
reforms. Only recently the Competitive Grant Program of NATP is designed to
strengthen public-private partnership in agricultural research. It is, therefore,
important that an increasing proportion of research funds are used for competitive
funding for specific objectives. Objectives of the fund, operational procedures
and research priorities should be determined well in advance for transparency
and credibility in management of the fund. In the absence of these, it is likely
that subjectivity and inconsistency will be involved in evaluation of research
proposals. Peers’ perceptions of priorities may vary, ‘good science’ may
overshadow need-based research, and the competitors’ credentials may dominate
relevance of proposal in terms of clients’ needs and objectives of the fund.
Finally, in order to make these funds successful, there should be enough flexibility
in financial and management operations — an essential requirement often lacking.
Here, it is important to note that the competitive funds finance the short-term
projects, usually of 3-5 years duration, and therefore, timely availability of
resources and flexibility in their use are essential for the successful and timely
completion of projects.
Networking. Consortium and networking approaches are powerful mechanisms
to bring together institutions and individual scientists. Usually, the former is a
formal arrangement between two or more research institutions, while the latter
establishes informal but effective links between the scientists working on a
common research theme. Both the approaches are gaining popularity in the
research systems. For example, the Rice-Wheat Consortium has established
joint research programs between CIMMYT, IRRI and NARSs of South Asia
for sustaining the productivity of the rice-wheat system in the Indo-Gangetic
Plains. Similarly, there are a number of research networks also. Both the
approaches are cost effective and can generate synergies, and therefore, should
be encouraged. Electronic connectivity and flexibility in establishing linkages,
including international linkages are essential for their promotion.191 Agricultural R & D Reforms in India
Public-private interface
Private sector is assuming greater roles in funding and performance of
agricultural research. Its presence is particularly significant in the developed
countries where it contributes about half of the research efforts (Alston et al.
1999). The developing countries have started witnessing such an institutional
change. Most of the private funds are utilized to support the in-house research
programs even in the developed countries, and public-private research linkages
are negligible. For instance, in the US, about 13 per cent of the total private
funds for agricultural research were used by the public research institutions.
Although instances of public-private partnership in agricultural research are
witnessed, their contribution to the total research effort is still negligible  (Huffman
and Just 1999).
Conceptually, the private sector is expected to build on basic research done
in the public research organizations for its commercial application. The products
of applied research have high appropriability—a necessary condition for private
investment (Umali 1992). Therefore, a closer link between the two sectors can
substantially reduce R&D lag and improve efficiency of the research system.
These links would also improve client orientation of research efforts, as the
private sector works more closely with clients. The available evidences indicate
that in such linkages, the government-funded work preceded the industry-funded
work and researchers in both the sectors were in constant touch—academic
researchers identified problems in consultation with the researchers in industry,
while the latter availed the consultancy services from the former. Further, the
standard of faculty, scale of research and geographical proximity were found to
be positively associated with the perceived contribution of academic researchers
to industrial revolution (Mansfield 1995). Such instances of the public-private
interface are a few in the developing countries and India is no exception. The
more common practice in India is that the products of public research
organizations are commercialized by the private sector. If necessary, some
adaptive work is also done by the private sector. Availability of information and
transparent mechanism for access to the products of public research programs
foster this kind of interface (Table 1). Examples of this kind are found in the
Indian seed industry (Pal et al. 2000).
The need for public-private interface is likely to increase with further spurt
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Table 1.  Public-private interface in the provision of rice seed
Elements Nature of interface Sustainability
Acquisition ♦ Open access to public ♦ The public sector has the
of source seed varieties incentive of wider
♦ Supply of source seed technology impact
by the public sector ♦ Resource generation by the
♦ Commercial sale of public sector
foundation seed by ♦ Provision under seed law
public seed agencies ♦ Transparent mechanism to
acquire source seed
Seed Training of private sector Increasing understanding of
multiplication personnel in seed private sector as potential client
production techniques by of public research products
public research institutions
Quality control Extending public seed ♦ Provision under seed law, but
certification and testing seed agencies argue for a
services to private seed liberal procedure
agencies ♦ Incentive of subsidy on
certified seed of ‘new’ variety
Conditioning Private processing of ♦ Incentive of increasing
and storage public agency’s seed market share in seed sale
on contract basis and ♦ Utilize excess seed
vice versa processing capacity
Marketing ♦ Private sale ♦ Commercial incentive for
(by seed dealers) of the private sector
public agency’s seed ♦ Public sector to bridge seed
♦ Trade in commercial demand-supply gap
seed between public and
private seed agencies
Seed Private delivery of ♦ Private media to cover progra-
information information of varieties mmes/ information of public
through television and (including farmers) interest
farm magazine ♦ Private sector unlikely to
promote new varieties
Note:Rice variety development is exclusively in the public domain. However, there is a
public-private joint research program on hybrid rice, and there are several private
seed companies using public lines in their research program on hybrid rice.
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biology and genetic engineering. The new trade regime is also expected to help
globalization of biotech products, and therefore, developing countries are likely
to witness exponential growth in private-sector research. A variety of actors,
viz. national public research systems, international public research systems, and
national and international R&D companies, may form new alliances and
partnerships. Such partnerships should be based on comparative advantage and
strengths of the partners. Public research organizations should learn to gain
access to proprietary research material through joint ventures, secrecy
agreements, licensing purchase and material transfer agreements. They should
also learn to manage their intellectual property and exchange it for gaining access
to proprietary technologies for larger public interest and social welfare (Byerlee
and Fischer 2000). The national research system should initiate a strategic
response to development, management and transfer of technologies (Table 2).
The success on this front will largely be determined by transparency and
effectiveness of the regulatory framework for protection and transfer of
technologies and mechanism for sharing of benefits.
A number of initiatives have been taken in India to foster public-private
partnership in agricultural research (Mruthyunjaya et al. 2000). However, the
response has been mixed. An application of Williamson’s (2000) theory of
transaction cost in contractual relations help explain this limited success (Fig.
3). There is an increasing realization among the private companies that market
dominance is possible only when they have superior product to offer to farmers.
This can be realized with adequate R&D support. In case, the R&D support is
provided by the public sector, there should be explicit mechanism for joint venture,
trust between the partners, benefit sharing and secrecy of contract. India is
slowly moving in this direction. These conditions are, however, easily met in the
private-private partnership, and therefore, new partnerships between the national
and trans-national companies are emerging in India. The most frequently cited
examples are in the seed sector — joint ventures of Monsanto and Mahyco,
Pioneer and Southern Petrochemicals, and ITC and Zeneca. Monsanto and
Mahyco have a joint research program for Bt cotton, while in the other two joint
ventures, research is with the trans-national company and marketing is with the
national company.
The companies which face high transaction costs of accessing the
technologies from the market, but have adequate assets, establish their own
in-house R&D programs. These companies need adequate protection of194 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
proprietary material. The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers’ Right Act
(2001) is enacted to provide incentives to the breeders to meet the commitments
made by India to the World Trade Organization. But what is equally important is
that credibility of the protection mechanisms should be maintained through
transparency and effectiveness in their enforcement. Also, as discussed
subsequently, the regulatory framework governing development, testing and
transfer of technologies should be less cumbersome, more transparent and less
time taking. However, this does not imply, by any means, that the mechanism
should be less stringent.
Table 2. Policies and strategic options for the stronger NARSs for
biotechnology
Issue NARSs that already have strong biotech capacity
Public sector • Invest in upstream capacity for tool development, and to
research capacity design around key components
• Contribute to global structural and functional genomics
consortia and data bases
• Define and assert ‘ownership’ of selected biological
assets for specific traits
Private sector • Provide favorable regulatory environment on technology
research importation, protection, and release consistent with
societal norms on risks.
• Revisit priorities of public sector to ensure
complementarity with the private sector
Public-private • Negotiate commercial licensing agreement directly with
partnerships private companies for accessing tools and technologies
for commercial and emerging markets
• Bargain for royalty-free license for non-competitive
market
• Develop and protect own IP products and for use as
bargaining chips in joint ventures
Regional/ • Develop partnerships for upstream research with
international advanced public and private research organizations and
alliance with the CGIAR
Source: Byerlee and Fischer (2000).195 Agricultural R & D Reforms in India
The last requirement of joint ventures is the provision for contract research
and consultancy. The ICAR has developed the guidelines (ICAR 1997) and
now encourages contract research and consultancy. However, guidelines for
sharing of benefits under contract research are not so well defined. Also,
difference in the work culture of public and private sectors and cost of delays
have raised the transaction cost of research contracts. It is expected that the
working groups constituted by the ICAR for various sectors (crops, livestock,
horticulture, fisheries, engineering, etc) would be able to cut ice on this front.
Research Management
With the increase in size and complexity of the NARS, management issues
have become extremely important for efficient provision of research services.
Jha (2001) has indicated some of the reforms for efficient management of
research system. In particular, he has highlighted the changes required for
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addressing research needs of small holders. We have also discussed here, some
more changes that are required in management of the public research
organizations. The key to success lies in reducing the transaction costs in
hierarchies, integrating organizations for synergies and evolving a participatory
and decentralized management system. Specific issues in this direction are
discussed below.
Decentralization and devolution
As noted above, administrative and other expenses of research management
are very high because of centralized management. Now the focus should be on
decentralization and devolution, which is also related, to some extent, with
autonomy of the system. Decentralization of research management would help
in two ways. Firstly, it will encourage management reforms to reduce the
transaction costs and improve research efficiency. Secondly, the system can be
made more accountable. Here, it is important that the decentralization should be
for all research management functions, viz. research planning, management of
resources including financial resources, evaluation of research programs, and
implementation of incentives and reward system, and should go down to the
project level. Lack of flexibility in any one of them may frustrate all efforts. For
instance, current decentralization efforts in ICAR are constrained by rigidity in
financial procedures.
Research planning and evaluation
Planning and evaluation of agricultural research are extremely important
parameters. Unfortunately, the performance of the system is rather uneven on
this front. Research performance and effectiveness can be as good as its
planning and evaluation during implementation. A weak research planning
would lead to poor targeting, cost overruns and frequent delays. At the
planning and initial stage of implementation, there is a scope for change, and any
oversight identified at a later stage is difficult to rectify; it would simply
require repetition of the research cycle. Similarly, concurrent evaluation must
be rigorous and objective; research programs meeting the evaluation criteria
should be allowed to progress and others should be critically reviewed and if
need be, abandoned. This can happen only when evaluation mechanism is stringent197 Agricultural R & D Reforms in India
and linked to commitment of resources as well as career advancement of
scientists.
Research planning involves two basic factors: (a) Allocation of resources
based on prioritized research portfolio developed using objective criteria and
systematic analysis; and (b) development of research programs in a bottom up
participatory approach. The idea is that resources should be allocated based on
expected contributions of the programs to research objectives, and the programs
must be of direct relevance to the clients. Increasing use of formal priority
assessment methods is recommended (Pal and Joshi 1999). A beginning in this
direction has been made under NATP. This, however, requires a system-wide
adoption.
Incentives and reward system
For healthy growth of any organization, it is essential that a proper incentive
and reward system is instituted and is linked to the performance of individuals
and institutions. At the same time, it is important that there is a transparent and
objective mechanism for performance evaluation of individuals as well as
institutions. As of now, both, the incentive and evaluation systems, are working
in isolation in the public research organizations, and therefore, it needs
rectification.
Information system
Development of an information system is essential for a proper decision-
making. It improves the quality of research planning and enables judicious use
of resources, reduces duplication of research efforts, and thereby, contributes
to cost-effectiveness of the research system. Past efforts to develop such a
system were frustrated because of inadequate infrastructure for the exchange
and updating of information and lack of effective information system.
Development of information system and electric connectivity are the high priority
components of NATP, and therefore, substantial resources are committed to
them. Besides hardware, an integrated system of information on research
programs, scientific manpower, financial resources, research products including
technologies, patent and publications, and other value-added information should
also be accorded high priority.198 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
Enabling Institutions
The overall efficiency of a research system is determined not only by
intensity, quality and organization of research efforts, but also by the types of
institutions or governing regulations. The role of state is now changing from a
controller to a facilitater, and therefore, the regulations governing R&D system
must facilitate the working of the system. Any effort to control the system, or
any actor, would be counterproductive. The state should intervene only when
market fails to deliver. The regulations relating to the entry of private companies,
import of research equipment, testing, release and commercialization of research
products, protection of intellectual property rights, etc. affect the working of the
R&D system. Although the public sector is also equally affected by these
regulations, we discuss them more in the context of the private sector, who
often debate about their effectiveness. These issues are discussed in the context
of seed sector—an area where the private sector has shown keen interest.
The protection of plant varieties is expected to further enhance activities of
private seed companies. There would be a better access to technologies available
all over the globe and a wide rage of technologies would become available to
the farmers. It is also expected that the rate of variety release would increase
and the older varieties could be replaced frequently, giving some yield advantage.
However, there could be indiscriminate import of technologies and attempts to
establish broad patents. The government would have to be vigilant on this matter
and should regulate import of seeds and their sale in the market. Once the
market is mature and competitive and farmers are well informed, the process
could be liberalized. In cases of concentration of markets, the government can
apply ‘compulsory licensing’ and/or bargain for free use of proprietary material
in lieu of public research material including germplasm.
Another concern relates to the regulations on transgenic products. There is
wide apprehension and fear about the transgenic products due to lack of
information. The Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation in the Department
of Biotechnology has laid down guidelines for transgenic research. Nevertheless,
there are some genuine concerns that need to be addressed: (i) The monitoring
and evaluation process should focus more on product than on process which is
more or less similar. This means that environmental and health risks of transgenic
products must be assessed on case by case basis. (ii) There should be a close
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biosafety and plant variety protection. Any confusion and delay in release of the
products would prove to be expensive for the companies as well as for the
society. (iii) Adequate attention should be given to seek preferences of the
producers and consumers. The government and other agencies should inform
them, so that they can assess cost and benefits of transgenics and make informed
decision about use of transgenic products.
The control of input quality is another area which has received considerable
attention. The primary responsibility of providing information and ensuring quality
of inputs lies with the government. Accordingly, the mechanisms for quality
control should be evolved. For example, seed quality in terms of genetic purity
and physical standards, is examined by the government officials at different
production stages, and the seeds meeting all the requirements are issued
certification tag1. In addition, there is a mechanism of point-of-sale seed
inspection, and seeds found to be sub-standard at this stage invite legal
proceedings against the seller (dealer, company or both). This is a ‘third party’
case of quality control usually found in the developing countries. Private seed
companies argue for liberalization of these quality control measures, and the
case put forth is that the companies have incentives in maintaining seed quality
to establish their reputation. This is true to a large extent, but there are instances
of lack of information about the company, variety and formal seed quality control
measures. There could be a case for liberalizing when markets are competitive,
farmers are informed about the market and consumer forums are effective to
address grievances.
 The success of these regulations should be assessed not only in terms of
protecting farmers but also effectiveness of their enforcement. Lack of
transparency, scope for ‘rent seeking,’ and long delays in delivery of technologies
to farmers may weaken the credibility and basic purpose of these regulations.
These may even neutralize other incentives for private research investment,
such as tax exemption on private R&D expenditure, concessions on import of
scientific equipment, and sale tax benefits on certified seeds. As of now,
1
 In the Seed Act there is a provision of ‘labelled seed’. Seed producers can sell uncertified
seeds provided a white label is provided with seed indicating name of the variety,
physical standards, etc. Most of the companies sell ‘labelled seed’, particularly of
proprietary hybrids to protect the parent lines. But, they prefer to sell certified seed of
public varieties to avail tax benefits.200 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
competition guided discipline supported with workable public quality control
measures seem to be adequate for the Indian system.
Research-Extension Linkages
Lack of effective research-extension linkage has been a perennial problem
of agricultural technology system in India. The main reason for this is that
agricultural research and extension functions are conducted by independent
organizations and there are no incentives for bringing them together. Researchers
consider extension a less challenging activity, whereas there are no incentives
for extension agents to establish close links with research institutions. The solution
may lie with diversification of institutional and funding base of the extension
system, where all actors pool their resources and skills. In particular, participation
of the private (for profit) sector and voluntary organizations will be important.
Their roles in various extension functions are discussed below.
Provision of information
Provision of information is an important function of extension. The
information flow should be both ways — from researchers to farmers and vice
versa. With increasing focus on farmer participatory research and involvement
of farmers’ organizations in research planning is expected to improve information
flow from farmers to researchers. Two kinds of information are to be delivered
by researchers to farmers. First is the general information like the one about
prices and weather. This can be best provided by public extension system through
mass media. Second is the specialized information like scientific
recommendations, soil tests, animal health, etc. Agricultural research stations
can provide this type of information through computerized information system.
This information should be gathered based on homogenous production systems.
Some of the specialized information like soil quality, animal health, etc. can
be provided by the private (for profit) sector, as there is scope for appropriability
in provision of this information, especially in the short run. Farmers are also
willing to pay for such services if the stake involved is high, such as in orchards,
livestock and commercial crops (Sulaiman and Sadamate 2000). Voluntary
organizations independently or with support of public funds can provide the201 Agricultural R & D Reforms in India
information having low scope for appropriability, e.g. crop and resource
management practices.
Imparting skills
Imparting skills is a specialized task requiring some personal contact with
clients. Here also, private sector can play an increasing role. The skills relating
to management of high-value commodities can be provided by profit-oriented
private sector. The skill required for management of common pool resources,
where social benefits exceed private benefits, can be best provided by voluntary
organizations. If the front-line extension organizations like Krishi Vigyan
Kendras and Regional Research Stations of SAUs, can assume significant role
and work with farmers to generate resources—more is the resource generation
and stronger will be research-extension linkages. Lastly, research-extension
linkages in the profit-seeking private sector are bound to be stronger, as both
these functions are well integrated in this sector.
Concluding Remarks
This paper highlights policy, institutional and organizational issues for
reforming the NARS, in general, and the public research system, in particular,
for making the system responsive and efficient. This requires understanding
on the part of the policy makers to make the public research organizations
autonomous and accountable. The public research organizations should also
learn to function in a network mode. The idea behind this is that research
agenda should be identified in a participatory mode and the best talent from
all the sectors should be put to work under an enabling environment and
incentive system. Also, transaction cost of the governance of the public
research organizations should be brought low. The institutional framework
should be effective, efficient and credible so as to accelerate the rate
of technology generation, commercialization and transfer. The technology
system will provide a competitive edge in an era of knowledge-based
society, and therefore, it must change to keep pace with the rapidly changing
world.202 Suresh Pal and Raka Saxena
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he burgeoning stock of food grains is the hallmark of success of the agricultural
policy, research and extension organizations that not only led to the green
revolution in India but also sustained it.  Yet, the ecological, social and political
consequences of the green revolution and the impact of these consequences on
the development goals of the nation, pose difficult questions, often directed at
these institutions.
The social scientists question the unending need for policy regimes that
subsidize inputs and provide price protection to the farming community and to
consumers (Pingali et al. 1999). The research system is questioned for
concentrating heavily on irrigated tracts and major cereals with ‘assured benefits,’
at the cost of rainfed agriculture and coarse cereals. The inability of ‘productivity
enhancing technologies’ to deliver better livelihoods to the poor in marginal areas
demands ‘more focused and tightly managed’ participatory research with a
systems approach to handle the multisectoral and seasonal dimensions of rural
areas and ecologies (Mortimore et al. 2000; and Raina 2000).  Weak research
programs are cited as a major cause of poor performance of agricultural research
in many developing countries. For example, in a review conducted by ISNAR, it
was found that “Research programs often do not sufficiently reflect the country’s
development objectives, respond poorly to the needs and demands of the research
users, and do not take advantage of technologies and information generated
elsewhere” (Collion and Kissi 1994, p. 78). The relevance and quality of scientific
research are hampered by the increasing bureaucratization in research
organizations, reducing their access to other actors/agencies in the agricultural
innovation and agricultural development processes (Raina 1999a; and
Mruthyunjaya and Pal 2000).  Institutional features like leadership and flexibility
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to take advantage of new research opportunities vary in different research
organizations within the public agricultural research system in India (Evaluation
Team 1999)1.  Fundamental reforms in extension, moving away from hierarchical
(top-down) transfer of information or advice, towards a ‘mutual learning’ process
can help better design of relevant research, enhanced uptake of technology and
more desirable or less disruptive impacts on development (Nitsch 1994; Roling
1988; and Garforth and Usher 1997). Ultimately, the complex and dynamic
relationships between agricultural science, society and ecology demand that all
actors in the agricultural innovation system make conscious and consistent efforts
for institutional learning and institutional change2 (Hall et al. 2000; and Raina
2001).
The call for ‘institutional change’ for a deeper greater agricultural technology
impact highlights several issues in the social studies of agricultural science that
were taken for granted previously.  What is institutional change?  How is it
different from organizational change? If the Indian Council of Agricultural
Research (ICAR) and the State Agricultural Universities (SAUs) are public
sector research organizations, how is the ‘institutional change’ to be negotiated
in these organizations?  How do these research organizations relate to each
other, to policy and extension organizations, to stakeholders (farms and
ecosystems) and to the national agricultural innovation system in general3?
To achieve the desired impact(s) of agricultural technologies, such as poverty
alleviation or reduction in ecological disruption, is highly demanding indeed.  It
calls for the philosophy of sustainability.  Agricultural innovations can no longer
1
 A team of experts assessing the Rockefeller Foundation funded International Program
for Rice Biotechnology, noted that leadership and flexibility to take advantage of
opportunities (in research avenues and training) are easier to come by in Indian agricultural
universities than in research organizations under the jurisdiction of the ICAR (Evaluation
Team 1999).
2
 This is a statement that affirms the ‘national systems of innovation’ approach to
understanding and analyzing institutions, their roles and changes in agricultural
technology generation and utilization.  For a detailed analysis of changing policy goals
and institutional reform, see Hall et al. (2000).
3
 The ‘national systems of innovation’ approach enables us to look beyond our earlier
narrower definition of national agricultural research system (NARS), where we excluded
the policy and extension systems, and their respective goals and accountabilities from
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depend only on the philosophy of productionism4 to address the diverse ecological,
political and economic demands of agricultural technology generation and
diffusion.  Impact assessment ex-ante and ex-post, needs clear understanding
of the institutional economics and more inclusive analytical frameworks that
can handle bio-physical and socio-economic information.  Empirically, the tools
of analysis shift from expert-led, assumption-ridden econometrics to participatory,
deliberative and rational methodologies, using quantitative as well as qualitative
information.
This paper argues that a conceptual and analytical distinction between
institutions and organizations is an essential input to planning and managing
institutional change.  Institutional change involves a transformation of the rules/
norms that govern the research and extension organizations.  Examples from
the history of agricultural research and extension in India reveal a legacy of
conceptual muddles and bureaucratic inertia that have stalled over decades
every well-intentioned move for institutional change in the national agricultural
research and extension organizations.  The paper discusses the role of the social
sciences in the conduct of agricultural research, technology generation and impact
assessment. It argues that the institutional hardware of the neo-classical
economics that affects decision-making in the agricultural research and extension
organizations, must change.
Institutions and Organizations in Agricultural Policy,
Research and Extension
In the realm of innovations, broadly including technology generation and its
impacts, institutions have been characterized as necessary to cope with
uncertainty, to manage conflicts and ensure cooperation among different
research/development actors, and to provide appropriate incentives for these
actors. Institutions may also be used to encourage or hamper certain lines of
4
 The philosophy of productionism that informs modern agricultural science states that
continuing enhancement of production is the guiding principle of all agricultural sciences.
This belief in technocentric productionism and continued moral pride in production is a
form of self-deception. Technocentric productionism with “headlong and unreflective
application of …technology for increasing production is anti-environmental” (Thompson
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inquiry, and in yet another form can become entities that bring rigidity,
allegations of ‘institutional sclerosis’, and the demand for progressive
institutional reform (Edquist and Johnson 1997). The institutional economics
classifies ‘institutions’ into hard and soft, formal and informal, mature and
evolving; and ‘institutional change’ as driven by or preceding technological change,
designed or self-grown, exogenous or endogenous, radical or incremental,
moving towards a market equilibrium, a series of punctuated equilibria, or a
perpetual non-consummatory evolution.  In analyzing institutional change for
greater agricultural technology impact, we recall the definition of institutions as
‘sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules or laws that
regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and groups.
Organizations are formal structures with an explicit purpose and they are
consciously created. They are players or actors (Edquist and Johnson 1997).
Bromley (1985) defined  institutions as the “working rules for going concerns”,
which govern organizations.
The distinction between organizations and institutions is important to
understand institutional change. ‘If organizations are the players and
institutions the rules, then how are the rules changed?’ (ibid p.57).  This is
the specific concern when we discuss institutional change for deeper agricultural
technology impact.  Analytically, this distinction between organizations and
institutions is an important input to planning, organizing and executing
agricultural policy, research and extension effort to achieve desired technology
impacts.  An innovation system inhabited by policy, research and extension
organizations, each with their own characteristic as well as several
complementing or conflicting institutional variables is depicted in Figure 1.  Given
the three important points of confluence of institutional variables and organizations/
structures, viz. (a) the expectations/policy framework, (b) the knowledge and
information, and (c) the technology-society interface, it is possible to identify
and target institutional reform to achieve the desired policy goals.  For instance,
if the incentives and ideologies of dominant multinationals are not conducive to
encouraging the research on natural resources in the innovation system, then
the policy organizations have to find appropriate institutional change (incentives
and ideologies) that will encourage natural resources research in the public
sector.  Coalitions of interest in directing, generating, diffusing/analyzing
technological change, dismissed in mainstream economic analysis as political
anomalies, become much more clear when the institutional basis of contending209 Institutions for Agricultural Research and Extension
coalitions are made explicit5.  While there are institutions that are common to
policy, research and extension organizations, their features vary in different
organizations and to a large extent determine the relationship of the organization
with other organizations in the same or other systems (including cultural or
political organizations).
Patronage to agricultural science by the State, middle class professionals
and their aspirations, the State’s political and economic expectations from and
for the agricultural sector, and the assessment of the impact of technological
change are all embedded in rules/institutions like hierarchy, attitudes,
incentive patterns, or values.  Given the distinction between institutions and
organizations, agricultural policy can be seen as an institution, a set of
guidelines, a rule or framework that the patron-State uses to meet the specific
economic and political ends.  These ends have been met through several
organizational and institutional changes in Indian agricultural research system.
Using Figure 1 as the analytical framework, we can see that reorganization
of ICAR in 1966 and again in 1974, as well as establishment of the SAUs or the
Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board (ASRB) were all organizational
changes.  The recommendation of the Marion Parker Review Committee
(Ministry of Agriculture 1964) for the “creation of an incentive system
that would encourage more research from professional personnel, and
establishment of an organizational framework that would enable them to
focus on the most urgent problems,” was ignored in the 1966 organizational
reform (consolidation and centralization) of agricultural research under ICAR.
These unfulfilled recommendations for institutional reform, which were either
mistaken for organizational change or neglected in the policy push for the
green revolution, led to severe institutional (personnel) problems, necessitating
the reorganization of ICAR in 1974.  In this instance, the reorganization
led to the increasing centralization and bureaucratization of agricultural research.
But, the introduction of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) in 1976
envisaged to be equal in status to the Indian Administrative Service, with
its new norms and procedures for personnel evaluation, was an important
institutional reform6.  Yet, the fact that the ARS evaluation processes (the Five
5
 Contending coalitions in technology development and policy research, as espoused
by Biggs and Smith (1995), are yet to receive adequate analytical attention within the
institutional innovation literature, which can perhaps be characterized as another
contending coalition in the academic world.210 Rajeswari S Raina
Figure 1. Illustration of selected institutions and organizations in
agricultural policy, research and extension
All organizations are located in specific institutional contexts.  They behave according
to working rules, norms or institutions The policy, research and extension organizations
have common and permissive boundaries as well as crucial interactions.
6
 Among the negative consequences effected by the ARS are: (a) An excessive
concentration on short-term applied/adaptive research, at the cost of fundamental/
strategic research (ICAR 1988; and Rajeswari 1992), (b) eventual criticisms of ritualistic
and repetitive research (ICAR 1988), (c) unhealthy guarding of specializations, (d) a
scramble among scientists for research management positions, and (e) suspicions about
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Yearly Assessments) were discarded in 1986 proves that ‘providing ample
incentives to scientists’ continues to be an unresolved institutional problem.  Now
when ICAR and SAUs try to resolve problems of attitudes or incentives that
can encourage private-public interaction in agricultural science and development,
values or ideologies essential for capacity building for natural resources research,
motivations that will establish priority setting methods in research organizations,
or management solutions to improve personnel morale, they are forced to face
some of these historically unresolved institutional variables.
The extension system, in a similar manner, gone through several
organizational changes since its origin in the broad-based Community
Development Program in the 1960s.  But, it has maintained the norms of
hierarchy, linear top-down transfer of knowledge (technology) from research,
through extension to farmers. The Training and Visit (T&V) system is the best
and most recent example in extension methodology, introduced as an institutional
change by the Department of Agriculture in Indian states in the late 1970s.  The
T&V system rests on “the assumption that an outside agency can accurately
assess what is good for rural people and that the solution to rural under-
development and poverty is the provision of science-based technical knowledge”
(Nitsch 1994).  This institution with perfect hierarchy, continues to constitute
the functional basis of the ‘technology-society interface’ (see Figure 1). The
history of agricultural research reveals an implicit hierarchy in the generation of
knowledge and technology, as well as the dissemination and utilization of this
technology in the society.  This hierarchy has been amply challenged by several
alternatives to mainstream public agricultural research and extension (Chambers
et al. 1989; Scoones and Thompson 1994; Roling 1988; Nitsch 1994; and Biggs
and Smith 1995).  The changing role of extension from technology transfer to
mutual learning demands a complete breakdown of the extensionist with reference
to the farmer (Nitsch 1994).  These institutions that are taken for granted have
shaped our view of agricultural research, extension, and the impact of technology.
We argue here, that this unstated hierarchy, from policy down to research
and from there to extension is an important institutional impediment in
achieving the desired impact of agricultural technology.  Hierarchy essentially
precludes institutional learning processes and thereby the scope for progressive
change.
The history of agricultural development reveals a remarkable mutual
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science.  A significant shift in research content, from export/cash crops to staple
cereals, following independence in all erstwhile colonies (now less developed
countries) is a good example.  Agricultural policy in most of these countries
maintains this emphasis on food security and nutrition, in contrast to the policy
almost 50 years ago of increased export earnings or of promoting supply of
primary goods to the industries of the colonizers.  Recent developments in the
world trade regimes and the ecological degradation caused by myopic policies
and adoption of technologies, have led to revision of agricultural policies (including
subsidies and income support) by several of these less developed countries.
This, in turn, calls for a change in the relationship between agricultural science
and agricultural policy to spearhead the drive for economic and ecological
sustainability of agriculture7.  The most crucial, however, is a re-orientation,
theoretically and methodologically, of the social sciences that form the conceptual
and functional relationship between agricultural science and society.  In particular,
the neo-classical economics with a very limited institutional understanding needs
re-examination for its suitability to study and guide agricultural sciences.
Social Sciences and Institutional Change
Social sciences have enhanced our understanding of institutions in
agricultural science and development.  Agricultural science has been subject to
analyses within both endogenous and exogenous theories of economic
development.  The theory of endogenous growth, when applied to the analysis
of agricultural research or directions therein, emphasizes the fact that
technological advancements are determined directly by the relative factor
scarcities and prices prevailing in the economy8. This induced innovation theory
7
 We have argued elsewhere (Raina 2001) that governments, policy makers, agricultural
scientists and farmers have not made the essential distinction between sustainability
and profitability. The two are often perceived within agricultural research systems as
conflicting objectives.  We must recognize that profitability is a fickle goal and can be
tackled primarily at the policy level (Clark 1999). Science for sustainable agriculture need
not focus on the criterion of profitability.  It is only one among several other criteria that
are more scientifically challenging, and specific to ecological systems, knowledge and
technologies, cultural and social contexts, and political commitments.
8
 This is a legacy of the Hicksian labor-capital ratio. It is most profoundly stated in
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of technological change and agricultural development has been challenged by
the exogenous development school (Burmeister 1987; and Grabowski 1988).
Olmsted and Rhode (1993) suggest that the institutional innovation hypothesis
does not hold for agricultural research and technology generation even in the
USA (the prime case generalized by Hayami and Ruttan (1982) to present the
induced innovation hypothesis).  The commercial crop research agenda in the
erstwhile colonies, in response to demand for raw material/commodities of
commercial interest to the colonizer’s home market, is the most successful
demonstration of the exogenous growth model in national agricultural R&D.
The commercial crop production technologies, factor scarcities or prices had
little to do with the local economies.
In introducing the institutional element in their analysis, the neo-classical
economists have gone one step further than the Marxist political-economy
analysts who treat institutions as another (dialectical) material input to
development.  The induced institutional innovation, an after-thought of the
induced innovation school, tells us that institutions are also products of relative
scarcities (factors or other institutions) and prices (Hayami and Ruttan 1992;
and  North 1990). The economic phenomena or processes in society thus
determine institutions. Accordingly, all institutions governing a system of
policing, health services, banks, trade corporations, firms etc. are products of
some economic imperative to save costs or increase efficiency or both, in
order to ensure increased profits.  The third school of institutional economics
[to adopt Field’s (1984) classification9] has produced much of the institutional
analysis that is published today.  It is marked by the confusion between
institution and organization.  We argue here, that the historical understanding
of institutions and organizations and their interactions with all
relevant systems in their contexts is essential to explain the conduct and
performance of the concerned organization (research institute or firm or
household).
9
 Field (1984)  presents three schools of institutional economics. The first and the
earliest being the Commons variety of context (space and time) specific individual case
study method.  The second, the assumption-loaded economic analysis of the Marshallian
variety, where institutions are uniform and exhaustive across regions, sectors, or actors.
The third, the modern neo-classical economists compromise between the two, is based
on the assumption that there are costs or transactions beyond the market; but these are
quantifiable and can be subject to rational economic analysis.214 Rajeswari S Raina
In the agricultural research system, scientist or research manager makes
decisions for public welfare10. Managers and experts have well-defined roles
within the administrative monolith.  This administrative rationalism is “the problem-
solving discourse which emphasizes the role of the expert rather than the citizen
or producer/consumer in social problem solving, and which stresses social
relationships of hierarchy rather than equality or competition” (Dryzek 1997, p.
63).
A key instrument deployed effectively in the decision-making mode of
administrative rationalism is the complacency of the bureaucracy and expertise.
There is concern (about food production targets, nutrition, trade competitiveness,
soil degradation, etc.), and reassurance (about weedicide-resistant or transgenic
crop varieties, or impending fossil fuel shortages, or more tangible environmental
research projects that tackle issues like pesticide residues or toxicity).  The
externalities of the industrial model of agricultural growth are either ignored, or
assumed to be located in the ill-disciplined socio-political sphere, beyond the
control of the rationally administered and disciplined world of science.  The
superiority of the experts (who represent and work for achieving the State’s
public welfare goals) is maintained almost perfectly within agricultural research
administration.  The hierarchy of science and technology, flowing from State,
down to policy-maker, scientist, extensionist, and further down to the ultimate
adopter, is perfectly maintained.
The administrative rationalism of natural resource bureaucracies the world
over, are evident in the ‘institutional and policy hardware’, which have a very
tangible existence (Dryzek 1997).  In our attempts at institutional change for
greater agricultural technology impact, we must strive to wear out this tangible
institutional and policy hardware.  Continuous exposure to and open deliberations
on ecological, social and political problems in the agricultural sector, can help
change agricultural policies, the research and extension organizations and the
institutions that govern them.  It should not be surprising if in the agricultural
innovation systems, the social sciences begin to play the role that plant breeding
did in the previous century.
10
 That this decision, in the best NARSs, is informed by the economic rationale of cost-
benefit analysis, legitimizes the public servant’s (here the expert’s) capacity to make
decisions about the direction and content of technological change in agriculture.  Here,
the service or mission of the agricultural research organization is clearly defined — it
could be national food security, export competitiveness, or more specifically, land-saving
technologies, etc.215 Institutions for Agricultural Research and Extension
Box 1. Dryzek’s discourse analysis of administrative rationalism applied to the
administration of agricultural research and extension
Dryzek’s Discourse Analysis Crucial counterparts in agricultural
technology generation and diffusion
1. Basic entities recognized or constructed
● Liberal capitalism - Assured private markets/profits
● Administrative State - Protectionist policies, regulated
markets, public investment and
infrastructure
● Experts - Institutionalization and authority
● Managers - Bureaucratic organization and
management
2. Assumptions about natural relationships
● Nature subordinate to - Pervasive commodity-based research
human problem solving and production-productivity orientation
● People subordinate to State - Most favorable tracts, most responsive
crops to meet national objectives
● Experts and managers - More and new bureaucracies to manage
control State disaggregated problem components
- Research organizations superior to
extension organizations and strict
hierarchy of information flows and
decision-making is maintained within
both the organizations
3. Agents and their motives
● Experts and managers - Professional/career advancement
● Motivated by public interest, - Cost-benefit analysis in project
defined in unitary terms appraisal
- Prioritization of research programs
projects to meet targets (of
dissemination/adoption) set by the
State/policy makers
4. Key metaphors and other rhetorical devices
● Mixture of concern and - Food security vs. transgenic crop
reassurance varieties or environmental research
● The administrative mind - Scientific research and extension effort
as yet another government service
Source: Dryzek (1997)216 Rajeswari S Raina
Society and Agricultural Technology: The Need for
Institutional Analysis
There has been over the years an increasing intellectual and institutional
isolation of agricultural sciences (see Mayer and Mayer 1976 for the USA; and
ICAR 1988 and World Bank 1990 for India).  Intellectually, agricultural sciences
the world over, are isolated from other liberal arts and sciences of the general
universities.  Institutionally, agriculture sector now has its own scientific research
organizations, technology diffusion systems, professional, trade and social
organizations, and political system (Mayer and Mayer 1976). We agree with the
Mayers’ that the formidable strength of this agricultural complex is difficult to
break or reform.
The theories of economic development, which have been applied to
the analysis of agricultural science, share two common features.  The first
is that they are all grounded in the rational expectation that agricultural
science and the technology it generates can lead to economic development.
This economic development, in turn, draws from increased production,
reduced cost, and/or increased economic efficiency, and from the management
of capital and labor resources to cater to this ideal of development.  The
economics of agricultural science and development have contributed to
these assumptions about, (a) direct causal relationship between science
and development, and (b) relative insignificance or non-existence of
externalities and institutions. In the latter case, it must be pointed out that
all institutions that are not directly and exclusively the product of changes in
economic variables are ignored. In conventional neo-classical analysis, this means
that all institutions are either reduced to their simplistic economic expressions or
ignored or at best assigned a value as an error term in the econometric model
estimated.
The second feature is a relationship based on ‘instrumental value’ between
agricultural sciences and the social sciences that inform it and legitimize its
institutionalization and growth. Accordingly, the scientific research and technology
generation in the agriculture sector leads to welfare maximization, which is the
ultimate mission of all science and technology endeavours. The scientific
community and the NARSs within which they work make rational decisions
regarding the most efficient technologies and their utilization in society.  Thus,
the social sciences, economics in particular, measures the welfare gains due to217 Institutions for Agricultural Research and Extension
technological change, and this legitimizes and increases the investment made by
the State in agricultural research11.
The disciplinary isolation of agricultural sciences both within the academic
community and from the society, in general, arises from a basic kink in the
agricultural science paradigm of using the social sciences.   The social sciences
are used  (a) as a substitute for extension or transfer of technology, (b) for
statistical verification of experimental results —an economic viability statement
before release of the technology, and (c) for conditional priority setting, evaluation
and policy formulation in agricultural research systems.
In all the three cases, social sciences are of instrumental value within
the agricultural science paradigm.  A clear, logical distinction is made between
reality and morality.  Instrumentalism logically defines the sole task of science
“as the discussion of means on the basis of given objectives” (Hagedorn 1993).
In practice, in the organization and conduct of agricultural research, be it in the
private or public sector, this translates into a division of labor between scientists
and politicians.  This division of labor is ‘postulated in order to guarantee the
logical distinction between reality and morality’.
This distinction is most evident in the agricultural science community’s
defence of itself from the negative social and environmental impacts of science.
For instance, in an exercise modelling the effect of precision technologies on
agriculture and environment, scientists present the view that “(M) any of our
environmental problems are not the result of ‘bad science’, but are the products
of  inadequate policies, institutions and management” (Zilberman et al. 1997).
The declining rate of growth of food grain production and productivity, as well
as declining soil health (in Punjab and Haryana) cause concern (ICAR 1998).
Here again, the blame is placed on myopic policies and resource degrading
cropping patterns (ICAR 1998; and Pingali and Shah 1999).  Though scientists
do acknowledge that they attempt to find the absolute truth, verified by an
acceptable degree of significance, sometimes do not address the physical, social
and economic constraints faced by the farmers. This tendency reinforces the
status quo of science. Accordingly, it is the government—its policies and
institutions—that must change, not the objective morality of science.  The social
sciences embody this neutral instrumentalism, keeping agricultural sciences
11
 Several studies estimating returns to investment in agricultural research are available
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isolated from social and political processes, as well as the consequences
of agricultural technologies.  What is instrumentalism in theory becomes
autonomy and unaccountability in practice.  The neo-classical economics provides
the main legitimization for this autonomy, by justifying the research agenda that
responds only to factor scarcities and price vectors (Raina 1999).
Evaluation: breaking hierarchies
Politicians and policy makers have over the past couple of decades witnessed
an increasing reliance on ‘expert’ advice as a source of resolution and more
importantly on legitimization of political decisions. This simultaneous scientification
of politics and the politicization of science poses a paradox, ultimately de-
legitimizing science and expert advice (Weingart 1999).  But, this loss of public
faith in the authority of expertise has not prompted the academic community/
scientists to “adapt their ideas on science and its relation to politics”  (Rutgers
and Mentzel 1999).  The reluctance of the agricultural science community to
adapt or change their ideas about the morality of science or the institutions that
govern their science, is understandable. The theoretical and empirical instruments
or methodologies of evaluation (of impact assessments/project appraisals)
practised in NARSs today, reveal some major institutional impediments that
influence the conduct of agricultural science and its impact on society and
environment.  The hierarchy in the administrative rationalism of agricultural
science, and the neo-classical economics framework used for technology
assessment are two of these institutions that deserve immediate attention.
Two major purposes of evaluation are: (i) To help ex ante research decision-
making through project appraisals, and (ii) to understand the consequences of
agricultural technology through ex-post impact assessments. Several problems
following the green revolution technology  (in employment, equity, rural
indebtedness, nutrition, soil and water quality, incidence of phyto-pathological
problems, etc.) had been highlighted in the 1970s and 1980s12. In India, for
instance, institutionalization of an effective research monitoring and evaluation
system in the NARS could have prevented worsening of several negative impacts
of the green revolution technology, or atleast re-oriented much of the research
12
 See UNRISD (1974), Palmer (1974), Farmer  (1977), Lipton with Longhurst (1989) and
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that is now criticized as being “repetitive and ritualistic” (ICAR 1988; and World
Bank 1990).  In practice, these evaluations in the NARS make the entire system
suspect and invite criticisms of disciplinary convergence, over-simplification,
uniformity in perspective, and coalition between the scientific community and
agro-industrial capital (Vorley 1998).
In the State-sponsored administration of agricultural innovation, agricultural
technology is evaluated exclusively in terms of commodity production goals (the
objectives given by the State).  Other impacts/externalities that are direct
consequences of agricultural technology are often ignored.  There is a need for
methods and practices of project appraisal and impact assessments that
can capture the relevant changes in the ecology and society due to
technological change.  Evaluation methods must essentially tell us why and
how technology generated by the research system leads to sustainable
development, or why it does not.
Let us assume that ‘greater agricultural technology impact’ does mean
greater technology impact to move towards the dynamic goal of sustainable
agriculture.  Much change in ‘decision-making and evaluation’ is needed if
agricultural research and extension are to serve sustainable agricultural
development (Herdt and Lynam 1992).  During the past decade, there has been
a conceptual evolution among agricultural economists and policy makers, from
drawing lines and demarcating phases to introduce sustainability into the research
process, to embracing sustainable development as the ultimate objective of
agricultural research (see Lynam and Herdt 1989).
First and foremost,
“Impact assessment ... must ... focus on development goals, not just on the
outputs generated by research. ... Biotechnology, adoption of new crop
varieties, higher crop yields, agricultural credit, off-farm employment and
industrialization may be components of development, but they are not the
goals. ... Genuine agricultural development alleviates rural poverty and
increases food production. Agricultural research must ultimately be judged
against its contribution to this vision of development. Impact assessment
must demonstrate how research leads to technology and how technology
leads toward achieving development goals, or alternatively, why it does
not” (Herdt and Lynam 1992).220 Rajeswari S Raina
Thus, information about and possible reasons for negative impacts of
agricultural research have never been part of the conventional impact assessment
studies, which exhibit a characteristic positive bias.  Conventional impact
assessment studies are located in an institutional void — there is no policy
context or extension system.
Unfortunately, impact assessments thus far have focused on commodity
research programs, and not on natural resources research programs, where
impacts do not easily fit into supply curves or production functions.  But, even in
the commodity research impact studies, “analysts have fudged the analysis”
(Herdt and Lynam 1992).   The critical assumptions about supply shifts, range
of inputs and input quality, measure of research effort, lag lengths, and private
and social rates of return, made in economic surplus and production function
analysis have been discussed and questioned (Schmitz and Seckler 1970;
Binswanger and Ryan 1977; Norton and Davis 1981; Pardey and Craig 1989;
Hallam 1990; Rajeswari 1995; and Alston et al. 1995).  These arguments support
our view that methodology is increasingly being substituted for data and
farm level or social information.
Development of methodology for assessing the impact of natural resource
research programs has been limited by the problem structure of natural resource
research.  There are more particular spatial as well as temporal scales to be
considered, and impacts are highly location-specific (unlike commodity yields,
incomes or market prices). These, then pose intractable aggregation problems.
Most critically, however, monitoring the multiple bio-physical consequences of
natural resources research outputs in the field is very expensive, and the interplay
between the economic and bio-physical domain is very strong (Lynam 1994).  It
is, therefore, a must that appropriate information sources be tapped at the local/
regional level, with increasing participation of stakeholders and a shared
knowledge base.
Evaluation of research and technology, thus, has been blinded by a vision of
technology as an end in itself; a solitary, isolatable variable that enters a production
function of given inputs and transforms production or productivity.  In agricultural
research (as in research in every other sector), a variable that measures research
effort (be it investment, or research publications, or technologies, or personnel),
can never enter a production function as an isolated independent variable.  All
the other inputs that enter the production function are either there solely due to
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the research effort.  This transformation may be quantitative, qualitative or
both, and is always accompanied by innumerable changes in the process of
application or utilization of the particular input.  These processes, especially of
requirement and consequence that are an inextricable part of the
generation, diffusion, transformation and utilization of technology, are
always ignored when technology is assessed as an isolated independent
variable.  These processes that accompany technology utilization are critical to
the assessment of research or technology, when we seek the goal of greater
impact of agricultural technologies.  An evaluation framework based on the
‘evolutionary theory’ is an important input, to point out where consistent results
or impacts can be sought along the technology trajectory (from generation,
through development, diffusion, adoption and multiple impacts) (Loevinsohn
1998).  An evolutionary economics theoretical framework can also help identify
where organizational or institutional problems occur.  Here, the need for local
information is critical.  There is an even greater need for participation and
deliberation on the issues, by extension workers and different groups of farmers.
Do they understand technology generation and utilization? Or do scientific
research decision-makers understand their science and its utilization in rural
lives?
Much of the literature on evaluation of agricultural research has
concentrated on methods and tools13.  Little has been said on the need for a
change in perspective; though there are brilliant attempts to bring evolutionary
theory to define a framework for evaluation of ‘participatory research’
(Loevinsohn 1998a).  Mainstream agricultural science rather innocuously
continues to use the same neo-classical theory of market-based technology
generation and use for evaluation of and priority setting in agricultural research.
This is justified in the name of cost effectiveness, real-world limitations on
available information, and want of a complete theory of aggregation (Alston et
al. 1995).  It is also acknowledged that “to a great extent this literature has
neglected” issues of externalities and environmental sustainability. There have
been attempts to generate multi-market economic models more sensitive to
local and regional agro-ecological concepts and variables, when these models
13
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are employed to make decisions about research priorities or resource allocation
(Wood and Pardey 1998).  Within the neo-classical economics framework, the
lack of disaggregated cross-section and time-series data has made economists
substitute methodology for actual data (Herdt and Lynam 1992).  The main
argument against collection of actual disaggregated data is the cost involved
(Alston et al. 1995).
If information is stored and handled by the people of the area, the labor and
cost of data collection for each individual evaluation with a pre- and post- program
timeframe can be avoided (Raina 2000).  It is important for research, extension,
ecosystems, and farms to share the same information base about crops, resources,
livestock, technologies, markets, labor and capital. In such participatory data
collection and use, choice of units, frequency of observation, selection of scale,
samples and randomization can be an integral part of the statistical design of the
research project (Riley 1996).  While aggregation is possible (and required) for
selected quantitative and qualitative variables, aggregation is not an essential
requirement for analysis at appropriate organizational levels, with befitting
institutional flexibilities.  Evaluation to this end must use an evolutionary economics
approach to understand and assess agricultural and ecological values in different
valuation contexts.  This also calls for a range of participants in the evaluation
exercise who can reflect upon and inform the decision process about the variety
of valuations that rural populations make about a natural resource or technology
or production practice.  Given the institutional rigidities in the agricultural
innovation system in India, it is unthinkable in the given hierarchy that
extension officers in the field must be a part of evaluation teams to assess
a research program, project or technology.  Agricultural research must now
acknowledge the role and credibility of voluntary organizations in ‘criticising’
agricultural policies, science/ technology, in ‘creating more inclusive epistemic
networks’ around agri-environmental objectives, and in ‘the construction of
effective knowledge-action links’ through information dissemination, mutual
learning and technology transfer (Jasanoff 1997).  Evaluation, by encouraging
the participation of diverse actors and agencies, and building systems linkages
among technological, social and ecological variables, can and must provide inputs
for further change of policies and institutions in agricultural research and
extension.223 Institutions for Agricultural Research and Extension
Conclusions
This paper begins with the thesis that agricultural policy, research and
extension organizations are interlinked, and are embedded in a larger framework
of institutions or rules. It has highlighted the fact that if technology has to have
an impact on sustainable agriculture, then institutional change is essential across
all relevant actors/organizations.  It concludes by suggesting that evaluation is
an important research management input which can gradually bring about
progressive changes in the institutions governing agricultural policy, research
and extension organizations.
Evaluation informs all relevant stakeholders about how research leads to
technology and technology leads to development, or why it does not. Thereby,
an evaluation exercise covers an entire range of organizational and institutional
variables that govern, generate, develop, diffuse, utilize, and modify/ transform
the knowledge/technology, and breaks the neo-classical adherence to exclusively
economic variables and non-economic variables that can be quantified and
aggregated at the market level (exchange value).  By demanding participatory
information and analysis, an ideal evaluation exercise breaks the dominant
institution of hierarchy, so prominent in agricultural innovation systems.  It also
remodels the overriding ‘instrumentalism’ that informs the relationship between
agricultural sciences and social sciences.  When the social sciences, in an inter-
disciplinary fashion, expose agricultural sciences and technology generation,
diffusion and adoption process to ecological, social and political issues in the
agricultural/rural sector, the institutional and organizational impediments to
achieving desired technology impacts become evident.  This pro-active role of
social sciences brings with it the seeds of autonomy of science from (essentially
bureaucratic) institutions or rules that retard or impede the desired technology
impacts. At the same time, it also enables greater local agri-environmental
accountability. The ambition for greater technology impact demands that the
boundaries between extension and research should be blurred.  Extension here
would be mutual learning in the field, and research would be ideological open
quest for basic, applied and adaptive knowledge for understanding and solving
problems in a participatory deliberative mode.
The need to distinguish between organizations (structures) and institutions
(their rules/norms) is crucial when planning for and implementing ‘institutional
change for greater agricultural technology impact. Examples from the agricultural224 Rajeswari S Raina
innovation system in India reveal that organizational changes have been
implemented time and again, with little or no change in the institutions such as
hierarchy, incentives, or work culture.  While there are institutions that are specific
to each organization, some institutions/norms like hierarchy seem to cut across
the entire agricultural innovation system.  Institutional innovations must be enabled
through a perpetual process of ‘institutional learning’ where we can analyse
and explain as well as overcome our technological, organizational and institutional
shortcomings (Hall et al. 2001).  We must recognize that farmers, extensionists,
input/agro-processing industry, agricultural scientists, policy-makers and politicians
have equally crucial roles to play in changing these institutions governing
agricultural knowledge and technology in today’s society.
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here is an increasing recognition all over the world that institutions are
fundamental to the economic change. Agricultural development depends on
an efficient flow of information among all the actors in the system, and agricultural
extension has been traditionally performing this role with varying levels of success.
Its important contributions in promoting agricultural development and increasing
food production have resulted in increased interest in extension during the last
few years (van den Ban and Hawkins1998).
Notwithstanding methodological shortcomings, there is enough evidence to
show that returns to investment in extension education are reasonable and perhaps
comparable to those on other public services (Gill 1991). But, the new political
agendas, increased cost-consciousness and budgetary restraints, and major
technical advances are necessitating significant changes, such as reduction in
public sector services, experimentation with new service delivery structures,
growing interest in privatization and decentralization of activities and shared
responsibilities between central and local governments and private user
associations (Rivera and Gustafson 1991). The economic reforms pursued in
many developing countries have also accelerated the process of limiting the role
of government  in provision of several services, including extension. India is also
actively considering various options for limiting public sector involvement in
extension and is contemplating steps to complement, supplement and replace
some of its activities by greater involvement of the private sector  (DAC 2000).
Extension managers and professionals are presently engaged in learning
lessons from the results of various experiments in funding and delivery of
extension implemented in the 1990s. The new millennium is going to see a number
of changes in extension funding, delivery and approaches. The success would
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
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be based on how extension organizations perceive the changing nature of
agriculture and thereby handle the information and educational needs of their
clientele and restructure itself based on learning from these experiments,
accumulated understandings (in the realm of social, policy and management
sciences) and developments in information technology.
Evolution of Indian Extension System
In India, pre-independence extension efforts were mainly driven by
humanitarian motives. These had only limited impact and were restricted to
areas where these were implemented. The relevance of organized extension
was acknowledged quite early after independence. The external aid for
agricultural development emphasized the need of extension in the 1950s. The so
called “extension bias” till the mid-1960s was mainly attributed to the overall
importance given to extension in the Community Development (CD), National
Extension Service (NES) and Intensive Agricultural Development Program
(IADP). The program could not make much success due to several reasons, as
for example, the village level worker (VLW), the lowest rung of the administrative
machinery in the Ettawah Project (pre-cursor to CD) and NES Program,
continues to remain even now, albeit the numerous deficiencies, the face of
extension in rural India.
There have been two reasons behind this extension bias (Goldsmith 1990).
The first was the misplaced confidence in the relevance of modern technology,
and the second, the view that peasant farming is economically irrational and that
ignorance made small farmers hold on to traditional methods. Both assumptions
led to the conclusion that the first step in agricultural development should be to
establish mechanisms to diffuse the inventory of modern knowledge directly to
end users.
With no signs of significant improvement in agricultural development, these
views started shaking in the coming decades and the need for development of
relevant technologies through research began to emerge. Strengthening and
reorganization of the research establishment of state agricultural universities
(SAUs) and research stations, and the institutional developments associated
with the green revolution corrected the bias against extension and generated a
lot of goodwill to firmly establish it as an inevitable arm for agricultural231 Restructuring Agricultural Extension
development. The discipline of extension education also received recognition
and it expanded along this trajectory.
The agricultural extension was a function performed under the guidance of
the state Department of Agriculture (DoA) until the 1960s. A few voluntary
organizations were also doing some effective work in this direction in areas of
their jurisdiction. The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) started
involving itself in the extension activities in 1966, with the initiation of National
Demonstration Program. ICAR’s involvement increased considerably in the
later years, with the establishment and spread of Krishi Vigyan Kendras
(KVKs). ICAR also initiated such programs as ‘Lab-to-Land’, and ‘Operational
Research’, etc., which were merged with KVKs in the1990s.
Establishment of radio stations and initiation of rural programs resulted in a
wider use of mass media for agricultural development. The print media followed
the suit. SAUs also initiated training programs (for officials and farmers),
demonstrations, and exhibitions. These got strengthened with the establishment
of the Directorate of Extension in each SAU. Organizations created for the
promotion of specific commodities (Commodity Boards) and specific areas
(Command Area Development Authority) also initiated extension activities.
Extension was treated essentially as a public good, and the focus has been on
facilitating the reach of extension to all parts of the country through more staff
and programs.
Extension paradigms have been changing globally during the last fifty years.
The paradigm shifted from “diffusion of innovations” in the 1960s to “constraint
identification” in the 1970s, and to  “improved management” in the 1980s. This
led to a wider acceptability of the Training and Visit (T&V) System across
several countries. The 1980s saw most of the states in India embracing the
World Bank funded T&V program. It improved the funding and manpower
intensity of extension and brought a unified command for it. The ‘Straight Jacket’
approach of T&V, ignoring the agro-climatic and socio-economic diversity of
this country, produced mixed results. A review of evaluation studies on the
T&V system revealed its impressive gains (in terms of productivity gains) in the
1
 One of the reasons identified was the similarity between agro-climatic conditions
where technologies are generated and where they are to be used and the favorable
socio-economic situation and developmental infrastructure prevalent in the irrigated
areas for the wider uptake of technologies. In contrast, these were not available in the
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irrigated areas1 and failures in the majority of the rainfed areas. The need for a
proper analysis of institutional and socio-economic factors in the rainfed areas
and the importance of varied social science skills for making relevant interventions
was also highlighted2.
Since the 1980s, increasing number of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), agro-input industries and agro-processors have been taking up
agricultural extension activities. Farmers’ associations and producers’ co-
operatives are also presently involved in extension services in a few crops and
commodities3. With the drying up of external support, the states started
downplaying the rigor of T&V systems, and the 1990s witnessed several
experiments by the state governments in providing extension services.
Post-T&V Initiatives
The uniformity imposed on the functioning of extension systems started
disappearing, soon after the creation of funding for T&V system. States started
experimenting on their own programs and this has resulted in a number of diverse
extension approaches. Some of these are highlighted in this section.
Kerala decentralized the functioning of DoA in 1987 by creating agricultural
offices (Krishi Bhavans) under each panchayat. In 1989, the state initiated
the ‘group approach for extension’ in rice farming, which was subsequently
extended to other crops. Rajasthan adopted the ‘group approach’ to extension
and presently the village extension workers operate mainly through kisan mandals
(groups of 20 farmers). The state has also been encouraging NGOs to participate
in the extension activities and has contracted out some extension activities to
NGOs, including transfer of entire extension responsibility to NGOs in a few
blocks/districts. Rajashtan also experimented with para-extension workers and
now  Uttar Pradesh is trying this program on a larger scale, with an aim to cover
every panchayat with a kisan mitra, as a “cost-effective supplement to village
extension worker”.
2
 For a more detailed discussion on the institutional and socio-economic issues in
rainfed areas, see Farrington et al. (1998).
3
 For a detailed discussion on investments and performance of various extension
organizations in India, see Sulaiman  and Sadamate (2000).233 Restructuring Agricultural Extension
Maharashtra adopted the ‘single window’ system in July 1988, by merging
the Departments of Agriculture, Horticulture and Soil Conservation at the
operational level. This effectively improved its field extension manpower intensity.
In the state of Uttar Pradesh, the grassroot link for agricultural extension has
weakened with the deployment of kisan sahayaks as multi-purpose Village
Panchayat Development Officers (VPDOs). Out of the 50,000 odd gram
panchayats, only 6,000 have the former kisan sahayaks as VPDOs, and in
the rest of gram panchayats, there is no kisan sahayak and the multi-purpose
VPDO drawn form other departments is doing extension activities.
Punjab has been following the SAU-farmer direct contact method over the
past two decades and has upgraded all front-line extensionists to graduate level.
The Punjab Agricultural University employs its own multi-disciplinary extension
team in each district, which is engaged in adaptive research, training and
consultancy. In Andhra Pradesh, the SAU has established one District
Agricultural Advisory Technology Centre in all the districts for technology
refinement, diagnostic visits and for organization of field programs in collaboration
with DoA and allied departments.
Different approaches are also being tried in several project-specific districts.
The most ambitious among them is the Agricultural Technology Management
Agency (ATMA) model, presently under implementation in 28 districts (6 in
advanced stages) in 7 states. The project envisages testing of several new
institutional arrangements such as creation of ATMA, a registered society at
the district level for integrating the activities of all organizations involved in the
transfer of technology, decentralization of decision making at the district level,
and increase in farmers’ participation in planning and implementation of extension
interventions (ICAR 1998; and MANAGE 1999a & 1999b). The program is
based on the Strategic Research and Extension Plan (SREP) developed through
a participatory approach.  The process of implementation of the project, if
documented and monitored effectively, would provide rich experience in
undertaking future planning for extension in the country.
In Uttar Pradesh, two major programs are presently under implementation,
namely the Uttar Pradesh Sodic Land Reclamation Project (UPSLRP) and the
Uttar Pradesh Diversified Agricultural Support Project (UPDASP). Both these
programs are funded by the World Bank and have a separate component for
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approach is being tried (kisan mitra, mahila kisan mitra, group leaders, master
trainers, etc.), commodity-based farmer interest groups (FIG) are formed, and
the field activities are implemented through user groups. The program is being
implemented by the Uttar Pradesh Bhoomi Sudhar Nigam, a government
undertaking set up for this project. UPDASP envisages capacity building of the
line department functionaries, decentralization of the technical and managerial
decision making (SREP, PRA, ATMA, etc), increasing the role of the private
sector, enhancing the participation of farming community, Self-help Groups
(SHGs) and Farmers Interest Groups (FIGs), etc. and support for HRD and
enhanced communication capacity. Interventions for agricultural development
under this project are implemented by the field functionaries of DoA.
Another innovative program, again supported with the external funding
(European Economic Community (EEC)) is the Kerala Horticultural Development
Program (KHDP). Its salient features include, SHGs of farmers, master trainers,
field centres for collective marketing, and credit package for tenant farmers
(Isvarmurti 2000). KHDP (recently renamed as Fruit and Vegetable Promotion
Council) was initiated in 1993, and has been implemented through creation of a
new organization comprising consultants and 250 young professionals with
university degrees in agriculture, business administration, social welfare, etc.
Programs for training of farm women in technologies were implemented in
different states with external assistance. For instance, DoA in Karnataka initiated
(in 1983) the Women/Youth Training Extension Project (WYTEP) with assistance
from the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). The project
established training centres for women farmers, arranged extension programs
for farm women and organized groups of farm women for taking up collective
action for input procurement, learning from each other, thrift and micro-credit
activities. Similar programs were implemented in Madhya Pradesh and Tamil
Nadu also with the Danish Assistance.
The Ministry of Agriculture has also taken a few important initiatives during
this period. These include the establishment of an autonomous training institute,
the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management (MANAGE) at
Hyderabad in 1987, initiation of the scheme, “Agricultural Extension through
Voluntary Organizations” in 1994/95, and a recent initiative, “macro
management”, in which 27 centrally sponsored schemes were merged, enabling
the states to make their own plans and prioritize them as per felt needs. The
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the districts in selecting programs that would better serve the needs of the
districts.
Another important experiment has been the initiative by the Small Farmers
Agri-Business Consortium (SFAC) to set-up 5000 agri-clinics through unemployed
agricultural graduates. The agri-clinics would be providing testing facilities,
diagnostic and control services, and all kinds of agricultural consultancy services,
on payment basis. The program is financed through banks from National Bank
for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) to those selected graduates
and the government provides 25 per cent of the cost as subsidy.
The involvement of ICAR in extension has increased during the last two
decades, with the increase in the number of KVKs. Presently, there are 261
KVKs in the country. The council has also strengthened 53 Zonal Agricultural
Research Stations (ZARSs) to take up the additional functions of KVKs. ICAR
spent Rs 339 million in 1997/98 on KVKs (Das and Hansra 1999). Apart from
KVKs, the frontline extension program of ICAR comprises 8 Trainers Training
Centres (TTC), 42 Institute Village Linkage Program (IVLP) centres and 60
centres of Technology Evaluation and Impact Assessment (ICAR 2000). Under
the National Agricultural Technology Project (NATP), ICAR extension
component comprised establishing of 40 Agricultural Technology Information
Centres (ATICs), remandating of the Zonal Agricultural Research Stations to
take up the additional functions of KVKs, expansion of IVLP to more centres,
and strengthening of the Directorate of Extension of SAUs and the Zonal Co-
ordination Units of ICAR. ATIC is a single window delivery system for the
products, information and services available from an institution to farmers and
functions in a separate building with facilities to access them. Of the 40 centres,
25 would be in SAUs and 15 in ICAR institutes.
The private sector has also been exhibiting a lot of diverse approaches in
agricultural extension. The prominent ones include the activities of the farmers
associations (e.g. Grape Growers Association of Maharastra); producers co-
operatives (e.g. Kerala Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation, sugar co-
operatives in Maharashtra); NGOs (BAIF); input industries (fertilizer and seed
companies); agro-processors through contract farming (Pepsico and Hindustan
Lever in Punjab, VST Natural Products in Andhra Pradesh); mass media (E-
TV in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra, newspapers and magazines in Kerala)
and individual consultants and consultancy firms.236 Rasheed Sulaiman V
Present Scenario
The study on extension in private sector in India has revealed the presence
of a number of organizations providing extension services (Sulaiman and
Sadamate 2000). Their presence is highly skewed towards well endowed regions
and the intensity in terms of expenditure, manpower allocation and contact varies
widely. DoA is one of the most important source of information for farmers,
though their role in delivering information on non-foodgrain crops is limited.
Farmers’ dependence on other farmers and input dealers as source of information
continues to be high, reflecting the limited reach of DoA. The main extension
function performed by DoA is the delivery of technical messages to individual
farmers or their groups through visits of an extension worker to specific locations
in his circle/area. These visits are not regular and are influenced by his pre-
occupation with the implementation of a number of central and state sector
schemes, having input/subsidy delivery. Farmers’ associations and producers’
co-operatives provide a large number of services including extension to farmers,
but they exist only in a few crops/commodities/locations.  Same is the case with
the Commodity Boards. The field extension activities of the Directorate of
Extension of SAUs and ICAR institutes are restricted to a few villages around
its location. KVKs are organizing a number of vocational training programs for
farmers. NGOs are involved in a number of activities. With very few exceptions,
most of the NGOs are small and their activities, though intensive, are restricted
to a few beneficiary farmers or at the most to a few villages. Consultancy
services are few and are mostly private ventures found in high value crops. The
potential of media is under-utilized at present, but agricultural programs of some
of the private TV channels and print media have high impact as source of
information. Input companies do not have full time extension staff. Its marketing
staff organizes the extension activities, such as demonstrations and seminars
with the support of dealers and at times, in collaboration with DoA.
With the increasing realization of knowledge as one of the most
important inputs for efficient farming, the institutional diversity in provision of
extension services would increase in the years to come. Many of the institutional
innovations initiated by various organizations in the post-T&V era offer a lot of
insights on how to do or not to do extension. An inclination or willingness to
systematically document these interventions and to draw lessons for its wider
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of these experiments and these need to be addressed before replicating them on
a wider scale.
Generic Problems
There are generic problems inherent in extension functions, regardless of
the management system or approach to extension. Feder et al. (1999) have
indicated eight such generic problems, viz. scale and complexity; dependence
of extension on the wider policy environment and other agency functions; inability
to trace cause and effect; commitment and political support; accountability;
liability to public service functions beyond agricultural knowledge and information
transfer; operating resources and fiscal sustainability; and interaction with
knowledge generation. All these are relevant in India too. The key issues in the
Indian context are discussed below.
Scale and complexity
The Indian extension system is to cater to the needs of about 90 million
farm holdings, cultivating 142 million hectares of land, of which 70 per cent
belong to small and marginal farmers. The public sector extension in the country,
comprising mainly DoA and other allied departments, has about 1,00,000 extension
workers. There is a wide diversity in the manpower intensity ratio across states
and districts. For instance, the ratio of technical manpower to cultivator is 1: 300
in Kerala, whereas it is 1: 2000 in Rajasthan. All other organizations in the public
and private sectors employ very few personnel and put together, this would not
change the ratio much. The DoA still continues to be the only agency which has
its presence in all the districts in India, though they often are not the primary
source of information for farmers everywhere. With little reliance on mass media
to multiply its impact and with continued reliance on individual or group contact,
the coverage of DoA remains awfully low.
The changing nature of the Indian agriculture, especially during the 1990s,
had its implications on the type of services demanded by the farmers. They now
need support from extension system on a wider range of aspects; the most
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(a) What technological options could be used profitably, keeping in view the
potential resource constraints in terms of land, capital, labor and knowledge?
(b) How to manage various technologies (how to make optimal use of new
inputs in his farm)?
(c) How and when to change the existing farming system (e.g. diversifying
from crop production to mixed farming or vegetable or animal production)?
(d) For which type of product, there is a good demand in the market?
(e) What are the quality specifications required to get a good value for the
produce and how to achieve them (e.g. for export markets, organic farming)?
(f) How, when and where to buy inputs and sell products?
(g) How to make decisions collectively on resource use and marketing?
(h) How to find quickly the most reliable knowledge and information?
(i) What are the feasible off-farm income generation options and how far they
are dependable?
(j) What are the possible implications of his farming if the input subsidies
are phased out and the trade in agriculture is liberalized? (van den
Ban1998).
To make good decisions, farmers need information from different sources
and often need help to integrate them. Due to its sole dependency on knowledge
and information mainly from SAUs and ICAR institutes, the public sector
extension is able to provide information only on technologies generated in these
research stations. The emphasis continues to be on foodgrains, though
broadbasing of the agricultural extension (including messages for other crops/
enterprizes) is an accepted philosophy.
Linkages
Though extension has to maintain effective linkages with several systems
(and each system comprising organizations having different types of information),
only the research-extension (R-E) linkages have been emphasized so far.  Several
measures to improve the R-E linkages have not yet yielded positive results.
Information flow has been mostly top-to-down (Macklin1992) and the weak
feedback has not resulted in any fundamental change in the way research
priorities are set at the research stations (Jha and Kandaswamy 1994). Even
after two decades of our efforts to strengthen the R-E linkages, they continue to
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activities of all research and extension agencies are being attempted through
the ATMA model.  For instance, DAC has recently come up with a new set of
guidelines for establishing R-E linkages under the Innovations in Technology
Dissemination Component of NATP. These may not also be able to change the
ground situation, as our approach to this important issue has been too mechanistic
and the premise is based on the linear model of innovations,4 which has outlived
its utility.
Even within the research and extension system, the linkages between
different organizations working on the same crop/commodity/enterprize/
geographical area have been weak. This has been severely restraining the
performance of these systems, especially in the public research system on which
the public extension system heavily banks for technological support. Case studies
on the horticultural research system have amply illustrated this aspect (Hall et
al. 2000 and 2001). Inter-department and intra-department co-ordination for
extension programs, in both the ICAR and SAU systems, appear to be weak
(ICAR 1996). In the case of extension, the linkages between KVKs and DOA
in most of the cases, are less than satisfactory. Though a number of other
organizations have come up for doing extension in selected regions, crops and
enterprizes, DoA continues to operate alone, ignoring the presence of these
organizations which can potentially supplement its efforts.
Apart from linkages for receipt of technology, the capabilities of the extension
agencies to assess and refine them for integration in their knowledge base have
been very weak, mainly due to lack of qualified human power. Extension’s
inability to influence the type and direction of research has also affected its
performance. Several states lack competent Subject-Matter Specialists (SMSs)
4
 In the linear model, the knowledge flows are modelled quite simply – the initiator of
innovation is  science and an increase in scientific inputs into the pipeline will directly
increase the number of new innovations and technologies flowing out of the downstream
end. In reality, however, ideas of innovations can come from many sources and at any
stage of research, development, marketing and diffusion. Biggs (1990) discussed the
multiple sources of innovation model of agricultural innovations. He explains that
agricultural innovation does not take place in the ordered linear fashion that current
public sector research and extension arrangements would suggest. Many other actors
are involved in the process. Most importantly he suggests that the outcome of research
is determined by the institutional context, by which he means the political, social and
cultural backdrop as well as the actors and organizations involved.240 Rasheed Sulaiman V
at the district level, a major factor that contributes to poor-research-extension
linkages and lack of integration across crops and livestock systems. These
constraints severely limit the capacity of the technology dissemination system to
assist farmers in utilizing improved production practices, and in incorporating
high value commodities into their farming systems (Sharma 1999).
Extension’s linkages with other institutions, whose polices have a direct
bearing on its performance, have been virtually non-existent. For instance, it
does not have linkages with the input supply system, credit system or marketing
system and has no influence on the policy or political system deciding on
investments or priorities regarding research, infrastructure, public administration
or technical education. Extension continues to be a passive recipient and often a
victim of the decisions taken by all these systems. Part of the loss of credibility
of extension could be attributed to its failure in influencing other systems.
Operational resource and fiscal sustainability
Inadequate operational resources have been a perennial weakness of the
public extension systems and it has been crippling its effectiveness. Macklin
(1992) in his study of T&V extension in India had noted that the level of operational
funding was not maintained in real terms, thus reducing the mobility of extension
workers. Salary alone accounts for about 85-97 per cent of the total expenditure
of DoA in the states (Sulaiman and Sadamate 2000).  According to Swanson
(1996), the allocation of operating expenses in DoA is around 15 per cent,
whereas a fully functional extension system should have 30-35 per cent of its
total expenses as the operational expenses. This has resulted in the under utilization
of the existing facilities and personnel. Ameur (1994) has portrayed the problem
as a vicious circle of fiscal difficulty, curtailed services, inefficient operation,
poorer results, and less staff motivation, training and competence. The increasing
budgetary constraints on the states have its fallout on the budgetary
allocations for DoA and questions are being raised on the financial sustainability
of the vast extension infrastructure in India (DAC, 2000). Adoption of the
measures to recover at least a part of the operational expenditure is rather
slow; due to lack of pay-worthy value-added services and political sensitivity
involved in charging for the government services which have been traditionally
available free of cost. Though a sizeable number of farmers (48 per cent) are
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crops (Sulaiman and Jha 2000), measures to capitalize on these opportunities
are still lacking.
Conceptual problems
The major factor underpinning the above generic issues is the lack of a
shared understanding on the role of extension – what each extension organization
should do, keeping in view the country’s socio-political and agro-economic setting?
Many extension organizations have a very narrow view of extension and
see it as a process of supplying information to farmers on demand, and of
introducing technical changes in agriculture which they consider to be desirable,
rather than one of promoting farmers development and independence (van den
Ban and Hawkins 1998). But the role of extension is much wider as it needs to
develop the management and decision making skills in farmers, help the rural
people develop leadership and organizational skills, enabling them to organize
better, operate and/or participate in co-operative credit societies and other
support organizations, as well as to participate more fully in the development of
local communities (Swanson and Clarr 1984). A study on the Indian extension
system commissioned by MANAGE articulated that besides technology transfer,
the public extension in India should embrace other roles like human resource
development, broadbasing and farming system perspectives and gender
differentiated strategies (MANAGE 1993).
The Indian extension system, in general, is based on the transfer of technology
mode, with a few dispersed attempts at embracing functions beyond technology
transfer. Due to its preoccupation with input delivery and scheme implementation,
DoA has failed to do justice even to the function of technology transfer. Field
extension workers of DoA are implementing a number of programs, involving
distribution of subsidies and subsidized inputs, and have little time for field visits
or solving field problems of farmers. Jinraj (1999) has found that agricultural
officers and agricultural assistants get only 40 per cent of the time for extension
activities, whereas administrative takes away 60 per cent of their time. The
much publicized group approach embraced by DoA in various states though
resulted in formation of farmer groups, but, most of them remain dys-functional
or inactive, due to lack of clarity on its purpose and follow up efforts for
strengthening groups for various activities. This type of business needs a high
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development, conflict resolution and negotiation between different interest groups,
management of common property resources, etc.) which is lacking with DoA.
Organizations which have been successful in this regard, for instance KHDP,
recruited personnel with these type of skills and expertize and out sourced the
services of organizations to train the staff and group members (Isvarmurthy
2000).
Though the availability and diffusion of right type of technologies continue
to be a challenge for the extension system in the majority of the rainfed and
disadvantaged areas, a wider adoption of technology also requires joint efforts
of the farmers, as many of the technologies for rainfed agriculture are knowledge-
based and need community action (integrated pest management, management
of common property resources, etc.). Therefore, farmers groups have to be
organized and sustained at the grass root level. It is also essential for transferring
some of the extension functions to the farmers groups in the long run. Unless
extension expands its role beyond technology transfer, its relevance and utility
to the farmers would remain subdued and the public support and commitment to
it may decline further. The complexity of this challenge, as illustrated by Van
Beek (1997), is given in Box 1.
What is the view of the Indian extension system on taking these
responsibilities, and how much prepared it is in undertaking some or all of these
roles? A debate on this issue is long overdue.
Capabilities
Many of the questions on the capabilities and functioning of extension
organizations in future would essentially depend upon the identification of roles
each extension organization is going to play in the Indian context.
Several organizations with varying resources and professional capabilities
exist in the country. The performance of the public extension agencies in
integrating knowledge and skills from these various sources has been limited. In
total, the states have some 1,10,000 extension staff presently, of which only
around 20 per cent are graduates. There is now a fairly broad consensus that
poorly-trained village extension workers would not be able to deliver goods
under the changing extension environment. Some states have already taken a
decision to make graduation in agriculture as the minimum qualification for
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Box 1.  Extension in complex situations
The model was based on the Knowledge System Approach ( Rolling 1998) of the
1990s and would help to conceptualize the complexity of the challenges involved in
expanding from Technology Transfer.
Source: van Beek, P. G. H. (1997)
The vertical axis is formed by a base of technical know-how, with increasing levels of
people oriented skills added on top of that. The horizontal axis represents increasing
complexity of situations, often caused by the growing importance of human factors
in situations, rather than by physical or biological ones. Extension in this view
occupies the area in the ellipse, where an understanding of the situation comes
together with the required technical and people skills, and when the desired outcome
is action or change of some nature.
None of the four areas can be left out when considering the lack of effectiveness of
an extension project and they are of equal importance. According to van Beek, the
total quantity of skills needed to cover all aspects is more than most individual
extensionists can or need to possess. However, extension in complex situations
needs co-operation between people who together have all these capabilities.
Technology Transfer, which links research in one discipline with users;
Problem-solving, which assists clients with solving individual problems;
Education, which aims to empower people to solve their own problems; and
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only agriculture, but also rural management, social mobilization, training, finance,
credit, marketing, etc.
Though enforcing of minimum qualification as graduation in agriculture at
the entry level should be welcomed, the fact remains that agricultural graduates
also lack many of the social science skills necessary for field extension work.
Post-graduate training in agricultural extension also doesn’t address many of
these skills (Sulaiman and van den Ban 2000a). As extension performance
depends considerably on the quality of agricultural graduates, the extension system
should find ways to address the content and quality of agricultural education.
Banning all future recruitment in the Village Extension Worker (VEW)
cadre without creating another cadre of qualified people is not the solution. Nor
its dependency on para-extension workers (as being done in the state of Uttar
Pradesh) is going to deliver results. Evidence from Rajasthan reveals that para-
workers though address the thin spread of DoA manpower, are constrained to
deliver the same technologies and information that VEWs deliver (Sharada et
al. 1996).
The Way Forward
Future roles and competence
To remain relevant and useful in the years to come, the extension system
has to strengthen its understanding on technology, markets, prices, demand and
policies. The system has to either recruit specialists or hire services of
professionals with expertise in these areas. Apart from collecting and integrating
information from a number of sources, extension has to provide problem-solving
consultancy and initiate measures to organize farmers. To provide these services,
the system should have the knowledge and competence in a number of areas
(Figure 1).
This necessitates a sound human resource management strategy. This
includes a clear analysis of the present and future knowledge and skill needed
by the organizations, job design for individuals and teams, matching qualifications
with the positions, transparent policies on recruitment, placement and promotions
and types of training required on the job.   Human resource development (HRD)
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no elaboration. But, the background and the expertise of trainers need emphasis.
There has been a tendency to view training as a substitute for education and in
many cases, the trainers themselves do not have any expertise, more than
received by him under a similar training program. In several cases, posts of
trainers are filled through promotion from officers of DoA. Hiring experts from
other institutions as resource persons for training has not been successful due to
low amount of honorarium and lack of adequate funds. Plans to set up training
institutions as autonomous institutions may partially help in solving this problem.
Redefining extension’s role in the agricultural innovation system
As seen earlier, the pubic extension in this country has not expanded its role
from technology transfer, and it is less than adequate to address the current and
emerging challenges in agriculture. The debate on the knowledge system
approaches in extension has brought into focus the diverse sources of information,246 Rasheed Sulaiman V
and the need for all stakeholders to be involved in all phases of development of
an innovation. This has led to the development of a number of participatory
approaches as an alternative to the dominance of technology transfer approach.
A large number of experiments in the farmers participatory research and
extension (FPR&E) and/or participatory technology development (PTD) were
also initiated. Despite accumulating body of literature, adoption of these
methodologies has failed to improve the performance of the research or extension.
Agricultural scientists also often find themselves struggling in applying
participatory approaches in an institutional and professional context that implicitly
denies such patterns of interaction with clients (Hall and Nahdy 1999). Though
extension could have potentially contributed to the experiments in PTD, the
social distance between the research and extension system prevented them
from undertaking any joint activities.
The need for addressing the institutional dimensions of technology
development and the analysis of knowledge flows and interaction among all the
actors in the innovation system5 became more evident in the late 1980s. The
emergence of the national systems of innovation (NSI) framework (Freeman
1987; and Lundvall 1992) has been a response to this issue. Analysis based on
the NSI approach stresses that the performance of the system as a whole is
important and this essentially depends on the effectiveness of knowledge flows
among the different institutional nodes in the system.
Several of the institutional innovations that have come up in response to the
weaknesses in public research and extension system, have given enough
indications of the emergence of an agricultural innovation system in India. This
has resulted in the blurring of the clearly demarcated institutional boundaries
between research, extension, farmers, farmers groups, NGOs and private
enterprizes. Extension has to play a very important role of facilitating the nodes
to generate, access and transfer knowledge between different entities in the
innovation system. It also has to create competent institutional nodes to improve
the overall performance of the innovation system. Inability to play this important
role would marginalize extension further.
5
 An innovation system encompasses all the elements of the system or network of
private and public sector institutions whose interactions produce, diffuse and use
economically useful knowledge. In this way, this type of analysis is more inclusive then
the narrower notion of a research or extension system.247 Restructuring Agricultural Extension
ICAR’s role in extension
This also brings us to the question of ICAR’s involvement in extension.
ICAR’s increasing involvement in extension has been of concern to the
Council for quite some time. Questions have been raised on the increasing
share of expenditure on extension and on the continuity of funding support to
KVKs. Though these questions are also important, the basic question
regarding the appropriate role of extension within ICAR system often seems to
be neglected.
ICAR seems to be unable to come out of the technology transfer mode and
embrace new and challenging roles. Technology assessment and refinement
(TAR) through the Institute Village Linkage Programme (IVLP) is obviously
one symptom of this thinking. To redefine ICAR’s role in the innovation system,
we need to examine closely its functioning over the years. The following
questions might be helpful in this regard:
(a) Is TAR a legitimate part of the technology development process itself and
if so, would it be better to leave that with the technology development team
itself?
(b) How far the extension research findings, in general and the results of TAR
exercise in particular, have influenced the research priority setting or research
problem identification?
(c) Apart from carrying a public relations role for the institute, facilitating training
programs and conducting adoption studies, what other useful contributions,
extension scientists can make in research institutions?
(d) What is and what should be its relationship with the general extension
system?
(e) How far the extension units/divisions within the research system have been
successful in developing institutional innovations leading to development,
refinement and transfer of technologies?
(f) How effective has been the extension on facilitating the development of
linkages of the research institute with other organizations?
(g) Can extension scientists in research organizations do something more useful
than what they are doing now?
Answers to difficult questions like these need to be searched before
expanding the roles and responsibilities of extension system in ICAR.248 Rasheed Sulaiman V
Public-private partnership
There is an increasing realization that “public extension by itself cannot
meet the specific needs of various regions and different classes of farmers.
Policy environment would promote private and community-driven extension
to operate competitively in roles that complement, supplement, work in
partnership and even substitute for public extension” (DAC 2000). Though the
above policy declaration seems to portray a genuine response to the changing
times, the level of preparedness of the public sector extension to work in a
multi-institutional environment looks not at all encouraging. The government-
NGO collaboration experiment for sustainable agricultural development
implemented in Rajasthan has revealed a number of issues that emerged when
the government and NGOs were brought together to work in a collaborative
mode (Alsop et al. 1999).
Though the private sector involvement in agricultural extension is not
uniform across the country, there are several districts, wherein a number of
organizations are providing diverse services and working in isolation without
any level of interaction. Unfortunately, we do not even have an inventory of
these organizations at the district level. As long as the major responsibility of
DoA continues to be the implementation of schemes, they would not see
enough reason for forging links with the private organizations. The past
experience of R-E linkages has not given enough confidence to believe that
these partnerships would definitely come through. Partnerships by definition
go many steps further than linkage and more serious efforts and time are
required to build them. To start with, a series of learning programs to inculcate
the right attitudes for building close working relationships with other
organizations need to be organized for the extension managers. Documentation
and disseminating successful examples from field could be the right starting
point.
Organizational and management reforms
Organizational and management (O&M) reforms are long overdue in the
extension system.  This involves decentralization of responsibility, delegation of
a large number of powers to the district heads, autonomy for routine decisions,
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designed based on SREP, provisions to hire special expertise and facilities,
separate budget for operational expenditure, and more flexibility in utilizing the
funds for approved programs, etc.
This necessitates a reduction in the number of programs designed and
implemented by the Centre.  Extension of the macro management approach to
the states would help the districts to choose programs more relevant to them. It
would be worthwhile to do a professional O&M review of DoA at the state and
district levels. Evaluation of the performance of many of the extension programs
with external funding would also provide indications on factors facilitating a
better performance.
Privatization
Use of the term “privatization” has probably created more confusion in the
minds of the public and functionaries of public sector extension, and the response
of the state governments to the idea of private sector participation in extension
has not been encouraging, though most often on the wrong reasons6. The fact
that the broad term ‘privatization’ offers a menu of options to improve the
efficiency of extension services, has often been overlooked, and the international
experience with alternative sources of funding and delivering extension has
been mixed (Carney 1998; and Umali and Schwartz 1994).
Though private sector participation in agricultural extension in India is limited
to a few crops and geographical areas, the increasing number of private entities,
such as NGOs, farmer associations, producers co-operatives, input agencies,
agro-processors (especially contract farming) private consultants and media
offers much scope for complementing public sector extension. As farmers are
also willing to pay for high value services, the challenge is in creating pay-
worthy services (by all concerned), so that some cost of providing extension
6
 The draft policy framework for agricultural extension prepared by DAC calls for an
increased participation of the private sector in agricultural extension. In the workshop
held (18-19 January 2001) to elicit the views of the state governments on this document,
most of the states expressed their strong reservation on the idea of private participation
in extension. The reasons given against this were the profit motive of profit sector, lack
of ability of farmers to pay, no effective private sector, public sector research as the final
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could be recovered by the public sector or these could be left to the private
sector to pursue. In an increasingly complex environment, there are a number
of responsibilities (so called public goods) to be taken by the public sector, which
the private sector would not be doing anyway7. All these services, though to be
paid primarily through public funds, need not necessarily be delivered
through public extension system. Still there is a need for a strong and
vibrant public sector extension to exist. Institutional pluralism in extension would
only increase in future and the public sector extension has to charter  a clear
mission and strategy on how it would use the options of privatization to its
advantage.
Client involvement in planning and management
The importance of client involvement in planning and management of
extension has often been handled as tokenism. The common strategy has been
of inviting farmers to some meetings. In most regions and crops, the clients and
their representatives are too weak to articulate their concerns. Extension has a
primary responsibility of strengthening the clients’ hands by facilitating the
formation of strong and articulate farmers organizations.
Application of information technology
Information Technology (IT) has a lot to contribute for improving the
efficiency and effectiveness of extension systems. Availability and spread of
internet has created a lot of interest in cyber extension (Sharma 2000). The
excitement generated by internet technologies has tempted many to consider
opening of more number of information kiosks/IT parlours and on-line
connectivity to ICAR and SAUs as answers to the weaknesses of public
extension system.  But, research has clearly shown that the information supplied
through the media is helpful only at the initial stage of adoption and a more
detailed interaction is required at the later stages (van den Ban 2000). As seen
earlier, the problem is conceptual and the tendency is to treat extension as
something that can be digitally served through computers.  The non-availability
7
 Though the literature on public and private goods clearly makes a distinction between
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of infrastructure, including software in local languages, and illiteracy would be
constraining the use of IT by farmers for availing technical knowhow. It has,
however, a lot of potential for improving the effectiveness of research and
extension systems.
Conclusions
The post-T&V period has seen experimentation with diverse extension
approaches by a large number of extension providers. But, most of them have
not addressed the generic problems of extension in the country. The basic issue
underpinning many of these has been the lack of a clear articulation of what
should be extension’s role in India. The public sector extension in the country
has to expand its role beyond technology transfer. Unless it takes on more
diverse roles and enhances its knowledge-base and competence, it may loose
its relevance in the years to come. Extension can play a very useful and productive
role in the emerging agricultural innovation system, provided it is clearly defined.
Though other issues are also important, solving them alone would not improve
extension’s effectiveness.
A strong public sector extension having more diverse skills should exist
even in a pluralistic extension environment. The public extension has to clearly
identify its role and priorities, based on an analysis of the type of information and
services needed by farmers, availability and characteristics of the solutions, and
the availability and potential for the private sector participation in extension. To
meet the increasing needs of farmers, collaboration between various organizations
is essential, as it is often difficult to have all the competence and skills in an
organization. Public sector extension has to lead this change and it would be
unrealistic to expect this to happen without a total restructuring of the public
extension system. This would become possible only if we ask the right questions
and challenge our basic assumptions.
References
Alsop, R., E. Gilbert, J. Farrington and R. Khandelwal. 1999. Coalitions of
interest: partnerships for process of agricultural change. New Delhi
and London: Sage Publications.252 Rasheed Sulaiman V
Ameur, C. 1994. Agricultural extension: a step beyond the next step. World
Bank Technical Paper 247. Washington, D.C: World Bank.
Biggs, S. P. 1990. A multiple source of innovation model of agricultural research
and technology promotion. World Development 18(11): 1481–1499.
Carney, D. 1998. Changing public and private roles in agricultural service
provision. London, UK: Overseas Development Institute.
DAC. 2000. Policy framework for agricultural extension (draft), New Delhi:
Department of Agriculture and Co-operation, Ministry of Agriculture,
Government of India.
Das, P. and B. S. Hansra. 1999. Status report on Krishi Vigyan Kendras - A
reality.  New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
Farrington, J., Rasheed Sulaiman V. and Suresh Pal. 1998. Improving the
effectiveness of agricultural research and extension in India: an analysis
of institutional and socio-economic issues in rainfed areas. Policy Paper
8. New Delhi: National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy
Research.
Feder, G., Anthony Willet and Willem Zijp. 1999. Agricultural extension - generic
challenges and some ingredients for solutions. Policy Research working paper
No. 2129, Washington, DC: World Bank.
Freeman, C. C. 1987. Technology and economic performance - lessons from
Japan. London: Pinter.
Goldsmith, A. A. 1990. Building agricultural institutions transferring the
land grant current model to India and Nigeria. USA: West View Press.
Gill, D. S. 1991. Economic returns to expenditures on agricultural extension
system. Journal of extension systems 7: 44–61.
Hall, A. J. and S. Nahdy. 1999. New methods and old institutions: systems
problems of farmers participatory research. Agriculture Research and
Extension Network Paper No 93. London: ODI.
Hall, A. J., Rasheed Sulaiman V., N. G. Clark, M. V. K. Sivamohan and B.
Yoganand. 2000. Public and private sector partnerships in Indian
agricultural research: emerging challenges to creating an agricultural
innovation system. Paper Presented at the XXIV International Conference
of Agricultural Economists, August 13–18, Berlin, Germany.
Hall, A. J., Norman Clark, Sarah Taylor and Rasheed Sulaiman V. 2001.
Institutional learning through technical projects: horticulture technology
R and D system in India. Agriculture Research and Extension Network
Paper 111. London: Overseas Development Institute.253 Restructuring Agricultural Extension
ICAR. 1996. Report of the review committee on extension system of the
ICAR (Surjewala Committee report). New Delhi: Division of Agricultural
Extension, Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
ICAR. 1998. National Agricultural Technology Project: main document,
New Delhi: Indian Council of Agricultural Research.
ICAR. 2000. Annual Report 1999/2000. New Delhi: Indian Council of
Agricultural Research.
Isvarmurthi, K. 2000. Kerala horticulture development program – new way to
help farmers, Agriculture and Industry Survey 10(11): 23-34.
Jha, D. and A. Kandaswamy (eds.) 1994. Decentralizing agricultural research
and technology transfer in India. Washington, D.C: IFPRI and ICAR.
Jinraj, P. V. 1999. Performance evaluation of Krishi Bhavans set up in
Kerala. Thiruvanthapuram: Centre for Development Studies.
Lundvall, B. A. ed. 1992. National innovation system towards a theory of
innovation and interactive learnings. London: Pinter.
Macklin,  M. 1992.  Agricultural extension in India. Technical Paper 190.
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
MANAGE. 1993. Farmers participation in agricultural research and
extension systems. Hyderabad: National Institute of Agricultural Extension
Management.
MANAGE. 1999a. Innovations in technology dissemination, NATP
series 1. Hyderabad: National Institute of Agricultural Extension
Management.
MANAGE. 1999b.  Agricultural Technology Management Agency, NATP
series 2. Hyderabad: National Institute of Agricultural Extension
Management.
Rivera, W. M. and D. J. Gustafson. 1991. Agricultural extension: worldwide
institutional evolution and forces for change. Amsterdam: Elsevier
Publishers.
Roling, N. 1998. Extension science – information system in agricultural
development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sharada, H. C., P.  Ballabh, M. Chauhan and P. K. Labh. 1996. Process
documentation of client drives agricultural research and extension –
experiences of VB KVK, Udaipur. In Process documentation
and monitoring in action, eds. D. V. Rangrekar and John Farrington. Pune:
BAIF.Sharma, R. 1999. Reforms in Indian agriculture: the case of agricultural
extension. Paper presented at the NCAER–IEG–WB workshop on
Agricultural Policies, 15-16 April 1999, New Delhi.
Sharma, V. P. 2000. Cyber extension in the context of agricultural extension in
India. MANAGE Extension Research Review 1(1): 24-41.
Sulaiman, R. V. and V. V. Sadamate. 2000. Privatizing agricultural extension
in India. Policy Paper 10. New Delhi: National Centre for Agricultural
Economics and Policy Research.
Sulaiman, R. V. and A. W. van den Ban. 2000a. Reorienting agricultural extension
curricula in India. Journal of Agricultural Education and Extension 7(2):
69-78.
Sulaiman, R. V. and A. W. Van den Ban. 2000b. Agricultural extension in
India – the next step, Policy Brief 9. New Delhi: National Centre for
Agricultural Economics and Policy Research.
Sulaiman, R. V. and Dayanatha Jha. 2000. Determinants of demand for paid
farm extension services in India: a discriminant function approach. Afro-
Asian Journal Rural Development 33(2): 57-67.
Swanson, B. E. and J. B. Clarr. 1984. The history and development of agricultural
extension. In Agricultural extension – a reference manual, ed. B. E.
Swanson. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization.
Swanson, B. 1996. Innovations in technology dissemination component of NATP.
Delhi: Ministry of agriculture, Government of India (mimeo).
Umali, D. L. and L. Schwartz. 1994. Public and private agricultural extension:
beyond traditional frontiers. Discussion Paper No 236.  Washington, D.
C.: The World Bank.
van Beek, P. G. H. 1997. Beyond technology transfer. European Journal of
Agricultural Education and Extension 4(3): 183-192.
van den Ban, A. W. and B. S. Hawkins. 1998. Agricultural extension. New
Delhi: CBS Publishers & Distributors.
van den Ban, A. W. 1998. Supporting farmers decision making process by
agricultural extension. Journal of Extension Systems 14: 55-64.
van den Ban, A. W. 2000. Different ways of financing agricultural extension.
Agricultural Research and Extension Network Paper 106b. London: Overseas
Development Institute.
254 Rasheed Sulaiman VFarmers’ Participation in Sub-Surface





everal scholars have highlighted the extent of waterlogging and secondary
salinization due to mismanagement of irrigation. At the global level, 45.4
million (m) ha land is salt-affected in irrigated areas and the estimated annual
loss is of the order of US $ 11.4 billion (Ghassemi 1995). In India, the estimated
loss varies across command areas. The pure effect of soil salinity in terms of
declining yield ranges from 1 to 3 per cent for sugarcane and wheat in the
Western Yamuna Canal and the Bhakra system, to as high as 64-74 per cent for
paddy and other crops in the Sharda Sahayak Irrigation Project (Joshi et al.
1995). In the Western Yamuna Canal and the Bhakra system, net worth of the
loss at present is about Rs 23,900 per ha. The estimated annual loss from
waterlogged saline-area is about Rs 1,669 million (Datta and de Jong 2001).
Besides causing significant economic losses, waterlogging and soil salinity also
present threat to sustainability of land resources and reduce their productivity.
At the regional level, the consequences are displacement of labor from agriculture,
widening income disparities and adverse impact on the secondary and tertiary
sectors. At the national level, negative effects of waterlogging and salinity are
in the form of decline in agricultural production and gross domestic product,
slowing down of agricultural exports and increase in import bill (Joshi et al.
1995).
A number of measures such as a better water management, conjunctive
use of surface and groundwater, improvement of surface drainage, management
of shallow groundwater and national land use have been suggested to address
the problems of waterlogging and salinity. Increasing ground water discharge
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
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and controlling water table can be effective by vertical (skimming well) or
horizontal drainage.  In the approach paper of the Tenth Five-Year Plan, it is
proposed to improve water efficiency through adoption of water-efficient devices
and promote conjunctive use of surface and groundwater. But, in the long run,
sub-surface drainage (SSD) is the only effective option to reclaim waterlogged
saline lands, where salts are accumulated in both soil and groundwater. In Egypt,
SSD is provided on 1.75 m ha of irrigated area, in the western U.S.A. 25-30 per
cent irrigated area is covered under SSD, and Pakistan has also embarked upon
a big program of providing SSD in the irrigated area. Although the horizontal
drainage in India was started in 1925 at Chakanwali (now in Pakistan) and in
1928 at Baramani in Maharashtra, SSD is comparatively a new concept. It is
now realized that SSD is one of the important components of the irrigation
system. The cost of installation of SSD mainly depends on the soil type, depth
and spacing of drains, location under drainage and the type of drainage material
used. At present (1994/95 prices), the cost of manually installed SSD varies
from Rs 18,525 to Rs 22, 310 per ha in Haryana (Datta and de Jong 2000).
There are basically three reasons for installing the drainage system: (i) for
trafficability so that seedbed preparation, planting, harvesting, and other field
operations can be done on time, (ii) for protection of crops from excessive soil
water conditions, and (iii) for control of salinity. Apart from that, drainage system
widens the land-use options, raises crop-productivity, helps bring new land under
production, and creates the conditions for using other modern inputs. In other
words, SSD restores and sustains the productivity of agricultural lands (Datta
and de Jong 2000). There are strong incentives for all stakeholders to participate
in the development of drainage system.  This paper examines the conditions and
modalities for the participation of farmers, using the case study of Indo-Dutch
SSD Project in Sonepat district of Haryana.
Constraints to Adoption of Drainage Technology1
The study on SSD in Haryana and Gujarat has visualized several constraints in
its adoption. These include: (i) indivisible nature of the SSD technology, (ii) no
attraction to individual farm households for investment in SSD to prevent or
1
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reclaim the degraded lands, (iii) increased economic differentiation and socio-
political factionalism, and (iv) internal heterogeneity and inequities. The technical
and economic issues relating to curative or rehabilitation of land in saline
environment depend on its productivity. Evidence shows that people care more
about highly productive lands than for unproductive lands.
Reconciliation of diverge interest groups is essential for the success of
SSD. Major improvements could readily be achieved by reclamation of the
degraded lands. However, the benefits would be rapidly vanishing when the
reclaimed lands are not well maintained subsequently. Datta and Joshi (1993)
have identified several factors determining the effectiveness of SSD. These
are: (i) problem of free riders, (ii) degree of participation of beneficiaries, (iii)
conflicting objectives, (iv) perception of the program objectives, (v) factionalism
in the village, (vi) high dependence on government patronage, and (vii) erosion
of the culture of group action and sharing of the system.
It has been realized that mere planning and executing the drainage system
by a government agency may not yield the desired results unless there is a
positive attitude and active participation of the beneficiaries in the program.
Higher the participation of the affected population, the greater will be the success.
If the conception, designing and implementation of SSD is not clear to the people,
then such an intervention will finally lead to disempowerment of the community
and disintegration of its stake, and marginalization of local knowledge system
and institutional arrangement. It is found that persuasion and education of potential
beneficiaries and demonstration of benefits are crucial for the successful operation
and management of such land reclamation programs.
Differential resource endowments mainly created the incompatibility of
actions of rational individuals. To resolve this problem, any kind of formal or
informal group approach must assure each individual participant that decisions
of other individuals will not cause any negative externality for him. But, the
major problem arises when all villagers do not adhere to the agreed land-use
plan. For instance, bigger farmers may choose to grow paddy, whereas small
and marginal farmers may prefer to produce sorghum for their livestock. The
farmers growing rice deprive the tail-end farmers from maintaining moisture in
their fields. Thus, difference in crop preferences of farmers in the drainage
area can lead to conflicts. Achieving higher efficiency through the investment in
the drainage system can  help solve this problem to some extent.258 K K Datta
Options for Drainage Organization
For the management of SSD, focus on bottom-up approach, sensitization of
decision-makers and local potential beneficiaries, and identification and
incorporation of traditional practices into design and implementation of SSD
should be encouraged. The centrality of common welfare is expected to trigger
off new processes that are self-balancing, both socially as well as
environmentally. The state should play a promotional role, and self-governance
based on the values like freedom, autonomy and dignity, besides material well-
being, should be encouraged. The task of organizing farmers may be taken-up
by the government as well as non-governmental agencies. A review of the
institutional options for drainage system in Haryana has revealed the following
five distinct possibilities:
(1) The recognition/restructuring of the Soil Conservation Office and
incorporation of the operational pilot drainage project nucleus organization
to undertake large-scale SSD.
(2) Incorporation of operational drainage project into an existing body like the
Haryana Land Reclamation Development Corporation (HLRDC) or the
Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewell Corporation (HSMITC).
(3) Institution of a new non-governmental organization (NGO) exclusively for
the implementation and monitoring of SSD.
(4) Creation of a new department of agriculture with the responsibility of
reclamation of wastelands where operational drainage project would work
as a nodal organizational unit.
(5) Formation of a drainage co-operative on the pattern of Pani Panchayats
in Maharashtra.
Three general directions for establishment of a drainage organization are: a
government agency, an NGO, or a public corporate enterprize. But, scaling up
of the existing drainage staff in the department of agriculture to meet the
challenges of large-scale SSD seems pragmatic, as this would be a cost-effective
solution. The option of NGO appears impractical as they lack accountability and
knowledge of SSD, and moreover, these do not exist in a progressive state like
Haryana.
Another alternative is the promotion of drainage co-operative on the pattern
of the ‘Saline Land Agricultural Development Co-operative’ in Gujarat which
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1860. The main activity of this co-operative is to share the operation and
maintenance (O&M) cost. The problem in forming such co-operatives is that
the need for soil improvement is not uniform in the entire drainage area, and
therefore, farmers located in disadvantageous position may not be enthusiastic
to participate in the co-operatives in the long run (Datta and Joshi 1993).
Another option could be scaling up of the Haryana Operational Pilot Project
(HOPP) as a para-statal agency. This could be accomplished by either creating
a new organization with exclusive mandate for large-scale mechanized SSD
works, or integrating the same into an existing corporate entity such as HLRDC
or HSMITC. A move in this direction would have significant advantages over
the government locus, but its success will mainly depend on commitment and
motivation of the staff.
Approach to Ensure Farmers’ Participation
In this respect it must be realized that farmers’ participation in irrigation
management is much below the expectation in many instances. The problem
may be more acute in the case of drainage, which is not accorded much
importance by the farmers. Therefore, adequate attention should be paid to the
following three factors: (a) Motivation and organization of farmers and preparing
them for the selected activities; (b) Identification of activities and nature of
farmers’ involvement; and (c) Assessment of the actual benefits of the increased
involvement, and lessons learnt for the future. In the case study project, it was
assumed that farmers would not ask for the compensation during the installation
stage of SSD, and they would allow free movement of machine for installing the
drainage. Cleaning and maintenance of the collector drain would be done after
a long interval (10-15 years) under the technical guidance. The main responsibility
for O&M was with the drainage and irrigation department and farmers were
expected to provide labor. Pumping of drain water was the main activity for
which farmers were organized and asked to bear the cost for running the pump.
The participants were allowed to reuse the drain water.
The most distinguishing part of the SSD in Haryana was that there was a
constant interaction among farmers, implementing agency and other stakeholders.
A farmers’ participation section (FPS) was established by the implementing
agency to create basic awareness about the problems and the program, and to260 K K Datta
organize farmers’ group to manage the resources. In FPS, there are community
organizers (COs) to help the farmers to analyze their resources and organize
themselves into a drainage society. A well-defined system of mass awareness
with gender focus was developed through the FPS section. This section was
always in touch with the village Sarpanch, and also developed good rapport
with the progressive farmers and influential persons in the villages to settle any
dispute arising during the process of installation of drainage.  Informal groups of
women were also encouraged.
A flexible and learning approach based on the principles of consensus and
cooperation was followed to ensure farmers’ participation in the project. In
order to check the farmers’ opinion about the involvement in the project, it was
decided consciously that the crop compensation should not be allowed in the
large-scale implementation of the project. For accomplishing this task, FPS
supported with the consultants was created in the project as an important wing
with a major role assigned to the community organizers and the women mutilators
in conflict resolution.  It also works as a second-line defense for the Farmers’
Drainage Society (FDS).
Approach to set up organization of farmers
The FPS acts as an interface between farmers and the project. At the
beginning, the FPS familiarizes the local people with the objectives and activities
of the project. The section also selects those local people who are interested to
participate in the process. To motivate and mobilize people, a written agreement
is also made with all farmers on a drainage block basis (area about 50 ha).
Farmers are made to realize that major beneficiaries would be those whose
lands are covered under SSD. In order to avoid the problem of free riders and
minimize the transaction costs, a small number of farm families (30-35) are kept
in a drainage block or FDS. These societies (FDSs) are registered under Section
21 of the Cooperative Societies Registration Act (1860). The main objective of
the FDS is to take care of O&M of the SSD system. Accordingly, they have
created their own byelaws so that the group’s activities can address the felt
needs of the members. The group has enough solidarity to compel other people
and organization to cooperate with them in addressing the common problems.
The FDSs tend to be strongest when they (i) collect monthly or yearly fees from
members in order to strengthen the financial position of the society; (ii) ensure261 Farmers’ Participation in Sub-surface Drainage
availability of members for the society’s work whenever needed; and (iii) provide
credit facilities to their members through a carefully planned, accountable credit
program.
Already about 14 such societies have been registered and made functional.
Mid-term review of the project has revealed that participatory aspects are
encouraging and responsibilities of O&M could be handed over to the
societies. The FDSs require common fund to undertake the O&M work on a
sustainable basis. An apex body of all the FDSs is to be established to co-
ordinate the work at the project level. The viability of the FDSs will mainly
depend upon considerable follow up work to be done by their FPSs. Also, it
is essential to solve the problem of de-watering of the system before taking up
a new area for drainage installation. Unless a fully operational SSD system is
not provided, farmers will be hesitant to take up O&M work. Success of the
FDS primarily depends on the strong determination and commitment of
the personnel of the project authority to demonstrate exceptionally good
performance and to solve farmers’ problems regarding waterlogging and soil
salinity in their fields.
Profile of the Farmers’ Drainage Society in Haryana
Particulars Description
Name of the Society Farmers Drainage Society
Registration Act State Co-operative Societies Registration Act, 1860.
Area of operation Saline and waterlogged areas belonging to the farmers
of the Farmers Drainage Society Block
Objectives (i) To regulate the pumping of saline water and
discharge the effluents from the outlet to the
main drain
(ii) Operation and maintenance of SSD system
(iii) To raise resources through collection from the
members for meeting the O&M cost
(iv) To arrange loans, subsidies, grants, etc. for the
society toward reinvestment in the development262 K K Datta
of SSD, agricultural productivity and reclamation
of saline soils; and
(v) To take any official and legal action deemed
necessary to achieve the above-mentioned
objectives.
Aims (i) Increasing agricultural production and reclamation
of saline lands
(ii) Adoption of improved methods of water and land
management
(iii) Monitoring ground water level, quality of land and
water, and crop yields
(iv) Reuse of the effluents for irrigation; and
(v) Involving women of the member-households in
the management and functions of the society.
Membership (i) Farmers, both men and women, who own or have
land under their control under the jurisdiction of
the Society and their spouse, above 18 years of
age and sound of mind are eligible for membership.
(ii) Members have to pay non-refundable fee of
Rs 21/-.
(iii) Farmers and their spouses who lose possession
of land automatically cease to be members.
(iv) The ADO (Soil Conservation) of the respective
area shall be the ex-officio member of the society.
General Body (i) All members together constitute the General Body
and any decision of the General Body is binding
and final.
(ii) The General Body has the power to prepare and
amend the byelaws.
(iii) The annual meeting of the Society will be conducted
during September every year. Special meetings can
be convened whenever need arises. At least seven
days notice will be given for holding a meeting.
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(iv) To pass a proposal for amendment of the byelaws,
vote of at least sixty per cent of all members
present is required.
Executive Committee (i) The General Body will elect at least seven
members to the Executive Committee for one
financial year.
(ii) The ADO from APO office will be ex-officio
member of the society who will be responsible to
check the registers and other records maintained
by the society.
Funds (i) Funds can be raised by the Society for its
functioning in several ways, such as membership
fee, annual fee, or land fee; proportion of crops;
fines; donations from well wishers; loans from
banking institutions, etc; and funds from HOPP,
Government and other agencies.
(ii) The Functioning of the society will be on a no-loss
and no-profit basis.
Relation with (i) HOPP–Department of Agriculture (Haryana)
HOPP and officials shall have the right to verify the records
Government and accounts of the society at any point.
(ii) On the dissolution of the Society, all its assets and
liabilities shall vest with the HOPP-Department
of Agriculture, Haryana.
(iii) The society is registered under the Cooperative
Societies Registration Act, 1860 and all provisions
of the said act are applicable to the society.
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Mruthyunjaya

hree papers on the institutional change in agricultural research and
development (R&D) in India have discussed policy, institutional and
organizational aspects. The general consensus has been that there is a need for
intensification of agricultural R&D in the country, coupled with implementing a
variety of reforms for accelerating technology development activities. The focus
of reforms should be on reassessment of the priorities in the context of new
economic scenario, development of capacity in frontier areas of science,
management of intellectual property and improving technology absorption capacity
of farmers. The growing literature has also highlighted these issues, and in
particular, emphasized the need for public-private partnership in agricultural R&D.
In general, the research system is aware of these pressing constraints and
the need for organizational reforms. A number of steps have been taken by the
system, particularly by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, under the
National Agricultural Technology Project. Some of these include perspective
planning, ecoregional approach in system perspective, public-private partnership,
project-based planning, institutionalization of improved research planning,
monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, resource generation, organization and
management reforms, information system development, modernization of research
infrastructure, human resource development in frontier areas of science, etc.
On the extension side, integration of extension agencies, skill development,
farmers’ participation, resource generation, use of information and communication
technologies, participation of the private sector, etc. are being given high priority.
The progress on these reforms is being monitored closely for necessary
modifications and mid–course corrections.
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P. K. Joshi and Raka Saxena)These reforms are often criticized for their slow progress. But, we should
remember that we are dealing with one of the largest R&D systems of the
world, and bringing significant changes in such a large system, particularly bringing
a change in the mindset of people is a challenging task. Also, we should keep in
mind, as pointed by one of the papers, that change is a slow process and drastic
changes sometimes may prove costly. Therefore, we should gradually move
towards our objectives. This does not mean that we should not be clear about
the target, i.e. the direction of change. In order to accelerate the process of
change, attempt should be made to learn from the past experiences, and also
incorporate lessons from the other national systems and international research
centers. In my opinion, the following issues will be critical in the coming years:
Firstly, the public system should learn to identify client needs more clearly
and work with other actors in a partnership mode to use available resources
more efficiently and effectively.
Secondly, management of intellectual property for resource generation,
access to proprietary material and technology and serving the interest of small
land holders will be critical.
Lastly, striking a balance between modern science of biotechnology, meeting
needs of elite consumers, focusing on traditional agenda of food security, and
sustainability of natural resources and production systems will be a challenging
task.
Social scientists are expected to play a proactive role in providing systematic
information for conscientious decision-making in addressing these emerging
challenges.






and reforms seem to have lost their traditional flavour and favor among the
policy makers of India in recent years. This is particularly so in the wake of
economic liberalization and World Trade Organization regime when trade and
market reforms occupy the central stage of development policy. However, this
does not mean that land reform as an instrument of social and economic change
in the country has lost its relevance altogether. The agrarian structure in the
country still continues to be as unequal as before. Even today, insecure tenancies
and fragmentation of holdings constrain the agriculture growth in many regions.
Still above 60 per cent of our workforce is engaged as agricultural workers, and
a majority of them are marginal farmers and landless laborers living under abject
poverty. In the absence of adequate employment opportunities, in both farm and
non-farm sectors, the access to land holds the key to their livelihood. Under
these circumstances, there is no reason why land reform should lose its relevance
as a development policy.
There are several reasons for the present aversion to land reform.  Firstly,
various land reform laws passed in the 1960s and 1970s have remained largely
ineffective, due to lack of political will to implement them in most of the states.
Therefore, there is no hope that land reform would be effectively implemented
in the near future, particularly when the political will appears to be weaker
today.  Secondly, it is being argued that the land sector cannot continue to bear
the burden of growing millions infinitely.  Already under the impact of population
growth, the average size of holding appears to be small and non-viable.  Thirdly,
land reform, which encourages small holders’ agriculture, can be successful
only when there is necessary institutional and policy support.  Particularly, the
roles of co-operative delivery systems and public subsidies are crucial.  Since
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such institutional and policy support may not be forthcoming, land reform is not
likely to yield the desired results.  Lastly, due to more thrust on export-oriented
agriculture, there is a demand for corporatization of agriculture and liberalization
of land ceiling and tenancy laws so that both quality and stable supply of
commodities could be ensured.
The present paper examines some of these issues in the context of land
reform and agricultural growth.  Specifically, the paper answers the following
questions:
i) Is it really necessary to relax the ceiling laws in order to promote export
oriented and diversified agricultural growth? If so, will that mean
encouragement to capitalist farming and growth of landlessness?  Will such
a measure be politically feasible?
ii) What has been the impact of recent tenancy reforms on agricultural growth
and equity in the states like West Bengal and Karnataka?
iii) Will legalization or liberalization of land leasing policy help promote economic
growth and equity?
iv) Does agricultural tenancy, especially share cropping continue to be an
inefficient and exploitative institution? If so, can we replace share cropping
by a system of lease for fixed cash or fixed produce?
v) Does contract farming in collaboration with national or multinational agro-
processing industries help promote diversified agricultural growth?
vi) Will the entry of the corporate sector in farming either directly or indirectly
through contractual arrangements lead to an efficient as well as sustainable
use of land and other natural resources?
Relaxation of Ceiling Laws
It is often argued that commercialization of agriculture, particularly for export
promotion, requires the size of land holding to be reasonably large so that
economies of scale as well as quality of produce could be maintained.  In reality,
however, this kind of argument seems to be misplaced because countries like
China and Vietnam with smaller size of land holdings do influence the international
export markets today in a significant manner.  What is probably more important
in this context is that we should become internationally cost competitive through
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marketing of agricultural produce through appropriate delivery systems.  Several
state governments in India have already modified their ceiling laws to exempt
orchards, fish ponds, etc. But, the results are far from satisfactory in the absence
of other necessary reforms and support.  Besides, a generalized relaxation of
ceiling laws in all the cases, may neither be socially desirable nor politically
feasible, as the resultant landlessness may cause unmanageable tensions in rural
areas in the absence of adequate employment opportunities.
Impact of Recent Tenancy Reforms
The states of West Bengal and Karnataka are known for the radical tenancy
reforms introduced in the late 1970s. Therefore, a brief critical review of the
impact of these reforms would be in order.
‘Operation Barga’ in West Bengal
The Land Reforms Act (1955) of West Bengal was amended in 1977 to
protect the interest of the sharecroppers.  According to the amendment Act,
owner could resume his land given to a sharecropper if: (i) The land owner or
any member of his family resides in the locality of land; (ii) income from land is
the principal source of his income, (iii)  the resumed land is cultivated with the
help of family labor and not hired labor; and (iv)  the resumption leaves a minimum
of one hectare land with the sharecropper.  To implement this Act effectively,
the government launched a special campaign to record the names of
sharecroppers in 1978.  This campaign is popularly known as ‘Operation Barga’.
It is often said that ‘Operation Barga’ is a major force behind the recent spurt in
agricultural growth in West Bengal, and a number of reasons are cited to support
this argument.  Firstly, it provided a security of tenure to the sharecroppers
which provided additional incentive to cultivate land more efficiently.  Secondly,
it ensured entitlement of sharecroppers for accessing institutional credit facilities.
Thirdly, ‘Operation Barga’ and other institutional reforms altered the rural power
structure, thereby enabling the sharecroppers and poor peasants to have equal
access to modern technical inputs.  Logically, therefore, the productivity of
sharecropped land should have increased.  Up to 1980, the agriculture productivity
in the state was more or less stagnating.  The average annual growth rate of270 T Haque
food production in 1970-80 was merely 0.7 per cent.  The coverage under high
yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice and wheat was hardly 33 per cent in 1980/81.
It increased to 58 per cent in 1990/91 and further to nearly 85 per cent in
1998/99.
The average yield of rice increased from 1.4 tonnes/ha in 1980/81 to 1.8
tonnes/ha in 1990/91 and 2.3 tonnes/ha in 1998/99.  Although the rice yield in
West Bengal is still lower than that in Punjab or Haryana, the growth rate of rice
yield during 1980-90 was the highest (5 percent) in the country. The yield of
wheat increased from 1.4 tonnes/ha in 1980/81 to 2.2 tonnes/ha in 1998/99.
The average yield of foodgrains increased from 1.4 tonnes/ha in 1980/81 to 2.2
tonnes/ha in 1998/99. Assuming 1981/82 as the base year (100), the productivity
index of non-food crops also rose sharply to 189 in 1996/97 (GOWB 1999/
2000).  Similarly, during 1977 and 1993, there was a drastic decline in the rural
poverty ratio in West Bengal — it declined from 68 per cent in 1977 to 63 per
cent in 1983 and 40.8 per cent in 1993.  This decline in poverty ratio in West
Bengal was thus about 27 per cent, while the all India poverty ratio dropped only
by 16 per cent during this period (Haque 2001).
There is often a debate whether the credit for agricultural revolution in
West Bengal should go to technological change or land reform, particularly
‘Operation Barga’.  As pointed out earlier, the adoption of HYVs and chemical
fertilizers was very rapid from 1980/81. Besides, one lakh hectare of additional
land was brought under canal irrigation during 1980-90, and another one lakh
hectare was brought under government canals during 1990-1997.  The number
of both shallow and deep tubewells also increased substantially during this period.
While the access to additional irrigation by government canals was the result of
government initiative, private initiatives were largely responsible for the adoption
of new technology and increased access to minor irrigation facilities.  The
‘Operation Barga’ and other land reform measures undertaken by the government
have changed the rural power lobby structure in favor of the poor, and has
enabled the poor peasants and sharecroppers to enjoy an increased access to
credit, irrigation, HYV seeds and chemical fertilizers, which helped in productivity
growth and improvement in their socio-economic status.  The ‘Operation Barga’
thus, acted as a catalytic agent for development.
A number of studies have also observed a positive connection between
land reform and agricultural growth in West Bengal.  According to Banerjee
and Ghatak (1995), after controlling factors such as rainfall, public irrigation and271 Land Reforms and Agricultural Development
region-specific fixed effect, the growth in production of aman, aus and boro
rice was found to be correlated with the progress of tenancy reform.  The
relationship was found to be statistically significant in aman and aus, but not in
boro rice.  While the yields of major crops were positively and significantly
correlated with the progress of tenancy reform, the evidence about the
mechanisms through which the higher yields were associated with tenancy reform
was not vivid.  Although HYV adoption and increase in shallow tubewells were
positively correlated with tenancy reform, the relationship was not found to be
statistically significant.
Webster (1992) observed that consolidation of management around tubewell
command areas was the major source of growth in the West Bengal agriculture.
Earlier tenancy patterns have been reversed for the irrigation-based boro paddy
cultivation season.  Water owners, who have mini submersible tubewells, tend
to be the richest and powerful in the villages, rent-in land for boro paddy
cultivation.  This led to the expansion of area under boro paddy, the yields of
which were much higher than those of aman and aus paddy and other coarse
cereals.  At the same time, the slowing down of production in the 1990s, might
have been caused by the depletion of groundwater, particularly in the districts of
Haora, Hooghly, Murshidabad and Birbhum.
Bhaumik (1993) observed that even after recording of barga, resource
allocation and productivity still varied between the owned and the share-
cropped land.  However, the recorded tenants (the result of ‘Operation Barga’)
tend to perform better than the unrecorded tenants regarding cultivation of
sharecropped lands.  The recorded tenants also extract a much larger share of
total returns as compared to the unrecorded tenants, and to this extent, the
‘Operation Barga’ has led to augmentation of income of a large section of
recorded tenants.
The results of a recent study (Haque 2001) have indicated that the
cropping pattern as well as the yield levels seem to have changed after
recording of barga.  Nearly 95 to 100 per cent peasant bargadars expressed
that they are better off financially after ‘Operation Barga’. Due to increase in
the security of tenure, there is no significant difference in the average productivity
of own land and leased-in land, under  homogenous agro-climatic situations.  In
some cases, where it existed, it was due to difference in the qualities of land,
and not due to tenancy as such.  Sharecroppers are now adopting improved
technology and are showing greater interest in raising the crop yields.  Although272 T Haque
the average yield of kharif paddy has increased only marginally, most of the
sharecroppers are now growing boro paddy which yields about 5-7 tonnes/ha.
The yield of wheat has also increased. Almost  all the sharecroppers opined that
they are now taking more interest in the sharecropped land due to the new
incentives.
The farm level survey however revealed that although recording of barga
has provided the sharecroppers the access to credit facilities, due to various
procedural difficulties and delays in accessing institutional credit, they prefer to
borrow money from private moneylenders at high interest rates, ranging from
36 to 48 per cent per year, merely on grounds of convenience.  In fact, the credit
availability situation was found to be slightly better in the case of non-recorded
sharecroppers, although the sources of credit were mainly the land owners and
private moneylenders in this case.
Nevertheless, the new incentives created by the operation barga have
helped the sharecroppers to make investment in various land improvement
measures.  The sharecroppers have increased access to irrigation due to
development of water markets and some of them have installed tubewells with
or without government help.  A majority of the sharecroppers were found to
adopt HYV technology, and input use pattern and land productivity of the owner
cultivators and the recorded sharecroppers did not differ significantly within the
same size group of farmers.  According to the perception, of the sharecroppers,
the new incentives, irrigation expansion and adoption of improved technology
contribute about one-third each to the incremental productivity of land. Of course,
the change in the rural power structure due to recording of land rights of
bargadars has helped them to have equal access to modern technical inputs for
improving land productivity.
It was also observed that the socio-economic condition of sharecroppers
has significantly improved due to ‘Operation Barga’. A majority of the
sharecroppers, who were interviewed, reported that they effectively participate
in politics and local level democratic institutions.  They are socially treated at
par with others.  Nearly one-third of household income of the sharecroppers
comes from leased-in land, and this is the contribution of share cropping in
poverty reduction.  If these people could not have access to leased-in land, their
income level would have reduced by one-third. Nevertheless, the overall income
position of the sharecroppers was not very satisfactory, and they are miles to go
for improving their economic conditions.273 Land Reforms and Agricultural Development
Occupancy rights to tenants in Karnataka
In 1974, the Karnataka Land Reform Act (KLR Act) 1961, was substantially
amended to ban leasing of land in the state, except by soldiers and seamen, and
the right of resumption of land was eliminated.  The 1974 Act did not spare even
widows, unmarried daughters, old and disabled small landowners, who leased
out land.  Further, through an amendment in 1979, persons inducted as tenants
before 1-1-1979 were entitled, with effect from the date of vesting (1-3-1974),
to be registered as occupant in respect of the land under his cultivation, subject
to the ceiling limit.  The Act prohibits the tenants who have been conferred
occupancy rights from transferring such land by way of sale, gift-exchange, and
mortgage within a period of 15 years from the date of certificate.  However,
when a tenant dies, the landlord shall be deemed to have continued the tenancy
to the heirs of such tenant on the same terms and conditions on which the tenant
was holding at the time of his death.  The tenant can surrender the land only in
favor of the government.  Also, he should cultivate the land personally, otherwise,
the land shall be forfeited by the government.
Up to July 2000, about 0.49 million tenants under the above category were
conferred occupancy rights, covering 1.85 million acres of land.  Nearly 10
thousand cases are pending in the state High Court, involving 59.5 thousand
acres of land.  There are regional variations in the number of beneficiaries.  The
districts of Uttar Kanada, Dakhin Kanada, Udupi, Belgaum and Shimoga have
a relatively large number of beneficiaries, involving also a larger area under
occupancy rights. Both administrative and historical reasons could be behind
such inter-regional variations.  The coastal region which had high concentration
of tenants and had also witnessed several agrarian movements are reported to
have done well in this respect.  The proportion of area under tenancy was much
lower in Old Mysore region and therefore, agrarian unrest was minimal.  In
northern Karnataka, particularly in Bombay-Karnataka region, the proportion
of area under tenancy was higher than that in old Mysore, and at lower level
than that of coastal Karnataka.  But the lands were mostly dry and the former
tenants were largely indebted to local moneylenders (Pani 1997).  According to
Pani (1997), uniform implementation of the law had different effects on the
three regions in the states.  In the coastal region, the substantial transfer of land
from landowners to tenants fundamentally transformed the agrarian system.
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alter the nature of the agrarian system.   Since both ex-tenants and landowners
belonged to all size of classes, the reform only led to a vertical split in the rural
society on factional rather than class lines.  This was partly true for northern
Karnataka also.  However, in districts like Kolar, Bangalore, Hassan, Mandya
and Mysore, the proportion of area under tenancy was more in the larger size
classes and hence, the law benefited them most.  Rao (1992) points out that the
benefits were not focussed on the rural poor and landless, who did not gain any
land under tenancy legislation.  The principal beneficiaries of the tenancy
legislation were the lessees having the farm size of more than 15 acres, who
were also in a better position to assert their rights as tenants.  The agricultural
production also lost its momentum in the 1980s and the political wave initiated
by Devaraj Urs lost its thrust.  Iyer (1997) has shown that despite legal ban, the
concealed tenancy exists in all the regions of the state.  It varied from 4 to 6 per
cent in the central and coastal regions and 6 to 8 per cent in the villages of
northern dry region.  At the state level, it is about 6 per cent.  There also have
been a few cases of reverse tenancy.
Nonetheless, the Act was considered to be a revolutionary step in providing
security of tenure to the erstwhile tenants. Its impact on agricultural growth and
equity, however, needs to be studied systematically. The proportion of gross
cropped area irrigated increased from 19.2 per cent in 1979 to 35.4 per cent in
1995.  The foodgrain production in the state increased form 6.4 million tonnes in
1980-83 to 7.6 million tonnes in 1990-93 and further to 9.98 million tonnes in
1998.  Even if, we accept V.M. Rao’s thesis that agricultural growth rate slackened
in the 1980’s, it was not so in all the districts.  In fact, in districts like Belgaum,
Bijapur, Mysore, Raichur, Shimoga and Kolar, there was an improvement in the
agricultural productivity growth in the 1980s as compared in 1970s.  Besides,
coastal and ghat region, where incidence of tenancy was large, reform might
have helped to reduce the rural poverty ratio to 9 per cent, as compared to the
higher state average (India Rural Development Report 1999).  Besides, our
farm level survey (Haque 2001) reveals that occupancy tenants made investments
in the land improvement measures and increased their land productivity.  For
example in Kolar district, nearly 90 per cent of them invested in the land
improvement measures, including fencing, land leveling, construction of wells,
etc. However, nearly 90-95 per cent of occupancy tenants depend on non-
institutional sources of credit.  Although the rate of interest is as high as 36 to 48
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banks because of convenience and fear of harassment. This calls for credit
reform in the institutional sector with increased accessibility of the farmers to
institutional credit. In fact, it is not so much land relations, but credit relations
and poverty, which go together. In some areas, there has been emergence of
water market. But, it is mainly the large farmers who own and sell water. Since
the Karnataka land reform does not focus much on the landless, it is time to see
whether ownership of tubewell or tank by the landless would help them to
improve their economic condition. Unfortunately, in most areas of the state, the
average agricultural wage rates are low, the agricultural laborers hardly get
employment for less than six months in a year.
Should Agricultural Tenancy be Legalized?
It is often argued that the restrictive tenancy laws have not served much
purpose for either growth or equity and, therefore, tenancy should be liberalized
in an appropriate legal framework. A number of arguments are put forward in
favor of legalization or liberalization. It is stated that legalization of tenancy
would increase the mobility of people from the rural to urban areas and improve
the availability of land in the lease market, which may improve the poor people’s
accessibility to land through leasing (Saxena 1997). At least legalization of tenancy
on experimental basis can be tried in selected areas and examine whether this
has positive or negative impact.
Legal restrictions discourage the landowners to lease out their land, even if
there is a demand for it and take up non-farm enterprizes, which is vital for rural
transformation. Secondly, as Appu (1995) points out, if tenancies are allowed
legally, tenants can acquire rights on the land they cultivate and the rural poor
will have access to a larger area of agricultural land. In many areas, the restrictive
tenancy laws have resulted in landowners leaving their land uncultivated due to
the fear that they may lose the land if they lease it out. The lifting of ban on
leasing in such cases will result in a better utilization of the available land, fuller
absorption of human labor and increased farm output. Parthasarathy (1997) has
opined that legalization of tenancy would increase the poor peoples’ access to
land in most places, as large land owners would tend to migrate for taking up
non-farm occupation, if there is no risk of losing land because of leasing out.
The advantage of cheap family labor favors the poor to lease-in land, and276 T Haque
therefore, liberalization of tenancy would enable the small farmers to augment
their operational holdings by leasing in land. In addition, it would promote both
farm and non-farm developments by improving the large landowners’ ability
and incentive to invest.
Thirdly, it is said that the tenancy laws of several states do not permit the
landlords to resume land for personal cultivation from a tenant belonging to the
scheduled castes (SCs) and scheduled tribes (STs). Such a provision in law
discourages the landowners to lease out land to SCs and STs, and, therefore, is
anti-poor in effect (Haque 2001).
Fourthly, it is often argued that in progressive states, the landlords tend to
assume greater risk and accountability in the process of production and therefore,
lifting the ban on tenancy and liberalization of land-lease market would be to the
advantage of small operators who would be able to lease in more land.
However, the opponents of liberalization of tenancy argue that it would
promote reverse tenancy and capitalist farming in some areas and absentee
landlordism in others and the poor would tend to lose in both the situations.  In
fact, there is a danger that in the absence of adequate non-farm development,
liberalization of tenancy and market-led agricultural development may alienate
the marginal farmers from land, without an alternative regular source of income.
Hence, accelerated diversified development is the answer and not just a legal
reform. The shares of marginal farms in the total leased in land are low in a
number of states, and in some states, the share of large and medium farms has
increased in recent years. Therefore, there is no guarantee that liberalization of
tenancy would enable the marginal farmers to have greater access to lease
market unless adequate number of large and medium farmers move to the non-
farm sector. It is also not certain whether legalization of leasing would sufficiently
motivate the large and medium farmers to lease out land and take up non-farm
enterprizes and employment unless rural literacy, electricity, roads,
communications, markets and credit facilities develop significantly.
Is Agricultural Tenancy an Inefficient Institution?
Agricultural tenancy, particularly sharecropping, as an economic institution
has been under criticism since the very beginning. During the first round of land
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system of fixed rent leasing. According to Alfred Marshall (1956) , the share
tenant would be an inadequate as well as inefficient cultivator. However, the
logical basis of such inefficiency argument has been under attack by several
economists like Cheung (1969) and Newbery (1974) saying that the argument is
misleading since both the landlord and the tenant voluntarily enter into a contract.
Cheung (1969) observed that the implied resource allocation under private
property rights is the same whether the landowner cultivates the land himself,
hires farm lands to do the tilling, leases his holdings on a fixed rent basis or
shares the actual yields with his tenant. A study in India by Walker and Ryan
(1990) shows that sharecropping accounted for 18.7 per cent reduction in output
and a sizeable decline in the average use of family and bullock labor.
However, these formulations represent over-simplification of the land tenure
system where the efficiency question of alternative land tenure arrangements
cannot be analyzed out of context of various types of land relations. A study by
Haque (1996) shows that there are fourteen major types of land relations in
India, with wide differences in their relative efficiency. The details could not be
presented here due to lack of space. The study bears out that crop productivity
varies according to who leases-in and who leases-out land for cultivation. For
instance, the marginal and small farmers leasing-in land from resident landowners
were found to have comparatively higher gross productivity levels than the
marginal and small farms leasing-in land from absentee landowners. But the net
returns per hectare for tenants were higher in the case of the latter. Further, the
net returns varied widely between various land tenure groups due to varying
terms of lease. Under crop-sharing arrangements, tenants get relatively lower
returns than under the systems of fixed produce or fixed cash. Pure tenants–
those who leased-in land under interlocking arrangements, had higher gross
returns per unit of land than the others, because of close supervision and provision
of credit and other inputs by the landowners. This confirms the Braverman-
Stiglitz hypothesis (1982) that interlinkages of credit and tenancy contracts may
serve landlords as a screening device in identifying efficient tenants. But in that
case, the extent of exploitation was also more. Furthermore, a recent study of
West Bengal tenancy situation by Haque (2001) shows that, ceteris paribus,
productivity differences between owner-operated land and sharecropped land
have more or less disappeared now due to security of tenure of sharecroppers.
But, the question is whether we can record sharecropping tenancy in all other
regions on the pattern of West Bengal so that the sharecroppers have the278 T Haque
necessary incentive to produce more. Alternatively, can we stipulate replacement
of inefficient sharecropping by a system of fixed rent? Probably any legal effort
to do so would fail and the emergence of land-lease market will give the signal.
Poor Peoples’ Access to the Land-Lease Market
Prior to Independence, the tenants in India were considered to be the poor
cultivators who leased-in land for subsistence from either local landowners or
absentee landlords. However, with the passage of time, the poor peoples’ access
to lease market has weakened. Recent rounds of the National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO) (Table 1) show that in several states, including Haryana,
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and Rajasthan, the medium and large farmers
(>4 ha) held about 50 per cent or more of the total leased-in area in 1982-1992.
In fact, during 1982-1992, the percentage share of the marginal farmers in the
total leased-in land was as low as 7.0 per cent in Rajasthan, 1.0 per cent in
Haryana, 5.7 per cent in Punjab, 4.0 per cent in Maharashtra, 8.3 per cent in
Madhya Pradesh and 7.3 per cent in Gujarat. Considering the country as a
whole, the marginal farmers accounted for hardly 16.3 per cent of the total
leased-in land in 1992, while their proportion was as high as 60 per cent. In other
words, marginal farmers who needed to have greater access to leased land for
their viability had, in fact, very little access to such land.
In a number of states, including Assam, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Kerala,
Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Uttar Pradesh, the
marginal and small farmers still have a relatively larger share in the total leased-
in land. But, there is an apprehension that as leasing policy becomes liberal and
market-led agricultural development takes place, the accessibility of small
farmers’ leased-in land would further decline, particularly when non-farm
employment opportunities (either self-employment or wage employment) are
growing very slowly. For example, even in a relatively progressive state like
West Bengal, marginal farmers in some areas are found to lease out land to
large farmers during the rabi season for the cultivation of boro rice, vegetables,
etc., which require large investment. Thus, the dynamics of market-led
development may favor the large farmers to have greater accessibility to land-
lease market and would, in all probability, be inequitous in nature. The overall
economic benefit could be distributed equally, only if the marginal and small279 Land Reforms and Agricultural Development
Table 1. Share of various size-classes of farms in total leased-in area (based on
operational holdings)
State Year Percentage share in total leased-in
area by size class (ha)
<1 1-2 2-4 >4
Andhra Pradesh 1982 12.69 16.40 28.53 42.37
1992 20.20 24.40 29.20 26.20
Assam 1982 18.15 30.24 38.43 13.24
1992 26.90 30.80 13.90 28.50
Bihar 1982 29.73 39.74 20.82 9.73
1992 45.80 35.30 17.30 1.60
Gujarat 1982 7.87 2.26 11.27 78.55
1992 7.30 7.30 43.60 41.80
Haryana 1982 3.83 4.24 32.97 58.97
1992 1.00 2.40 14.40 82.20
Himachal Pradesh 1982 33.43 33.88 16.15 16.14
1992 49.30 27.20 23.50 0.00
Jammu and Kashmir 1982 17.80 31.05 43.58 7.56
1992 21.10 51.80 26.00 1.00
Karnataka 1982 3.56 11.17 23.25 56.29
1992 7.00 15.70 12.40 65.00
Kerala 1982 57.72 18.69 2.83 20.76
1992 39.00 30.40 13.50 17.20
Madhya Pradesh 1982 4.11 11.68 17.53 66.66
1992 8.30 18.50 35.60 37.70
Maharashtra 1982 3.21 2.86 16.56 77.39
1992 4.00 6.20 16.50 73.30
Orissa 1982 17.15 23.59 19.94 39.13
1992 25.80 45.60 23.40 5.20
Punjab 1982 2.57 10.41 21.60 65.40
1992 5.70 6.70 21.30 66.30
Rajasthan 1982 2.77 3.89 24.17 69.23
1992 7.00 5.10 12.40 75.50
Tamil Nadu 1982 34.18 28.85 22.50 14.47
1992 28.70 28.20 24.70 18.50
Uttar Pradesh 1982 21.46 28.49 27.76 22.07
1992 26.60 31.10 25.20 17.10
West Bengal 1982 31.93 26.27 25.48 11.61
1992 50.70 35.70 12.30 1.30
All India 1982 15.57 19.57 23.86 41.03
1992 16.30 19.30 21.60 42.90280 T Haque
farmers can have improved employment opportunities. A recent study of reverse
tenancy situation in Punjab (Haque 2001) shows that this is a win-win situation
for both the landowner and the tenant, as small farmers maximize their income
by both leasing out land and hiring out labor or by undertaking self-employment.
However, a large-scale growth of reverse tenancy, particularly in the backward
regions, may alienate the marginal farmers from land without any alternative or
additional source of income.
The Case for Contract Farming
Two case studies of contract farming — one each in Punjab and Andhra
Pradesh — were conducted by the present author (Haque 2001). The results
(Table 2) indicate that contract farming helps in raising the yields and income of
the farmers because of the high quality seeds and assured market for the produce
provided by the company. It also helps the company to ensure adequate supply
of quality and captive raw material for its processing unit, at a pre-determined
price. Besides, it helps in meeting the market presentation criteria and
sustainability of the processing unit as such.
Agro-processing industries by nature provide a forward linkage to the
farmers whenever there is a contractual agreement between the industry and
raw material producing farmers. But, the small farmers can effectively participate
in contract farming only when there are backward linkages also in the form of
assured supply of all critical inputs. In the case of Hindustan Lever Limited (in
Punjab), which has contractual arrangement for tomato,  It was observed that
only hybrid seeds were provided to the farmers.  Almost all the 300 contract
farmers were large and medium farmers. This is an imperfect and inadequate
contractual arrangement from the point of view of small farmers. However, in
the case of VST Natural Products Limited (NPL) (in Andhra Pradesh), almost
all the contract farmers were marginal, small and semi-medium farmers. This
has been possible because the VST (NPL) provides not only seeds, but also
other inputs on credit basis, if needed. Since the company takes care of capital
and technology needs of the farmers, even the small and marginal landowners
have been encouraged to join contractual arrangements. Thus, while the Punjab
model of contract farming as practiced by the Hindustan Lever Limited is not
easily replicable to large parts of the country in the absence of appropriate281 Land Reforms and Agricultural Development
institutional mechanism to provide credit, technology and other inputs to small
landholders, the VST (NPL) model appears replicable. Secondly, the contract
farming in Punjab has encouraged the large farmers to cultivate land above the
ceiling limits by leasing in land from the marginal and small farmers. This has
alienated the small farmers from land through reverse tenancy. In other words,
the process has been inequitous in nature. But, contract farming of VST (NPL)
seems to have promoted equity, as small farmers have also benefited from it.
Table 2. Average per acre income of contract and non-contract farmers
Company Crop State District Net income Net income
of contract of non-
farmers contract
per acre farmers per
(Rs) acre (Rs)
Hindustan Tomato Punjab Amritsar 20,000 10,200
Lever Hoshiarpur 9,940 6,440





VST Natural Cucumber Andhra Karimnagar 4,500 3,200
Products Pradesh Mehboob Nagar 5,200 4,500
Limited Medak 4,100 3,400
Nalgonda 4,800 4,200
Ranga Reddy 5,400 5,000
Source : Based on primary survey in 1998-99.
Thirdly, although there is no legal framework on contract farming in both
Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, there has been no violation of contracts in Andhra
Pradesh from either side, while in Punjab the violation of contract was reported
from both sides. However, legalization of contract farming may help in protecting282 T Haque
the interests of both the parties and create healthy relationship between the
company and the contract farmers.
Fourthly, as an assured market for the farm produce motivates a farmer to
enter into a contract with a company, similar market prospects should exist for
the processed products of the company. Ultimately, it is the success of the
company’s product in national and/or international market, which decides whether
contract farming for any particular crop or commodity would sustain.
The government has also to create a conducive policy environment, which
encourages national and international companies to promote contract farming,
by creating an appropriate legal, political and administrative system as well as
the necessary infrastructure. In addition, the government needs to ensure
that contract farming, which tends to promote monoculture does not grow
beyond proportion to destroy biodiversity and agricultural ecology. Although
no such risks are visible so far in the two cases studied, it may be necessary
to provide necessary guidelines for land-use planning in each region in order
to prevent such eventualities in future. Besides, as Pandiyan (1996) and
Reddy (1997) have pointed out, large scale corporate farming bears the potential
danger of dispossessing many poor farmers of land through either purchase or
lease.
Conclusions
It has been argued that land reform has not outlived its relevance. Tenancy
reforms undertaken since Independence have yielded some positive, but not
spectacular results. Particularly, the occupancy tenants in Karnataka and
‘bargadars’ in West Bengal have significantly improved their land productivity
and income in recent years. Also, productivity difference between owner-
operated land and sharecropped land in West Bengal and those between
occupancy tenants and traditional owners have disappeared as a result of tenancy
reform. It is also not certain whether legalization of tenancy would increase the
access of the poor to land by motivating the large farmers to lease out land and
take up non-farm entrepreneurships, in the absence of adequate infrastructure
and policy support. Besides, market-led development would tend to promote
reverse tenancy which will alienate the marginal farmers from land, without
providing any alternative source of employment. Therefore, liberalization of leasing283 Land Reforms and Agricultural Development
should be allowed only within ceiling limits for improving the poor peoples’ access
to leased land.  While contract farming arrangements would be helpful in
providing necessary forward and backward linkages to agriculture as well as to
agro-processing industries, there should be efforts to enable the small farmers
to benefit from contract farming. In fact, it is the small farmers who need credit
and technology support more through contract farming. Similarly, relaxation of
ceiling laws may not necessarily promote diversified agricultural growth. As a
matter of fact, removal of technological and infrastructure constraints are of
more crucial importance.
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evelopment of rural areas continues to remain a matter of serious global
concern. Addressing the needs and aspirations of millions of downtrodden
of the world community, particularly that concentrated in the villages of developing
nations, probably has been the most challenging task.  The issue has received
enormous amount of attention during the last five decades. Efforts have been
made to tackle this multi-faceted and complex issue on a variety of dimensions.
This experience has unfolded new vistas of varied nature and necessitated fresh
rounds of relooks from time to time at the processes, approaches and strategies
adopted in tackling the intricate phenomenon of rural development.
Rural banking systems in different countries have been primarily instrumental
in channelizing finances worth billions of dollars to the villages. These continue
to be one of the major players in rural development. Their functioning has
constantly affected the millions of rural poor.  Therefore, activities of rural financial
institutions (RFIs) have attracted specific attention and their ‘efficacy’ has
assumed critical significance.
It is quite interesting to note a broad pattern concerning RFIs of developing
countries.  Basically, the origin lies in the following assumptions: (i) Farmers are
poor, (ii) farm credit needs creed, (iii) rural development should be promoted by
government, and (iv) rural development needs supply leading finance as a pre-
requisite. This thinking has led to the formulation of policy with emphasis on
cheap supply of rural credit (subsidization through low interest rates on loans
and other modalities). Since such a policy does not meet the rigor of commercial
criteria of normal banking organizations, specialized RFIs were established in
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
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many of the third world nations.  Since these RFIs were required to provide
cheap credit, they had to be on the lookout for avenues to mobilize resources at
cheaper costs.  This has often resulted into (i) heavy dependence of RFIs on
treasury or external support on soft terms, (ii) separation of rural savings from
rural credit, and (iii) limited access of RFI to market for funds.  These RFIs
were, in a way, alienated from the mainstream banking activities.  Also,
channelizing of their credit flow and credit rationing practices followed the political
criteria. These drawbacks culminated into deterioration of loan portfolio and the
consequential debacle on other business parameters which, in turn, impaired the
working of RFIs.  Needless to state, this caused a serious damage to the image
of RFIs as a financial organism.
The World Bank has identified the following constraints in the working of
RFIs (BMZ 1997):
● The RFI suffered from inflexibility of objectives within an inappropriate
policy and legal framework and lack of institutional autonomy;
● Subsidized or regulated interest rates on loans have blocked the emergence
of new credit markets;
● Target group access to credit has been severely restricted and loans at
concessional rates have mostly gone to larger enterprises;
● Domestic resources mobilization and national financial market integration
were seriously neglected;
● The accumulation of disclosed and undisclosed losses due to defaults,
inadequate risk management and excessive inflation has eroded the capital
base;
● Government-owned RFIs have acted as administrative agencies in
channelizing funds from donors/central banks/government;
● Personal loans for operational efficiency have been absent;
● Due to lack of autonomy, loans have been unprofitably allocated or misused;
and
● Monitoring and evaluation by donors/funding agencies have been inadequate.
Paradigm Shift
The obvious failure of conventional development bank model led for search
of an alternative approach which would aim at giving poor an access to essential287 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
financial services through the means of promoting financial self-help.  The failure
has also induced the World Bank and other multi-lateral institutions (including
donors) to shift to a systems approach, combining reforms in the financial sector
with strategies for the development of a market-oriented policy framework.
The requirements for a successful financial sector warrant mobilizing financial
resources through savings promotion and creating access to credit (Adams et
al. 1984; Bisley and Coate 1991; and Bisley 1994).  There is enough evidence to
prove that the disadvantaged population groups have a much greater capacity
for savings, investment, and loan repayment than assumed previously (Siebel
and Shreshtha 1988; Bakar 1996: Klitgaard 1996; Bouman and Hospes 1994;
Ghatge 1992; and Kropp and Quinones 1992).  Through the promotion of financial
self help, their productive capacity can be enhanced and their standard of living
improved further. Considerable research has been undertaken on this aspect
(Siebel 1989; Quinones 1992; Bennett et al. 1996; Herath, 1994; and Rutherford
1998).
The approach calls for a shift from the old ‘directed credit paradigm’  (DCP)
to the new ‘financial market paradigm’ (FMP) (Adams 1996).  Treating financial
markets as apparatus to help allocate resources more efficiently between surplus
and deficit units of the economy, viewing rural poor as commercial clients (and
not beneficiaries), doing away with the idea of “subsidy,” considering savings as
a source to provide most of the loanable funds (and not the funds from government
and donors), and evaluating performance of financial institutions, are some of
the salient features of FMP. Responsibility of the state would be to provide an
environment which is conducive to the development of rural financial markets
(e.g. facilitating macro economic reforms, enabling RFIs to provide both deposit
and lending services, etc.). The emphasis is laid on the following aspects:
● Credit worthiness of clients ● Apply accounting practices that
and relatively low cost of its take into account inflation
identification ● Treating the poorest as a
● Multiple banking services commercially bankable proposition
● Risk management (risk ● Emphasis on promotion of rural
evaluation, client selection, savings
portfolio diversification and ● Establishing the practice of savings
management) linked credit
● Real rates of interest on loans ● Encouraging group activities
● Interest rates deregulation
● Dispensing with the ‘subsidy’288 D P  Khankhoje
Efficacy of RFIs
Financial performance (cost, spread and profitability) and key outreach
indicators considered appropriate for judging the success of RFIs are summarized
below (Yaron 1992; Meyer 1985; and Chaves and Gonzalez Vega 1996):
● Clientele ● Interest on deposits advances
● Staff ● Loan collections
● Loan outreach ● Techniques used for selection of
● Savings outreach borrowers and prompt repayment
● Terms and conditions of loans ● Incentives to staff and borrowers
● Action on defaulting borrowers ● Major non-financial services
The term “efficacy” has not been in common use in the context of
evaluation of RFIs. Empirical evidences on the performance of RFIs or their
‘success and failures’ are available today.  These can be bifurcated into two
categories.  First, those which evaluate RFIs from the viewpoint of their outreach,
self-sustainability, viability, etc.  In short, the strength of RFIs as business
and commercial organizations is analyzed (Yaron 1992; and Khandker et al.
1996).  The second category constitutes mainly the shape of impact studies on
RFIs at the grassroots level.  The number of borrower households, operational
area of bank branches, villages financed, etc. are covered to measure the
impact which is taken as an indicator of the performance (Pitt and Khandker
1996; Rahman 1987; Khandker and Chowdhury 1996; Zellar et al. 1995; and
Sharma 1994).  For the purpose of this paper “efficacy” has been perceived as
a combined function of efficiency and effectiveness of RFI.  Efficiency of
RFIs is perceived as a phenomenon that relates to internal aspects of their
working. Effectiveness of RFIs is concerned with the aspects and environment
external to their functioning.  Efficiency in a way is a pre-condition for RFIs to
be effective and effectiveness pre-supposes a certain level of efficiency.  In
other words, RFIs can not be efficient without being effective and vice versa.
Though the two are inter-related closely, various aspects making RFIs efficient
and effective, are clearly distinguishable. The level of the efficiency is determined
by various dimensions connected with internal working of RFIs, whereas the
effectiveness is decided by a set of dimensions, producing impact of RFIs on
the external environment.  Performance of the RFIs on these dimensions relating
to efficiency and effectiveness together determines sustainability of RFIs.289 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
The three levels of this element of sustainability are, viz. (i) RFI level, (ii) individual
borrower level, and (iii) societal level, together influence and decide efficacy of
RFIs in the long-run.
‘Efficacy’ of RFI could be viewed from two perspectives: (i) the long-
term, and (ii) the short-term. Mission and goal of the RFIs reflect on the former,
and a short-term perspective is a part of the long-term horizon. Consistency in
the short-term objectives and long-term perspectives is absolutely essential for
‘efficacy’ of an RFI on a sustainable basis.
‘Efficacy’, again, is a relative term and contains some element of subjectivity,
particularly with regard to certain qualitative parameters. The level of ‘efficacy’
would vary from RFI to RFI, particularly during the short run, depending on the
present level of functioning and ‘efficacy’ positioning.  To illustrate, RFI which
is operating at near insolvency level would look forward to a situation of coming
out of the woods and this would be the test of its ‘efficacy’, whereas another
RFI which is doing reasonably well, would like to consolidate its position and this
would spell out its ‘efficacy’ path.  In other words, no standard or prototype
formula can be prescribed to measure the ‘efficacy’ of RFIs.
Efficiency of RFIs
Efficiency of RFIs, as mentioned earlier, is a function of their internal
operations. There are certain key areas which influence and determine smooth
working of any business organization.  Likewise, each key area consists of
certain norms on the basis of which performance of an organization/institution is
determined. RFIs, obviously, are not an exception to this phenomenon.  Certain
features which are critical in deciding about the efficiency of RFIs have been
depicted in Figure 1. It can be seen that three basic features determining the
efficiency of RFIs are: (i) Financial dimension, (ii) internal working mechanism,
and (iii) sustainability. Financial dimension which consists of viability and
profitability of RFIs (through cost reduction, cost saving and income generation
measures), is of paramount significance and has been amply emphasized in the
literature (Agrawal et al. 1997; Bernasek and Stanfield 1997; Gurgand et al.
1996; Hashim 1995; and Kaladhar 1996). Since a financially weak RFI cannot
remain efficient, particularly in the medium- to long-run, it is imperative that any
step taken to improve the internal working mechanism and sustainability must
save as costs and generate income. The internal working mechanism (second290 D P  Khankhoje






















































 291 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
basic feature depicted in Figure 1) consists of various functions of corporate
activity which are equally relevant and applicable to RFIs.  These need to be
attended properly and reviewed periodically.  This would develop sound
working mechanism, contributing significantly to the third basic feature of
the efficiency, viz. sustainability. The sustainability of RFIs, apart from its
relationship with internal working mechanism, is visualized as a function of (i)
autonomy, (ii) decentralization, (iii) accessibility, (iv) simple operation, (v)
transparency, (vi) innovation, and (vii) sharing of experiences.  Better the
performance of any RFI on these parameters, stronger it would be on the
sustainability front. These features of the sustainability are litmus test for the
efficiency of a RFI. In other words, financial discipline with an eye on the
viability and profitability, and the sustainability through the seven parameters
referred above have direct relationship with the different dimensions of the
internal working mechanism. An interplay of this relationship is crucial for
increasing the efficiency of RFIs.
Effectiveness of RFIs
As mentioned earlier, effectiveness of RFIs relates to their performance in
terms of fulfillment of their goals and objectives through proper delineation of
defined roles and functions. This effectiveness has several facets and this section
proposes to cover some of them.
An important parameter of the effectiveness is fulfillment of the
expectations by the RFIs. These expectations emanate from several quarters
such as the society at large, policy makers, goals and targets of organization,
top management, network of branches, and customers at the grass root
level. Quite often these expectations are not spelt out clearly and objectively.
Making a comparison between the expectations and performance as an
indicator of the effectiveness is difficult. In particular, the expectations of
the society and the customers are difficult to spell clearly because of their
socio-economic diversity. It is, however, possible to specify them with
reference to the national and corporate levels.  The idea is that one should
identify quantifiable indicators of the effectiveness. Some of these are given
below:292 D P  Khankhoje
Table 1. Measuring the effectiveness of RFIs
National level expectation RFI (corporate and branch) level
parameters parameters
● Reduction in donor’s role ● Promotion of coordination with
other constituents in the delivery
● Greater reliance on the savings system, mainly development
and own funds departments of the government
and other financial institutions
● Greater autonomy/free from
political interference ● Improvement in access to ancillary
services, especially for input
● Meeting the target/goal in supply and marketing
respect of
- Outreach ● Improvement in linkages with
- Coverage of weaker sections supportive services such as crop
- Gender aspect insurance, extension services,
- Employment generation credit guarantee facilities, etc.
- Diversifying into non-farm
  sector ● Improvement in the relationship
- Arresting exploitation of with non-governmental
  rural poor organizations (NGOs) to facilitate
the process of credit delivery and
● Reduction in dependence of repayment
clients on informal sources
of finance ● Linkages with other institutions
experimenting new techniques of
● Forging effective linkage production and working for their
between informal sector and dissemination
formal sector (wherever and
whenever feasible) ● Promotion of savings
● Reduction in regional disparities ● Increase in outreach293 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
● Promotion of entrepreneurial ● Emphasis on borrowers’ training
initiative entrepreneurial and skill
improvement training
● Increase in productivity levels,
in both farm and non-farm ● Mobilization of customers
sectors
● Encouragement to people’s
● Decrease in dependence on participation
‘subsidization to customers’
● Easier access of banking facilities
to the rural masses
● Reduction in transaction cost to the
borrowers (e.g. through formation
and linkage of self-help groups)
● Promotion of innovative financial
products
● Fine-tuning the banking services
according to area/location and type
of client groups
The parameters of effectiveness listed in Table 1 are indicative in nature,
and their application may vary from country to country, RFI to RFI and
location specificity of the branches of RFI.  As mentioned earlier, the effectiveness
is a relative term and unless quantification of these parameters is made,
making judgement about the effectiveness would be rather difficult and also
hazardous.
Should the effectiveness of RFIs be assessed on the basis of performance
on the norms relating to rural banking activities, or should the RFIs go much
beyond and make their contributions to the long-term goal of sustainable rural
development?  As per the present practice, RFIs strive to achieve their goals
and objectives through disbursal of credit and mobilization of rural savings through
individual and group-level activities.  By and large, proper utilization of loans,
Table 1.  Contd..294 D P  Khankhoje
generation of incremental income, rise in savings level and timely repayment of
loan and interest are the main expectations of RFIs from the customers, which,
in turn, meet their primary goals and objectives.  In the process, the objective of
improving the standard of living of the customers (quality and type of food,
nutrition, health, hygiene, sanitation, education, etc.) is also achieved occasionally.
The present level of thinking on the effectiveness of RFIs is primarily confined
to these aspects only. Perceptible improvements in quality of life (as shown in
Figure 2) would, step by step, enhance social and cultural awareness and
understanding, which in turn, would inculcate social accountability.  These aspects
collectively would lead to betterment of social values and greater realization of
social ethics.  These traits would ultimately result into greater political awareness,
empowerment of people for their legitimate rights, and participation in the political
process, both as a citizen and a participant.  Changes of this nature could be
viewed as indications of the ‘Sustainable Rural Development’. The question
now arises, whether the effectiveness of RFIs should be judged on the basis of
their prime responsibility of providing financial services to the rural poor, or
could the basis be extended much beyond it to encompass wider aspects of
sustainable rural development’? Admittedly, RFIs as a constituent of formal
financial system, should facilitate and promote the savings and the productive
endeavor of their target customers through the process of financial intermediation
and these should not have a jurisdiction over social, cultural and political
dimensions of the sustainable rural development.  At the same time, the RFIs
should channelize and streamline their main activities in such a manner that
these contribute significantly to the sustainable rural development. In this context,
other constituents in the delivery system, viz. various government departments
responsible for promotion of economic and social welfare, NGOs, etc. have a
pivotal role to play, and a close collaboration between them is necessary. This is
not something unfamiliar to RFIs as they have to develop and maintain linkages
with government departments concerned with economic activities in rural areas,
particularly to ensure complementarity between credit and non-credit inputs.
Such coordination needs to be extended vigorously and systematically to a wider
network of other government departments working on the social aspects.  There
are examples from the developing nations where social welfare and economic
development activities at the grass roots level were combined into an operational
strategy.  As an illustration, four such models and their precise focus is discussed
in the next section.295 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
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Models from the Developing Nations
Four models — two each from Bangladesh and India, are discussed in this
section (Figure 3),  which depict different approaches for combining credit/
financial services with social welfare. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) has placed emphasis on the social aspects of rural
development before embarking upon credit/financial services.  The Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh has given simultaneous attention to broader aspects of
rural development and ‘credit’ and ‘savings’.  The Bhartiya Agro-Industries
Foundation (BAIF) has focused on economic upliftment of rural poor through
provisions of credit. The Planning for Development of Villages (PDV) places
attention on peoples’ participation in rural development and linking it to credit
activity.  A brief description on the focus of these four institutions is given
below.
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
Established in 1972, BRAC has its focus on integrated community
development programme. Strategy adopted by BRAC comprise four major
activities: (i) Rural Development Program (RDP) for forming village organizations
for the poor and raising general awareness, credit provision, health, education
and other social interventions through them; (ii) Rural Credit Project (RCP) to
evolve a self-sustaining bank for village organizations which are four year old;
(iii) Health Program for women and children with a focus on preventive healthcare
measures and assistance to government rural health system; and (iv) Non-
formal Primary Education for children who have never gone to school (Lovell
1992).
The RDP assists the poor to reduce their economic dependency on state
and avoid exploitative forces by improving their health, education, sanitation and
income earning potential. It is implemented for four years, successfully, before
an RCP is taken up.  The BRAC is fully aware that poverty cannot be alleviated
unless the poor becomes economically self-sustainable. Reaching the rural poor,
particularly rural women, through RDP and RCP is one of the major achievements
of BRAC.  In BRAC, the poor sees a source of their empowerment, a plan to
receive credit and an accessible bank for savings.  Therefore, viability of this
organization is more tenuous than any other organization, which makes available297 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
Figure 3. Models relevant to efficacy of RFIs
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only credit.  Loan recovery rate is consistently above 90 per cent.  It is estimated
that RDP and RCP together would attain the sustainability by the year 2010
(Khandker et al. 1996). However, it may be difficult to achieve full self-
sustainability in the short run.
The Grameen Bank
A widely discussed RFI in the world today is the Grameen Bank of
Bangladesh which was started as an experiment, and was initially financed by
one of the nationalized commercial banks.  With prime motive of taking banking
to the common man, the Bank concentrated on financing the lowest strata of
the society, mainly through creation of opportunities for self-employment. It is a
classic example of introducing and institutionalizing a non-traditional banking
system in rural areas to provide credit facilities under special terms and conditions
(e.g. loans extended without collateral) (Yaron 1992).  Emphasis was on the
group concept.  Focus on the poor women as a target group, strong central
management, well-defined organizational structure, extensive staff training, staff-
dedication, borrowers’ education, transparency in loan administration, intense
banker-borrower relationship, compulsory element of ‘savings’ by customers,
close monitoring and supervision, non-compromization on commercial banking,
etc. have been some of the factors responsible for the success of the Grameen
Bank.  Social development is an integral part of the credit programs (most of the
sixteen principles focus on social objectives of health, education, etc.). This
institution has successfully demonstrated that while credit is the primary need,
development work cannot be artificially separated into economic and social
activities. The linkage between development work and social reforms is evident
from the high rate of savings and use of those savings for collective welfare and
social security schemes.
Bhartiya Agro-Industries Foundation (BAIF)
Working in tribal areas of western India, BAIF’s primary emphasis is on
improving the economic condition of the poor and upgrading the quality of their
life. BAIF’s basic philosophy is, “Once the poor become green (economically
better-off), other things will automatically follow” (Bhatt 1989).  Therefore, it299 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
does not get involved with other issues like conscientization and mobilization
against corruption, oppression, injustice, etc.
Salient features of the BAIF’s approach are: Identification of main and
supplementary economic activities, planning and providing backward and forward
linkages, providing or facilitating social development activity, and facilitating flow
of benefits of other schemes (Khankhoje and Mankidy 1997).  In order to
implement this approach, BAIF develops strategies to harmonize land, water,
cattle, trees and other natural resources on one hand, and the rural poor on the
other.  Application of science and technology and efficient management of
economic activities undertaken for the rural poor are noteworthy features of
BAIF’s functioning.
Planning for Development of Villages
The National Institute of Bank Management (NIBM) initiated this experiment
in 1984 at the selected rural branches of commercial banks. The project aimed
at increasing the contribution of financial services towards poverty alleviation
and rural development. The banks’ field officers organized people through
interaction with the village community. Initially, developing contacts with the
key persons in villages, participation in their social functions and events, and
interaction on the issues of their interest were taken up.  Organizing meetings of
all the villagers (village development assembly, i.e. VDA) to discuss their problems,
prospects and process of development and importance of peoples’ participation
therein were also attempted.  This was followed by formation of the Village
Development Councils (VDCs) consisting of 10-12 members representing the
village community and capable of implementing the Peoples’ Action Plan (PAP).
Preparation of PAP by VDA, covering the assessment of credit needs and
social and other support services, ensured peoples’ participation under the project.
The members of VDC were provided training on credit planning, credit discipline
and support/social services.  Implementation of PAP by VDC involved three
aspects: (i) micro credit (identification of prospective borrowers, recommending
them to bank after appraisal, follow up for sanction of loans and its utilization,
and ensuring timely repayment of loans); (ii) support services for economic
activities (follow up with concerned government departments, arranging for
guidance camps on rural activities, construction of small check dams on streams/300 D P  Khankhoje
riverlets, tree plantations, etc.); and (iii) social services/infrastructure (awareness
camps on safe drinking water, nutrition, child education, healthcare services,
organizing social functions, construction of social meeting place, approach roads,
drainage system, etc.).  Benefits accruing from this approach in terms of ‘credit
plus’ were:
(a) Externalizing loan appraisal, borrower’s identification, supervision over credit,
repayment responsibility leading to reduction in transaction cost of the
financing bank;
(b) Improvizing profitability through higher business with increased recycling
of funds, lower risks and long-term relationship with clients; and
(c) Developing confidence among the banks about the rural poor as customers.
Common features of the models
There are certain common features that emerged from these four models.
These are significant from the viewpoint of efficacy of RFI, and are listed
below:
● Emphasis on credit plus- quality of rural life
● Focus on women as a client group
● Emphasis on savings
● Close contact and intense interaction with villagers
● Emphasis on formation of groups of the rural poor
● High degree of transparency in operations
● Close monitoring of loan utilization- strict control and supervision
● Excellent loan repayment performance
● Heavy stress on training of staff and education of borrowers
● High motivation level of the staff
● Emphasis on high level of rigor and discipline on the part of villagers
● Provision of standby funding arrangements for emergent needs of the rural
poor.
Summary
The role and functions of RFIs are quite crucial in the context of rural
development in the third world countries.  Their ability to serve the rural301 Efficacy of Rural Financial Institutions
communities, to a large extent, depends on their efficacy, which is a combined
function of their efficiency and effectiveness.  The efficiency relates to internal
functioning of RFIs with constant eye on the financial viability and sustainability.
The effectiveness of RFIs could be viewed in terms of their impact on the
external environment. Expectations (of nation, society, customers, RFI) from
RFIs and the extent of their fulfillment could be one of the yardsticks for
ascertaining the efficacy of RFIs. Studies conducted on this aspect indicate the
need of attention to viability and sustainability of RFIs and their impact on
customers.  Although RFIs, as constituents of formal financial system, do not
have any jurisdiction over social, cultural and political dimensions of sustainable
rural development, these should channelize their main activities in such a manner
as to contribute significantly to the overall objective of sustainable rural
development.  There are examples from the developing countries indicating that
this could be possible through integration of economic and social dimensions into
an operational strategy.  Keeping long-term thinking along these lines is desirable
to improve efficacy of RFIs.
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icrofinance is the provision of a broad range of financial services such as
deposits, loans, payment services, money transfers and insurance to poor
and low income households and their micro-enterprises. According to the Task
Force on ‘Supportive Policy and Regulatory Framework for Microfinance’
(NABARD 1999), microfinance is “provision of thrift, credit and other financial
services and products of very small amounts to the poor in rural, semi-urban or
urban areas for enabling them to raise their income levels and improve living
standards.” Thus, microfinance is broadly synonymous to rural finance as
practised in India. Except that, of late, semi-formal institutions such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and non-banking financial companies
(NBFCs) have entered the rural credit business, bringing in a new (rather
renewed) approach of lending to groups of people popularly known as Self-
Help Groups (SHGs).  It is this type of lending involving SHGs which is referred
to as microfinance in the modern parlance. This paper deals with the microfinance
in this connotation. The need, evolution, spread, impact on clients, future prospects
and potential of microfinance are discussed in this paper.
Need
The traditional rural credit system in India has not succeeded well,
notwithstanding its long existence and numerous innovations/interventions, in
1
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reaching the needy sections of the society. Even by the year 1991, as revealed
by All India Debt and Investment Survey (GOI 1998), dependence of rural
households on informal sources of finance for cash debt was to the tune of 37.4
per cent.  Ironically, the level of dependence on informal agencies continued at
the same level between 1981-91 — a decade that has seen impressive expansion
of network of credit institutions. Further, most of the credit institutions are in
perpetual loss or inconsequential profits so that their sustainability in the rural
credit business is at stake. The casualty has been the small borrower as the
statistics on small borrowal accounts of Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs)
reveal2. Thus, there seems to be a big vacuum so far as flow of credit to small
borrowers comprising marginal and small farmers, as also artisans and village
craftsmen, are concerned. Women, agricultural laborers and oral tenants have
already been excluded from the beginning from the purview of institutional
credit system, as they cannot offer the necessary collateral the banks
demand for extending the credit. These disadvantaged sections are either
excluded or exploited through usury by non-institutional agencies such as
agricultural moneylenders, landlords, traders/commission agents, friends/relatives,
etc. that have been operating in the rural areas since long. Thus, there are
certain categories of rural inhabitants having only aspirations to prosper without
the necessary access to credit. In fact, an efficient and viable credit delivery
system catering to a large section of the poor is still a distant dream. This
situation has led to the introduction of SHGs in the country by some NGOs in
the mid-1980s.  What started as an experiment has gained momentum in
recent years.  The movement received institutional back up with the linking of
SHGs with banks. And SHG-Bank linkage has become synonymous with
microfinance.
2
 The number of small borrowal accounts (SBA) has been falling over time. According
to Banking Statistical Returns of RBI, proportion of small borrowal accounts with
outstanding of Rs 25,000 or less (of late, the accounts with outstanding of up to Rs 2
lakh are classified as SBA) declined from 95 per cent as on 31 March 1990 to 82 per cent
by the end of March 1999. The proportion  of amount outstanding declined from 23 per
cent to 10 per cent during the same period.  During 1997-99, the number of SBA under
agriculture declined from Rs 213.14 lakh to Rs 177.94 lakh. The RBI survey has revealed
that (i) 84 per cent of number and 75 per cent of amount of SBA accounted by rural and
semi-urban areas, and (ii) agriculture and allied activities had a share of about 40 per cent
of SBA both in number and amount.307 Microfinance in India
Evolution
Way back in 1987, National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(NABARD) provided Rs 10 lakh as grant assistance to Mysore Resettlement
and Development Agency (MYRADA) to be used as seed money for its Credit
Management Groups (CMGs). This successful experiment was the precursor
to the launching of the pilot project in 1992 for linking 500 SHGs with banks
(NABARD 1995). In February 1992, the project was made operational
throughout the country.  Thus, NABARD’s initiative brought in an additional
constituent in the rural financial sector (Nair 2000), i.e. NGOs, voluntary
organizations and NBFCs who have been promoting the self-help concept.
SHGs are characterized by their small size, usually limited to less than 20
members per group. Homogeneity in terms of socio-economic conditions and
levels of living form the basis for the group formation. Periodic meetings, on a
weekly or fortnightly basis, inculcating the habit of thrift, generating a common
fund through contributing regular saving from the members, lending to its members,
availing credit support from financial institutions with collateral substitute, etc.,
are some of the salient features of the group functioning.  The process of group
formation takes six months to one year and the management of these groups
vests with the representatives selected from the group members.
Broadly the four different models of SHG-Bank linkage have emerged
over the past few years and are as under:
Model I: Bank-SHG-members (without NGO intervention)
In this model, the bank itself acts as an institution to promote SHGs.  It
takes initiatives in forming the groups, nurturing them over a period of time,
opening their savings bank accounts and then providing credit to them after
satisfying itself about their maturity to absorb credit.
Model II: Bank-SHG-facilitating agency-members
In this model, groups are formed by facilitating agencies like NGOs,
government agencies or other community-based organizations. The groups are
nurtured and trained by these agencies. The bank opens savings bank accounts
and then provides credit directly to the SHGs after observing their operations308 K J S Satyasai
and maturity to absorb credit. While the bank provides loans to the groups directly,
the facilitating agencies continue their interactions with the SHGs. Most linkage
experiences begin with this model with NGOs or other agencies playing the role
of facilitators. In a variation of this model, even SHGs act as non-financial
intermediaries.
Model III: Bank-NGO(as financial intermediary)/ MFI-SHG- members
Due to various reasons, banks in some areas are not in a position to even
finance SHGs promoted and nurtured by other agencies.  In such cases, the
NGOs act as both facilitators and micro-finance intermediaries (MFIs).  Firstly,
they promote the groups, nurture and train them and then approach banks for
bulk loans for on-lending to the SHGs.  Under this model, NGOs have also been
found to federate the SHGs and gradually equip the SHG federations to take on
this role. Here also, in a variant of this model, SHGs themselves act as financial
intermediaries between banks and individual members.
Model IV: Cooperative-SHG-members
In addition to the above models, a fourth model is suggested wherein co-
operatives at primary level (PACS) can lend to SHGs which would further lend
to members (Bandyopadhyay n.d.). The basic premise is that SHGs are the
abstract forms of the co-operative principles and ideas, i.e. they are co-operatives
within co-operatives. This model is basically implied in the Model I. One practical
problem that arises in case of linking SHGs with co-operatives is that there
could be discrimination between the members of PACS and SHGs in the matter
of share capital contribution and collateral security requirements.
Progress of the Program
The program registered a significant growth in terms of both coverage and
outreach of credit to the poor. Beginning with a modest number of 255 SHGs in
1992/93, a total of 94,645 SHGs were refinanced and linked with banks by
March 2000.  This number jumped to 213,213 by March 2001.  This has brought
around an estimated 4.5 million families within the fold of the formal banking309 Microfinance in India
sector.  Banks have claimed refinance from the National Bank against financing
of 140,198 groups (including 21,630 groups refinanced more than once) during
2000/01. The cumulative disbursement of bank loans was Rs 4,808 million with
refinance assistance of Rs 4,007 million (Table 1).  By the end of March 2001,
the outreach of the program is extended to 27 states and union territories (UTs)
covering 382 districts with the participation of 750 NGOs, 41 commercial bank
branches, 166 regional rural banks (RRBs) and 111 co-operatives. The size of
the loan per SHG is much lower.  However, the target households to be covered
by SHGs also have very low credit needs mostly for consumption needs.
Table 1. Progress in SHG linkage programme
                (Rs million)
Cumulative up to the year During the year Bank
Year SHGs Bank Refinance SHGs Bank Refin- loan/SHG
linked# loan assistance linked # loan ance (Rs)
 (No.) (RA) (No.) assistance
1992/93 255 2.9 2.7 255 2.9 2.7 11,373
1993/94 620 6.5 4.6 365 3.6 1.9 9,863
1994/95 2,122 24.4 23 1,502 17.9 18.4 11,917
1995/96 4,757 60.6 51.6 2,635 36.2 28.6 13,738
1996/97 8,598 118.4 106.5 3,841 57.8 54.9 15,048
1997/98 14,317 237.6 213.9 5,719 119.2 107.4 20,843
1998/99 32,995 570.7 520.6 18,678 333.1 306.7 17,834
1999/00 94,645 1,929.7 1,501.3 61,650 1359.0 980.7 22,044
2000/01 213,213 4,808.7 4,007.2 118,568 2,879.0 2,505.9 20,535@
Annual compound growth rate ( per cent) 114.4 139.7 142.0 10.5
@ Computed taking into account 21,630 SHGs formed earlier but receiving repeat
refinance during the current year. Such adjustment was not needed for earlier
years, as the magnitude of repeat refinance was not significant.
# No. of SHGs indicated pertains to those refinance linked in all these tables.
Source: NABARD (2001).
Nevertheless, the coverage is limited mostly to the southern region where
around 73 per cent concentration of SHGs is found (Table 2).  The central
(9 per cent), eastern (8 per cent) and western (6 per cent) regions rank next to310 K J S Satyasai
Table 2.Year-wise and region-wise share of cumulative number of SHGs
linked with the banks
(per cent)
Region March March March March March
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Northern 43323
North-Eastern <1 <1 <1 <1 <1
Western 7 10 10 8 6
Eastern 13 13 10 9 8
Central 12 11 11 13 9
Southern 63 62 65 67 73
Source: NABARD (2001).
the south, in the same order, in respect of their share in  the groups linked with
the banks.
Inter-state differences also manifest in a significant way (Table 3).  In the
southern region, Andhra Pradesh dominates the scene with the highest share in
linkage, while it is less than 6 per cent in Kerala.  Likewise, Maharashtra in the
western region, Uttar Pradesh in the central region, and Orissa in the eastern
region dominate, with the highest proportion of SHGs linked in the region.
State-wise pattern of SHGs linked per lakh of rural households shows
that the density of SHGs is more in states with higher level of infrastructure
(correlation coefficient being 0.41). A priori, one may expect that SHG
density would be positively correlated with the number of families below poverty
line. Data, however, show that there is no correlation (0.09) between these two.
Main constraint faced in spreading SHGs is non-availability of effective NGOs
to promote SHGs. State patronage in promoting SHGs in states like Andhra
Pradesh, is also missing in many states.
Among the various models of linkage, the one involving NGO as a facilitator
is the dominant model accounting for 76 per cent of SHGs and 77 per cent of
the bank loan.  Next is the model with NGO as financial intermediary.  Direct
linkage to banks without facilitator and intervention of NGO is limited to only 13
per cent of the groups (Table 4).  It is interesting to observe that SHGs under
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under Model III account for only 8 per cent of the bank loan.  The average loan
per SHG under Model I and Model II was Rs 22,600 and Rs 20,867 respectively,
whereas only Rs 15,243 was disbursed under Model III.  This trend may be
because of the insistence of the banks on higher savings due to security
considerations.
Table 4.  Model-wise linkage of SHGs as on March 2001
Model Number Bank loan
of SHGs Total loan Loan per
(Rs million) SHG (Rs)
Direct (Model I) 30,739 694.71 22,600
 (13) (15)
NGO as facilitator 1,78,248 3,719.96 20,867
(Model II)   (76) (77)
NGO as intermediary 25,856 394.12 15,243
(Model III)   (11) (8)
Total 2,34,843 4,808.79 20,535
(100) (100)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage to the total.
Source: NABARD (2001).
Table 5.  Distribution of SHGs as per participating banks as on March 2001
Bank Category Number Bank loan
of SHGs Total loan Loan per
(Rs million) SHG (Rs)
Commercial banks 1,24,246 2,958.69 23,813
 (53) (62)
RRBs 97,824 1,599.57 16,352
 (42) (33)
Co-operatives 12,773 250.53 19,614
 (5) (5)
Total 2,34,843 4,808.79 20,535
(100) (100)
Note: Figures in parentheses indicate percentage to the total.
Source: NABARD (2001).313 Microfinance in India
The share of commercial banks, RRBs and co-operatives in total number
of SHGs linked was 53 per cent, 42 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively (Table
5). Among commercial banks, the Andhra Bank linked the highest number of
SHGs (17,358) followed by the State Bank of India (17,105) and the State Bank
of Hyderabad (6,273).  The other banks having a significant share in the program
were Indian Overseas Bank, Indian Bank, Canara Bank, Bank of India, Bank
of Baroda, Syndicate bank, Union Bank of India, Vysya Bank, Bank of Madura,
Karnataka Bank, Global Trust Bank, and South Indian Bank. Bank of Madura
also had the credit of taking on the role of the promoting institutions in a big way.
Among RRBs, Sri Visakha Grameen Bank of Andhra Pradesh linked 7,339
groups followed by Nagarjuna Grameen Bank (4,802) in Andhra Pradesh,
Pandiyan Grameen Bank in Tamil Nadu (4,155), and Manjira Grameena Bank
(2,189) in Andhra Pradesh. Among co-operatives, District Cooperative Banks
(DCCBs) in Hooghly (West Bengal), Bidar (Karnataka) and Krishna DCCB
(Andhra Pradesh) have been the leaders in credit linkage.  In many states,
suitable amendments to the Cooperative Societies Act have been incorporated
enabling SHGs to become members of PACS and avail of loans.
Impact of Microfinance
Impact of microfinance can be visualized at two levels: (i) the living standards
of the clients (both social and economic aspects), and (ii) the cost of transaction
for participant credit agency as well as borrowers.
Impact on living standards
A study conducted by NABARD during 1997 in Tamil Nadu revealed that
the SHG-Bank Linkage Program was successful in triggering off the development
of the rural poor, though on a modest scale. This was achieved by shifting the
loaning pattern from consumption towards production purposes, leading to
generation of income, savings and also empowerment of women (Puhazhendhi
2000).  Another study from Andhra Pradesh concluded that the SHGs showed
positive impact on member households in respect of building self-confidence,
economic and social development, skill formation and social empowerment of
members compared to other programs. The study further concluded that there314 K J S Satyasai
is a strong case for giving a ‘big push’ to the linkage program in view of its
superiority over other methods of reaching the poor in many aspects (Rao 2000).
The most outstanding impact of the linkage program is the socio-economic
empowerment of the poor, particularly the rural women (Nanda 1998).
A recent impact evaluation study (Puhazhendhi and Satyasai 2000) has
compared the socio-economic conditions of 560 member households from 223
SHGs located in 11 states before and after (spanning over an average of 3-year
period) their association with these groups. A positive impact has been observed
on economic as well as social aspects of the members such as assets, income,
access to credit, savings, self-confidence and behavioral patterns. The average
value of assets per household, including livestock and consumer durables, etc.
has registered an increase of 72.3 per cent from the pre-to post-SHG situation.
About 58.6 per cent of the sample households have registered an increase in
assets. There has been three-fold increase, from Rs 460 to Rs 1,444, in savings
per household. The average borrowings per year per household has doubled
from Rs 4,282 during the pre-SHG situation to Rs 8,341 during the post-SHG
situation. Almost 50 per cent of the borrowing in the pre-SHG period was for
consumption, while after group formation, the borrowing for consumption was
only about 25 per cent with as much as 70 per cent going for income generation
purposes. The annual interest rates converged to 12-24 per cent. The overall
repayment percentage improved from 84 to 94 per cent between the two periods
with an impressive improvement in the repayment of loans from banks, by 29
percentage points. The average net income per household recorded about 33
per cent increase. The involvement in the group significantly contributed in
improving the self-confidence of the members. The feeling of self-worth and
communication with others improved after association with the SHGs. The
members have become relatively more assertive in confronting with social evils
and problem situations. As a result, perhaps, there was a fall in the incidence of
family violence. In terms of various parameters for which impact was assessed,
the linkage models involving NGO as either facilitator or financial intermediary,
performed better compared to the direct model. The groups in existence for 3
years or more recorded higher impact.
The composite index of different social and economic parameters,
constructed á la Singh and Chand (2000), rose from 40 to 65 between the
pre- and post-SHG situation, recording an increase of 25 percentage points
(Table 6).  The index of economic indicators has increased from 40 to 52 and315 Microfinance in India
that of social indicators from 40 to 74 during the same period. Thus, the impact
of microfinance was relatively more pronounced on the social aspects than on
the economic aspects. As the age of a group increased,  the increment in the
index also increased.
Table 6. Distribution of households according to the index of standard of living
(per cent)
Index range Social Index Economic Index Overall Index
Pre-SHG Post-SHG Pre-SHG Post-SHG Pre-SHG Post-SHG
Upto 20 19.5 1.0 17.8 3.5 8.5 0.2
20 – 40 34.7 3.9 41.9 30.1 46.1 5.2
40 – 60 28.5 18.1 29.2 34.4 35.1 26.6
60 – 80 13.1 29.9 9.3 24.3 9.3 53.9
80 – 100 4.2 47.2 1.9 7.7 1.0 14.1
Average value 40 74 40 52 40 65
of the index
Impact on transaction costs of the credit agency/mFI and borrowers
The existing Rural Financial Institutions (RFIs) are shying away from
financing small borrowers on account of high transaction and risk costs in dealing
with large number of small accounts. It is often recommended that giving bulk
loans to SHGs/NGOs acting as financial intermediaries for on-lending to small
borrowers would reduce transaction as well as risk costs because of decrease
in the number of accounts.  Puhazhendhi (1995, 2000), Srinivasan (2000), Rao
(2000), Jindal (2000), Gain et al. (2000) and Malhotra and Chauhan (2000) have
estimated such transaction costs under different scenarios. The general conclusion
that follows is that there is reduction in the transaction cost to the tune of
Rs 100 per account  for the bank, resulting in improvement in the profitability of
the bank. These studies, however, suffer from certain methodological and other
problems. Firstly, these studies implicitly assume the ultimate objective in rural
banking is to reduce the transaction costs of the lender, and therefore, view the
cost advantages of the microfinance innovations from lender’s point of view.
But the cherished objective has been to provide access to credit to the ultimate
borrower at minimum cost to the lender as well as borrower, or in other words,316 K J S Satyasai
to minimize the cost of delivering credit to the ultimate borrower. Transaction
costs to lenders (banks) can be reduced by transferring the banking functions of
the lenders, including risk bearing, to an intermediary such as an NGO (even
trader or commission agent). But such transfer raises some important questions:
What are the costs to such intermediary for performing these transferred
functions? How do they pass on these costs to the ultimate borrowers? What
will be the extent of rent seeking by them? Of the two, i.e. banks and
intermediaries, which has the comparative advantage in costs vis-à-vis
effectiveness in reaching the borrower3? Will the transfer not reduce the banks
to mere wholesalers/re-financiers?4  The second limitation is that lending through
SHGs has additional costs of forming, nurturing and capacity building of the
groups. These costs are not included in the transaction costs of the lender in
these studies5.
These issues notwithstanding, prima facie, there are apparent and
impressive gains for the borrowers from the linkage between banks and NGOs.
In view of reduction in number of visits to the bank branch and documentation
charges, the cost of borrowing for the borrower is likely to decline. The transaction
cost to the borrowers, for example, declined from 16.8 per cent in the case of
direct borrowing to 1 per cent if borrowed through Self-Employed Women’s
Association (SEWA) (Gain et al. 2000). The transaction cost to the borrower
under the Grameen Project of Oriental Bank of Commerce was reported to be
negligible compared to 3.5 per cent under normal lending (Malhotra and Chauhan
3
 Srinivasan (2000) has provided highly informative account of comparative costs of
forming and nurturing the SHGs by banks and NGOs, and has concluded that banks are
cost-effective in forming and nurturing SHGs of comparable performance.
4
 Transfer of banking functions to NGOs would rather replace the existing institutional
arrangements instead of augmenting them. In fact, the growing demand for rural credit
can be met by stepping up credit by supplementing and not substituting the existing
arrangements.
5
 The cost of forming and nurturing groups can be substantial, especially for maiden
groups in a village in initial years.  It is estimated to be as much as Rs 7,000 per group by
Harper et al. (1998). The explanatory note to Annexure 17.2 in Srinivasan (2000) that
reads as, ‘The surplus generated by the group is sufficient to pay for the branch manager’s
costs in group formation and nurturing from the second year’ gives an impression that
these costs have to be loaded on to the groups. This raises the issue of sharing these
costs by the groups, banks and NGOs.317 Microfinance in India
2000). Cost of making repayments was apparently not taken into account, which
was seen to be as much as 73 per cent of the total cost to the borrower in the
study by Gain et al. (2000).
The Task Ahead
The SHG experiment has given encouraging results and evoked lot of interest
in all concerned circles, so much so that the Swarna Jayanthi Gram Swarojgar
Yojana (SGSY) is modelled on the ‘group’ approach. Naturally, it is being
attempted successfully to scale up the experiment.  In the Union Budget 2001,
it was proposed that one lakh additional groups would be formed during the
current year.  Accordingly, NABARD has set for itself the Corporate Mission
to reach microfinance services to about 20 million poor households by the year
2008. This still leaves the gigantic task6 of providing access to the needy
incomplete, as there are about 60 million such households, as on today.
Promoting microfinance is often taken synonymous with promoting SHGs.
Scaling up SHGs in number is only one facet of microfinance, and it alone may
not attain the ultimate objective of reaching the needy, as imparting the spirit of
microfinance among all formal rural credit agencies would do.  Further, as feared
in some quarters (Nair 2001), unless a larger perspective is framed within the
concept of poverty alleviation, microfinance interventions will end up adding
another appendage to the existing system.
Scaling up the microfinance should concentrate on two facets: Firstly, scaling
up SHGs in number, and secondly the most important one, spreading spirit of the
microfinance among the existing RFIs having a vast network of rural branches.
In this process, the following important features of the microfinance in the modern
connotation should be kept in view:
(i) It is of the borrowers, by the borrowers and for the borrowers.
(ii) Savings is followed as first principle and thrift habit is inculcated to the
members before they borrow. This helps them understand the value of
borrowed money.
(iii) Regular meetings are insisted where member involvement and education/
awareness are taken care of.
6
 It is all the more gigantic, as the progress is considered slow and inadequate considering
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(iv) Women form the focal point of the movement.
(v) It is built on the trust, and flexibility rather than security, legal safeguards,
etc. It is person (family)-oriented and not activity-centerd.
(vi) Group approach provides the strength as it reinforces confidence, positive
comparison, mutual check, peer pressure, etc.7
(vii) Frequent repayment in small amount relieves the pain involved in repaying
the loan in large sums at a time and helps to maintain continuous interaction
between borrower and lender. In the traditional system of repayment, large-
sized instalments are fixed at six monthly or annual intervals. In the case of
agricultural loans, however, borrower household may be encouraged to take
up a simultaneous enterprise that can counter the half-yearly/annual bunching
of income.
(viii)Convenience banking facilities should be available at the doorsteps of the
borrower at the time convenient to him.
(ix) Rotation of leadership in SHGs every year may help minimize the power
politics and develop each member into a leader ultimately.
Mosley (2000) has isolated four best practices in the microfinance
experiments world over as: (i) levying market (full cost) interest rate, (ii) mobile
banking and ensuring intensive repayment, (iii) ensuring availability of savings
and insurance products, and (iv) provision of incentives to repay.
These features may have to be implanted onto the formal credit agencies,
especially co-operatives, which are mutilated version of SHGs. Small groups
can be formed within PACS, and each PACS can act as a federation of SHGs.
But the possible pace of expansion of the microfinance program over space and
possibility of extending it across formal rural financial institutions, viz. PACS
and RRBs are to be explored (Gulati and Bathla 2000).  Efforts of NGOs can
be streamlined to supplement the current system rather than substituting it. Simple
passing on the responsibilities of banking sector to NGOs may not add to the
overall advantage as institutionalizing the rated NGOs into rural banking as
independent agencies would do.
7
 Though no correlation has been found between the group approach and the success
of the programs (Mosely 2000; and Nair 2001), importance of the groups, especially on
caste lines, in the rural societies in tuning the individual’s social, political and economic
behavior cannot be ignored.  Here, homogeneity, especially in terms of common suffering
from poverty, can be the effective binding force.319 Microfinance in India
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V. M. Rao
1. Agrarian institutions are basis to the institutions supporting agriculture, and
therefore, concern on the waning interest in land reforms is legitimate.  As
a component in development strategy, land reforms are designed to play
multiple roles with focus on eradication of poverty.  I am confirming my
comments to the role they can play in adding thrust to the processes of
technological change in agriculture which is the theme of this seminar.
2. The adoption and assimilation of new technologies by farmers depend on
some critical requirements.  Viable farm size, security of tenancy tenure,
fair returns to farmers’ labor and other owned resources, access to credit
and modern inputs and dependable marketing facilities would be among the
important determinants of the farmers’ attitude towards new technologies.
Our strategy so far has been to combine land reforms— ceilings, regulation/
abolition of tenancy, fair reforms of tenancy for the tenant, consolidation of
holdings, requirement of self-cultivation— with research and extension,
cooperativization and reforms in credit and marketing.  This package had a
good impact in a few areas and pockets where agriculture has been dynamic,
but large parts of Indian agriculture benefited only partially or not at all.  Dr
Haque’s discussion of the success of land reforms in West Bengal and
Karnataka is very revealing.  But, it has also the implications that such
instances have been a few.  I believe that the cases of suicide by farmers
are indicator of local environments being unfriendly, if not hostile, to the
remunerative but risky enterprises and farmers are suffering as a
consequence.  Sadly, one suicide may serve to dissuade a score from
adopting new technologies and crops.
3. This suggests that land reforms would retain their relevance and importance
in the emerging policy regime for agriculture reflecting the new paradigm
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
P. K. Joshi and Raka Saxena)322 V M Rao
of liberalization and globalization.  Dr Haque has provided many clues to
the pressing need to rethink land reforms as a part of a package to promote
rapid technological change in liberalizing agriculture without harming the
poor.  As he has persuasively argued, what is needed is a new style of land
reforms consistent with processes like spread of contract farming, corporate
farming and reverse tenancy which are likely to gather momentum in the
coming years.
4. Without going into details, I enumerate the aspects of land reforms which
would deserve priority attention in the new policy regime:
● Legislation. Land reforms are notorious for litigation, causing long
delays, and injustice to the poor in implementation.  We should learn
from the past experiences to prepare better and quickly implementable
laws.
● Targetting.  In implementing land reforms, particular attention would
have to be paid to areas and social groups whose need for land reforms
is pressing.  The agricultural growth and development so far have given
rise to sharp differentiations within Indian agriculture.  These will have
to be borne in mind while prioritizing and focusing implementation of
land reforms.
● Packaging with other components. The precise content of land
reforms – permitting tenancy, relaxation of ceiling limits in specific
cases – needs to be decided in the light of institutional innovations in
other areas like credit, marketing and input supply.
● Indirect support to the poor. The presence of a large and extremely
vulnerable sections of population like small and marginal farmers and
agricultural laborers makes it difficult to regulate transactions like
tenancy contract between them and the rural elite.  Measures like
employment guarantee programs and public distribution system would
be essential to stabilize the position of the poor and to protect them
from exploitative practices.
● Political mobilization. The lower strata in rural communities are
gaining in political awareness all over India.  In some of the hard core
poverty areas like Bihar, the scheduled castes are reported to be in a
position to resist to some extent in coercion and violence practised
over a long past by the rural elite.323 Discussant’s Note
It is important to encourage such processes as they prepare the ground for
effective implementation of land reforms.
5. Essential prerequisites. Database and information system: It is necessary
to take note of the serious weaknesses in the availability of data on land-
related aspects. While devices like remote sensing provide a wealth of
information on the physical aspects such as presence of forests, extent and
degree of degradation, etc., the institutional aspects like distribution of holding,
and extent and types of tenancy, remain inadequately documented in the
principal sources of data like village records and the National Sample
Surveys.  It would be desirable to use the newer data gathering techniques
like participatory rural appraisal studies to improve information on institutional
aspects of land, including transaction in land market.
● Personnel. An important requirement of effective implementation of
land reforms is development of personnel at the grass-root level with
adequate support from the poor and vulnerable parts of rural
communities. These development personnel need to be adequately
trained and sensitized.
● Panchayati Raj institutions (PRIs). The fundamental institutional
change needed in rural communities to provide an environment favorable
for reforms and development is to have functional PRIs.  Without the
strong foundation provided by PRIs, it would be frustrating to promote
growth, modernization and equity in the rural society.  Measures like
land reforms would find it difficult to strike roots in the present state of
institutional vacuum at the grassroots level.Discussant’s Note
J. P. Mishra

chieving a rapid growth in agricultural lending has been one of the main
strategies of the Government of India for agricultural development, ever
since Independence.  This strategy was reinforced in 1969 with the nationalization
of banks.  Priority sector lending became the most important phrase among
commercial banks.  In 1975, a new dimension was added with the opening of
the Regional Rural Banks (RRBs).  Since then, priority sector lending got firmly
entrenched in India’s financial system. Agricultural lending by banks kept on
increasing in a phenomenal manner.  However, this phenomenon received a jolt
in 1990/91 when the Narsimham Committee recommended the financial sector
reforms in banks.  Adoption of prudential norms and profitability were strongly
recommended by this Committee.  The climate of agricultural lending had been
vitiated by the Debt Relief Scheme of the Government in 1990.  Willful defaulters
got away with non-repayment of loans.  Because of these developments, priority
sector lending and particularly, agricultural lending lost its prominence in the
banking circles.  The tempo of agricultural lending receded in commercial banks.
In the above context, new innovations in agricultural lending were necessary.
Micro-finance came quite handy.  It is a model of lending which is convenient to
all, i.e. banks, borrowers and the Government. The paper on micro-finance has
introduced the topic in a fitting manner.  He has elaborated the Self-Help Groups
(SHGs) and Self-Help Group Promoting Institutions (SHPIs).
Micro-finance in rural India has been promoted by the National bank for
Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD) since 1987. During the last
14 years, there have been changes in the approach and consequently,
three models, viz. (i) Bank-SHG-Members (without NGO intervention), (ii) Bank-
SHG with NGO or other SHPI (as facilitating agency) – Members, and
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conceptual clarity about the models presently in use in micro-finance in India.
The author has given an account of the progress made by the SHGs.  He
has elaborated on the credit provided through various types of organizations,
viz. commercial banks, RRBs and cooperative banks.  He has also brought out
regional and inter-state variations in the progress made through micro-finance.
He has discussed his paper under these two broad streams and these areas
deserve to be further probed and analyzed.
Firstly, we may take a look at the performance of SHGs.  The data regarding
disbursement are striking.  Per SHG disbursement is woefully small.  All the
SHGs (i.e. 94,645) combined together had disbursed only Rs. 1,929.7 millions
by the end of year 2000.  Per SHG disbursement works out to be Rs. 20,338,
which is too small.  It should be analyzed whether the amount provided to each
member is adequate or not.
Further, disbursements by each type of linkage should also be analyzed.
Three types of linkages have been mentioned in the paper, viz. (i) SHGs directly
linked with the banks, (ii) SHGs facilitated by NGO, and (iii) SHGs with NGO
as intermediaries.  The SHGs directly assisted by the banks have disbursed
larger amounts, than those facilitated by NGOs, and SHGs facilitated by NGOs
have disbursed more than those assisted with intermediary NGOs.  The
disbursement per SHG directly assisted by the banks worked out to be the
maximum (Rs 25,056) than those facilitated by NGOs (Rs 20,415) followed by
intermediary NGOs (Rs 16,189).
The study has brought out that regional variation in micro-finance in rural
India is quite pronounced.  The southern region accounted for 67 per cent of the
lending.  In the North and North-Eastern parts, the activities of SHGs are on the
lower side.
The above aspects of the study deserve to be further analyzed.  The utility
of micro-finance through SHGs is well established.  In the present era of the
financial sector reforms when the priority sector lending is the least preferred
item among commercial banks, micro-finance will help the rural people in a
significant manner.  The author has done a good job.  He would have still done
better had he mentioned some of the recommendations of the Task Force on
Supportive Policy and Regulatory Framework of Micro-finance set up by
NABARD which submitted its recommendations in 1999.




nstitutional framework for Indian agriculture needs critical review in terms
of both rules of the game and organizational structure.  This is more so for
the marketing segment of the agricultural sector.  This note outlines an analytical
framework for such a review.  The note has been divided into four parts.  The
first part introduces the concept of institution.  Some aspects of institutional
framework for the agricultural development in general and agricultural marketing
in particular, are discussed in the second and third sections.  Issues relating to
the alternatives in institutional framework for the agricultural marketing are
presented in the last section.
Understanding the Institutions
Institutions are generally understood as (a) rules of the game; and (b)
organizations.  Alternatively, institutions encompass (a) formal rules; (b) informal
contracts relating to norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of
conduct; and (c) enforcement characteristics of (a) and (b).
Institutions help in building the capacity of individuals through collective
action. But studies show that institutions, particularly enforcement characteristics,
are sometimes discriminatory and reduce the scope for capacity building of the
poor.  This is so because hierarchy in power relations inhibits change in rules.
Further, the linkage-dependent small institutions (like dairy cooperatives) have
less freedom to design and pursue their own goal.  Such an institutional framework
may produce perverse incentive for rural poor to benefit from free market and
trade.  It is in this context that we need (i) institutional innovations to make the
institutions redistributive in character (trade unions vs industrialists); and
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(ii) both formal and informal institutions, but eventually these should become
complementary to each other.
It needs to be recognized that both formal and informal institutions have
strengths and weaknesses.  For example, (a) formal institutions not rooted in
local culture may not bring the desired results (why cooperatives in certain
areas failed?); (b) large heterogeneity of members makes these institutional
dysfunctional; and (c) informal institutions often do not try to renovate by shedding
dysfunctional traditional practices in response to outside chnages.
Institutions (rules of game and organizations) can be discussed in the realm
of:
(i) Government sector institutions engaged in policy formulation, identification
of policy instruments and in their implementation;
(ii) Market sector: groups, associations (profit seeking); and
(iii) The third sector: non-profit seeking, voluntary or sponsored organizations.
The third sector has a distinct role and space in the context of government
failure and market failure.  The institutions and organizations in this sector can
succeed if they resist becoming the agents of government or fee-charging private
consultancy firms.
Institutional Changes for Agricultural Development
1) The changes in the institutional framework need to be examined in three
broad areas:
(i) Evolution, generation, perfection and transfer of technology – this
includes institutional framework of agricultural research and extension
initiatives/activities;
(ii) Provision of input and services including credit; and
(iii) Assurance of remunerative market environment.
2) Institutional framework for agricultural marketing should include the
institutions both for inputs and outputs.
3) As the institutions include both rules of the game and organizations,
agricultural marketing institutions can be grouped into: (a) government
sponsored; (b) open market related; and (c) institutions in the third sector –
informal, voluntary, participatory, mostly non-profit organisations like NGOs,
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4) Government-sponsored institutions influence the performance of the market-
related and the third sector institutions, which taken together determine the
nature of market structure, conduct and performance, and hence, the
efficiency of the marketing system.
The Institutional Framework for Agricultural Marketing
The institutional framework for agricultural marketing can be understood
as consisting of following broad groups or sets:
1. Institutions aimed at regulating the market conduct, structure and hence,
the performance (efficiency).  In the Indian context, these include:
(a) Regulation of primary agricultural produce markets; and
(b) Legal and regulatory provisions relating to storage, transportation,
packaging, processing, buying/selling and quality specifications.  The
specific institutions in this category are: State Agricultural Marketing
Board (SAMB), State Department of Agricultural Marketing (SDAM),
Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (APMC), Directorate of
Marketing and Inspection (DMI), Health Department, Civil Supplies
Departments of the Central and State Governments, etc.
2. Institutions aimed at providing and maintaining marketing infrastructure
include: (a) Physical infrastructure. Yards, roads, storage, cold storage,
telecommunications, market information, packaging material; and (b)
Institutional infrastructure. The institutions in this category are: SAMB,
APMC, Public Works Department (PWD), Food Corporation of India (FCI),
Central and State Warehousing Corporations and cooperatives.
3. Institutions involved in administered prices are: FCI, National Agricultural
Marketing Federation (NAFED), Cotton Corporation of India (CCI), Jute
Corporation of India (JCI), Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices
(CACP), State agencies, and Fair Price Shops (FPS).
4. Institutions entering the markets directly.  The institutions in this category
are some of the above plus commission agents, producers or consumer
cooperatives and processors.
5. Institutions influencing foreign trade (imports/exports). The institutions in
this category are lobbies or interest groups, Agricultural and Processed
Food Export Development Agency (APEDA) and several others includingforeign agencies promoting their products in the country.
In the context of changes in the economic environment, owing to the
liberalization, privatization and globalization initiatives, there is a need to review
the role as well as rationale of many components of the agricultural marketing
institutional framework evolved over the years.
Issues Relating to the Alternative Institutional
Framework (Third Sector)
In the event of state and market failure, the most important issue is how to
safeguard the welfare of small producers and poor consumers.  The attention
needs to be given to the reduction in the gross marketing margins (GMM).
There are three main components of GMM: (i) statutory charges (6 to 12 per
cent); (ii) net margins of intermediates (6-20 per cent); and (iii) real cost of
performing marketing functions (68 to 88 per cent).
The reduction in real cost of marketing would require increasing the scale
of operations and technological change in the marketing system. Certainly, small
farmers with low marketed surplus cannot do it.  The organized sector is,
therefore, coming in a big way whose share is now around 6 per cent and it is
predicted to go up to around 20 per cent by 2010.
In this context, there is a need for an institutional revolution to enable the
producer organizations with professional management to emerge in the scene.
We know that our experiences with cooperatives have been a mixed one.  Can
we think of farmers’ corporations to emerge in production as well as processing
and marketing of agricultural commodities?
Given the heterogeneity among the farming community, the individual’s stake
in the organization ought to be in proportion to his share in the business.
Implications of this form of institutional set up in agricultural marketing need
critical examination and serious debate.





gricultural marketing has assumed greater importance, especially in the
context of economic liberalization and globalization. The thrust right from
the ‘grow more food campaign’ through the Green Revolution period has been
to increase agricultural production, posing the first generation problems of
marketing.  Commercial production, shifting cropping patterns, increasing
domestic and international trade and growing market intervention have led to
increased marketed surplus, resulting in the second generation problems.  The
increased surpluses together with higher demand for non-conventional commercial
inputs have put greater pressure on the existing marketing system and have
exposed the inadequacies.  Today, marketing has become a serious constraint
both in the sale of agricultural products, and supply of crucial inputs.  Despite
major market interventions and support by the Government, efficiency of the
marketing system continues to be a matter of concern.
Government in developing countries is realizing the importance of the
marketing institutions as a stimulating and dynamic force in agriculture.  In
India, through a series of marketing reforms, a number of institutions have been
established from time to time to keep pace with the expanding and changing
needs of agricultural sector. This paper reviews the institutional developments
in agricultural marketing in the country and assesses their efficiency and adequacy
in the present economic and agricultural scenario.
Establishment of the Regulated Markets
The idea of regulating markets for agricultural produce was first conceived
towards the end of the 19th century when the first agricultural market at Karanja
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was regulated in 1896 in the former Hyderabad State. Thereafter, a special law
known as the “Cotton and Grain Market Law”, was enacted in the year 1897 in
the Berar region, then known as the Hyderabad Assigned District. The efforts
made until 1915 in the direction of establishing additional regulated markets
were mostly sporadic. Subsequently, based on the recommendations of the Indian
Central Cotton Committee (1917) and Royal Commission on Agriculture (1928),
various provinces and states enacted Acts for the establishment of the markets
in the country.
Before Independence, market legislation was in force in Bombay (1927),
Central Province (1932, 1935), Mysore (1939), Punjab (1941) and Patiala (1947).
After starting the planning era, the Planning Commission emphasized the vital
role played by the regulated markets and urged the states to enact suitable acts,
keeping in view the fact that agriculture is a state subject in the constitution. As
a result, there are now 25 Regulated Market Acts in vogue in the country covering
most of the states. However, the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Sikkim,
Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram and Union Territories of Andaman and Nicobar,
Dadar and Nagar Haveli and Lakshdweep are yet to enact such an act.
History of market regulation in India reveals that the establishment of
regulated markets was not intended at creating an alternate marketing system,
but to create the conditions for improving the efficiency of the private trade
through free and fair competition. Thus, a regulated market is one that aims at
eliminating unhealthy and unscrupulous practices, reducing marketing charges
and providing facilities to producer-sellers in the market. The main aim, therefore,
is to establish an orderly marketing system. In the changing scenario of
agricultural production, an assessment of the performance of regulated markets
has become imminent. It is necessary to discuss issues such as whether the
specific objectives for which they were established, have been achieved.
Whether the producers have been benefited? Whether the markets are
competitive in their functioning? What changes are necessary to keep pace
with the liberalization and globalization? Is there a need to amend the existing
market regulation Act? An attempt has been made in this section to answer
these questions.
Constitution of the regulated markets
        The regulated markets all over the country function on democratic principles
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(APMC), represented by farmers, traders, representatives from marketing and
processing co- operatives and warehouses and officials drawn from the marketing
and other departments. The APMC consists of 15 to 17 members and is
responsible for the enforcement of the rules and regulations framed under the
APMC Act.  However, a wide variation is seen in the composition of the APMC
in different states.
        According to Section 10 of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing
(Regulation) [KAPM (R)] Act of 1966, the APMC consists of 15 members –11
elected by the agriculturists in the market area (one of them should be a woman)
and two persons belonging to the schedule castes and schedule tribes. Besides,
one member each shall be elected by the traders and co-operative agricultural
processing societies carrying business within the market area. In addition, there
shall be an officer not below the rank of the Secretary of the concerned APMC
nominated by the Director of Agricultural Marketing. Further, according to
Section 41 of the KAPM (R) Act, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman shall be
from the members representing agricultural constituencies. Thus, the Act has
ensured representation of all those concerned with the APMC. However, in
many states such provisions do not exist, and the elections are not held regularly.
In view of the devolution of powers to the panchayats, inclusion of their
representative in APMC is relevant. Also, the secretary of APMC is an official
appointed by the government who is responsible for the day-to-day functioning
of the market. The pros and cons of making the secretary as member secretary
of the APMC may be given a careful consideration.
Functioning of the Regulated Markets
Number and area covered by the regulated markets
At the time of Independence, there were only 250 regulated markets in the
country, which increased to 6,836 by 1995. However, it is noteworthy that nearly
98 per cent of the wholesale assembly markets have been regulated in the
country.
In most of the market regulation acts, there is a provision to establish one
regulated market in each taluka. However, as seen from the number of markets,
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of Karnataka, which is known for its progressiveness in agriculture and
generation of marketable surplus, there exists only three main markets for the
whole district. The area covered by a regulated market varies from state to
state. It is 902 sq km in Rajasthan, 833 sq km in Madhya Pradesh, 574 sq km in
Gujarat, 484 sq km in Karnataka, 480 sq km in Andhra Pradesh, 171 sq km in
Haryana and 76 sq km in Punjab. The National Commission on Agriculture
(1976) had recommended establishment of one market at a radius of 5 km.
Similarly, the Agricultural Production Team of the Ford Foundation (1951) also
suggested that a market with a distance reached by bullock cart will help the
farmers to get remunerative price for their products. Thus, the area covered by
the regulated markets is too inadequate and there is a need to establish more
number of markets. We could probably reach somewhere near these
recommendations if nearly 26,930 rural markets are established in the country.
In the process, amalgamation of markets to make them economically viable has
to be kept in mind.
Coverage of agricultural commodities
The number of commodities notified for regulation varied from a minimum
of three in Kerala to as many as 54 in Andhra Pradesh. In Karnataka, the
commodities regulated are called notified commodities whose number varies
from market to market. There are provisions for establishment of special
commodity markets in most of the Acts. For example, according to the KAPM
(R) Act 1966, commodity markets can be established for cattle, sheep, fish,
fruits or any other commodity notified by the government (Section 96). However,
so far, only one such market, viz. fruit and vegetable market has been established
in Bangalore city.
The arrival of agricultural produce in the regulated markets is on the increase
but it is not keeping pace with the growth in the marketed surplus. For example,
foodgrains handled at the regulated markets in Karnataka formed 9 per cent of
the total production in 1983/84 which increased to 24.05 per cent in 1987/88 and
to 28 per cent in 1997/98. The marketed surplus for foodgrains is estimated at
around 40 per cent of the production, indicating that a substantial part of trade
takes place outside the purview of the regulation. Chand (1999) also observed
growing tendency to sell produce through informal markets.  However, there is
no point in compelling the producers to bring their produce to the market yard.335 Institutional Aspects of Agricultural Marketing
Ideally, farmers should be attracted to transact their produce at the market yard
by making the marketing system more convenient and efficient. There has been
some kind of experimentation is the form of agent-less markets or Apni Mandi,
which are controlled by farmers associations rather than by the market
committees. It is time that we should assess performance of these models and
if found efficient, replicate them for the benefit of farmers.
Role of commission agents
The hub of activities of a regulated market is the market yard that is a
statutory area where sellers of notified commodities bring their produce for
sale. According to the KAPM (R) Act, producers bring their produce to the
premises of a commission agent who arranges for sale of the commodity under
the supervision of the market committee. Even though, the commission agents
are responsible for the display, sale, storage and payment immediately after
sale, yet the farmers undergo a lot of problems in realizing their sale proceeds.
Also, it has become a practice for the commission agents to collect the commission
charges both from sellers and buyers, even though the producers are exempted
from paying the same as per the regulated acts of most of the states. The
commission agent perhaps gains more control through money lending operations.
By offering loans, commission agents compel farmers to sell their produce through
them only. In the process, the producers not only lose their bargaining power for
a better price but are also made to pay exorbitant interest on loan. The recent
introduction of pledge loan scheme by the regulated market committee in a few
states will certainly help the farmers.
Infrastructural facilities at the regulated markets
Success of the market committee in implementation of the Act depends
upon the proper location of the market yard and facilities provided for efficient
conduct of market transactions. The provision of facilities such as market yard,
office building, godowns, shops, water supply, weighing platform, farmer guest
house, cattleshed, bank and cafeteria are mostly seen in the bigger regulated
markets. The absence of these facilities is common in the smaller markets. The
Indian Standards Institution (ISI) and Market Planning and Design Cell of the
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regulated market. The absence of facilities for handling and location of markets
away from the business centers have contributed greatly for trade taking place
outside the regulated markets.
Thus, there is an urgent need to develop necessary facilities either from the
resources of the market committee, borrowing funds from the market or
government support. The provision of facilities will improve the physical efficiency
greatly. Some market committees have adequate funds collected as market fee,
license fee and rent on godowns, shops and canteen. For example, the amount
stood at Rs 600 millions in Karnataka in 1998/99. However, there is no
comprehensive long-term plan for market development, resulting in a slow growth
and poor performance of the markets.
Competition at the regulated markets
Competition is the key element for assuring fair prices for the farmers’
produce in the regulated markets. The empirical results concerning
competitiveness of regulated markets have suggested that the performance varied
not only from market to market but also from commodity to commodity (Sujata
et al. 1989). Most of the studies have shown that the markets for foodgrains and
commercial crops are fairly competitive, as compared to those for perishables
(Lele 1971; Moore et al. 1973; Thakur et al. 1988; Subrahmanyam 1988; and
Bhalla 1991). The studies have also shown that the terminal markets located in
metropolitans and big cities have huge turnover and exert considerable influence
on the price formation that has a bearing on the final price received by farmers
in other states. The results also show that there exists high degree of market
integration in the long run (Cummings et al. 1967; George 1973; Jasdanwala
1966; and Thakur 1974). Further, such markets provide price signaling to other
markets, and therefore, it is necessary to identify them to develop by providing
modern market technology. The management of such markets may have to be
different from that of other regulated markets.
One of the main achievements of the market regulation is rationalization of
market charges and control of unauthorized deductions from sale proceeds.
However, instances of unfair practices (e.g. short weighment, higher charges
for the services, etc.) and delay in the payments are still common. To overcome
these problems, the collection of market fee from the purchasers (traders),
provision of the services of weighman through the market committee and337 Institutional Aspects of Agricultural Marketing
payments through bank have been introduced in some markets. It is necessary
to follow these practices uniformly in all the regulated markets. The possibility
of keeping away the intermediaries from the producers has been practised in
cocoon markets in Karnataka with the market committee rendering these
services. Such attempts merit serious consideration for their replication.
Directorate of Agricultural Marketing and State
Agricultural Marketing Board
Based on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agriculture
and the Central Banking Enquiry Committee, a central Department of Agricultural
Marketing was created in 1934.  Later, it was named as the Directorate of
Marketing and Inspection (DMI) in 1958.  The DMI was a separate department
under the Ministry of Rural Areas and Employment, but it was shifted to the
Ministry of Agriculture recently. Agriculture being a state subject, most of the
state governments have also created a separate directorate for agricultural
marketing. This department is entrusted with the responsibility of implementing
the provisions of the APMC Act.
The Directorate of Agricultural Marketing is attached to the Agricultural
Secretariat in some states, while in others, it is attached to the Ministry of Rural
Development or Co-operation. A uniform structure with the directorate forming
a part of agriculture secretariat could be more meaningful to bring the production
and marketing under a single entity.
There is also a provision for the establishment of State Agricultural Marketing
Board in most of the Acts (e.g. Section 100 of KAPM (R) Act). These Boards
came into existence to speed up the market development programs by acting as
a central agency. In the states of Punjab and Harayana, the board is vested with
the powers of market regulation, whereas in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra
Pradesh and Orissa, this is merely an advisory or promotional body. The board
is very active in Maharashtra and has implemented many programs for the
benefit of farmers. In Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, the board
is performing the developmental function, and the department does the regulatory
function. In this context, it is necessary to debate the form and function of the
Agricultural Marketing Boards, keeping in view the ongoing changes in the
marketing system of the country.338 P G Chengappa
Regulation of Rural Markets
Rural markets have an important role to play as an institution of rural
development. Income of many farmers, especially small and marginal farmers,
is decided by the process prevailing in these markets. There are 26,930 rural
markets in the country. A survey of these markets has indicated that about 25
per cent of agricultural production is being handled by the regulated markets
and the remaining trade is confined to rural or village markets. Hiremath et al.
(1987) reported that in northern Karnataka, a majority of small farmers (59 to
67 per cent) disposed their produce (Jowar) in rural markets, which accounted
for 75 to 79 per cent of their marketed surplus. These markets, however, lack
basic amenities and infrastructural facilities for handling the produce. Besides,
the control of some rural markets is vested with charitable organizations,
municipalities and panchayats. Rural markets in Karnataka are under the
dual control of panchayats and APMCs, sharing the income on 3:1 basis. In
some states (like Punjab), sale in the village is completely banned and all
transactions should take place in the Mandi that are under the purview of the
regulation.
Whether regulation of rural markets amounts to regulating the retail trade?
If so, is it desirable, and what should be appropriate controlling authority? Also,
whether all rural markets can be converted into sub-markets of the main markets
for making them viable? These questions need in-depth analysis for making
rural markets viable and efficient with greater access for small and marginal
farmers. The possibility of involvement of the zilla/taluk committees or
panchayats in the development and management of these markets should also
be examined.
Future role
The regulated markets have been functioning in India for more than a century
and have come to stay as an effective tool for assuring a fair deal to producer-
sellers. The primary objective of regulating marketing is to prevent and eliminate
malpractices. Though this is important, it must be recognized that this is essentially
a policing function and not a marketing function (Dandekar 1994). All these
years, the regulated markets have concentrated only on streamlining the selling
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marketing functions such as processing, market finance, packaging,
transportation, market extension, market information and intelligence have not
been given due attention. The emerging scenario of globalization coupled with
high market competition, calls for performing these functions by the regulated
markets if they have to survive. Without any collective effort by farmers to sell
their produce on their own, the regulated model will continue to play a vital role
in marketing of agricultural produce. However, there is a need to reform the
regulated markets as farmers’ markets and upgrade their capability to perform
varied marketing functions to improve the marketing efficiency. To achieve
these objectives, the market regulations should be made more flexible with less
of government control and more of farmers’ participation.
Co-operatives in Agricultural Marketing
Co-operative marketing was developed as an antidote to the treacheries
that existed in our traditional marketing system.  The co-operative marketing
societies have been organized on a two-tier structure in all the states.  The
primary society, the Taluka Agricultural Produce Co-operative Marketing Society
Ltd. (TAPCMS) operates at the Mandi or regulated market level, functioning
both as trader and commission agent.  These societies are federated at the state
level as the State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd. (SCMF) and at the
national level as the National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation
Ltd. (NAFED).
There are 6,872 primary marketing co-operatives (2,933 general and 3,939
specialized/commodity), 191 district/central level, 51 (including 22 specialized)
state level co-operatives marketing federations. The NAFED and the Tribal
Cooperative Federation (TRIFED) are two national-level apex co-operatives
involved in the marketing of agricultural produce.  In addition, some Primary
Agricultural Co-operative Societies (PACSs), Large Multipurpose Cooperative
Societies (LAMPSs) (2,734) and Farmer Service Societies (FSSs) (1858) are
also engaged in agricultural marketing. Activities of these societies comprise
outright purchase, procurement on behalf of the Government for the Food
Corporation of India (FCI) or State Civil Supplies Corporation, processing, supply
of agricultural requisites, distribution of consumer goods, and providing services
such as storage, transportation and grading.  It is observed that nearly one-third340 P G Chengappa
of these co-operatives are not performing purchase and sale of agricultural
produce, but are concentrating on distribution of inputs and essential commodities.
A study in Karnataka (Chengappa and Sashidhara 1999) indicated that the share
of agricultural commodities handled by these co-operatives in their business
was low (16 per cent) when compared to agricultural requisites (23 per cent)
and consumer goods (61 per cent).  It is distressing to note that the number of
societies engaged in sale of produce of their members is on the decline.  This
kind of shift in the composition of trade from agricultural produce to consumer
goods is not a healthy sign in the interest of producer members.  Further, the
quantity handled by these co-operatives on ownership basis was too meager,
and most of them acted as commission agents, facilitating transaction between
member producers and traders.
The credit and pledge loan facilities extended by the marketing co-operatives
are too little, indicating their failure to prevent distress sales by farmers.  The
capital base of these societies is weak and they largely depend upon heavy
borrowings.  This shows that the marketing co-operatives can achieve only
limited turnover in their business. The business performance of these co-
operatives indicates that nearly 40 per cent of them have incurred loss and their
number is increasing over the years.
To improve the functioning of these co-operatives, the All India Rural
Credit Survey Committee (1951) made a significant recommendation of
linking credit with marketing.  However, it is observed that hardly 13 per cent of
the PACSs are engaged in such activities (Chengappa and Sashidhara 1999).
The Dantwala Committee (1964) reviewed the whole system and suggested
switching over to a two-tier co-operative system instead of the three-tier system,
and undertaking supply function in addition to agricultural marketing and
distribution.
Thus, it is amply clear that marketing co-operatives have contributed very
little as an alternate channel in marketing the produce of member farmers.
There is a need to redesign these co-operatives to meet the emerging challenges,
especially in the context of new economic environment.  In this context, the
following suggestions are worth considering:
The marketing co-operatives should practice “member first” model rather
than “value first” model.  These co-operatives should primarily concentrate in
performing various marketing functions such as assembling, grading, pooling,
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even export of agricultural commodities rather than merely performing the “agent”
function.  This will help in realizing value addition and economies of scale, thereby
maximizing return to producer members.
The production scenario with commercialization of agriculture would
necessitate more of market finance, which is hardly met by the institutional
sources.  The provision of credit on the basis of pledge loan would go a long
way in realizing remunerative prices by farmers.
There is a substantial wastage/loss of agricultural produce at farm level
because of poor post-harvest management.  The improved technology has to be
applied in the field at post-harvest level to prevent losses and doing value addition.
This would entail establishing cold chains consisting of pre-cooling units,
refrigerated transport, establishment of cold storage at production as well as
consuming centers, etc., especially for perishables, such as fruits and vegetables.
This is particularly important for the globalization of agriculture and improving
access to rapidly expanding international markets for agri-horti exports. The
marketing co-operatives in Maharashtra have demonstrated this.  NAFED is
also doing export to the extent of Rs 3.3 billion (1993/94).  However, most of it
is in the form of canalized exports.  In the liberalized era, the scope for canalized
exports is limited.  Marketing co-operatives have now to compete with private
exporters.
Due to the de-licensing policy, co-operatives have lost the advantage of
government preference hitherto enjoyed by them, and the private sector is
emerging in a big way. The debt-equity ratio has been raised to 50:50 for
co-operative spinning mills, making it difficult for them to raise the funds.
The co-operatives have been depending for equity on the National Co-operative
Development Council (NCDC) and state governments.  These sources are
also facing resource crunch, making the position of co-operatives still more
difficult.
The basic structure of co-operatives is being subjected to a change so as to
facilitate them to raise funds for their business, and efficient performance.  In
this direction, the formation of “co-operative companies” has been mooted initially
by amending the Multistate Co-operative Societies Act.  If this is effected, co-
operatives, especially the large sized co-operatives engaged in marketing such
as the Central Arecanut Co-operative Marketing and Processing Co-operative
(CAMPCO), will be able to do the business efficiently on corporate lines, as
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model, the co-operatives will have the option to register as a co-operative or as
a co-operative company.  This would provide the much needed autonomy to the
co-operatives with less government control.
Warehouses
The warehousing for agricultural commodities is mainly undertaken by public
sector agencies, such as the Central Warehousing Corporation (CWC), the State
Warehousing Corporation (SWC) and FCI.  Besides, co-operatives also provide
the warehousing facilities to its members.  The installed capacity of FCI stood
at 18.6 million tonnes, CWC at 6.4 million tonnes, and SWC 1.0 million tonnes in
1991. It was envisaged to enhance the storage capacity of co-operatives to 8.0
million tonnes by the end of the IX Plan under the scheme of National Grid of
Rural Godowns.  Thus, the total installed capacity of warehouses would be 34
million tonnes. Besides, there are 3,253 cold storages, with an installed capacity
of about 8.7 million tonnes (1995/96).  However, the concept of warehousing
has not caught up with farmers. It is found that the input manufacturers and
traders make use of warehousing facilities more than that by farmers.  The
warehouse receipt, which is a negotiable instrument, can be pledged by the
farmers to avail loan up to 75 per cent of the value of the commodity.  However,
most farmers are not aware of the services provided by the warehouses.  Hence,
there is a need to educate farmers on the benefits of warehousing.  The central
government has taken steps to provide greater role for the private sector in (by
de-licensing) storage of agricultural commodities by repealing the Cold Storage
Order of 1964.  This is a step in the right direction, and some private cold
storages have already emerged in certain states.  However, the growth of private
cold storages to create a “cold chain” for linking production and consumption
centers is yet to emerge.
In the central budget of 1999/2000, a credit-linked subsidy scheme for the
construction of cold storages for perishable commodities was announced. So
far, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and
NCDC have provided Rs 1610 million as credit for creation of additional capacity
of 0.97 million tonnes.  A subsidy of Rs 780 million has been provided during
2000/01 for setting of cold storages.  The scheme is also extended to cover rural
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available to individuals, co-operatives and others.  In addition, it is also proposed
that the NABARD would reduce its interest rate for funding storage of crop
products from 10 per cent to 8.5 per cent, so that it will benefit small farmers by
avoiding distress sales of their produce.
Commodity Boards and Corporations
The commodity boards and corporations are essentially producer-oriented
organizations performing broad range of functions, starting from production to
marketing, including export of specific crop produces. To organize commercial
production and marketing of selected commodities, such as coffee, tea, rubber,
cotton, tobacco and spices, the Government of India constituted the commodity
committees from time to time which were later converted into boards and
corporations. The approach of these institutions is commodity-specific with
emphasis on the promotion of exports.  These boards are basically classified
into trading and non-trading boards.  Many boards have dispensed with trading
functions because of inherent problems faced by them like other public sector
organizations.  For example, the Coffee Board — an organization performing
monopoly trading functions since its inception in 1942 — was forced by the
growers to divest its marketing functions mainly due to inefficiency in its
operations.  Since then, the Board has concentrated on research and development.
Most commodity boards in our country such as the Tea Board and the Spices
Board, carry out promotional activities. Others, such as the Rubber Board and
the Tobacco Board, are only regulatory in nature.
The economic liberalization has raised apprehensions regarding the
functioning and existence of these boards.  Unless they change and adapt by
way of redefining their new role, their survival will be jeopardized.  In the process,
some boards may have to be phased out and others revamped to meet the
emerging challenges.
Commodity Exchanges
Commercialization of agriculture has necessitated linking the domestic
markets with the global market.  This has made it imperative to have formal344 P G Chengappa
commodity contracts to spread the risks among various market players.
Commodity exchanges for futures trading narrows the marketing, storage and
processing margins, thereby benefiting both growers and consumers.  Many
studies have shown that future trading also smoothens operation of different
marketing functions by reducing risks, thereby increasing the marketing efficiency
to the benefit of all. The future markets also complement the working of spot
markets.  Currently, futures trading is permitted in 10 commodities.  The Kabra
Committee (GOI 1994) has suggested the extension of futures trading in 17
other commodities. There is a definite case for introducing future trading in
other commodities, provided they fulfil the requisite conditions.
Farmers Associations
The farmers associations are similar to those of co-operatives but are not
under the purview of co-operative laws.  There are a number of problems in
marketing under the umbrella of co-operative legislation. These farmers
associations are registered organizations enjoying a lot of flexibility in the
enrolment of members, raising funds, and carrying out the chartered activities
following plural management process.  There is less scope for government
intervention in their functioning.  The accounts of associations are audited by
any charted accountant and not by the co-operative audit department.  The
experience of the Maharashtra Grape Growers’ Association selling grapes under
the banner of MAHAGRAPES has achieved great success with active
participation of the members.  This model is being copied in other states like
Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.  If right type of incentives are provided, farmers
associations will succeed in a big way because of the cohesiveness in the group.
In the wake of the withdrawal of the state from the scene, the producers
associations are considered to be an alternative to the public sector undertakings
engaged in agri-business.
Contract Farming
The contract system of agricultural production and marketing is
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activities.  The companies involved in the processing and export trade face lot
of problems in resourcing the raw material.  They are unable to practise captive
farming since there are lot of restrictions, e.g. land ceiling. The labor problem
also discourages them to go for large-scale cultivation.  To overcome these
problems, these firms resort to ‘contract farming’, wherein they supply the planting
material and provide the required credit and extension support to ensure organized
supply of standard quality material.  The firm procures the produce at a pre-
determined price.  It is beneficial to farmers as they are assured of both price
and sale of their produce. They also get the required inputs and technical know-
how from the firms.
The system of contract farming was first introduced by the seed
companies.  The experiences of Pepsi and Hindustan Lever in Punjab and
Gherkin and baby corn production in Bangalore by a few companies,
have indicated that both the contracting parties have been largely
benefited.  Although there are problems relating to violation of the contract by
farmers and corporates not paying the agreed price and rejecting material due
to low quality, the model appears to be successful with vast scope for its
replication.
Other Initiatives
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs have close contact with
farming community and are well aware of their problems.  In the recent times,
some NGOs have entered into marketing of farm produce, especially organic
food.  The Eco-net, an NGO in Karnataka, is directly involved in the marketing
of organically produced foodgrains, fruits and vegetables. NGOs can be
encouraged in other states to help the farmers in marketing their produce in a
better way.
Ryot bazar/apna mandi (farmers’ market). The concept of farmers’ market
was advocated by Johl (1989), and the Punjab Agricultural Marketing Board
started it as “Apna Mandi.”  Now on experimental basis, ryot bazars or apna
mandis are being set up in some states so that farmers can sell their produce
directly to consumers.  Conceptually, the system appears ideal due to the absence
of middlemen. The experiences in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are quite
encouraging and more markets are being setup mainly for the benefit of small346 P G Chengappa
and marginal farmers. However, it has some limitations, especially when the
marketable surpluses are large.
Conclusions
India has a long history of regulating the agricultural markets. The
regulated market model is in vogue for more than a century and this model
will continue for many more years.  So far, the efforts have been to regulate
the trading practices, especially buying and selling and to some extent,
standardization and grading.  In the liberalized era, the paradigm of agricultural
marketing is changing and hence the emphasis should be on the performance of
all marketing functions. The competitiveness of the agricultural markets can
be sharpened by providing required infrastructure, price transmission and
policy support.
The rural markets have remained outside the purview of the regulation and
as such, lack basic marketing amenities.  There is a need to develop these
markets and link them with the wholesale and terminal markets.  In the process,
the role of the panchayat raj institutions should also be examined.
It is revealed that the dimensions and magnitude of agricultural marketing
institutions are changing.  Co-operative marketing has been successful partially
and can be impressed further, provided a favorable environment is created through
a change in the co-operative policy.  New marketing institutions, such as farmers’
associations, NGOs and ryot bazars, emerging in certain pockets, are yet to
make a visible dent.  Contract marketing and futures trading in selected
commodities have been advocated to link the domestic and international markets.
By and large, it is clear that there is lack of farmers’ participation in the
management and regulation of market institutions. The government support has
been counter-productive and restrictive in true decentralized functioning of these
institutions.
Considering the persistent financial crunch faced by the government, one
cannot foresee an increase in public investment for the development of market
infrastructure.  Therefore, the government should come out with a comprehensive
policy framework to encourage private investment under the systems of ‘build,
own and operate’ (BOO), ‘build, own, operate and transfer’ (BOOT), etc. for
the development of rural marketing infrastructure.347 Institutional Aspects of Agricultural Marketing
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nstitutional intervention of some kind in agricultural marketing and trade in
India has a long history.  The strongest intervention began in the mid-1960s,
which has been very closely associated with the adoption and spread of the
new agricultural technology. Massive food shortages and near famine-like
conditions in some parts of the country due to successive poor harvests
resulted into dependence on food aid and costly food imports. This compelled
the government to follow the policy of self-sufficiency in food production. This
coincided with the advent of the high yielding varieties of wheat and rice,
which later came to be known as the ‘green revolution’. Adoption of these new
varieties involved use of modern inputs and investments on the part of the farmers.
For this, it was necessary to create adequate incentives through favorable price
environment for the farmers. To achieve this objective, two new institutions,
namely the Agricultural Prices Commission (APC) and the Food Corporation
of India (FCI) were created which have been dominating India’s food
administration ever since their establishment (Broca 1999). Subsequently,
the government intervention has been expanded in terms of coverage of
commodities, institutions and regulatory measures. This paper reviews
various kinds of institutional interventions in agricultural marketing and trade
since the mid-1960s, which marks the beginning of technological revolution in
Indian agriculture. It also discusses the institutional change needed to maximize
gains from technological change in the context of liberalization of economic
environment.
1
 This paper draws heavily from the references listed at the end, particularly the work of
Dr  S  S  Acharya.
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Administered Prices
To encourage the adoption of new technology, stable and remunerative
prices constitute the foremost factor. The Government of India has set up APC
in 1965 to advise the government on a regular basis for evolving a balanced
and integrated price structure. While formulating such a policy, the Commission
was required to keep in view (a) the need to provide incentive to the producers
for adopting the new technology and maximizing production, and (b) likely
effect of the price policy on cost of living, level of wages and industrial cost
structure.  This policy was very effective in encouraging adoption of new
technology in the areas well endowed with irrigation, and helped in raising the
production of wheat and rice. This made the situation on foodgrain front
comfortable, as a sort of balance between demand and supply which was in
sight by 1980 (Acharya 2001).
With the easing of pressure on foodgrain production, it was appropriate to
follow the policy that leads to balanced allocation of resources towards various
enterprises. Thus, terms of reference of the APC were changed in 1980 to shift
emphasis from maximizing the production to developing a production pattern
consistent with overall need of the economy.  The Commission was also renamed
as the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), mainly to satisfy
the demand from farmer groups that the Commission should fully account
for the cost of production while making recommendations on support/procurement
prices.
Looking at the achievement of the policy of administered prices in relation
to the target set for it, following conclusion seems evident. The price policy has
been very successful in providing incentive for adoption of new technology of
rice and wheat as set out initially, but it failed to induce changes in production
pattern consistent with overall needs of the economy. This happened as both the
price policy and technological change remained biased towards rice and wheat.
A simple indicator of this is that while the country is now having buffer stock
exceeding one-third of total output of rice and wheat, it is deficit in edible oil to
the extent of more than 40 per cent and in pulses to the extent of 6-10 per cent.
Policy instrument and commodity coverage
The most significant instrument of agricultural price policy has been
assurance of minimum support price (MSP) which serves as a surety to farmers.351 Agricultural Marketing and Trade in India
If the market price falls below the MSP or the guaranteed level, the government
is under obligation to procure the produce offered for sale at the guaranteed
price. Commodities covered under the MSP system are: paddy (rice), wheat,
sorghum, pearl millet, finger millet, maize, ragi, barley, chick pea, pigeon pea,
moong, urad, rapeseed and mustard, toria, groundnut, sunflower, soybean,
sesamum, nigerseed, cotton, jute, copra and tobacco, while sugarcane is covered
under the statutory minimum price (SMP) system. It is illegal for anybody to
purchase the commodity at a price less than the MSP when the commodity is
covered under the system of (SMP). Apart from major commodities, support
price has been extended to some other commodities like onion, ginger,
potato, castor seed, and some fruits in a few states under the market intervention
scheme.
It is pertinent here to mention that mere announcement of MSP or SMP
does not automatically guarantee that market price would not fall below MSP or
SMP. According to various Reports of the Commission for Agricultural Costs
and Prices, there are instances of market prices ruling below MSP in some
markets for certain crops where government procurement agencies were absent
to procure the produce. The experience shows that institutional intervention in
ensuring the guaranteed price is effective only in those regions and crops where
government or public sector agencies procure the produce in a big way. For
instance, official agencies procure wheat and paddy in Punjab and Haryana on
a large scale, and if the price of maize or sunflower in these states falls below
the MSP, there is hardly any procurement by the official agencies. Similarly, if
wheat price in the market say in West Bengal or Bihar, falls below the MSP,
there is no intervention by the official agencies.  The purpose of these illustrations
is to bring home the point that MSP without an effective procurement
mechanism does not guarantee that prices would not fall below the floor set by
the government.
Implementation of MSP shows that rice and wheat are the main
beneficiaries of the policy while cotton, at large and edible oilseeds and pulses,
in some pockets, have also benefited from the policy. In recent years, there
have been frequent reports from the states of Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and
Bihar about distress sale of rice and maize below the MSP. These states, besides
being late adopter of new technology and food deficit at aggregate state level,
have several growth pockets with surplus foodgrains. These pockets are in the
first stage of green revolution and agricultural development, when the private
trade and market institutions are not in place to provide incentive to encourage352 Ramesh Chand
adoption of new technology and hence, accelerate output growth. Agriculture
growth would get a serious setback in such areas if institutional support in the
form of guaranteed price is not provided.
One of the serious criticisms of the price support policy has been that it has
mainly benefited rice and wheat and, even in these crops, it has favored the
regions which were early adopter of the new technology. There is a need to
discuss how MSP can be made effective in various commodities and in major
producing regions. As it is not feasible to ensure that prices would not fall below
MSP in any commodity, can we devise some criteria as to what crops should be
covered under MSP? It is suggested that the crops which can be considered as
price leader or the crops for which technological breakthrough is imminent
ought to be covered under the MSP, and other candidates for support price
could be the crops grown in high risk environment (Vyas 2000). Vyas further
adds that in all these cases, MSP should be treated as a transient measure, i.e.
until we are able to have a viable crop insurance scheme and/or forward trading
arrangements.
Due to changes taking place in consumption basket of food, there is a lot of
emphasis to develop technologies that promote diversification of agriculture
sector. Can we think of price interventions that encourage agricultural
diversification? There is also a need to discuss criteria on which MSP should be
based in the changing context. The popular perception is that MSP is determined
based on cost of production. When the emphasis of production is shifting from
food security to market-led production, is it justified to base MSP on the cost of
production. Further, there are concerns relating to definition of the cost of
production on which MSP should be based. Some of the cost concepts like
“Cost C3” are such that the price based on those is said to represent “guaranteed
profitable price” rather than “minimum support price”.
Direct Price and Market Interventions
According to Acharya (2001), direct market intervention refers to
direct entry of public agencies in market with a view to influence market
structure, conduct and performance. Some of the forms of direct market
intervention currently in vogue in India are: (i) maintenance of stock of rice
and wheat, (ii) distribution of cereals and sugar at prices lower than market353 Agricultural Marketing and Trade in India
prices, and (iii) open market operations (procurement and sale) by the public
agencies.
To ensure implementation of the guaranteed price or MSP, stabilize prices
and feed the public distribution system (PDS), government procures large
quantities of foodgrains through FCI and other official agencies from market at
the procurement price, which is invariably same as the MSP. This blurring of
MSP and procurement price has come under severe criticism. It is argued that
in order to procure the required quantities for PDS and buffer stock, such market
conditions are created wherein prices are artificially forced down to the level of
procurement prices by the measures like putting stock limit, denial of credit, not
making available railway wagons to private sector for transport of foodgrains
and restrictions on movement of commodities (Johl 1995). The second
consequence of this is that government is forced to buy whatever produce comes
in the market, irrespective of its requirements.  Thus, the government has to
carry excessive stock which is again sold back after some time through free
sale in the market.  In this process, the government has to bear the losses due to
quantity and quality deterioration and inefficient handling and transportation of
the produce by the public agencies. It is thus argued that the procurement
price and MSP should be different.  Under this kind of dispensation, the
government should announce MSP which covers only the variable cost plus a
small margin and protect farmer against seasonal price slumps due to gluts.
The procurement of foodgrains required by government should be done at open
market price determined by supply and demand in a distortion free environment.
This would have the advantage of buying only the needed quantity, whereas,
currently the government has been buying whatever is offered for sale (Mahendra
Dev 1997).
Foodgrains procured by the public agencies are sold either through the
PDS or in open market. This system has attracted lot of criticism in the recent
years, mainly on the ground of efficiency and heavy losses being incurred by the
public agencies (Gulati et al. 2000; and World Bank 1999). The procurement,
distribution, and buffer stocking programs of the government are reported to
have had negative impact on private foodgrain marketing, undercutting its potential
contribution to food security in the long run. This has also discouraged
modernization of marketing, resulting into losses and inefficiencies. It is proposed
that the government should use regulatory mechanism only when price
movements are outside the desired price band representing width between the354 Ramesh Chand
ceiling and floor price, which permits reasonable marketing margin for profitable
public sector operations (World Bank 1999). The Expenditure Reforms
Commission (ERC) set up by the government, also recommended that the state
governments and private trade should be encouraged to enter into procurement,
trade and export of foodgrains through an assurance of continuity of policy over
the next 15 years (GOI 2001). There are indications that the government is in
agreement with the suggestions of the World Bank study and ERC and necessary
changes in the policy to encourage private sector participation in foodgrains
trade are on the anvil.
How this shift from public sector dominance in foodgrain trade to private
sector would affect farm-level prices and price stability? What is the appropriate
price band beyond which government should intervene in the market? What are
the implications of this band for consumers? These questions need to be discussed
to understand the implications of proposed changes in the government
interventions in grain trade.
Estimates of price band prepared for a study show that the existing
structure of statutory charges/taxes, and transport and other costs, retail price
for wheat should be higher than the farm harvest price by 53 per cent in the
surplus states and by about 100 per cent in the deficit states to attract the
private trade (Table 1). Similarly, the band suggests that retail prices of rice
should be 149 to 213 per cent higher than the farm harvest price of paddy to
attract private trade (see Table 2). How would these increases affect
consumers? Are there ways to reduce the price spread between producers and
consumers?
According to the World Bank study (1999), there is a considerable scope to
reduce the price spread by modernization of storage, handling, processing and
other processes involved in foodgrains marketing. Two major items of price
spread are: statutory charges and transport cost. It has been observed that the
proportion of produce sold through the regulated markets is on decline and there
is a growing tendency to sell produce through informal markets to avoid different
charges and taxes of the regulated markets (Maheshwari 1998).  This is also
happening because of the declining credibility of the regulated markets to provide
a competitive price to producer sellers.
Market charges and taxes vary from state to state. There is a need to
rationalize these charges wherever these are excessive.  It should be ensured
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of markets rather than spending on facilities and high salaries for market staff
and office bearers of the State Marketing Boards.
There are formal as well as informal restrictions on inter-state movement,
stocking and trading of agricultural produce. Even when all the requirements
are fulfilled, there are instances of harassment and rent seeking. The
consequences of this are: slow movement of produce from surplus to deficit
markets, low market integration, depressed price in producing areas and high
prices in consuming areas.
Levy System
Under the provision of levy, millers are required to sell a part of rice and
sugar milled by them to the government at a price derived from the procurement
price. The levy on rice is as high as 75 per cent in the agriculturally progressive
northern states. Millers often complain that after contributing as high as three-
fourths of rice at a price which is often below the open market price, they are
left with small produce to run their business.  In reality, the levy component of
rice is an important source of economic cost, food subsidy and inefficiency of
FCI in rice marketing.  What the millers actually do is that they retain best grade
rice with them and supply inferior, broken and adulterated rice to FCI, which
would sell at a very low price in open market.  Except at a subsidized price
under PDS, such stock would not be lifted by states for their consumers. Same
is the case of custom milling of paddy. In the case of sugar, level of levy has
already been reduced to 15 per cent and the government has indicated that it
would go for a complete decontrol of sugar industry. This should improve
efficiency and competitiveness of the Indian sugar industry.
Buffer Stock
India has been following a policy of maintaining buffer stock to meet the
PDS requirement and to stabilize the prices in the wake of year-to-year
fluctuations in production. Maintenance of buffer stock involves heavy cost on
the public exchequer and suggestions have been made to explore other alternatives
for price stabilization and food security. Some scholars find that the option of358 Ramesh Chand
variable levy is far superior than the buffer stock in stabilizing prices under
liberalized trade (Jha and Srinivasan 1999). Whereas some studies find that
imports turn out to be much costlier than what appears from international price
when a country of India’s size go for import of food commodity to meet its
deficit (Chand 2000).
As per the recommendations of ERC, a national food security buffer stock
of 10 million tonnes, comprising 4 million tonnes of wheat and 6 million tonnes of
rice, should be maintained at all times. The Commission further recommends
that objective of the procurement policy should be to maintain food security
buffer of 10 million tonnes and availability of 21 million tonnes per annum for
distribution through the PDS. This way total buffer stock should not be more
than 21 million tonnes.
Such restrictions on buffer stock and proposal to reduce the role of FCI in
procurement for the PDS might affect enforcement of MSP.  In such situations,
where should FCI concentrate its operations? Should it continue to procure
needed quantity from the traditional regions from where it has been buying
earlier, or should it shift focus to newly emerging growth pockets. This is a
debatable issue but in relation to technology impact, one can suggest that FCI
should focus in such regions where private trade and marketing infrastructure
are weak and underdeveloped.
Public Distribution System
The Public Distribution System (PDS) is an integral part of food management
policy of the government of India. It involves distribution of foodgrains through
a countrywide network of fair price shops. Price stability for consumers in
urban and food deficit areas was the focus of PDS in the early years. Of late,
PDS has become a permanent feature of the strategy to control prices, reduce
price fluctuations and achieve the objective of equity through supply of subsidized
foodgrains to vulnerable and weaker sections of the society.
The PDS is run by the state governments, and the central government
supplies foodgrains procured by FCI to various states for this purpose. In the
recent years, level of procurement has far exceeded the offtake for PDS, resulting
into accumulation of vast stocks with the government.359 Agricultural Marketing and Trade in India
The PDS has attracted much criticism. It was alleged to have urban, regional
and class bias. It was also found that the rich and the middle classes benefited
more from the PDS. Also, the PDS is not a cost-effective way of income
transfer to the poor as compared to other nutrition programs or wage employment
programs (Guhan 1996; and Radhakrishna and Rao 1997). Available data suggest
that many of the poor states (e.g. Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh)
choose to draw a much lower share of PDS than what they are entitled to
(World Bank 1997). To overcome the problems relating to targeting and leakage,
several changes have been initiated to make PDS serve the target population
better.
State Trading and Parastatal Organizations
Several public sector agencies are involved in the marketing and procurement
of agricultural produce.  Prominent  among them are: FCI, the Cotton Corporation
of India (CCI), the Jute Corporation of India (JCI), the National Agricultural
Co-operative and Marketing Federation (NAFED) and the National Dairy
Development Board (NDDB).  At the state level, the agencies involved in
agricultural marketing and processing are: the State Agricultural Marketing
Federation, Board, Corporation and other co-operative institutions. Some of them
are: the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Federation (MARKFED), the Punjab
Sugarcane Marketing Federation (SUGARFED) and the Punjab Agro-Industry
Corporation in Punjab, the Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Federation
(HAFED) in Haryana, the Himachal Pradesh Horticultural Produce Marketing
and Processing Corporation (HPMC) in Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir
Horticultural Produce Marketing and Processing Corporation (JKHPMC) in
Jammu and Kashmir, and the Central Arecanut and Cocoa Marketing and
Processing Cooperatives (CAMPCO) in Kerala and Karnataka.
Among all these agencies FCI has remained in the center stage of
government intervention in agricultural marketing due to scale of its operation
and its role in food security. Though this agency has played a significant role in
ensuring guaranteed price and hence adoption of improved technology in the
green revolution region, its cost of operation and efficiency have remained a
subject of criticism and are seen as the main factors for mounting food subsidy
in the country. Some studies find that FCI cannot be blamed for high cost of360 Ramesh Chand
foodgrain handling and distribution as economic cost of its operation turns out to
be lower than in the private trade if latter pays same statutory charges and
serve the same purpose which the former has been doing (Acharya 2001).
Similarly, Swaminathan (1999) finds that the operational costs of FCI were
justified and that this organization is vital for food security of the country. In
contrast, some other studies conclude that there are several negative effects of
the government’s foodgrain marketing policy and operation of FCI which have
been found to be increasingly costly and inefficient. Technical and managerial
inefficiencies in the FCI operations are said to be responsible for its high
functioning costs (World Bank 1999).
Though one can justify economic cost of FCI, this justification does not
include implicit value of quality deterioration of produce at various levels. This
happens due to purchase of lower than specified grade of produce, weight
manipulations at the point of purchase and dispatch, excessive charges of the
contractors, and adulteration and supply of poor quality stuff under levy and
custom milling of rice. Deterioration in the value of produce resulting from such
practices is the main source of leakage in the FCI operations and is not reflected
in the cost or price calculations. The produce gets sold because it is offered to
various states at a subsidized price and the difference between economic cost
and issue price is shown as food subsidy.  This way the inefficiency of FCI is
concealed. One way to ascertain and quantify this kind of leakage is by comparing
market value of PDS supply with ruling market price of FAQ produce. If the
grains supplied through PDS can sell at the ruling market price, then there is no
quality deterioration. If it sells at a price lower than the market price, the
difference represents allowance for quality deterioration or leakage. The studies
that justify operational cost of FCI, do not reckon this aspect. If such leakage is
accounted for separately, food subsidy bill would go down significantly and we
feel it is not difficult to check such leakages.
The inefficiency and high operational cost of FCI are often used to make
the case for winding it up and to pave the way for greater participation of
private sector. In this context it is worth mentioning that in the absence of public
agencies, private trade in grains may turn out to be exploitative and what now
goes as inefficiency of FCI would go as excessive profit of the private trade.
Therefore, the public agencies should be retained and they should plan their
operations in such a way so as to control exploitative tendencies of the private
trade. However, the area of operation of the parastatals should be reduced and361 Agricultural Marketing and Trade in India
their efficiency should be improved by modernization of their operations on
scientific lines and by professionalization of their management.
Market Regulations
There are several government regulations like the Essential Commodities
Act (1955), stock limit, credit control, etc. which were formulated to deal with
scarcity situations and to curb activities of the hoarders. These regulations need
to be modified to encourage participation of private players in agricultural trade.
The idea is not to allow free ride to the private sector but to allow more room for
market manoeuvring.  Licensing provisions for different activities should also be
liberalized to increase the number of market players. The government has
indicated in the recent budget to review the Essential Commodities Act and to
remove many restrictions on the free inter-state movement of agricultural produce
and also on storage and stocking of such commodities. It is also proposed to
reduce the number of commodities declared as essential under the said act and
to bring their number down to the minimum required (GOI 2001a).
Based on a comprehensive study of the domestic market policies,
Acharya (2001) proposed phasing out of the following market regulations: (a)
Levy on rice and sugar mills, (b) Statutory rationing of foodgrains in Calcutta,
(c) Monopsony procurement of raw cotton in Maharashtra, (d) System of state
advised prices of sugarcane, (e) Imposition of stocking limit, and (f) Inter-state
movement restrictions. As noted above, some reforms on these lines are on the
anvil.
External Trade
Agricultural exports and imports in the country till the early 1990s were
strictly regulated through the quantitative restrictions (QRs) like quotas and
licenses or canalization through some trading organizations or combinations of
them (Nayyar and Sen 1994). With the new trade policy initiated in 1991, three
major changes were effected in export-import sector of agriculture. One,
canalization of trade was abandoned and now the government does not determine
the value or nature of the import or export, except export of onion and import of362 Ramesh Chand
cereals, pulses and edible oils. Two, most of the quantitative restrictions on
agricultural trade flows were dismantled. Three, tariff rates on imports were
also reduced. Agricultural trade has been further liberalized as per our
commitment to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and quantitative restrictions
on import and export of most of the commodities have already been removed,
except in the case of cereal imports.
While QRs and canalization were very effective in insulating domestic prices
from instability in international prices, the domestic prices are going to be affected
by the movement in the international prices in a liberalized trade regime. How
would this affect the prices received by the producers? Behavior of international
agricultural prices is such that they become very high sometimes and go very
low sometimes. These prices generally move on a cyclical path (Chand 2002b).
A comparison of these prices with domestic prices shows that sometimes trade
offers opportunity to sell at a very high rate and sometimes it forces the prices
to go very low. Thus, unregulated trade would make domestic prices highly
unstable, particularly if international prices have more volatility than domestic
prices.
Compared to the international prices, the domestic price of rice, wheat,
sugar and soybean oil have exhibited far lower instability during the last three
decades while sorghum and maize have presented a mixed picture.  This is
remarkable because before 1970, the domestic prices were much more volatile
than the international prices, except in the case of sugar (Table 3). Main reason
for the domestic prices becoming more stable than the international prices after
1970 is the strong institutional interventions in the form of procurement, buffer
stock, issue price, etc. It follows from our results that the government
interventions have been quite effective in insulating the domestic prices from
effect of instability in international prices. There is also a clear indication that
unregulated and free trade would impart instability to domestic prices. As various
studies show that price risk has negative impact on supply responsiveness of
agriculture in developing agriculture, increase in price instability resulting from
free trade would have an adverse impact on supply response and adoption of
new technology. Therefore, there is a strong case to regulate international prices
through appropriate tariff so that farmers face a stable price environment. Since
under the WTO obligations temporary imports and price shocks can’t be checked
through QRs, there is a need to develop mechanism to regulate unwanted imports
and exports. While domestic producers must compete with stable level of
international prices, they need to be protected against volatility.363 Agricultural Marketing and Trade in India
Ensuring a stable price environment would require imposing tariff on import
as well as export whenever the international price goes below or above a certain
band. Such a band can be determined based on the impact of international
prices on the welfare of producers and consumers. For example, when
international prices start rising, it would lead to more export and raise domestic
prices, which is beneficial to producers but adverse to consumers. In such cases,
upper band of international price can be taken as that beyond which adverse
impact of export on consumers exceeds positive impact on producers. Similarly,
when international prices go very low, it results in more imports, which are
beneficial to consumers but have adverse impact on producers. In this case,
lower band in international price can be taken as that below which adverse
impact on producers outweighs positive impact on consumers leading to loss in
net social welfare. Deviation in international prices outside this band needs to be
appropriately tariffied to ensure that domestic producers and consumers are
subjected to international price change in a specified range. To regulate export
and import, this kind of mechanism is neither protectionist nor discriminatory
against producer. In fact, WTO commitments do not prevent any country from
adopting such a mechanism.
It could be seen from Table 4 that long run average price of wheat works
out to be $ 148 per tonne, while long run price of fine and poor grade rice works
out to be $ 286 and $ 199 per tonne, respectively. It also shows that after 1998
the prices of most of the agricultural commodities turned below the trend and
this is the main reason for Indian market becoming attractive for imports. The
present phase is only a part of the cyclical behavior of international prices and it
does not characterize long-term trend of international prices. One way to provide
protection against such instability is to impose variable tariffs, which restore
current import prices to their long-term trend.  This level of tariff can be taken
as:
RVTt = (LTIP – AIPt)/AIPt ;    for AIP < LTIP
Where, RVTt is rate of variable tariff in time t, LTIP is long-term international
price, and AIPt is actual international price or price at which quantity is traded in
period t.
Corresponding to the prices of year 2000, the required tariff to protect
against volatility in international prices works out as under: Wheat: 34.8%; fine
rice: 15.2%; broken rice: 42.0%; sugar: 52.2%; maize: 33.7%; sorghum: 28.5%;
and soybean oil: 50.6%.364 Ramesh Chand
Table 3. Instability index of domestic and international prices of selected
commodities, 1951-1999
Particular 1951-60 1961-70 1973-80 1981-90 1991-99
Wheat
International price, $ 5.63 6.49 28.72 13.5 15.83
International price, Rs 5.63 11.11 29.98 16.14 19.13
Domestic price, Rs 11.16 10.98 14.44 5.83 6.25
Rice
International price, $ 7.44 13.6 38.22 19.37 10.73
International price, Rs 7.44 19.19 39.66 20.94 15.16
Domestic price, Rs 11.1 8.21 13.19 5.27 4.15
Sorghum
International price, $ 9.32 6.01 20.45 15.43 15.11
International price, Rs 9.32 13.32 22.29 17.83 18.56
Domestic price, Rs 29.64 16.43 12.79 12.62 20.57
Maize
International price, $ 6.63 7.96 22.08 17.95 16.69
International price, Rs 6.63 14.47 24.05 20.59 19.1
Domestic price, Rs 17.87 20.43 23.97 10.45 20.43
Soybean
International price, $ 11.03 19.10 35.71 24.51 17.09
International price, Rs 11.03 25.16 37.56 26.74 19.55
Domestic price#,  Rs 22.25 13.95 20.79 11.84 8.12
Sugar
International price, $ 22.01 52.24 60.76 37.29 17.96
International price, Rs 22.01 44.19 62.90 36.72 15.85
Domestic price, Rs 7.11 4.51 13.87 7.11 8.56
Exchange rate instability 0 13.76 3.97 4.28 9.85
# Refers to price of edible oils.
Note: 1. International prices refer to: wheat US HRW Fob Gulf, rice 5% broken Fob
Bangkok, sorghum US 2 Yellow Fob Gulf, maize US 2 yellow Fob Gulf, soybean
Fob Dutch, and sugar ISA price Fob Carribean port.
2. Instability during the decade of 1970s is estimated for 1973 to 1980, as first two








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Timely imposition of tariff is as important as the tariff itself to check
undesirable imports. Recent experience shows that such measures are taken
when enough damage has already been done. A cell should be created in the
Ministry of Commerce or Agriculture to constantly monitor the international
prices and to suggest timely intervention to check adverse impact of their volatility
on the domestic market. In the emerging era of free trade, the need to monitor
and forecast the international prices and output is as important as is being done
for the domestic prices and production of some crops in the country.
Beside tariffs, other mechanisms also need to be evolved to safeguard
against the price volatility and to ensure smooth flow of export. One such
mechanism could be setting up of an international price stabilization fund.  When
international prices are high and profitable for export, then export can be taxed
to contribute to this fund. On the other hand, when international prices are low
and not attractive for export, this fund could be used to provide export subsidy in
the form of transport/freight or other means. To manage such funds country
should encourage setting up of commodity boards as exist in several developed
countries.
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368 Ramesh ChandInstitutional Aspects of Agro-Processing
and Value Addition for Rural and Small
Farmer Development in India:





gro-industries have been given high priority in India because of their
significant potential for the economic development of the rural population
and small farmers. The focus on village-based agro-industries was started by
Mahatma Gandhi during India’s freedom movement. Even today, the agro-
industries are looked at for their important role in bringing value-addition to
agricultural output, and increasing rural incomes and employment (Planning
Commission 1996). However, a large number of difficulties and bottle-necks,
such as raw materials, supply-chain, and market constraints, exist in their growth
(Srivastava and Patel 1994; Goyal 1994; and CII-Mckinsey 1997). Is this priority
on agro-industries well placed? What kind of institutional and organizational
arrangements/models are appropriate for overcoming the problems of rural
masses, and maximizing their contribution to the rural and small farmer
development?
The freedom movement up to the 1940s under the leadership of Mahatma
Gandhi included particular focus on encouragement of agro-based village
industries. The objective was to enhance involvement of the masses of rural
people in the development process, and the freedom movement, and to reduce
their external dependence (Goyal 1994). The ideology was economic, social
and political. Though, the model provided strong development linkage with the
1
 The paper is based in part on research by Vasant P Gandhi, Gauri Kumar and Robin
Marsh on a related topic.
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rural people, it failed later because it became a blanket basis for the so-called
nationalists to favor the less efficient techniques of production and oppose modern
industry, and became incompatible with market preferences. The experience
revealed the limitations of such an approach.
Between 1950 and 1980, the policy towards agro-industries was dominated
by the thinking of the former Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru and his economic
think-tank, led by Mahanalobis, who argued that India needed large capital goods
industries for modernization and growth. The strategy relied on the large industries
for the capital goods sector, but the consumer goods sector was primarily reserved
for and assigned to small-scale, agro- and rural industries which require less
capital and generate more employment. This was consistent with the need of
the day and to reduce the demand on limited capital and savings and to expand
the employment base. However, such small-scale agro-industries, because of
poor technology, management and low capacity to invest, frequently failed to
meet the expanding and changing market demand for quality goods emanating
from the growing population.
From 1980s onwards, there have been efforts towards promotion of agro-
industries in India with a stress on market demand, innovative technology and
efficient management, particularly of the supply chain. Recently, there has been
a substantial opening-out in government policy towards technology import and
private foreign capital (Goyal 1994). This has led to the establishment of large
modern units with innovative technology and marketing. However, this current
trend towards large private agro-industrial units has a strong risk that the small
farmers and the rural poor are being ignored, alienated and will not substantially
benefit. This has weakened the development linkage to the small farmers and
rural poor, for which agro-industries were being given priority. What policies
and institutional models are appropriate under the present context is a major
question for the future?
An ideal of the agro-industry serving as an anchor activity for rural
development has been presented by Gaikwad (1986). A review of the literature
(CEPAL/GTZ/FAO 1998; Glover and Kusterer 1990; and Rello and Morales
1999) shows that some case studies on contract farming arrangements with
small farmers in Latin America might be appropriate to evaluate their usefulness
under the Indian context. Glover and Kusterer (1990) found that contract farming
could be a “change agent”, breaking exploitative and paternalistic relations with
traditional rural elites. In cases of Latin America, and one each in Kenya and
Canada, it was found that small farmers agreed to enter into contracts with371 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
agro-processors when they offered, “the best available combination of income
enhancement and risk reduction” to them (p 136).  However, there is also a risk
potential posed by contract farming arrangements dominated by large agro-
industry firms, national or multi-national; they would squeeze out cottage and
rural small industries that are important sources of local employment and
livelihoods.  The poorest rural population, typically landless farm laborers and
marginal farmers, can benefit from contract farming through large increases in
seasonal demand for hired workers by contract farmers. However, non-owning
of land and exclusion from formal non-farm employment, because of education
or socio-cultural barriers, the benefits of agro-industrialization to the poor get
largely reduced.
What institutional and organizational models are appropriate for organizing
agro-industries in India?  Will they be able to address the existing structure,
environment and problems of agro-industries?  Will they be able to provide
modern technology and marketing to agro-industries?  Will they be able to meet
the challenges of procurement from small producers and supply chain
management faced by agro-industries?  Will they be able to share the benefits
with small farmers and rural poor?
This paper analyses the available data and reviews the literature on agro-
industries in India to evaluate their importance, characteristics and constraints.
Then, it evaluates some of the major institutional models on organizing of agro-
industries that have been experimented with or proposed in India under the
present context.  The experiences gained and lessons learnt may be useful for
future agro-industrial development in India as well as other developing countries.
Importance, Features and Constraints of the Agro-
Industrial Sector in India
Analysis of data from the Annual Survey of Industries2 shows that 46 per cent
of all industrial units in India are agro-industries (Table 1), which is a very large
2 
The Annual Survey of Industries is conducted by the Central Statistical Organization
of the Ministry of Planning. It covers registered factories employing more than 10
workers. Thus, non-registered factories and those employing less than 10 workers are
not covered. Factories employing more than 100 workers are covered by a census, and
the remaining are covered through a sample survey.372 Vasant P Gandhi
number. These agro-industries contribute about 22 per cent of the manufacturing
value adding. Further, they provide as much as 43 per cent of employment in the
manufacturing industry, which indicates their significant importance as
employment provider. Their contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) is
also significant.  Thus, the priority to them is perhaps not misplaced from this
point of view.
Agro-industries include many kinds of units, of which 37 per cent are in
food and 63 per cent in non-food sectors (Table 1).  The data on food industries
show that 44 per cent of the food-related factories are in milling and grain-
milling constitutes a large number in agro-food industries (Table 2).  Edible oil
constitutes 13 per cent, and sugar, another 10 per cent.  However, 33 per cent of
the factories are in other kinds of food industries, which include higher income
elasticity and higher value foods. The distribution is, however, very different for
the net value added.  Here, 49 per cent of the net value added comes from other
food industries, whereas only 7 per cent comes from the milling factories. Gandhi
and Mani (1994) have shown a considerable variation in it and the need to focus
on it for strategy.  Even in employment, 43 per cent of the employment is in
other food industries and only 20 per cent is in the milling industries. Thus, food
industries other than milling, edible oil and sugar, are of considerable importance
for the rural income and employment.
Table 1. Importance of the agro-industry sector in India: some features
Industries Percentage share
No. of Employment New value
factories added
(1996/97) (1992/93) (1996-97)
Agro-based food industries 16.69 13.67 5.85
Agro-based non-food industries 29.09 29.23 15.74
Total agro-based industries 45.78 42.89 21.59
Other (non-agro) industries 54.22 57.11 78.41
All industries 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: India, Annual Survey of Industries373 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
What are the structural and financial characteristics of agro-industries in
India?  It has been found that only 13 per cent of the total industrial fixed
capital is invested in agro-industries, as against 46 per cent share in employment
(Table 3).  This shows that agro-industries contribute a large share in the
employment, but use only a small share of the scarce fixed capital resource.
The share of payment to labor for the value addition is also higher at 48 per cent
in agro-industries as compared to 35 per cent in other industries.
Agro-industries require relatively less fixed capital and more working capital
as compared to other industries, as for example 57 per cent for food industries.
Whereas agro-industries annually generate 51 per cent value added (income)
over the fixed capital invested, other industries generate only 39 per cent value
added (income). The agro-industries are able to generate employment for 14
persons against an investment of Rs 100,000, whereas other industries generate
employment for only 3 persons for the same investment.  This does not include
the employment generated in agriculture through the backward linkage, which
is much more. The agro-industries also absorb more input from other sectors,
such as agriculture, as a percentage of the value of output, as compared to other
industries.  Many of these features indicate that agro-industries do deserve
priority for development.
Table 2. Importance of selected food industries in the agro-food industry
sector
Industries Percentage share
No. of Employment New value
factories added
(1996/97) (1992/93) (1996-97)
Agro-based food industries 16.69 13.67 5.85
Grain-milling 44.38 20.30 7.05
Edible oils 13.11 7.74 21.48
Sugar 9.58 28.57 23.03
Other foods 32.93 43.40 48.45






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s375 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
India launched major economic reforms in the year 1991.  What effect this
had on agro-industries?  Not enough data are available to evaluate this in detail
but Table 4 provides an evaluation in terms of industry-group GDP growth rates
in the pre- and post-reform periods (1984/85 to 1989/90, and 1990/91 to 1995/
96) in constant prices.  The results indicate that the growth rate in the food
agro-industries remained at over 10 per cent in both the periods, indicating no
significant effect of the reforms.  In the non-food agro-industries, the growth
rate has shown an acceleration from 3.7 per cent to 7.7 per cent, indicating a
positive impact.  For agro-industries as a whole, the growth rate has increased
from 5.2 per cent to 8.3 per cent.  Thus, on the whole, the impact seems to have
been positive for agro-industries.  On the other hand, other industries actually
show a deceleration from 12 per cent to 7.2 per cent in the same period.
Table 4. Performance of agro-industries: A comparison in the pre-reform
with post-reform periods
Industries Growth rate of value added (GDP) by industry
1984/85 to 1989/90 1990/91 to 1995/96
Agro-based food industries 10.45 10.27
Agro-based non-food industries 3.70 7.70
Total agro-based industries 5.15 8.30
Other (non-agro) industries 12.00 7.20
All manufacturing industries 9.23 7.60
Agriculture 5.67 2.68
Source: India, Central Statistical Organization, National Accounts Statistics
In what type of agro-industries are the major opportunities for employment
being created?  Sufficient data are not available to evaluate this.  Table 5 provides
some results for food industries for the periods 1979/80 to 1988/89 and 1988/89
to 1993/94.  The results indicate that employment is growing in dairy, fish canning
and preservation, edible oils, chocolate feed, and cashew processing.  On the
whole, with some exceptions, a positive trend is evident for food agro-industry
employment during the period of economic reforms.  It may be mentioned that
this does not include the employment generated through the backward linkage,
which is much higher.376 Vasant P Gandhi
Table 5. Profile of increase in employment in agro-food industries
Sl. Industry Percentage change
No. 1979/80 to 1988/89 1988/89 to 1993/94
1. Meat -21.62   8.47
2. Dairy  47.33  39.41
3. Fruit and veg. can/preservation   2.85  22.08
4. Fish can/preservation - 0.26  89.12
5. Milling  33.10  15.93
6. Bakery  35.53   1.00
7. Sugar fine -35.85   5.80
8. Sugar indig. -23.41 - 9.92
9. Chocolate  81.62  65.43
10. Hyd. Oils/vanaspati   4.36  17.28
11. Edible oils - 24.22  72.59
12. Tea - 21.22   5.07
13. Coffee  36.91 - 40.68
14. Cashew - 42.60 106.44
15. Animal feed  52.23  35.94
16. Starch -  7.08  18.00
17. Other food products -  0.91 -14.13
Source: India, Annual Survey of Industries
The FAIDA report of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and
Mckinsey and Company (1997) shows that there is a great potential for
development of food processing and agro-industries in India.  What have been
the major constraints in the rapid development of agro-industries in India?  Figure
1 shows a plot of the index of agro-food industry production (India, Ministry of
Finance) as well as the index of agricultural production (India, Ministry of
Agriculture) from 1960 to 1997 (both in real terms).  A few observations can be
made from this figure.  The production of agro-food industry has outpaced
agricultural production in the country.  There are fluctuations in the growth of377 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
agro-food industry production, and there is a significant acceleration in the growth
during the post-reform period of the 1990s.
Literature indicates that agro-industrial growth in India is affected
substantially by the supply of raw materials as well as the growth in demand for
the products of agro-industries (Srivastava and Patel 1994; and Boer and Pandey
1997).  Raw material is a produce of agriculture and it can be represented by
the index of agricultural production.  The demand for products of agro-industries
is affected substantially by income levels and so can be represented by either
total income or per capita income. To study if these were indeed important
determinants, the following simple models were formulated and tested:
FOODINDX = a + b1 * AGRPROX + b2 * GDPFC + e (1)
FOODINDX = c + d1 * AGRPROX + d2 * NNPCAP + u (2)
where:
FOODINDX = Index of production of food products industry





























Figure 1.  Agro-food industry production and agricultural production in India
Agricultural production Food industrial production378 Vasant P Gandhi
GDPFC = GDP at factor costs in constant prices
NNPCAP = Per capita net national product in constant prices
a, b, c ,d = Parameters
e, u = Error terms
These equations were estimated by the ordinary least squares method and
the results are given in Table 6. The results indicate that agricultural production
is a strong and significant determinant of food industry output, supporting the
important role of raw materials supply.  The results also show that GDP at
factor costs as well as per capita NNP have a strong and significant relationship
with the growth in agro-food industry.
Table 6.  Regression estimates: Dependent variable FOODINDX
Independent variables
Constant AGRPOX GDPFC NNPCAP R2 F-statistics
-  60.36 1.1708*** 0.001201*** 0.97 592.37
  (-2.32) (2.883)    (4.265)
-211.86** 1.8279*** 0.1231*** 0.96 458.08
(-7.766) (4.366) (2.545)
***, **, * : significant at 1,  5, 10 per cent level, respectively.
Apart from the quantity of raw materials, Srivastave and Patel (1994),
Kejriwal (1989) and Gulati (1994) have indicated that the quality of raw materials
is a major constraint.  The available raw materials are often of sub-standard
quality.  Processing varieties are frequently not available and even the period of
availability of the raw materials is very short.  Gulati et al. (1994) have indicated
that only about 0.5 per cent of the fruits and vegetables grown in India are
commercially processed.  It indicates a dire need for improvement in the
entire food value chain in India.  The problems of quantity and quality
indicate that there is a need to improve the linkage between small farmers
(which constitute a majority of raw material producers) and agro-industries.
Effective and innovative institutional arrangements are called for to overcome
these constraints.379 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
Srivastava and Patel (1994) have indicated that another major constraint
was the use of  obsolete technology in processing.  This results in low efficiency
and poor quality of the output.  Boer and Pandey (1997) have observed that one
of the problems in improving technology was the small size of the average agro-
processing unit.  There is a clear need to integrate the processing units in order
to get at larger scales of operation.  However, Goyal (1994) has expressed fear
that it often results in exploitation of small farmers.
Another major constraint reported by Srivastava and Patel (1994) was weak
market linkages and small market size for many processed products, and not
much is being done to develop these markets.  Srivastava (1989) had earlier
reported through nominal protection coefficient analysis that whereas tomato
paste and canned mushrooms were export competitive, mango pulp and apple
juice were not at that time.
Agro-industries also face difficulty in securing the necessary finance. The
financial institutions are mainly geared to lending for the fixed capital requirements,
but the agro-industries, as shown in the above analysis, have a large requirement
of working capital.  It is thus difficult for these industries to obtain credit and
higher interest rates have to be paid (Srivastava and Patel 1994).  Further,
government policies typically consider processed and packaged goods as luxury
items and as a result, they are heavily taxed. There are also special regulations
and licensing requirements for several agro-industries, such as the Milk Product
Order for dairy industry. These policies create disincentives for investment in
higher value-added agro-processing.  (Srivastava 1989; and Gulati et al.1994).
Agro-industry Models in India
The challenges poised by various problems and constraints in the
establishments and functioning of agro-industries on the one hand, and the need
for their growth to contribute to rural and small farmer development on the
other, call for new and innovative approaches and models for their organization
in India.  Several models which have been tried in the past, need to be evaluated
to provide lessons for what is required to be done in future in India as well as
other parts of the developing world. Some of them, real as well as hypothetical,
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Whatever may be the nature of the model, it is very important that it creates
sufficient incentives and addresses other needs of the farmers to produce the
required quantity and quality of agro materials.  After production, the system
should ensure that there is incentive to and commitment of the farmer to supply
the produce to the agro-industry only. The required farm inputs and technology
would need to be promoted and adequately provided, and the question of who
would bear the cost is important.  An effective small-farmer oriented procurement
and supply system needs to be created which functions continuously and efficiently
taking into account the nature of production and processing. Having a good
processing technology to produce quality output is of paramount importance.
Addressing the new and changing consumer demands and strength in marketing
are also the key success factors.  The enterprises need to have financial strength
and performance ability and capability to attract capital for investment and growth.
Overall, the issues of ownership, organization, management and control are
crucial.
Cooperative organization model: AMUL
One agro-industry model which has been quite successful in certain types
of agro-industries (such as dairying and edible oil) is the AMUL Co-operative
Model also called the Anand Pattern Model.  This model evolved out of a very
successful dairy cooperative movement in the Kheda district of Gujarat state.
This kind of organization now has a total national membership of 9 million, of
which 21 per cent are landless and 66 per cent small and marginal farmers.  In
this model, the ownership of the agro-industry is with farmers under the
cooperative principles.  The cooperatives are organized in a three-tier structure,
with primary cooperatives at the village level, a cooperative union at the district
level, and a cooperative federation at the state level.  Broadly, the village
cooperatives take the responsibility for procurement of the produce from the
farmers, the district union is responsible for its transport and processing, and the
federation is responsible for its marketing and overall developmental work. The
model is governed by a rotating board of farmer-elected representatives on
cooperative principles, but is run by a professional management. The cooperative
also undertakes extension and provision of veterinary and other services.
The model enjoys commitment and cost-efficiency in raw material supply
which is a major advantage for agro-industries. It also brings substantial382 Vasant P Gandhi
contribution to small farmers and rural development.  One major drawback is its
dependence on good committed leadership, which often becomes largely political,
detracting from both cooperation and good business.  Further, antiquated laws
governing cooperatives invite government interference and prevent use of
financial markets for raising equity capital, thereby often constraining expansion
and growth.
Government organization model: HPMC
In this model, the government or a government corporation plays the major
role.  One of the well known examples of this is the Himachal Pradesh Processing
and Marketing Corporation (HPMC).  The Corporation is fully owned by the
government and, is managed by its staff.  The Corporation sets up a network of
infrastructure and processing facilities including produce collection centers,
warehouses, cold storages, and processing plants.  The produce is purchased
from the farmers at pre-announced prices.  It is then stored, processed and
marketed nationally by the government corporation. The marketing of fresh
produce is sometimes upto the wholesale level only. The HPMC has set up two
collection centers, three warehouses and five cold storages in the state of
Himachal Pradesh, principally for apples.  It has also set up cold storages in the
metropolitan cities of Delhi, Mumbai and Chennai.
Even though the HPMC was fairly successful at one time, reports indicate
that it has not been able to sustain the high performance (Vaidya 1996).  Lately,
it has been neither able to attract enough farmer suppliers nor expand distribution
beyond its own outlets.  While government-owned agro-industries are well funded
for investment in infrastructure and technology and have government support,
they depend on bureaucrats for management whose business management
orientation is often very limited.  The bureaucrats are frequently transferred at
the whims of the government, and are accountable primarily to their superiors
and not to farmers or the consumers for their performance.  Their commitment
to procure from and develop small farmers on the one hand, and to meet the
marketing challenges on the other, is generally very limited.
The private multinational “partnering” with farmers model: Pepsico
This model involves backward integration by a private company with strong
marketing capabilities from already established strong brand products.  The383 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
model has been tried by Pepsi Foods (established in 1989) in India in the setting
up of a tomato processing plant at Zahura in the Hoshiarpur district in Punjab.
By 1994, 350 farmers over an area of 2,700 acres were covered and 650 tonnes
of tomato were processed every day (Gulati et al. 1994). The plant covered a
radius of 370 km for procurement of raw material.
In this model, contracts for production and procurement of tomatoes were
made with small farmers, but these contracts were only verbal rather than legal.
The company built relationships with them with a heavy commitment to extension
work with the farmers.  It provided experts and promoted the use of appropriate
farm technology and varieties with the farmers, bringing to bear research and
know-how available worldwide.  Seedlings were provided to the farmers and
the planting was scheduled and programmed using computers.  The best and
expensive technology of high standards was used in processing, and the company
used its strong marketing capabilities and networks for marketing quality products.
This model involved not simply procurement or contract farming, but also
developing a mutually beneficial partnership between the agro-industry and the
farmers. The company’s strong management and marketing capabilities are
used to make the project successful.  However, substantial costs were involved
and financial losses of Rs 40 million per year were incurred during the first three
years.  This model can generate good benefits for small farmers, but it requires
a long-term view and commitment from the company, substantial financial
strength, and willingness by the agro-industry to absorb substantial start-up costs
and initial losses.
Multinational-local firm partnership with corporate farming model:
Delmonte
This model, proposed in the Gujarat state, pertains to a joint-venture between
Delmonte, a multinational, and an Indian soft drink manufacturer.  The objective
is to manufacture different processed food products. It is envisaged that corporate
farming will be undertaken by the company to obtain 25 to 30 per cent of the
raw material requirement, and the rest would be obtained through contract
farming. The identification and allotment of farm land is presently under
consideration by the government of Gujarat.  The model is still not implemented.
The major constraint of this model would be in the availability of land for
corporate farming.  The land laws in India presently permit only farmers to own
agricultural land and this too is limited by land ceilings, given the history of384 Vasant P Gandhi
exploitation of farmers by landlords in the colonial period.  The corporate farming
will require formal employment of farm labor under its legal employment
requirements.  It is to be seen whether such farming will be cost-effective
compared to the economies of cheap family labor available on family farms.
Another issue is the sharing of ownership, control, management and returns
between the multinational and the local firm, and the position of the farmer-
supplier in the chain.
Government service center model: Khetardi
This model involves the use of a large wasteland site available to the
government-owned Gujarat Agro-industry Corporation principally as a service
centre for agro-industries.  Cold-chain infrastructure will be set up and made
available for use by private entrepreneurs, and a cargo complex for agro-products
would also be set up at Ahmedabad airport.  A wasteland site will get utilized
and the government through its resources will invest to create potentially useful
infrastructure to facilitate agro-industry development.
In this model, government provides infrastructure only.  One concern would
be the type of infrastructure provided, whether it would be of critical kind.
Another concern is the capability of the government to manage its operation
effectively and efficiently.  The extent and ease of access to the infrastructure
facilities to the private entrepreneurs, its capacity utilization and, whether this
would be sufficient for agro-industry development are other concerns.
Value addition center  model
The Gujarat Agro-industries Corporation has proposed a concept of the
Value Addition Center (VAC).  It has been conceived as a hub of activities for
pre- and post-harvest management of agricultural produce (see Figure 2).  It
would function as an anchor activity for regional rural development, providing
know-how, technology, inputs and market access to farmers.  Further, VACs
would serve as private-public sector “partnership nodes” around which different
types of contract farming can be organized. A completely operational VAC
would provide ‘an integrated chain from farm to the market’, reducing the number
of intermediaries at several stages of the food value chain.  The VACs will
focus on the processing of higher value products for regional and export markets.385 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
These would compete with the current trader network to access raw material
by offering an integrated package of services and guarantees to the farmers
and through building a long-term sustainable relationship. The VACs would entail
substantial investments in R&D and infrastructure.  But, the VAC is still a
concept.  Though it is attractive, the implementation problems in organizing
would be clearly enormous.
Figure 2. Value addition centre concept
Assessment
If the development objective is to be served, small farmers must benefit
from agro-industry, and the landless should benefit indirectly.  However, this
depends substantially on the nature of the organization and the commitment of
the agro-industry to involve them as partners.  It also depends on the bargaining
power of small farmers within the model and the structure that are created.
The cooperatives have often done better in bringing benefits to the rural poor,
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The contracts in contract farming are rarely enforceable in India, and remain
moral.  Therefore, in order to make contract farming successful, much depends
on the development of long-term relationships between agro-industries and
farmers through transparent contract terms, fair pricing, effective extension,
and good marketing.  This is possible even for private agro-industry firms as
shown by the Pepsico model.
Conclusions and Implications
Agro-industries have been given high priority in the economic development
of rural sector in India.  Mahatma Gandhi’s emphasis on developing village-
based agro-industries in the movement for independence marked the beginning.
Is the priority to agro-industries justified today?  The study finds that agro-
industries are a significant part of the manufacturing sector in India and contribute
substantially to employment and income generation.  Their contributions to
development, however, would depend substantially on their benefits to rural and
small farmer development.  Agro-industries in India face many challenges for
growth including raw material supply, obsolete technology, need for strength in
marketing and financial support.  For meeting these challenges and contributing
to development, several organizational models have been tried in India.  Their
evaluation indicates significant strengths in the cooperative model and the
multinational-farmers partnership model.
From the management point of view, one of the major challenges lies in
organizing sustained production and procurement from a large number of small
farmers.  A partnering approach is more successful and sustainable.  It can be
followed either through forming cooperative organizations, or building confidence
and trust through a meaningful and mutually beneficial long-term relationship.
Processing and marketing challenges, however, require use of modern technology
and professional management, and must be geared to the competitive and
changing market for the success of the agro-industry.
There is a need for new indigenous models to emerge for the organization
of agro-industries.  Government models alone do not show a good record of
performance.  The Amul cooperative model is one promising model which brings
benefits to small farmers and gives them control.  However, it needs to overcome
political, legal and managerial limitations. The Pepsico model involving cogent387 Institutional Aspects of Agri-Business Development
backward integration by a private company to the farmers from a strong product
market offers another alternative.  However, it requires long-term commitment
and financial strength.  It is critical that alternative agro-industrial models are
encouraged and provided strong government support, especially those models
which contribute positively to value addition, rural employment, poverty alleviation
and sustainable development.  This would require pro-active policy and program
initiatives.
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Appendix Figure 1. Flow chart of agro-industry
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Appendix Figure 2. Paddy by-product system



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yInstitutional Arrangements for Linking Horticultural
Production, Marketing and Processing




espite a comparative advantage and self-sufficiency in the production of a
number of agricultural crops, the predominance of pre-harvest contractor
and commission agent as an important marketing channel continues till date in
India. Institutional innovations integrating production with marketing and trade
are yet to emerge, in spite of the expanding domestic markets for value-added
products and incentives provided by the government for boosting the exports. In
particular, the institutions which could integrate small farmers with domestic
and international markets, with a focus on value addition, are non-existent.
Therefore, much needs to be accomplished with respect to marketing and post-
harvest handling of agricultural produce in India.
Direct interventions in agricultural markets by the government have been
the important mechanisms for improving marketing efficiency. These interventions
are through a number of agencies, which have evolved over a period of time.  It
started with the establishment of the first marketing society at Kumbakonam in
1913 under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act (1912). This was
followed by the establishment of the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing
Federation (NAFED) in 1958 to provide price support through direct market
interventions. Subsequently, the Commodity Boards and Agricultural Produce
Marketing Committees (APMCs) were established in the 1960s. The Commodity
Boards aimed to promote marketing of commercial/plantation crops, while the
Marketing Committees were for regulating markets for other primary agricultural
commodities. While the impact of these efforts has been mixed, efforts to improve
the efficiency of agricultural marketing institutions are still pursued on a high
priority.  The weakest link has been the inability to integrate production with
1
 Senior authorship is shared.
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
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marketing and processing for achieving the ultimate objective of improving access
of small producers to expanding markets and trade.
This paper reviews the developments and performance of agricultural
marketing institutions in India with a focus on horticultural sector.  The mechanism
to link production with consumption is also examined with the help of a few case
studies.
Organizational Support: Evolution and Impact
A number of measures have been taken by the Government of India to
promote horticultural sector in the country.  The budget allocation was increased
significantly from Rs 200 million in the VII Plan to Rs 10,000 million in the VIII
Plan for the horticultural sector. Adoption of the liberalized seed/planting material
import policy, reduction in import duties on greenhouse structures, delineation of
the export processing zones (EPZs), complete exemption of import duty for
export-oriented units (EOUs) and incentives for exports, etc. are among the
important policy initiatives taken to boost this sector. The government also
established the National Horticultural Board (NHB) in 1984 and the Agricultural
and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) in 1986.
An independent Ministry of Food Processing Industry (MoFPI) was created in
1988 under the central government.  A special grant of Rs 975 million was
made for export promotion during the VIII Plan (Kaul 1993).  These initiatives
speak volumes of the incentives provided during the post-liberalization period
for this sector.
 The underlying objective of any market intervention is to create an efficient
alternate market channel so that the role of conventional, often inefficient, market
intermediaries like the post-harvest contractors (PHCs) and commission agents2
is reduced.  Cooperatives are often considered to be one such alternative, and
therefore, a number of cooperatives were established. Notable among these
are: the Mother Dairy Scheme of the National Dairy Development Board
(NDDB) (New Delhi), FRESH (Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh), and the
Horticultural Producers’ Cooperative Marketing and Processing Society Ltd.
2
 Studies have pointed out that a majority of the producers still sell a substantial quantity
of their fruits and vegetables through these intermediaries (see Subrahmanyam and
Gajanana 2000).395 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
(HOPCOMS) (Bangalore, Karnataka). These were established with direct or
indirect support and participation from the government.  In contrast, examples
of successful producer cooperatives such as the Jalgaon Banana Marketing
Cooperatives, and MAHAGRAPES have not been uncommon and have, in
fact, proved the effectiveness of this form of institutional mechanism for marketing
of perishable produce3. Three cooperative marketing societies, viz. HOPCOMS,
FRESH, and the Kissan Cooperative Fruit (Banana) Sale Society (KISSAN)
(Jalgaon, Maharashtra) are discussed in this section.
The effectiveness of cooperatives is largely influenced by their financial
viability often measured in terms of profitability. Although financial performance
of an institution is important, it may be too narrow for assessing the performance
of an institution meant for social welfare. More significant measures should
involve the factors such as pricing efficiency, regulatory framework and
participation of stakeholders, besides their performance with respect to key
financial indicators.
Comparison of the cooperative marketing societies
These cooperative societies, viz. HOPCOMS, FRESH and KISSAN, have
striking similarity in their fundamental objectives, in spite of wide differences in
their capital outlay, management structure and membership. The main purpose
is to bridge the gap between producers and consumers and minimizing the role
of the conventional market intermediaries such as PHCs and commission agents.
Even more significant is the understanding of the role the society is expected to
play. While HOPCOMS and FRESH, having a government governance pattern,
fulfil the role of ‘creation and sustaining a new network of marketing’ to increase
the efficiency, better price regulation, etc., KISSAN, in sharp contrast, primarily
functions as a representative of the producer-members, aiming to provide better
bargaining power to its members (Table 1). Therefore, one of the ways to assess
the success of the co-operative societies is the degree to which they fulfil their
basic objective. The indicators that could be used for measuring the same are as
follows.
3
 A review of the performance of cooperative marketing societies has revealed that there
have been more failures than successes.  However, wherever the cooperatives are
successful, the producers have been found to benefit by selling their produce through



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































e397 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
Growth in membership and share capital. If growth in membership and
share capital is any indication of a society’s performance, HOPCOMS has
exhibited a higher growth rate and therefore could be judged successful. A
compound growth rate of 3.5 per cent per annum was estimated in the
membership of HOPCOMS (in the late 1980s and the early 1990s), while increase
in the share capital has been to the tune of 51 per cent per annum. In the case
of FRESH, membership grew at a compound rate of 29 per cent but has become
stagnant during the last three years.  The growth of share capital was around 41
per cent. KISSAN exhibited a trend similar to that of HOPCOMS with regard
to its membership growth, but had lower growth in the share capital (Table 2).
However, the fact that HOPCOMS registered a steady increase in the
government’s share in the share capital over the years, is an indication of the
growing dependence of the society on the government for funds, which is not a
desirable trend. FRESH also exhibited an increasing dependence on the
government assistance.  KISSAN, on the other hand, had adopted a policy of
ploughing back at least one per cent of the sale proceeds into its capital base,
thereby could gain self-sufficiency after some years. Therefore, growth in the
membership or share capital per se, as a measure of performance, needs
reconsideration. Contribution of the members to share capital and hence the
growth of a society are more important.
Governance and management. The management hierarchy in HOPCOMS
and FRESH has indicated a definite role for the government with at least two
government officials holding key administrative positions in the society.  In
contrast, the role played by the government was minimum in the case of KISSAN.
Closer links with the State Department could often pave the way for smooth
functioning of the society.  The fact that the change in leadership of HOPCOMS
for a brief period led to an enormous unrest in the society, is an ample proof of
this factor.
Procurement and marketing policies. Supply of produce to the society is an
accepted practice for a number of societies. However, procurement of produce
from fields is an important policy of all the three co-operative societies.  The
field procurement ranges from 35 to 85 per cent in HOPCOMS and FRESH,
whereas the entire procurement of banana by KISSAN is from the field (Table
2).  Due to seasonality of the produce and lack of availability of adequate quantities
to meet the demand, very often these societies procure produce from market,
despite high market price, causing a loss to the society.398 M Sudha and T M Gajanana
Linking credit with marketing. KISSAN society advances interest-free loans
to its members for the purchase of fertilizer and other inputs and links it with the
sale of banana. It gives advances up to Rs 5/ bunch, spread over three months,
i.e. Rs 2/bunch each in April and May, and Re 1/bunch in the month of June
after supervision of orchards. While making payments, the society deducts 2
per cent commission, railway freight, wagon expenditure and the advance given
to the members from the sale proceeds. Thus, as the advance is deducted from
the sale proceeds, recovery has never been a problem for the society. This type
of linking credit with marketing is worth emulating by HOPCOMS and FRESH,
which do not advance loan to its members due to the fear of non-recovery
(Subrahmanyam et al. 1994b).
Turnover, overheads and net profit. All the three societies have registered a
phenomenal growth in their turnover (Table 2). However, the prudent policy of
having minimal overheads of 2-3 per cent as against 12-23 per cent in case of
HOPCOMS and FRESH  (Subrahmanyam et al. 1994 a&b) helped KISSAN
make profits over the years. It may be noted that the society has been making
profit ever since its inception and the profit has always been around 1 per cent
of the turnover. The profit so earned was used as reserve fund, building fund,
price fluctuation fund, etc., which contributed to strengthening of the financial
stakes of the society (Gajanana and Subrahmanyam 1996).
Table 2. Growth in the membership and share capital of three major
cooperative societies, 1987-92
Particulars HOPCOMS FRESH KISSAN
Membership growth (per cent) 3.5 29.32 3.81
Share capital growth (per cent) 51 41.41 7.43
Govt. contribution to share capital 94 40 27
(per cent)
Share of field procurement (per cent) 84 40 100
Turnover (lakhs, Rs) 2105 86 241
Overheads as per cent of turnover 12-13 20-23 2-3
Net profit as per cent of turnover Negligible Consistent Consistent
in loss in profit
(1 per cent)399 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
Mode of sale and its impact.  All the three societies follow the diversified
mode of sale. These include the retail sales through their own outlets, sale through
commission agents, bulk sale of produce, and sale of value-added products. The
sale of value-added products should be cost-effective and in line with consumer
preferences. For example, FRESH, sold value-added products in a plastic cover
which was not preferred by consumers, resulting into huge losses (Sudha and
Subrahmanyam 1996). In contrast, KISSAN benefited from distant market sales,
due to larger volumes being transported at lower costs and also due to the ability
to take advantage of higher price in the distant markets. Such a method of sale
provided the collective bargaining power to the producers—a function cooperative
society is expected to perform for the benefit of member-producers.
Incentive for participation. The true spirit of cooperation, i.e. the ‘sense of
belongingness’ has mainly contributed to the success of KISSAN.  This basic
factor has been absent in the other two societies.  Further, in the case of KISSAN,
higher prices, bonus dividend, etc. were strong incentives for participating in the
activities of the society. Thus, it may be inferred that participation and collective
action are the two fundamental rules for success in institutional support, which
are ensured by economic incentives.  Invoking a sense of belongingness is yet
another feature that needs to be strengthened in these ventures for improving
their performance.
One of the most important setbacks in these types of institutional support
has been their inability to achieve a forward integration in the process of
marketing. They have not been able to integrate marketing with processing
through forward linkage, which is quite feasible.4  There have been several
efforts to provide institutional support for agro-processing, but the efforts at
integrating production, marketing and processing have not been very effective.
The next section deals with the existing institutional support for agro-processing
and the modalities for effective linking of production with marketing and
processing.
4
 It was observed that when cooperatives fully integrate production, processing and
marketing, they perform better than other institutions. This happens because the
cooperatives with such integration adopt themselves faster in the changing market
prices of outputs and inputs and policy environment (Gajanana 1993).  Therefore, the
Miric marketing society was able to give much higher price of oranges to producers by
having forward linkage with KANCHAN, the processing cooperative in Darjeeling (Gupta
and Gupta 1986).400 M Sudha and T M Gajanana
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Status of fruits and vegetables processing
It is estimated that about 30 per cent of the production of fruits and vegetables
is lost during post-harvest handling, and only about 1-2 per cent of the total
production is processed in India, as against 30 per cent in Thailand, 70 per cent
in the USA and Brazil, 78 per cent in Philippines, and 83 per cent in Malaysia
(Kaul 1997; and IFP 2000). Non-availability of raw material in the desired quantity
and of quality and wide fluctuations in production and prices are major constraints
to agro-processing (Sami 1990; Subrahmanyam and Sudha 1993a; and Barua
1997).   Another major constraint is lack of adequate agro-processing capacity,
and this is largely attributed to the capital-intensive nature of the technology for
agro-processing.  Therefore, one of the main objectives of the MoFPI since its
inception in the late 1980s was to create the capacity for agro-processing. As a
result, the installed capacity has increased from 8.94 lakh tonnes in 1990 to 21
lakh tonnes in 1999 (Appendix I).  Though it is a phenomenal increase, the
increased capacity, however, was mainly in the small, cottage and home-scale
sectors (Appendix II), which are characterized by limited capital base. It may
be noted that even by the end of 1999, only 12 per cent of the units had a
capacity of more than 250 tonnes per annum, but bulk of the production (over 55
per cent) was processed in these large-scale units. The contribution of the small-
scale units was found to be minimal. Similar trend is being observed for the
years, which is a matter of deep concern.  Another feature needing attention is
the fact that most of the technology used in the small-scale sector does not meet
the standard requirements (Sinha and Sinha 1992). Further, a majority of the
processing sector continues to remain under the purview of unorganized private
sector (Table 3), thereby making it difficult to impose strict quality control norms
(Anon 1997).
Incentives for processing of horticultural products
The MoFPI was mainly created to provide the required impetus to the
processing sector and to provide an organizational structure to the sector.
Institutional support for promoting agro-processing has also been provided by
institutions like NHB and APEDA through schemes that provide short- and401 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
long-term credits, grants-in-aid and subsidy (Table 4).  A total of over Rs 263
crores was allocated exclusively for the promotion of post-harvest management
of horticultural produce. NHB has been assigned the task of integrating different
sectors involved in post-harvest management of horticultural crops. It is proposed
to provide liberal financial assistance for infrastructure development.  As could
be seen from Table, the significant among these efforts are the schemes aiming
to establish post-harvest infrastructure and cold chain facilities for food
processing, establishment of food-processing industrial estates/food parks,
expansion and modernization of food-processing industries and also strengthening
backward linkages of food-processing industries.
The emphasis is mainly on initiating collective action, as it can be seen from
the fact that co-operatives or non-governmental organizations are the main focal
points. The reason for such an emphasis is the absence or declining number of
agro-processing units in this sector. As seen from Table 3, irrespective of the
category, agro-processing has been the sole domain of private sector rather
than of public or co-operative sector.  While the number of licenses issued by
the Food Products Order (FPO) indicated increasing trend in the private sector,
the same was either stagnant or decreasing in the public or co-operative sector.
Cumbersome procedures and stringent rules for land procurement were the
binding constraints for the collective efforts in this sector.  Further, taxation
policy of the government with regard to value-addition in food industry has often
Table 3. Sector-wise growth in FPO licenses
Sector/ Year Private Co-operative Public Total
Category
Large-scale 1976  140  (88)  4    (3) 14  (9)  158 (100)
1983  205  (89)  8    (4) 17  (7)  230 (100)
Small-scale 1976  221  (88) 12   (5) 17  (7)  250 (100)
1983  403  (92) 15   (3) 22  (5)  440 (100)
Cottage-scale 1976  249  (96)  5    (2)  4   (2)  258 (100)
1983  433   (94) 16   (4)  9   (2)  458 (100)
Home-scale 1976  556  (95) 13   (2) 16  (3)  585 (100)
1983 1119  (96) 17   (2) 22  (2) 1158 (100)


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































t404 M Sudha and T M Gajanana
been burdensome. Compared to other developing and developed countries, Indian
food processing involve additional burden in the form of excise duties. Despite
these constraints, there has been an increase in the volume as well as value of
export earnings over the years5, which is primarily attributed to a small percentage
of large-scale units. Also, there has been some change in the product mix and
source of the exports. The increased investment in food processing sector could
be linked to the favorable policy framework, such as the delineation of the
EPZs, concessional rates and ownership polices adopted by some of the state
governments. 6
Forward and backward linkages
The lack of integration of production, marketing and processing, or the
producers with the processors could be attributed to a number of factors:
(i) Low crop productivity, (ii) narrow crop-base for processing purposes,
(iii) short growing season coupled with erratic procurement policies and prices,
and (iv) faulty harvest and post-harvest handling, causing high losses.  Only a
few sporadic efforts have been successful so far in achieving such a linkage
(George and Singh 1970; and Viswanathan and Satyasai 1997). The most common
linkages are: (a) the contract farming wherein the linkage is based on procurement
of the produce at a predetermined price; and (b) captive farming wherein the
industry acquires land on lease for required raw material supply by producing it;
or through farmers’ co-operative, where farmers join to form a co-operative
society linking production with marketing and processing (Sinha and Sinha 1992).
5
 The export of processed fruit and vegetable (F&V) products like dehydrated and
preserved vegetables, fruit pulp, pickles and chutney, processed and dried mushrooms,
fruit-based beverages, juice, squash, etc. has increased substantially both in quantity
and value. The share of processed products in the total export of F&V is also increasing
with the expansion of markets for these products. This is an indication that there exists
enough potential for further increasing the export of the processed products.
6
 The cumulative investment by all financial institutions in the food industry has
increased from Rs 65 billion in 1992/93 to Rs 185 billion by the end of 1997/98. The
foreign direct investment (FDI) till December 1999 was Rs 91 billion. During the period
from July 1991 to December 1999, 1,808 proposals worth Rs 83 billion have been received
in F&V products category, including about 405 proposals for setting up 100 per cent
EOU with an investment of Rs 50 billion (IFP 2000).405 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
Notable examples of contract farming are: ‘Kissan’ in Karnataka, ‘Pepsi’ and
‘HLL’ in Punjab, ‘VST Natural Products’ in Andhra Pradesh and ‘Gherkins’ in
Karnataka with different degrees of success (Singh 2000; Haque 2000; and
Anonymous 1998 a&b).7 Similar efforts by WIMCO with mango growers in
Andhra Pradesh have not yet yielded positive results.8 The gestation period and
nature of crop involved in such contracts have a great bearing on the success of
such contracts. Restrictive land tenure laws, cost of policing and economies of
scale also restrict the success of these efforts in the long-term.
The second type of model of ‘job work or custom hiring’ entails linkage
between the large-scale and small-scale units for the production of a semi-
processed product and is very common. This model is seen in mango processing
in Chitoor (Sudha and Subrahmanyam 1994), tomato processing in Bangalore,
pineapple pulp production in Kerala, and pickling cucumber (gherkins)
(Anonymous 1998 a&b). However, a complete linkage, i.e. linkage between
producer and processor through co-operative effort is not very common.
Keeping in view the gap for initiating such co-operative efforts by farmers,
some studies have been undertaken to provide modalities for arriving at forward
contracts and linking production and processing. These studies have analyzed
economics of establishing a small-scale processing unit producing semi-processed
products such as tomato concentrate,  mango pulp, or on-farm conversion of
fresh grapes into raisins. Some of these models are discussed here.
Case Studies
Tomato. Tomato often experiences violent fluctuations in the wholesale prices.
While a link with processing would reduce distress sale by farmers, lack of
flexibility in the procurement policy of the processing units prevents any
contractual agreement between the two. Discussions with the farmers revealed
that the low procurement price offered by the processing units is a very important
7
 The effect of contract farming on yield and income of farmers was positive. However,
effective integration of small farmers into contracts depended on the backward linkage
in terms of assured input supply (Haque 2000).
8
 Personal communication with the factories for obtaining details of contractual
agreements.406 M Sudha and T M Gajanana
reason for not supplying tomatoes directly for processing (Sudha and
Subrahmanyam 1994; and Subrahmanyam and Sudha 1993 a&b). The analysis
of the wholesale and the procurement prices of tomato in Karnataka indicated
that the processing units prefer a contractual agreement for the procurement.
The produce is procured at a fixed price agreed upon in the beginning of the
season, which is much lower than the wholesale market price as well as the
cost of cultivation, which results in breaking of agreement by the farmers
(Subrahmanyam and Mruthyunjaya 1979). A procurement price at least 40 per
cent higher than the cost of cultivation was found to be reasonable and effective
for motivating farmers to supply tomato to the processing unit.
Further, the small-scale growers who plant at least 0.45 ha under tomato
every season, could form a group by bringing about 3-12 ha area or 6-10 members
together and enter into a contractual agreement with the processing unit. With
an initial investment of over Rs 10-15 million for establishment and machinery,
the processing unit for processing semi-finished products like tomato puree/
concentrate would need around Rs 1 million as working capital. The unit would
need to produce around 32 tonnes annually to reach the break-even point.
Forming co-operative in the production area for semi-processing would help
farmers minimize the post-harvest losses.
Mango. Similar arrangement can be worked out for fruits like mango as well.
Feasibility studies based on the experience of semi-processing units located in
Chitoor region of Andhra Pradesh (Sudha 1998a) indicated that a continuous
area of 200 ha under bearing mango orchard is required for successful running
of such a semi-processed product unit based in rural areas (Table 5).
Studies on the functioning of such semi-processing units located in Chittoor
district of Andhra Pradesh indicated the availability of working capital to be an
important constraint faced by the processors, which forces them into job-work
(custom hiring) type of processing linkage with the large-scale units. A linear
programming model based on the optimum utilization of the available processing
capacity indicated that with increase in the working capital, their option swings
more in favor of self-processing rather than custom processing (Sudha and
Subrahmanyam 1994; and Sudha 1998a).
Grapes. In contrast to the case of tomato and mango, grape growers from
Solapur region of Maharashtra adopt a very simple method of on-farm conversion
of fresh seedless grapes into raisins. The technology, which involves an additional
expenditure of about Rs 17,000 for 10 tonnes of fresh grapes, was found to be407 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
highly profitable and easily replicable. The fact that the raisins can be cold
stored and sold after the season of fresh grapes, extends the season of sale and
prevents distress sale. Such a technology was also found to be an efficient
alternative for the cost-intensive exports (Sudha 1998b).
Institutional Support for Linking Production with Processing
There is an urgent need for institutional support for facilitating the linkages
between production and processing.  Incentives in the form of grant-in-aid
announced by the Government for agro-processing units, which enter into
contractual arrangement with at least, 25 farmers, is one form of support for
promoting such linkages.9  However, it should be noted that this type of incentive
Table 5. Economic feasibility of establishing small-scale semi-product
processing units for fruits (mango) and vegetables (tomato) in
rural areas, 1991
Sl Particulars Value and quantity details for
No. Mango pulp unit Tomato puree unit
1. Capacity (MT /annum) 150-500 150
2. Capital investment
(land, buildings, etc) (Rs million) 1.30 1.50
3. Cost of processing of one tonne
of processed product (Rs) 4,600 11,185
4. Gross returns (Rs/tonne) 5,100 24,788
5. Net returns (Rs/tonne) 500 13,603
6. Break-even production (tonnes) 500 33
7. Minimum feeder area required (ha) 200 3- 12
8. Minimum number of growers required — 7-15
Source: Sudha and Subrahmanyam (1994)
9
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only promotes a contractual agreement and not the kind of forward/backward
linkage between production and marketing through processing. The pattern of
linkage adopted by grape growers in Solapur is worth replication in other crops.
Formation of farmer co-operatives, federation of these co-operatives at the
district level and institutionalization of marketing on the pattern of
MAHAGRAPES at the regional level present a three-tier system that needs
replication by other states as well.
Infrastructure parks.  In order to promote agro-processing, in general, and
production-processing linkages in particular, efforts are in progress to create
infrastructure parks. Out of four parks approved so far, one near Mallapuram in
Kerala has already acquired 70 acres of land with financial assistance of Rs 40
million from MoFPI and Rs 155 million from Karnataka Small Scale Industries
Development Corporation (KSSIDC) (IFP 2000).  Further, removal of
quantitative restrictions on imports under the new WTO regime is likely to attract
a number of multi-national companies investing into food-processing sector in
India.10  It is unlikely that these companies will benefit small farms and therefore,
co-operative processing units provide collective bargaining power to producers,
and integrate small farmers with export-oriented production.
Conclusions and Suggestions
Although institutional support for linking agricultural production with
processing has been in focus for quite sometime, the system needs frequent
revamp, given the dynamic nature of the processes involved. This paper has
reviewed the efforts at institutionalizing agricultural marketing and processing
over the years through some case studies. The following conclusions can be
drawn from the discussion:
 (1) Institutional support in the form of co-operative marketing societies has
proved to be useful for providing necessary impetus to agricultural marketing.
The guiding principles for success of such an effort should be ‘participation
and collective action’ by the producers themselves, with government playing
a regulatory role, as has been observed in KISSAN society of banana
marketing in Jalgaon.
10
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(2) Performance evaluation of the cooperative marketing societies should focus
more on their ability to achieve the objective of ‘collective action’ rather
than their financial performance only. Extent of coverage and their
effectiveness as an alternate marketing institution in minimizing the role of
exploitative market intermediaries need to be emphasized.
(3) Though the cooperative institutions like KISSAN have been able to solve
the problems of member-producers, they have not been able to add much
value to the produce by diversification towards processing. Although several
forms of the production-processing linkages are operational, such as contract
or captive farming, there are still some concerns to be addressed.  For
instance, gestation period (from planting till harvest) in perennial fruits plays
an important role in the success of these linkages.
(4) Lack of flexible procurement price policy of the processing units and non-
availability of adequate working capital have been the two most important
constraints for smooth functioning of the linkages between producers and
processors.
(5) Institutional support for the provision of technology for developing innovative
products for new market segments (such as production technology for fruit
candy) needs emphasis.
(6) Quality control assumes significance in the processing of fruits and vegetables
and therefore, the processors should avail the incentives provided by the
government to ensure international quality standards like ISO 9000 and
HACCP.
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Appendix I. Growth of fruit and vegetable processing industry in India
Year No. of units Installed Production Capacity
capacity (000 tonnes) utilization
(000 tonnes) (per cent)
1991 3925 950 360 37.89
1992 4057 1108 469 42.33
1993 4132 1260 559 44.37
1994 4270 1402 676 48.22
1995 4368 1750 850 48.57
1996 4674 1910 960 50.26
1997 4932 2040 910 44.61
1998 5112 2080 940 45.19
1999 5198 2100 980 46.67
CGR (per cent) 3.84 11.14 13.16 1.82
Source: Sudha and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Subrahmanyam (2000).413 Linking Horticultural Production, Processing and Marketing
Appendix II. Growth of fruit and vegetable processing industry by category
Capacity of the unit 1990 1995 1999
(tonnes/annum) Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent
Large (>250) 442 11.49 497 11.38 598 12.00
Small scale (50-250) 654 17.01 714 16.45 834 16.00
Cottage (10-50) 768 19.97 854 19.55 1083 20.00
Home (1-10) 1303 33.38 1520 34.80 2002 38.00
Relabeller (<1) 676 17.65 783 17.63 681 14.00
Total 3846 100 4368 100 5198 100
Source: Sudha and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Subrahmanyam (2000).Discussant’s Note
M. S. Bhatia

he first paper (by P. G. Chengappa) on agricultural marketing in India discussed
establishment and functioning of (a) the Regulated Markets, (b) Directorate
of Agricultural Marketing, and State Agricultural Marketing Boards, (c)
Regulation of Rural Markets, and (d) Marketing Cooperatives.  The paper has
highlighted the weakness of the existing regulated markets, particularly in regard
to market functions related to finance, processing, packaging, market extension,
market information and intelligence. The need to reform the regulated markets
to update their capability to perform varied market functions was emphasized.
In regard to functioning of some of the marketing cooperatives, there is a need
for linking credit with marketing.  Marketing cooperatives can play a lead role in
agricultural/rural production and marketing system on the pattern of agri-business
consortium.  Strengthening of market finance, improvement in technology in the
field of post-harvest management and greater emphasis on export-oriented
commodities are other areas needing attention. The need for future trading in
selected commodities to link the domestic markets with the international
markets was also indicated.  While most of us are aware of productive and
supportive role of some of the marketing institutions like cooperative, FCI, NAFED,
etc., we do not view future markets on commodity exchanges as productive
activities.
The paper on the market interventions (by Ramesh Chand) has very lucidly
covered the major issues relating to the various forms of market interventions.
Detailing the successes and failures of the administered prices, including system
of minimum support prices (MSP), buffer stocking, and system of levy and state
trading, the author has made important suggestions to improve marketing
institutions, so that they can be more effective in the changed scenario under
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and can provide incentive for adopting
© NCAP 2003. Institutional Change in Indian Agriculture (eds Suresh Pal, Mruthyunjaya,
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new technology.  Without attempting to summarize the valuable suggestions
contained in the paper, I would like to focus on some important themes which
may require more detailed discussion and deliberations.
The first and the most important observation of the author regarding the
administered prices is that the price policy has been very successful in providing
incentive for adoption of new technology of rice and wheat, but it failed to
induce changes in production pattern consistent with the overall needs of the
economy.  The author has observed that this happened as both the price policy
and technological change remained biased towards rice and wheat.  He has
given the example of 30 per cent of the output having as buffer stock and deficit
in oilseeds to the extent of 40 per cent.  Let me comment first on these
observations.  Most of us share the view that agricultural price policy of MSP
and market intervention for procurement of surpluses have been quite effective,
encouraging the farmers for adoption of modern technology, investment and
thus raising production.  The policy has a long history of over 35 years and has
been successful in balancing the procurement and public distribution system
(PDS), except some marginal deviations in certain years depending up to two or
three successive good or bad years.  However, balance of procurement and
PDS got disturbed during the last two years not due to faulty pricing policy for
the producers but because of changes in the PDS policy. The government has
changed the PDS policy by targetting food subsidy and supplying of foodgrains
to above the poverty line (APL) families at economic cost of FCI and at half of
this price to below the poverty line (BPL) families. The quantity is also restricted
to 10 kg per family per month for the BPL families.  Taking into consideration
the total number of BPL families of about 60 million, ever with 100 per cent off
take for the BPL, total off take of foodgrains would be about 0.6 million tonnes
per month or 7.2 million tonnes per annum.  As APL supplies were being made
at the economic cost, which in many states was almost equal or even higher
than market prices, the off-take for this section of population fell to almost
negligible.  This situation remained for almost 2-3 years, which resulted large
accumulation of stocks with the government.  Thus, building of large stock of
foodgrains in the recent period does not suggest the biased nature of MSP
policy towards rice and wheat but because of changes in pricing policy for the
PDS.
The other indicator used to show biased nature of the pricing policy towards
wheat and rice is the deficit in edible oils to the extent of 40 per cent.  The417 Discussant’s note
shortage of edible oils in the country is to be seen in the overall scenario of
demand and supply in terms of growth in per capita income, income elasticity of
demand and pattern of growth in the production and productivity.  In the early
1980s, country was importing edible oils to the extent of 1.6-2 million tonnes
annually, when domestic production was about 3.5-4 million tonnes and the per
capita annual consumption was about 5 kg.  The rate of growth of oilseed
production during the 1980s and 1990s was 5.75 and 3.06 per cent per annum,
respectively.  Even with the relatively slow rate of growth in the nineties, the
rate of growth of production and productivity of oilseeds were close to those of
wheat and almost 60 per cent higher than those of rice.  The rate of growth of
area under field oilseed crops (1.27 per cent) is about 120 per cent higher than
that of rice (0.49 per cent).  The higher rate of growth of production has raised
the per capita availability/consumption of edible oil to about 9-10 kg in 2000,
against 5 kg in the mid-eighties.  Thus, the continued import of edible oils is
because of relatively lower prices in the international market.  I agree with the
author about the limited impact of the price policy on pulses, but this may be
more attributed to the absence of appropriate technology rather than deficiency
in the price policy.
The author has rightly pointed out the institutional weaknesses for
implementation of price and market interventions in some of the states like
Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh.  He has also expressed
concern for finding ways to make MSP more effective for various commodities
and in major producing regions.  The author has further raised some issues
about the MSP policy which relate to (a) criteria for coverage of crops
under MSP, (b) a price intervention system that encourages diversification in
agriculture, (c) the basis for determination of MSP. These criteria should be
considered further in the context of a commodity to be covered under the MSP
policy.
The author has pointed out that direct market interventions by public agencies
have repressed the private trade in grain, discouraged modernization and caused
inefficiencies.  In this regard, it may be mentioned that the public-sector agencies
procured only 18-20 million tonnes of cereals out of about 180 million tonnes of
the annual production, which is 10-12 per cent of the total production, or about
25 per cent of the marketable surplus.  In other words, 75 per cent of the market
supplies were still handled by the private trade.  Excluding Punjab and Haryana,
where the public agencies were more active, the private agencies handled about418 M S Bhatia
90 per cent of the marketed quantities.  Is marketing more efficient and market
infrastructure better modernized in these regions in comparison to Punjab and
Haryana?
Discussion on the system of levy leaves some confusion.  It is stated that
the levy is very high at 75 per cent in the northern states, and after contributing
three-fourths of rice at a price which is often below the open market price, the
millers are left with small produce to run the business.  In the subsequent
statement, it is said that the millers supply inferior, broken and adulterated rice to
FCI, which would sell at a very low price in the open market.  If the second
statement is correct, then the millers should not have complained as made in the
earlier statement.
There is hardly any difference of opinion on the statement that there is a
considerable scope for improving the efficiency of FCI to reduce the economic
cost and food subsidy.  Similarly, liberalization of the domestic markets is a part
of the present policy.  The author has also suggested an approach for imposition
of variable tariff, based on the difference between the domestic and world
prices. This suggestion of continuous monitoring of international price and supply
situation merits serious consideration.
The paper on the institutional aspects of agro-industry by Vasant Gandhi
reviewed the growth of this sector in India and highlighted the experiences of
some of the developing and developed countries. Based on available literature,
the author has examined the importance, characteristics and constraints for the
development of this sector. The author has also examined the various agro-
industry models in existence in the country like cooperative organization model
(AMUL), the private multinational partnering with farmers model (Pepsico),
multinational-local firm partnership with corporate model, government model
(HPMC), etc.  The author has suggested that a partnership approach between
small farmers through contract or cooperative arrangement and building
confidence and trust through a meaningful and mutually beneficially long-term
relationship have better chances of success.  He has also highlighted the role of
modern technology and professional management in the changing and competitive
market scenario for the success of the agro-industry.
The second paper on agro-processing by M. Sudha and T. M. Gajanana
has examined the dynamic nature of the agro-processing and institutional support
needed for linking agricultural production to marketing.  It reviewed the functioning
of three case studies, viz. HOPCOMS, FRESH and KISSAN, having different419 Discussant’s note
types of institutional structure – first two being government-run organization but
with different orientation of consumer and producer, while the third is producer-
oriented cooperative institution.
The authors have also examined the status and need for processing of
agricultural commodities, particularly of fruits and vegetables and initiatives taken
by the Government by creating the Ministry of Food Processing Industry and
institutions like National Horticulture Board, APEDA.  The authors feel that
linking of production with marketing through processing has generally been
inadequate. Based on the performance of these case studies, the authors have
concluded that institutional support in the form of cooperative marketing society
is essential for promoting fair trade practices and serving small farmers.  This
may require provision of adequate incentives to setup processing unit, enter into
contractual arrangements with growers, setting up of infrastructure parks for
integrated production and processing, etc.
The importance of marketing institutions to encourage adoption of technology
in agricultural sector is well recognized.  The coming years are likely to witness
increasing attention towards changes in technology in the light of the WTO and
globalization and their impact on agricultural trade, land and water resources,
and environment.  Efficient marketing governed by a host of institutions would
play a vital role in informing the producers about the needs and desires of
consumers.S. S. Acharya, Director, Institute of Development Studies, 8-B Jhalana
Institutional Area, Jaipur 302 004, Rajasthan
Email: ssacharya@idsj.org
Vishwa Ballabh, Professor, Institute of Rural Management, Anand 388 001,
Gujarat   Email: root@irm.ernet.in
B. C. Barah, Principal Scientist, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Library Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: barah@iasri.delhi.nic.in
M. S. Bhatia, Former Member, Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices,
New Delhi 110 012
Ramesh Chand, Principal Scientist, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Library Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: rc@iasri.delhi.nic.in
P. G. Chengappa, Director of Instruction (Agric.), University of Agricultural
Sciences, GKVK Campus, Bangalore 560 065, Karnataka
Email: pgchengappa@yahoo.com
K. K. Datta, Principal Scientist, ICAR Research Complex for NEH Region,
Barapani 793 103, Meghalaya
R. S. Deshpande, Professor, Institute for Social and Economic Change,
Nagarbhavi, Bangalore 560 072, Karnataka
Email: despande@isec.kar.nic.in
T. M. Gajanana, Scientist, Social Sciences Division, Indian Institute of
Horticultural Research, Hessarghatta, Bangalore 560 089,
Karnataka    Email: gajanana@iihr.kar.nic.in
Vasant P. Gandhi, Professor, Indian Institute of Management, Vastrapur,
Ahmedabad 380 015, Gujarat  Email: gandhi@iimahd.ernet.in
T. Haque, Member, Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, Room #
408 Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi 110 001
A. K. Jha, Research Associate, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: akj66@indiatimes.com
ContributorsP. K. Joshi, Principal Scientist, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Library Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: pjoshi@iasri.delhi.nic.in
D. P. Khankhoje, Professor, National Institute of Bank Management, Kondowe
Khurd, Pune, Maharashtra  Email: dpk@nibm.ernet.in
D. K. Marothia, Professor and Head, Department of Agricultural Economics,
Indira Gandhi Krishi Vishwavidhyalaya, Raipur 492 012,
Chhattisgarh    Email: dkmarothia@yahoo.com
G. Mini, Research Associate, Institute for Social and Economic Change,
Bangalore, Karnataka
J.  P. Mishra, Assistant Director General (ES&M), Indian Council of Agricultural
Research, Krishi Bhavan, New Delhi 110 001
Mruthyunjaya, Director, National Centre for Agricultural Economics and Policy
Research, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: jaya_ncap@iasri.dehi.nic.in
Suresh Pal, Senior Scientist, National Centre for Agricultural Economics and
Policy Research, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: suresh_ncap@iasri.delhi.nic.in
P. A. Lakshmi Prasanna, Scientist, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: lakshmi_ncap@iasri.delhi.nic.in
Rajeshwari S. Raina, Scientist, National Institute of Science Technology and
Development Studies, Dr. KS Krishnan Marg, New Delhi 110 012
N. Rajalakshmi, Professor, Department of Economics, Madras University,
Chennai, Tamil Nadu
V. M. Rao, Former Member, Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, 22
CHBS, I Layout, Vijaynagar, Bangalore 560 040, Karnataka,
Email: vmrao@vsnl.com
R. Maria Saleth, Professor, Institute for Social and Economic Change,
Nagarbhavi P.O., Bangalore 560 072, Karnataka
Email: isec!saleth@kar.nic.in
K. J. S. Satyasai, Assistant General Manager, National Bank for Agricultural
and Rural Development, Department of Economic Analysis and
422 ContributorsResearch, Jeevan Seva Complex (Annexe), SN Road, Santacruz
(West),  Mumbai 400 054, Maharashtra
Raka Saxena, Research Associate, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: saxenaraka@rediffmail.com
R. L. Shiyani, Associate Professor, Gujarat Agricultural University, Junagarh,
Gujarat
M. Sudha, Senior Scientist, Indian Institute of Horticultural Research,
Hessarghatta, Bangalore 560 089, Karnataka
Email: sudham@iihr.kar.nic.in
Rasheed Sulaiman V., Scientist, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Library Avenue, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email: rasheed@iasri.delhi.nic.in
Laxmi Tewari, Research Associate, National Centre for Agricultural Economics
and Policy Research, Pusa, New Delhi 110 012
Email:  laxmi_ncap@rediffmail.com
A. Vaidyanathan, President, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, and
Professor Emeritus, Madras Institute of Development Studies,

















input market 19, 20
market institutions 20,46
regulated market 21, 331
Agricultural technology 216




Agro-industry 369, 371, 389
Agro-processing 21, 369
fruit &
vegetable processing 400, 402
Agro-forestry models 65
Aquaculture development 164, 165
Autonomy  15, 186, 290
Biotechnology 194
Subject Index
Collective action 39, 61, 83, 107
Commercialization 63
Commodity boards 20, 343
Commodity exchange 343







Command area development 109
Conflicts 131, 166
intra-sectoral 134
resolution mechanism 40, 160
Cooperative 3
marketing 21, 340
marketing societies 395, 408
tree growers societies 64, 70
Credibility 16
Cropping system 3
Decentralization 15, 92, 196, 290
research management 196
Devolution of power 15,196
Economic benefits 13






water management 3 Embeddedness of
institutions 8, 33, 44, 176
technology 10, 17
Enabling policies 15





Extension system 16, 230













parastatal organization 20, 359
public distribution system 358
Genetically modified organism 13
Governance structure 33, 182
Hierarchy 218
Incentives 11, 16, 44, 197, 399
Induced-institutional innovation 41
Information flow 200
Information technology 19, 250
Innovation system 16, 197
Institutional
arrangements 12, 67, 95, 393
change 11, 40, 177, 180, 212
design 45, 179















panchayati raj institution 94
political 46
Intellectual property rights 74












tank 66, 71, 110





backward 21, 391, 403, 404
forward 21, 391, 404






Natural resource management 60, 71




pani panchayat 71, 114, 158
water users association 103
Natural resource degradation 62, 163
biodiversity 69
forest  70
land 60, 64, 72
water 124, 129
Networking 190
Neo-classical economics 7, 29
New institutional economics 7, 8, 29, 30
Old institutional economics 8, 29, 30
Non-governmental






public-private 110, 191, 248
Participatory management 64, 97
Participation 100
people 81, 83, 87
stakeholders 83, 93
voluntary 63
Path dependency theory 35, 38
Policies
credit 3, 17
price 19, 396, 409
R&D 13, 15, 181
Poverty alleviation 49
Principle agency mode 11, 36
Property regime 106, 120
Privatization 249



























Self-help groups 92, 305, 308





moisture management  2
State marketing board 337
Sub-surface drainage 255
Sustainability 192, 240, 290
financial 288






Technology adoption 46, 47




water system 151, 154, 158
Transaction cost 9, 18, 19, 33, 35, 37, 47
Transparency 199, 290
Transition economy 47













Globalization, privatization and scientific advancements pose new 
challenges and opportunities for the development of Indian 
agriculture. The emerging paradigm shifts focus to creation and 
application of new knowledge for agricultural development and 
global competitiveness. To facilitate this shift and realize greater 
economic efficiency, a new set of responsive institutions should 
emerge.
This volume discusses the direction of institutional change in Indian 
agriculture. The roles of the state, markets and collective actions are 
examined for evolving the knowledge-intensive agriculture. The 
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institutions for R&D, land and water resources, credit, marketing, 
trade and agro-processing.   
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